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## PREFATORY NOTE

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Albert Henrichs  
*Editor*



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## ROYAL DOCUMENTS IN MACCABEES II

CHRISTIAN HABICHT

GIVEN its rather late origin, the second book of the Maccabees never became part of the Hebraic canon of holy books.<sup>1</sup> It was, after much discussion, included in the Bible of the Catholic Church in 1546, but never in that of the reformed churches nor in that of the Russian Orthodox. Its physiognomy is twofold: on the one hand it is a fiery testimony of true Jewish spirit and belief; on the other it is an eloquent product of Hellenistic Greek historiography. From the theological point of view it is purely Jewish, from the literary point of view it is almost entirely Greek. Therefore, Maccabees II is in itself a document of the struggle between Hellenism and Judaism, *Ἑλληνισμός* and *Ἰουδαϊσμός*, which is the object of its narrative.<sup>2</sup>

After a lengthy introduction, the book contains the early history of the conflict between the faithful Jews in Palestine and their superiors, the Seleucid kings from Antiochus IV Epiphanes to Demetrius I. Its hero is Judas Maccabaeus, who in 167 B.C., after the king had forbidden the observance of the Law and the practice of Jewish religion, opposed the king's order by armed resistance. He was successful and finally forced the royal government to withdraw the order, so that the Jews were free again to worship God in their own way and to live in accordance with the regulations of the Law. With this, the first stage of the struggle — the war for the freedom of religion — came to an end. It is

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this paper, which is a by-product of my study of Maccabees II (below, n. 2), has been discussed in seminars held in Oxford (The Queen's College), Harvard University, and Washington (The Center for Hellenic Studies). To all who participated in the discussions I am indebted for various suggestions and comments, in particular to the following: E. Badian, G. W. Bowersock, P. A. Brunt, R. A. Hadley, F. Millar, A. Momigliano, O. Murray, I. Ševčenko, J. Strugnell, and G. Vermes.

<sup>2</sup> See my introduction to 2. *Makkabäerbuch*, in *Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit* 1 (forthcoming). As for the struggle between Hellenism and Judaism see my paper "Hellenismus und Judentum in der Zeit des Judas Makkabäus," *Jahrbuch der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften für das Jahr 1974*, 97-110.

this stage alone which occupies us here; we are not concerned with the following stage, the struggle of Judas and his followers for the political independence of the Jews.

The first stage is much more fully described in Maccabees II than it is in Maccabees I. Unfortunately, the author of the book is as unknown as the date of its publication. At least two, in all probability three, different people worked in succession to produce what is now Maccabees II. The first was the otherwise unknown Jason of Cyrene, a Hellenized Jew of the diaspora. He wrote a detailed account of the wars of Judas Maccabaeus in five books. This was later abbreviated by another man, the so-called Epitomator, whose aim, as he tells us, was nothing else than to shorten Jason's extensive History. But in addition to that, the book contains some sections which are almost certainly not derived from Jason's account and which can hardly have been inserted by the Epitomator. Furthermore, there are other indications, for instance contradictions in the narrative, which make it virtually certain that a final revision took place some time after the Epitome had been published.<sup>3</sup>

Yet, with so many uncertainties, there is some solid ground. Jason himself seems to have been a contemporary witness of the crucial events. In addition, he has other qualities: all scholars agree that the book gives an excellent report on the institutions of the Seleucid monarchy, the royal administration, and the prosopography of the people in the king's service. Royal governors or generals, not mentioned elsewhere, whose very existence had been doubted, continue to turn up in new inscriptions. From comparison with inscriptions it can also be seen how familiar Maccabees II is with the official language of the royal administration and its specific terms. It is reasonable to give credit for all this first-rate information to Jason, whatever the date of the Epitome and of the final revision may be.<sup>4</sup>

Apart from the so-called letters of introduction in the first two chapters, which are obviously later additions to what is derived from Jason, the book contains five documents emanating from the royal court or closely connected with it. All five have been discussed extensively for about eighty years. As a result, there is now agreement on some important issues, but still disagreement on several major problems. And in one or two instances where there is agreement, I disagree. So much, then, as justification for risking another approach.

<sup>3</sup> Habicht, 2. *Makkabäerbuch* (above, n. 2).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.



The first document, not connected with the other four, is part of chapter 9, its text running from 9.19 to 9.27. It is (or pretends to be) a letter written by king Antiochus IV Epiphanes to the Jews shortly before his death, that is in the autumn of 164 B.C. The context is roughly the following. In chapter 6 the author has reported the royal order prohibiting Jewish Law and religion, the profanation of the temple by the pagans, the prosecution of the faithful, and finally the martyrdom of Eleazar, an elderly expert in sacral law. Chapter 7, the most famous in the book but certainly a later addition to the materials derived from Jason's History, narrates the story of the seven anonymous brothers and their mother who, in the presence of the king, all suffer death for their belief. It is the same chapter which, in this connection, develops the idea of physical resurrection. Chapter 8 describes the first successful steps of armed resistance. With chapter 9 the narrative turns again to the king, reporting his end and interpreting it as God's punishment inflicted on him. Antiochus, we are told, has just been ignominiously repelled while attempting to rob a sanctuary in Persepolis. After that he receives the news that his generals have been defeated by Judas. Furious about this, he breathes vengeance and directs curses against the Jews and the Holy City. God now strikes him down with a stroke, but the king becomes even more furious and he gives orders to hasten against Jerusalem. God now makes him tumble down from his chariot, his limbs are racked with pain, internal disease is added, and the king's body is eaten up by worms. Only now Antiochus becomes aware that God exists and how powerful He is, that he himself is only a mortal, and that he is suffering divine punishment for his sins against the people of God.

The king now makes a solemn promise to God (9.13 to 9.17). He vows to make Jerusalem a free city and to make the Jews like the Athenians (whatever that means); he solemnly promises to adorn the holy temple, to meet personally the cost for the daily offerings, even to turn Jew and to visit every inhabited place in order to praise God. When this prayer remains ineffective, since the Lord has no longer any mercy for him, the king finally despairs of his condition (9.18) and directs a letter to the Jews, in the manner of a supplicant, as the author adds. The text runs as follows:<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The Greek text follows R. Hanhart's edition, *Septuaginta* 9.2 (Göttingen 1959); translation by J. R. Bartlett, *The First and Second Books of the Maccabees*, The Cambridge Bible Commentary, (Cambridge 1973) 291-292. There is some confusion in the manuscript tradition in paragraphs 20-21. If one takes into account the words  $\tau\hat{\omega} \theta\epsilon\hat{\omega}$ , preserved in several manuscripts,

<sup>19</sup> Τοῖς χρηστοῖς Ἰουδαίοις τοῖς πολίταις πολλὰ χαίρειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν βασιλεὺς καὶ στρατηγὸς Ἀντίοχος. <sup>20</sup>† εἰ ἔρρωσθε, καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰ ἴδια κατὰ γνώμην ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, εὖχομαι μὲν τῷ θεῷ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν εἰς οὐρανὸν τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχων. <sup>21</sup> κἀγὼ δὲ ἀσθενῶς διεκείμην, ὑμῶν τε τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἐμνημόνευον φιλοστόργως†. ἐπανάγων ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Περσίδα τόπων καὶ περιπεσὼν ἀσθενείᾳ δυσχέρειαν ἐχούσῃ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγησάμην φροντίσαι τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἀσφαλείας. <sup>22</sup> οὐκ ἀπογινώσκων τὰ κατ' ἐμαντόν, ἀλλὰ ἔχων πολλὴν ἐλπίδα ἐκφεύξεσθαι τὴν ἀσθένειαν, <sup>23</sup> θεωρῶν δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὁ πατήρ, καθ' οὓς καιροὺς εἰς τοὺς ἄνω τόπους ἐστρατοπέδευσεν, ἀνέδειξε τὸν διαδεξάμενον, <sup>24</sup> ὅπως, ἐάν τι παράδοξον ἀποβαίνει ἢ καὶ προσαγγελῇ τι δυσχερές, εἰδότες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ᾧ καταλέλειπται τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιταράσσωνται. <sup>25</sup> πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κατανοῶν τοὺς παρακειμένους δυνάστας καὶ γειτνιῶντας τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῖς καιροῖς ἐπέχοντας καὶ προσδοκῶντας τὸ ἀποβησόμενον ἀναδέδειχα τὸν υἱὸν Ἀντίοχον βασιλέα, ὃν πολλάκις ἀνατρέχων εἰς τὰς ἐπάνω σατραπείας τοῖς πλείστοις ὑμῶν παρεκατετιθέμην καὶ συνίστων· γέγραφα δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ὑπογεγραμμένα. <sup>26</sup> παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀξιῶ μεμνημένους τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἕκαστον συντηρεῖν τὴν οὖσαν εὐνοίαν εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ τὸν υἱόν· <sup>27</sup> πέπεισμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐπιεικῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως παρακολουθοῦντα τῇ ἐμῇ προαιρέσει συμπεριενεχθήσεσθαι ὑμῖν.

To my worthy citizens, the Jews, warm greetings and good wishes for their health and prosperity from Antiochus, King and Chief Magistrate. May you and your children flourish and your affairs go as you wish. Having my hope in heaven, I keep an affectionate remembrance of your regards and goodwill.

As I was returning from Persia, I suffered a tiresome illness, and so I have judged it necessary to provide for the general safety of you all. (22) Not that I despair of my condition — on the contrary I have good hopes of recovery — but I observed that my father, whenever he made an expedition east of the Euphrates, appointed a successor, so that, if anything unexpected should happen or if some tiresome report should spread, his subjects would not be disturbed, since they would know to whom the empire had been left. (25) Further, I know well that the neighbouring princes on the frontiers of my kingdom are watching for an opportunity and waiting on events. So I have designated as king my son Antiochus, whom I frequently entrusted and recommended to most of you during my regular visits to the satrapies beyond the Euphrates. I have written to him what is here copied. (26) Wherefore I pray and entreat each one of you to maintain your existing goodwill towards myself and my son, remembering the services I have rendered to you both as a community

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then paragraph 20, which begins with the usual formula εἰ ἔρρωσθε, should read: "If you are well and if your children and your affairs are as you wish them to be, I am most grateful to God, having my hope in heaven."

and as individuals. For I am sure my son will follow my own policy of moderation and benevolence and will accommodate himself to your wishes.

All scholars but two accept this as a genuine letter, written by the king before his death and recommending his son as his successor.<sup>6</sup> This cannot be. The letter is obviously a literary product, fabricated for the very place where it is inserted. My reasons for this are the following. First, the prescript. It contains the following mistakes: the name of the writer and that of the addressee are in the wrong order (the king has to come first); the addressee is given epithets ("the worthy," his "fellow-citizens"); the greeting formula, being in the royal chancery always *χαίρειν* and nothing else, is enlarged (by the words *πολλά, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν*, and *εὖ πράττειν*). Within the Greek world, the addition *καὶ ὑγιαίνειν* to the usual *χαίρειν* is restricted to private letters, whereas the Jews used the extended formula also in official letters, as can be seen for instance in chapter 1.10: "The Jews in Jerusalem and in Palestine and the *gerousia* and Judas to Aristobulos, teacher of the king Ptolemy . . . *χαίρειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν*." Finally, the addition "and general" (or Chief Magistrate) after the title king is intolerable despite modern attempts to explain it in this particular case. There are at least twenty-five letters written by Seleucid kings of which the prescript is preserved (I am counting only letters on stone, excluding all others which are preserved in the literary tradition). The prescript is invariably: king, name, addressee, greeting — and nothing else.<sup>7</sup> Therefore we should have: "King Antiochus to

<sup>6</sup> For example, Ed. Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* 2 (1921) 460. B. Motzo, *Saggi di storia e letteratura giudeo-ellenistica* (1924) 139–140. H. Bévenot, *Die beiden Makkabäerbücher übersetzt und erklärt*, *Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments* IV 4 (1931) 215. E. Bickerman, *Institutions des Séleucides* (1938) 191 no. 24. F.-M. Abel, *Les Livres des Maccabées* (1949) 402–403. J.-G. Bunge, *Untersuchungen zum zweiten Makkabäerbuch* (Diss. phil. Bonn 1971) 422.

<sup>7</sup> Apart from the sixteen letters whose prescripts are preserved and which are contained in C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (1934), the following may be mentioned: six letters from a dossier preserved on a stone found near Scythopolis (V. H. Landau, *Israel Exploration Journal* 16 [1966] 54ff; cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bulletin épigraphique* 1970, 627); one from Nehavend in Media (L. Robert, *Hellenica* 7 [1949] 7ff) and one from Teos (P. Herrmann, *Anadolu* 9 [1965] 41; cf. 157 and 158). All these are letters written by Antiochus III. In addition, there is now a letter by his spouse, queen Laodice, to Iasus in Caria (G. Pugliese-Carratelli, *Annuario della Scuola archeologica in Atene* 45–46 [1967–1968, Rome 1969] 445ff, no. 2; cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1971, 621).



the Jews greeting." The evidence against authenticity is overwhelming. Therefore most scholars agree that the prescript is a falsification.<sup>8</sup> But they insist that the content of the letter is genuine and that the letter was originally sent to the city of Antioch, the royal capital (this is meant to explain the words "his fellow-citizens," as if the king were himself a citizen of Antioch which in fact he was not).

So we have to turn, secondly, to the letter itself. Unfortunately, its content offers just as many objections to authenticity as the prescript. Section 20 is especially edifying: the king directing a thanksgiving prayer "to God" (θεῶι), whereas any Hellenistic ruler could have said only "the Gods" (τοῖς θεοῖς) or "the Divine" (τῶι θεῷ).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the king putting his trust into heaven, εἰς οὐρανόν, is clearly a Jewish idea. No less intriguing is the fact that the king discusses his state of health in such a letter destined for a wider public, perhaps even more intriguing the utterly undiplomatic remarks about the foreign dynasts lurking to make their own profit at the expense of the kingdom as a result of his death. And the statement that Antiochus, while king, had often been visiting the Eastern parts of his kingdom is simply untrue. There can be no doubt that the whole letter is a fiction. Its purpose was to balance the sad story of the martyrs by an edifying one showing the persecutor duly punished, once the anger of God had turned into mercy for his people. It may also be that this letter was inserted to outdo the foregoing prayer of the king.

The two scholars with whom I agree in the view that this letter is a literary product are Isidore Lévy<sup>10</sup> (in a paper "Les deux livres des Maccabées et le livre hébraïque des Hasmonéens") and Marcello Zambelli<sup>11</sup> ("La composizione del secondo libro dei Maccabei e la nuova cronologia di Antioco Epifane"). It has to be admitted, however, that the letter contains some phrases which occur in genuine letters of the Seleucids.<sup>12</sup> From this I concluded that a true document had served as

<sup>8</sup> So, for instance, F. Ziemann, *De epistularum graecarum formulis sollemnibus quaestiones selectae*, Diss. Phil. Hal. XVIII 4 (Halle 1910) 267. Bickerman (above, n. 6) 191 no. 24, and below, n. 16. F.-M. Abel and J. Starcky, *Les Livres des Maccabées*<sup>3</sup> (1961) 26-27. Bunge (above n. 6) 422 n. 128b.

<sup>9</sup> See M. Holleaux, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* 3 (1942) 97, discussing the letter of king Antiochus III to Zeuxis (Josephus *Antiqu.* 12.150).

<sup>10</sup> I. Lévy, *Semitica* 5 (1955) 27-32.

<sup>11</sup> M. Zambelli, *Miscellanea Greca e Romana* (1965) 234-243.

<sup>12</sup> Compare 9.21 ὑμῶν τε . . . ἐμνημόνεον φιλοστόργως with καὶ σοῦ ἐμνημονεύομεν φιλοστόργως in the letter of Antiochus VIII (or IX) to Ptolemy IX of 109 B.C. (Welles, *Royal Correspondence* no. 71, 3-4). Other instances of the style typical for a royal chancery occur, for instance, in paragraphs 20.26.27.

a model for the forgery and that the original seemed to be a letter of a Seleucid king recommending his son as co-regent to his army. I then realized that this point had already been made by Lévy.<sup>13</sup> I do not agree, however, with his further view that this model was the letter written by Herod the Great to his army shortly before his death in 4 B.C., recommending his son Archelaos (we know this from Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 17.194). Such a date seems too late even for our fictitious letter. Therefore, the letter of Herod should be regarded as one example of a good many similar letters, one of which did inspire this falsification in Maccabees II.

The other documents are grouped together in chapter 11. In chapter 9 we have the long report on the death of Antiochus Epiphanes; chapter 10 begins with the recovery of Jerusalem by Judas and his men. They purify the sanctuary, renew the cult, and resolve to celebrate this event every year (10.8). The author then indicates that the following events took place under Epiphanes' son, king Antiochus V. The rest of the long chapter is devoted to new military activities of Judas. Like other sections of the book, this whole account is misplaced because, for whatever reason, several parts of the narrative have been transposed from one place to another, probably in connection with the final revision of the book. This has long been recognized. The original place of most of what chapter 10 contains was between chapters 12 and 13.<sup>14</sup> Now, chapter 11 is an account of the first campaign of the chancellor Lysias against the Jews. As it stands, this happened after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes late in 164 B.C. On the other hand, given the fact of several other alterations in the order of events, it is at least equally possible that this campaign took place during the absence of king Antiochus Epiphanes in the East and accordingly when he was still alive. These remarks are only meant to show that in establishing the chronology of events reported, and documents contained, in chapter 11 we are not bound by the sequence of the chapters as they now follow each other. On this, there is general agreement. Now to the narrative of chapter 11.

Despite his superior forces Lysias, so we are told, suffers a defeat near Jerusalem by Judas and his followers. Being no fool, he realizes that the Jews are invincible because God is fighting on their side. So he proposes a settlement, promising also to win the king's approval for it. Then follows (11.15): "Maccabaeus agreed to all the proposals of

<sup>13</sup> Lévy (above, n. 10).

<sup>14</sup> Wellhausen, *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (1905), 148-151, and in particular Zambelli (above, n. 11) 272-279.

Lysias out of regard for the general welfare, for the king had accepted all the proposals from the Jewish side which Judas had forwarded to Lysias in writing." With 11.16 begins the series of the following four documents which occupy the second half of the chapter:<sup>15</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Ἦσαν γὰρ αἱ γεγραμμένοι τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ἐπιστολαὶ παρὰ μὲν Λυσίου περιέχουσαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

Λυσίας τῷ πλήθει τῶν Ἰουδαίων χαίρειν. <sup>17</sup> Ἰωάννης καὶ Ἀβессαλωμ οἱ πεμφθέντες παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπιδόντες τὸν ὑπογεγραμμένον χρηματισμὸν ἡξίουσιν περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ σημαινομένων. <sup>18</sup> ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔδει καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ προσενεχθῆναι, διεσάφησα· ἃ δὲ ἦν ἐνδεχόμενα, συνεχώρησα. <sup>19</sup> ἔαν μὲν οὖν συντηρήσῃτε τὴν εἰς τὰ πράγματα εὐνοίαν, καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν πειράσομαι παραίτιος ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν γενέσθαι. <sup>20</sup> ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐντέταλμαι τούτοις τε καὶ τοῖς παρ' ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆναι ὑμῖν. <sup>21</sup> ἔρρωσθε. ἔτους ἑκατοστοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ὀγδόου, Διὸς Κορινθίου τετράδι καὶ εἰκάδι.

<sup>22</sup> Ἡ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολὴ περιεῖχεν οὕτως.

Βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος τῷ ἀδελφῷ Λυσίᾳ χαίρειν. <sup>23</sup> τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν εἰς θεοὺς μεταστάντος βουλόμενοι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ἀταράχους ὄντας γενέσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλειαν <sup>24</sup> ἀκηκοότες τοὺς Ἰουδαίους μὴ συνευδοκοῦντας τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ μεταθέσει ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀγωγὴν αἰρετίζοντας ἀξιοῦν συγχωρηθῆναι αὐτοῖς τὰ νόμιμα— <sup>25</sup> αἰρούμενοι οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθνος ἐκτὸς ταραχῆς εἶναι κρίνομεν τό τε ἱερὸν αὐτοῖς ἀποκατασταθῆναι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων αὐτῶν ἔθνη. <sup>26</sup> εὖ οὖν ποιήσεις διαπεμφάμενος πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ δοὺς δεξιὰς, ὅπως εἰδότες τὴν ἡμετέραν προαίρεσιν εὐθυμοὶ τε ᾧσι καὶ ἡδέως διαγίνονται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἀντίληψιν.

<sup>27</sup> Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἔθνος ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολὴ τοιαύδε ἦν.

Βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος τῇ γερουσίᾳ τῶν Ἰουδαίων καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰουδαίοις

<sup>15</sup> The following departures from Hanhart's text (hereafter: H.; see above, n. 5) should be noted: (16) γεγραμμένοι (without the article), H.; but the article is well attested and indispensable. (18) συνεχώρησεν, H.; but see below, n. 16. (19) H. omits ὑμῖν, which is attested in several manuscripts and printed in Abel's edition. (30–31) H. does not punctuate after ἀδείας and omits the δὲ in 31 which is preserved in a large part of the manuscript tradition. (31) δαπανήμασι καὶ νόμοις, H.; but see below, n. 19. In general cf. B. Niese, *Hermes* 35 (1900) 476–491. R. Laqueur, *Kritische Untersuchungen zum zweiten Makkabäerbuch* (1904) 30–51. Wellhausen (above, n. 14) 141–145. Laqueur, *Historische Zeitschrift* 136 (1927) 229–252. W. Kolbe, *Beiträge zur syrischen und jüdischen Geschichte* (1935) 74–107. E. Bickermann, *Der Gott der Makkabäer* (1937) 179–181. K.-D. Schunck, *Die Quellen des ersten und zweiten Makkabäerbuches* (1954) 103–109. V. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews* (1961) 213–219. F.-M. Abel and J. Starcky (above, n. 8) 39–43. Zambelli (above n. 11) 213–234. O. Mørholm, *Antiochus IV of Syria* (1966) 162–165. Bunge (above, n. 6) 386–400. E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ* (175 B.C.–A.D. 135) I, revised and edited by G. Vermes and F. Millar (1973) 161–164.



χαίρειν. <sup>28</sup> εἰ ἔρρωσθε, εἴη ἅν, ὡς βουλόμεθα· καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ὑγιαίνομεν. <sup>29</sup> ἐνεφάνισεν ἡμῖν Μενέλαος βούλεσθαι κατελθόντας ὑμᾶς γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις. <sup>30</sup> τοῖς οὖν καταπορευομένοις μέχρι τριακάδος Ξανθικοῦ ὑπάρξει δεξιὰ μετὰ τῆς ἀδείας. <sup>31</sup> χρῆσθαι δὲ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους τοῖς ἐαυτῶν <διαιτήμασι> καὶ νόμοις καθὰ καὶ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον παρενοχληθήσεται περὶ τῶν ἡγνοημένων. <sup>32</sup> πέπομφα δὲ καὶ τὸν Μενέλαον παρακαλέσονται ὑμᾶς. <sup>33</sup> ἔρρωσθε. ἔτους ἑκατοστοῦ τεσσαερακοστοῦ ὀγδοῦ, Ξανθικοῦ πεντεκαιδεκάτῃ.

<sup>34</sup> Ἐπεμψαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπιστολὴν ἔχουσαν οὕτως· Κόιντος Μέμμιος, Τίτος Μάνιος, πρεσβευταὶ Ῥωμαίων, τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἰουδαίων χαίρειν. <sup>35</sup> ὑπὲρ ὧν Λυσίας ὁ συγγενὴς τοῦ βασιλέως συνεχώρησεν ὑμῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνευδοκοῦμεν. <sup>36</sup> ἃ δὲ ἔκρινε προσανενεχθῆναι τῷ βασιλεῖ, πέμψατέ τινα παραχρῆμα ἐπισκεψάμενοι περὶ τούτων, ἵν' ἐκθῶμεν, ὡς καθήκει ὑμῖν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ προσάγομεν πρὸς Ἀντιόχειαν. <sup>37</sup> διὸ σπεύσατε καὶ πέμψατέ τινας, ὅπως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπιγνώμεν, ὅποιας ἔστε γνῶμης. <sup>38</sup> ὑγιαίνετε. ἔτους ἑκατοστοῦ τεσσαερακοστοῦ ὀγδοῦ, Ξανθικοῦ πεντεκαιδεκάτῃ.

The first document is a letter of Lysias to the Jews. Lysias mentions his negotiations with two Jewish representatives who had presented a written statement. He informs the Jews that he has granted what was within his competence and that he has submitted some major issues to the king's decision.<sup>16</sup> The correct reading in 11.18 is *συνεχώρησα*, as can be seen from the corresponding passage in 11.35. Lysias declares his goodwill, provided the Jews maintain loyalty, and his hope of coming to terms. The letter is dated in the month Dioskorinthios the 24, in the year 148 of the Seleucid era. The starting point of this era being early October 312 B.C., the year 148 runs from October 165 to late September 164 B.C. If we can depend on the year, the letter was written when Antiochus Epiphanes was still alive and campaigning east of the Euphrates. Unfortunately the name of the month is corrupt (no month with such a name exists) and eludes all efforts to emend.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> In 11.18 the true reading is *συνεχώρησα*, not *συνεχώρησεν*. Only the first makes sense within the context; decisive proof comes from the corresponding paragraphs 35–36: *ὑπὲρ ὧν Λυσίας... συνεχώρησεν ὑμῖν... ἃ δὲ ἔκρινε προσανενεχθῆναι τῷ βασιλεῖ*. There is a close resemblance in the letter of a high official of king Ptolemy I to the city of Iasus in Caria: *ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν λ[οιπῶν] συνεκεχώρηκαμεν αὐτοῖς, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς συντόξεως ἐδόκει μοι ἀνενέγκαι εἰς τὸν βασιλέα* (*Annuario della Scuola archeologica in Atene* 45–46 [1967–1968, Rome 1969] 439 B 12–14, as corrected by J. and L. Robert, *Revue des études grecques* [1971] p. 502). The true reading has long been established; see, for instance, Niese (above, n. 15) 477. Laqueur (above, n. 15) 236. Bickermann (above, n. 15) 179 n. 3. It is a pity that R. Hanhart (above, n. 5) returns to *συνεχώρησεν*.

<sup>17</sup> See most recently R. Hanhart, *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* [1961] 473–474. In a letter of a Seleucid official, the month

There can be no doubt that this letter was directed to the Jews around Judas, for two reasons. First, the chancellor addresses the Jews as *πλῆθος* (crowd) which means an unconstitutional body, not competent for negotiations in a proper sense, and he calls the Jewish agents not ambassadors (*πρεσβευταί*), but simply messengers. Second, the Jewish names of the agents indicate that these men do not belong to the Hellenizing Jews around the high priest Menelaus who were loyal to the king (they, no doubt, all had Greek names). And our conclusion that this is a letter to the Jewish rebels fits also the context of chapter 11.1 to 11.16.

The second document (11.23 to 11.26) is placed under the same context, introduced by the words "The king's letter ran as follows." From this we should expect the king to be Antiochus Epiphanes. But the following sentence from the letter itself makes it clear that he is in fact Antiochus V, the son of Epiphanes; for he begins with the statement that his father has died and that he himself, on being informed that the Jews do not accept his father's order to follow the Greek way of life instead of their own, is willing to grant this, for the general reason that all people within his kingdom should be without molestation. He decides that the temple should be restored to the Jews and that they should be free to live according to the custom of their ancestors. This, beyond any doubt, means the revocation of his father's order dating from 167, by which the observance of the Jewish Law and religion were prohibited.

This letter is directed to the chancellor Lysias who served in this capacity under Antiochus V as he had served under his father. Lysias receives the necessary instructions to carry out the king's decision (11.26). In a very polite manner he is addressed by the king as "brother" which in Seleucid documents is not unusual for very high ranking officials.<sup>18</sup> There is no date preserved with this letter. From the fact that Antiochus V appears as king it emerges that this letter could not have been written before the beginning of 163 B.C. at the earliest, i.e. it is not earlier than the Seleucid year 149.

The third document is also cited in a manner which shows that it was regarded by the author as part of the same negotiations between

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could only be (despite Hanhart, and Niese [above, n. 15] 483) one of the Macedonian calendar. Since this letter preceded by a very short time that of the Romans in 11.34-11.38, which is dated on the 15th of Xanthicus, the month in question here should be either Xanthicus or Dystrus, that is either the sixth or the fifth month of the Macedonian calendar—if the date in 11.38 can be trusted (see my discussion of the fourth document, below).

<sup>18</sup> E. Bickerman (above, n. 6) 43.



the Maccabean party on the one hand and Lysias and the king on the other: "The king's letter to the nation was the following" (11.27). In this, the king addresses the Jewish council of elders, the *gerousia*. He reports that the high priest Menelaus had appeared before him and spoken about the desire of the Jews to return to their own affairs. Therefore the king declares an amnesty for all those who return before the end of the month Xanthicus. He then grants the Jews their former way of life<sup>19</sup> and their own Law. The king finally declares that he has sent Menelaus back to reassure them. The letter is dated Xanthicus 15, year 148. Xanthicus being the sixth month in the Macedonian calendar of the Seleucids, the date would be mid-March 164 B.C., the author therefore Antiochus Epiphanes.

This letter, in contrast to the first, was clearly written to the Hellenizing party of the Jews, loyal to the king. That is obvious from the role of Menelaus and from that of the *gerousia*, which, since acknowledged by the king, can be only a body cooperating with the high priest. If, as the date indicates, the king is Antiochus Epiphanes it was the persecutor himself who put an end to the persecution and who reestablished by this letter the freedom of religion and the validity of the Law. Now the question arises how this is to be understood in comparison with the foregoing letter of his son which seems to express almost the same thing.

Bearing this question in mind, we turn to the fourth document, a letter by Roman ambassadors to the people of the Jews (11.34 to 11.38). The Romans state their agreement with what the chancellor Lysias had already conceded. But they are eager to learn more about what he had referred to the king for final decision. They ask the Jews to inform them orally and to listen to Roman advice. Since the Romans are on their way to the capital Antioch, they are in a hurry to learn the opinions of the Jews. This is dated Xanthicus 15, year 148, the very day of the date of the third letter.

The connection of this with the first document is obvious — there are even close resemblances in the wording.<sup>20</sup> This letter has been

<sup>19</sup> For the incomprehensible *δαπανήμασι* (suppressed in many manuscripts because it does not make sense), there is the brilliant emendation *διατήμασι* made by Adolf Wilhelm, *Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien* (1920) 44 and (1937) 22, approved by P. Katz, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 51 (1960) 16 and by Abel and Starcky (above, n. 8) 291, note b. Hanhart (above, n. 17) 467 ("Das Wort begegnet in den LXX nirgends") is not to the point, since the language of the Septuagint is irrelevant where an authentic letter of a Seleucid king is under discussion.

<sup>20</sup> Compare 11.18: ὅσα μὲν οὖν εἶδει καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ προσενεχθῆναι, διεσάφησ' ἃ δὲ ἦν ἐνδεχόμενα, συνεχώρησα (see above n. 16) with 11.35: ὑπὲρ ὧν Λυσίας...

written after the first one, but only shortly after it. Lysias had granted some points which were within his competence and had referred others to the king — exactly what he himself is saying in the first letter. Therefore the letter of the Romans is directed to the Maccabean party, as is the first one. The year is the same as in Lysias' letter (number 1). If the month is correct here, the corrupt name of the month in Lysias' letter could have been only Xanthicus or some month before (very shortly before) Xanthicus.

We have now some idea of what the four documents contain. Now the question is: what can we gain from them for the history of the time? First of all, I should like to emphasize that all four documents are genuine. After much discussion there is now general agreement. Within the last forty-five years only one scholar has doubted the authenticity of the second letter,<sup>21</sup> only one other that of the fourth letter.<sup>22</sup> But their arguments have been dealt with effectively by other scholars.<sup>23</sup> In my opinion, it can be safely said that the question of authenticity is now settled in favor of all four letters.<sup>24</sup>

Quite another matter is the question whether the author has inserted them in their proper context. He certainly has not, since in his opinion the king is always the same, as is the general background, whereas letters 2 and 3 have in fact been written by different kings, son and father, and under different conditions. In addition to that, the first and the fourth documents are addressed to the Maccabean party, the third is directed to the opposing group, the Hellenizers or reformers around Menelaus. From this it follows that the sequence of the letters is not the original sequence, because the letter of Antiochus V (number 2) wrongly precedes that of his father (number 3). If we are bound to accept the text of the documents as genuine, we are not bound to accept what the author tells us about them. Interpretation has to start not from his commenting remarks, but from the text of the letters themselves (it is surprising how often this simple rule of scholarly method is disregarded).

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συνεχώρησεν ὑμῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνευδοκοῦμεν. (36) ἃ δὲ ἔκρινε προσανενχθῆναι τῷ βασιλεῖ. . .

<sup>21</sup> K. D. Schunck (above, n. 15) 103-105.

<sup>22</sup> O. Mørkholm (above, n. 15) 163-164.

<sup>23</sup> Good arguments already in Laqueur (above, n. 15) 236. Most recently Bunge (above, n. 6) 394 n. 84.

<sup>24</sup> J. Strugnell and B. Knox independently pointed out, during discussions on these documents, that *ὕγιαίνετε* in 11.38, at the end of the letter of the Romans, instead of *ἔρρωσθε*, is a Latinism: the translation of "valet." I do not hesitate to regard this as the decisive argument in favor of the authenticity of the letter.

Another reservation has to be made. Even if the documents are genuine, there is of course always the problem of corruption in the manuscript tradition. Some corruption occurred with the names of the Roman ambassadors.<sup>25</sup> Since that is agreed by all, it may be sufficient to state the fact. A similar accident may have caused the loss of the date originally attached to the second document. But it is perhaps more likely that the date has been cut off on purpose by the man who inserted the letters here, since it openly contradicted his presumption that all were from the same year and from a coherent series of events.

The remaining dates are, however, also beset with difficulties. In the first letter the name of the month is corrupt, as we have seen, and cannot be restored. The third and the fourth document show the same day, month, and year, yet their background is entirely different. Only one, if either, can be correct and may have been attached later to the other letter for whatever reason. Furthermore, the two dates within the third letter are in open contradiction with each other. The document is dated Xanthicus 15, stating as deadline for the amnesty Xanthicus 30. This is in any event much too short, as has often been observed.<sup>26</sup> The end of Xanthicus corresponds roughly to the end of March, about the time of the year at which the season suitable for military operations begins. Therefore this is a good final date for an amnesty meant to prevent the renewal of hostilities after the winter's intermission. In fact, this very day, Xanthicus 30, is found in another amnesty under similar conditions.<sup>27</sup>

Therefore we can have some confidence in this date, the more so since it is part of the letter itself as written by the king, not of the dating postscript. It follows that the dates at the end of the third and fourth letter (in both cases Xanthicus 15) are more than suspect. Nothing can be built upon them. On the other hand, the years attached to the first, third, and fourth letter are not necessarily under the same suspicion. With them, there seems to be nothing wrong. If they are correct

<sup>25</sup> See Niese (above, n. 15) 478 and 485. Meyer (above, n. 6) 212-213. Bickermann (above n. 15) 180 nn. 1-2. Münzer, *PW* Sergius no. 16, 1692. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* I (1951) 440 n. 2. Taylor, *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (1960) 23. Mørkholm (above, n. 15) 163-164. Briscoe, *Historia* 18 (1969) 53. Bunge (above, n. 6) 393 n. 8c. Giovannini and Müller, *Museum Helveticum* 28 (1971) 170.

<sup>26</sup> Laqueur (above, n. 15) 39-40. Abel-Starcky (above, n. 8) 4c. Mørkholm (above, n. 15) 156-157. Schürer (above, n. 15) 162.

<sup>27</sup> Diodorus 18.56, as observed by Wilhelm, *Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien* (1937) 22. A terminal date on March 15 for a similar amnesty, proposed during the course of the Mutinensian War in 43 B.C., is found in Cicero *Philippics* 8.33.



(as I am convinced they are), these letters are all from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, dating between early October 165, when the king was in the East, to late September 164 B.C. The amnesty granted in the third letter would then expire by the end of March 164 B.C.

This third letter is the crucial one. Numbers 1 and 4 are in substance and time closely connected and are the result of Lysias' military campaign. How does letter 3, written by the king, fit into the picture? For nearly a century all scholars (except Zambelli) have agreed that the king's letter was written later than the other two. And this seems at first obvious and beyond doubt. The line of argument is simple. In the first document we see Lysias negotiating after the campaign, transferring the disputed matters, which he himself was not competent to settle, to the king. Shortly afterwards the Romans have notice of this (number 4). Now, the king's letter 3 grants an amnesty. Since Epiphanes is its author, this, everyone agrees, was his answer to what Lysias had brought before him and was therefore the final stage of those negotiations with the Jewish rebels. Therefore, document number 3 has to be placed after numbers 1 and 4.<sup>28</sup>

Obvious as this might appear at first sight, it cannot be the correct solution. First, we should expect the king's decision to be sent to Lysias and transmitted by the chancellor to the Jews. But the king's letter is addressed to the Jews themselves. Very strange. But more than that, it is directed not to the Maccabean party with which Lysias was negotiating, but to the king's loyal followers, represented by the *gerousia*. Furthermore, there is not the slightest indication that the king is writing after a military campaign nor that he is writing in connection with negotiations. He does not settle open issues put before him through Lysias' letter, but he grants the high priest Menelaus a favor. Again, this is not the result of Lysias' report, but of the personal appearance of Menelaus before the king. The Maccabean army, which during a truce was still in arms, is not even mentioned, and it can be doubted that the amnesty was meant primarily for it (rather for the followers of the former high priest Jason).

<sup>28</sup> Niese (above, n. 15) 484. Kolbe (above, n. 15) 84. Laqueur (above n. 15) 229. Bévenot (above, n. 6) 223. Bickermann (above, n. 15) 179-181. Abel (above, n. 6) 430. Tcherikover (above, n. 15) 215. Mørkholm (above, n. 15) 155-156, 162-165. Bunge (above, n. 6) 386ff. The exception is Zambelli (above, n. 11) 213-234, who has seen that number 3 has to be regarded as the earliest of all four documents. On the other hand, I cannot share his opinion that numbers 1 and 4 were written after the death of Antiochus IV, under Antiochus V Eupator. Apart from other difficulties, this necessitates an emendation of the year attached to these letters from Sel. 148 to Sel. 149.

The correct solution must be that the king's letter (number 3) is not later than numbers 1 and 4, but is in fact the earliest document of all four. Containing an amnesty for all Jews who are willing to return to their own affairs before the end of March 164, but written beyond the Euphrates, this letter must have been written very early in 164, if not late in 165 B.C. Therefore, the campaign of Lysias began only after the terminal date for the amnesty had expired — that is, not earlier than April 164. The amnesty, then, was meant to make a military campaign superfluous or, at least, to win over as many Jews as possible before a new campaign. In order to obtain this, the king revoked his order of 167 and granted again the freedom of religion and the validity of the Law. But this was under the condition that the Jews would lay down their arms, and was valid only for those who did so in time. When a good many did not (one reason for this certainly being that the king had again supported the hated Menelaus), Lysias had no other choice than to try force; he began his campaign.

The campaign being unsuccessful, Lysias opened negotiations, for the first time directly with the rebels. The letters 1 and 4 belong to those negotiations and were written before the end of the Seleucid year 148, that is before the end of September 164 B.C. During the negotiations the chancellor reported to the king, calling for his personal decision on some still disputed issues.

The question now emerges: What did the king reply? If his letter (number 3) is not identical with, or part of, his reply but was written some months earlier, there is no reply at all. Why not? To answer this, let us turn once more to the last of the four documents (number 2), the letter written by Antiochus V to Lysias. In this the new king grants the Jews the restoration of the temple and the freedom of religion. The second point is similar, almost identical with what his father had already conceded. We have noticed this earlier but left open the question of how to explain this very close similarity. Now we can answer it. Almost identical as the concessions seem to be, there is one major difference. Epiphanes had declared his concessions as part of an amnesty, valid only for those who would lay down their arms in time. His concessions were conditional ones. In the letter of his son, on the contrary, they are not restricted to part of the Jews but meant to be valid for all Jews. This time the concessions were unconditional. What are the reasons for such a change in the royal policy? This question brings us to the last major issue.

The letter of the young king Antiochus V (number 2) has been generally connected with the peace concluded after the second campaign

of Lysias against the Jews. This campaign is described in Maccabees I, chapter 6, and in Maccabees II, chapter 13. It was (whatever Maccabees II says to the contrary) a great success for the royal army, which again took possession of Jerusalem. But despite this success, Lysias and the king were forced to make peace hastily, because one of the generals who had been with the king's father in the East claimed the government for himself and had occupied the capital with his army. Opinions of scholars are at variance only as to whether all this happened in 163 or 162 B.C. This is only of secondary importance here, since the main problem is the connection between the peace and the king's letter. All scholars agree that this connection exists.<sup>29</sup>

Nonetheless, this is purely conjectural: there is no evidence for it, except that Maccabees I 6.59 reports that in concluding the peace the king took an oath granting the freedom of religion. But this can easily be explained otherwise and not only by reference to the king's letter (once the religion had been forbidden and was restored, it is obvious that its freedom had to be granted whenever a peace treaty was concluded). This is therefore no cogent argument for the supposed connection between that letter and the peace treaty. In fact this connection is very dubious. The letter (number 2) does not, not even by implication, mention hostilities, a campaign, or negotiations. But the question still remains whether it positively rules out such implications. In my opinion, it does. The whole spirit of the letter points clearly in another direction. It is programmatic. The king begins with the statement that his father has died, the implication being that this was a very recent event. He speaks of his desire that all his subjects be undisturbed in the conduct of their own affairs. He has learnt that the Jews do not consent to adopt Greek ways as his father had wished, but prefer their own mode of life and request that they be allowed to observe their own laws. He chooses, therefore, that this nation like the rest should be left undisturbed, and he orders that the temple be restored and freedom of religion granted. Lysias is instructed to inform the Jews accordingly and to give them assurances, "so that, knowing what our intentions are, they may settle down confidently and quietly manage their own affairs." This is not the language of a king negotiating after a campaign. This is rather a proclamation introducing an important change of policy. In other words, it is a programmatic announcement of the young king

<sup>29</sup> See, for instance, Bickermann (above, n. 15) 156-157. Tcherikover (above, n. 15) 225. Abel-Starcky (above, n. 8) 39. Mørkholm (above, n. 15) 163. Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus*<sup>2</sup> (1973) 178 n. 3, 530. Bunge (above, n. 6) 437ff. Schürer (above, n. 15) 167 and n. 14.



who just had become king, declaring that with his father's death things have changed.<sup>30</sup> Such announcements, containing an amnesty or privileges, were customary for a new Hellenistic ruler and are known as *philanthropa*. This is what Perseus did when he became king in 179 B.C., and what most of the Ptolemies did at their accession to the throne.<sup>31</sup> If I am not mistaken in this, the letter must have been written only a short time after the death of Epiphanes, that is during the first weeks of 163 B.C., not at the end of the second campaign, but before it began.

If that is the true date and meaning of the letter, we have also the clue to the problem of why Epiphanes did not reply to Lysias' report after the first campaign. When this report reached the headquarters in autumn 164 B.C., Epiphanes had just died. So it was up to his successor to decide the still disputed questions. The programmatic letter of Antiochus V to Lysias was the result. It is evidence for a much greater effort to come to a reconciliation than that made by his father a year earlier. But yet it was not enough: the king still regarded Menelaus as the legitimate high priest and the spokesman of the Jewish nation before the king. The Maccabean party resumed hostilities, and this in turn caused the second campaign, in which not only the king took part but also Menelaus. When peace was finally concluded, the young king not only repeated his concession of the freedom of religion (as mentioned in Maccabees I), but Menelaus was sacrificed. The king himself ordered his execution, blaming him for having been the source of all the trouble. A new high priest was nominated, Alcimus, with the result that the Maccabean party was split. The Asidaioi, the pious, made peace with the government and accepted Alcimus, because the main goal was achieved: the freedom of religion and a high priest from the right family. Judas alone went on with war. But it was no longer a war for the freedom of religion, but rather a war for independence.

One final remark. It took me nearly twenty years of repeated efforts to come finally to the conclusions here presented. I had always been unable, having read so many learned papers and having reflected on them, to make up my mind. Whether the solution presented here is, as a whole or in part, right or wrong, will be under discussion. But I should like to mention that the same solution was presented long ago, even before the extensive modern dispute over these documents began,

<sup>30</sup> So rightly Schürer (above, n. 15) 164.

<sup>31</sup> See L. Koenen, *Eine ptolemäische Königsurkunde* (P. Kroll), *Klassisch-philologische Studien* 19 (1957).

and almost without commentary or justification. As I realized only afterwards, it was proposed by Henry Fynes Clinton in the third volume of *Fasti Hellenici*, printed in Oxford in 1830 — and it was soon forgotten by the scholarly world.

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## HOMERIC DICTATED TEXTS: A REEXAMINATION OF SOME NEAR EASTERN EVIDENCE

DELBERT R. HILLERS AND MARSH H. MCCALL, JR.

ALBERT LORD'S theory of oral dictated texts has been for more than twenty years a fruitful element in the hugely difficult but crucial investigation of the early transmission of the Homeric poems.<sup>1</sup> Since the appearance of Lord's seminal article and his later treatment in *The Singer of Tales*, no serious discussion of Homeric transmission has omitted comment, whether positive or negative, on the Lord theory.<sup>2</sup> Two important and widely used books by distinguished Homerists have adduced parallels for dictated poetic texts from ancient Near Eastern literature. Webster, in examining possible connections between eastern and Mycenaean poetry, comments, "Two works listed in the catalogue of Ashurbanipal's library at Nineveh . . . have against them the note 'from the mouth of X.' This suggests that they were dictated by the poet."<sup>3</sup> After referring to several Hittite and Hurrian compositions, he says, "These are songs, therefore, and must have been recorded by dictation. Similarly the Ugaritic *Nikkal* begins 'I sing of Nikkal', and *Baal* was 'dictated by Attani-Puruleni, chief priest, chief shepherd.' Thus we have some evidence for what in any case we must assume that the poets dictated to the scribes, but no evidence that the poet himself was a scribe. He was a singer, who could dictate his songs to the scribe." Kirk, in discussing — and opposing — the Lord theory, notes, "'Oral dictated texts', then, are a practical possibility: this is also shown by the

<sup>1</sup> Lord's theory was first presented in "Homer's Originality: Oral Dictated Texts," *TAPA* 84 (1953) 124-134; subsequently reargued in *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) 124ff.

<sup>2</sup> See, as one example of many, A. Lesky, "Homeros," *RE* supp. 11 (1968) 704-705. The importance of the theory is well indicated and the central arguments on either side nicely juxtaposed in G. S. Kirk, ed., *The Language and Background of Homer* (Cambridge 1964). Kirk first outlines the controversy in his introduction (ix-x), then reprints (68-89) Lord's *TAPA* article and his own reply to it, "Homer and Modern Oral Poetry: Some Confusions," *CQ* 10 (1960) 271-281. See also, as a further stage in the debate, A. Parry, "Have We Homer's *Iliad*?" *YCS* 20 (1966) 175-216.

<sup>3</sup> T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer* (London 1958) 77.

short and rather poor Cretan song dictated in 1786 by the illiterate singer Pantzelió to a literate shepherd friend. More important, perhaps, certain Hurrian and Ugaritic songs of the 2nd millennium B.C. were dictated to scribes [here Kirk cites Webster]."<sup>4</sup>

Lord himself, so far as we know, has not made use of these eastern parallels. But as debate over his theory continues, as it is sure to do, every piece of evidence that has been thought relevant to the problem must be carefully scrutinized. This is particularly true in the present case since, first, the eastern parallels have been suggested by eminent scholars whose word commands respect; second, there is a growing realization among classicists of the depth and extent of eastern influences on early Greek literature,<sup>5</sup> which in turn lends additional credibility to any supposed individual instance; third, the actual Near Eastern documents on the basis of which the analogy has been argued are beyond the linguistic control of most classicists, which means that use of them cannot easily be checked.

We may conveniently begin with the colophon to a tablet of the Baal epic, which Webster cites. He relies on the widely used translations of H. L. Ginsberg<sup>6</sup> and G. R. Driver,<sup>7</sup> according to whom the Ugaritic term *lmd* must be translated "dictated." This same translation has recently been defended by J. C. de Moor, who concludes that "we have to do here with the first attempts to record a myth until then transmitted orally."<sup>8</sup>

Actually, Ugaritic *lmd* in this passage is not to be translated as the verb "dictated," but as a noun, "apprentice." It is a title of the scribe,

<sup>4</sup> G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962) 99.

<sup>5</sup> One thinks perhaps especially of the work of M. L. West and P. Walcot; see, e.g., Walcot's "The Comparative Study of Ugaritic and Greek Literature," *UF* 1 (1969) 111-118.

<sup>6</sup> In *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, 2nd ed., ed. James B. Pritchard (Princeton 1955) 141. The Ugaritic text of the colophon may be found in Andrée Herdner, *Corpus des tablettes en cunéiformes alphabétiques* no. 6 (Paris 1963) VI 53-57 = Cyrus Gordon, *Ugaritic Textbook*, *Analecta Orientalia* 38 no. 62 (Rome 1965) 53-57.

<sup>7</sup> *Canaanite Myths and Legends* (Edinburgh 1956) 115.

<sup>8</sup> *The Seasonal Pattern in the Ugaritic Myth of Ba'lu*, *Alter Orient und Altes Testament*, 16 (Kevelaer and Neukirchen 1971) 8; cf. p. 1 n. 2. In a brief note to an otherwise valuable article, "Prose and Poetry in the Mythic and Epic Texts from Ugarit," *HTR* 67 (1974) 1 n. 1, Frank Moore Cross, Jr., proposes the translation "master singer" for Ugaritic *lmd*, but without discussing the full range of evidence for correct understanding of the colophon, or bringing forward any cogent new evidence from Semitic for his rather startling suggestion (I Chron. 25:7 is scarcely relevant), so that one may perhaps for the present dismiss Cross's translation.

Elimelekh (Ilimilku). This suggestion was advanced long ago by R. Dussaud,<sup>9</sup> and the translation "apprentice" is given in the glossary of successive editions of Gordon's manual.<sup>10</sup> In his *Babylonische und assyrische Kolophone*,<sup>11</sup> Hermann Hunger correctly renders *lmd* "Schüler," as do M. Dietrich and O. Loretz in a recent lexicographical study.<sup>12</sup>

The evidence bearing on the question is as follows. The word *lmd* is not otherwise attested in Ugaritic in the sense "dictated." Various forms of the verb mean "learn" or "teach." Nor is there supporting evidence for a sense "dictate" in other Semitic languages. In biblical Hebrew *lmd* means "learn" or "teach," and the idea of dictation is expressed quite differently: *wayyiktōb . . . mippī X* (Jeremiah 36:4), literally "he wrote it at the mouth of X." Similarly in Akkadian, *lamādu* means "to learn, teach," etc., but not "dictate." In the rare cases in colophons where dictation is mentioned the expression is *ana pī . . . šaṭīr*, literally "written at the mouth of X."<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, *lmd* is well attested in Ugaritic in the sense "apprentice." One may compare biblical Hebrew *limmūd*, "pupil, disciple." Moreover, in Akkadian colophons, which are extant in abundance in comparison to our meager supply of Ugaritic examples, the scribe is frequently described as *šamallū*, "apprentice."

As a final point against the idea of dictation of Ugaritic texts, it is noteworthy that the tablets written by Elimelekh (Ilimilku) contain numerous scribal errors. Though no certainty is possible, it seems likely that these confusions of letters and other mistakes are copyists' errors and not errors of hearing.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of the Ugaritic *Nikkal* text, one must concede that it was intended to be sung; indeed also the other Ugaritic poetic texts may have been chanted. But one may question the logic of Webster's conclusion that such songs must have been composed orally and then

<sup>9</sup> *Les découvertes de Ras Shamra (Ugarit) et l'Ancien Testament* (Paris 1937) 31.

<sup>10</sup> Most recently in *Ugaritic Textbook*, glossary no. 1385. Oddly, Gordon in glossary no. 412 identifies *atn.prln* as "high priest and narrator of sacred myths."

<sup>11</sup> *Alter Orient und Altes Testament*, 2 (Kevelaer and Neukirchen-Vluyn 1968) 22.

<sup>12</sup> "Zur ugaritischen Lexikographie (V)," *UF* 4 (1972) 31-33.

<sup>13</sup> Hunger (above, n. 11) 8 and glossary s.v. *pū*.

<sup>14</sup> See Stanislav Segert, "Die Schreibfehler in den ugaritischen literarischen Keilschrifttexten," *Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 77 (Berlin 1961) 193-212 esp. 211, where Segert argues that the errors in the texts written by Ilimilku are best understood as copyists' errors.



recorded by dictation. The same objection would seem to apply to Webster's conclusion that the Hittite texts of Kumarbi and Ullikummi are called "songs" and therefore must have been recorded by dictation. Furthermore, the statement which introduces Hurrian passages in Hittite texts, namely "the singer of the land of Hurri sings as follows," is a rubric, a direction for performance, which permits no conclusion as to manner of composition and transmission.<sup>15</sup>

Webster's reference to works mentioned in the catalogue of the library of Ashurbanipal is puzzling and apparently incorrect. There is no single ancient catalogue of Ashurbanipal's library; there are several tablets or parts of tablets which contain catalogues of various kinds of compositions.<sup>16</sup> Apparently Webster is referring to a list of compositions (both poetic and prose, be it noted) which contains (not just twice, but repeatedly) the expression *ša pi X*, literally "of the mouth of X." This catalogue, known in part since 1880, has recently been edited and translated by W. G. Lambert, making use of newly identified fragments.<sup>17</sup> In an earlier article Lambert had hesitated over whether the phrase in question indicated authorship or editorship; a new bit (I 4) compels the conclusion that it refers to authorship, and Lambert translates the recurring phrase: "This is by (Ea, Oannes-Adapa, etc.)." Dictation is not implied; all the historical figures named as authors were literate, since they are given priestly titles and the designation *ummânu*, "scholar." Presumably we must suppose that such "authors" as the god Ea and several semilegendary figures are also thought of as literate writers.

There are a very few Akkadian colophons which refer to dictation of a text, in one case the dictation of a poetic text.<sup>18</sup> This is clearly exceptional, and apparently was regarded as undesirable, a last resort. Laessøe notes this somewhat plaintive statement: "Written at the dictation of the scholar (*ummânu*); I did not see the ancient copy"

<sup>15</sup> See E. Forrer, "Die Inschriften und Sprachen des Hatti-Reiches," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 76 (1922) 195-196, for references to Hurrian singers; see F. Hrozný, "Die Lösung des hethitischen Problems," *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft* 56 (1915), for a brief discussion of the use of Hurrian in the Hittite cult.

<sup>16</sup> See C. Bezold, *Catalogue of the Cuneiform Tablets in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum* V (London 1899) xxix-xxx. We are grateful to Dr. J. J. Roberts for assistance with Akkadian materials.

<sup>17</sup> "A Catalogue of Texts and Authors," *JCS* 16 (1962) 59-77.

<sup>18</sup> See Hunger (above, n. 11) 8. For the whole text see E. Ebeling, "Bewehrungen gegen den Feind und den bösen Blick aus dem Zweistromlande," *Ar. Or.* 17 (1949) 178-183.

(Hunger's no. 486).<sup>19</sup> It may be observed that even where dictation takes place it is from a literate scholar.

Our conclusion is brief. The bulk of the evidence from Near Eastern literature cited in support of Lord's theory of Homeric dictated texts should not be so used. On the other hand, one bit of eastern evidence seems to have been overlooked, the well-known story of how the prophet Jeremiah dictated a collection of his oracles, some or most of them certainly poetic, to his amanuensis Baruch (Jeremiah 36). The plausibility of the Lord theory will not, of course, stand or fall on the basis of the details discussed here. It must also be stressed that Lord's work has stimulated new views of the origin especially of Ugaritic poetic texts, which seem to many to display formulas and themes similar to what Lord has analyzed in the Homeric poems.<sup>20</sup> There is every reason to expect a continuing interchange between classical and Near Eastern studies on the subject of Lord's theories. Our purpose has been simply to help to clarify the terms in which the proposition of oral dictated texts should be debated.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> J. Laessøe, "Literary and Oral Tradition in Ancient Mesopotamia," in *Studia orientalia Ioanni Pedersen . . . dicata* (Hauniae 1953) 213. Laessøe concludes: "it would seem to appear that oral tradition was only reluctantly relied upon, and in this particular case only because for some reason or other an original written document was not available. The reservation with which an instance of oral tradition is reproduced here should make us cautious against underestimating the significance of written tradition in Mesopotamia."

<sup>20</sup> See, e.g., Frank Moore Cross, Jr., *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973) 112 and the reference there to the forthcoming work of Richard Whitaker, based on his 1970 Harvard dissertation, "A Formulaic Analysis of Ugaritic Poetry."

<sup>21</sup> A draft of this paper has profited from the suggestions of Professor G. Nagy.



# OBSERVATIONS ON THE "NESTOR'S CUP" INSCRIPTION

CALVERT WATKINS

THE Ionic inscription on the eighth century skyphos from the Italian island of Ischia (in antiquity, Pithekoussai), known as "Nestor's cup" (SEG XIV, 604), has given rise to a great deal of discussion since its discovery in 1954 and original publication in 1955.<sup>1</sup> This discussion, however, has remained within the domains of Greek epigraphy, archaeology, and literary history (including metrics); it is somewhat surprising, in view of the great antiquity of the text, that it has not claimed the detailed attention of students of Greek and Indo-European linguistics, nor of comparative metrics. It is from the latter two points of view that I would like to approach the text.

## I

The first reading of the inscription in Buchner and Russo (p. 222), in *SEG*, and repeated (with minor variations) in Dihle's most recent treatment, is (omitting all restorations)

Νεστορος : ξ[ ]ι : ευποτ[ ] : ποτεριο[ ]  
 hos δ α τοδε π[ ]σι : ποτερι[ ] : αυτικα κενον  
 ημερ[ ] εσει : καλλιστε[ ] νο : Αφροδιτες.

However, the facsimile in Rüter and Matthiessen (p. 240) gives the most up-to-date version of the text, incorporating two new join-sherds: the first mentioned in an addendum to the editio princeps of Buchner and Russo (p. 234) and the second visible in Metzger's pl. 17 (see n. 1, above). The three lines of the text now read

<sup>1</sup> G. Buchner and C. F. Russo, *RAL* 10 (1955) 215-234. For further references note especially T. B. L. Webster, *Glotta* 38 (1960) 253f; L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 253f; H. Metzger, *REA* 67 (1965) 301-305, who to my mind effectively defends the early dating of the inscription itself; A. E. Raubitschek in *L'épigramme grecque* 9-11 (Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens* 14 [1968]); K. Rüter and K. Matthiessen, *Zs. f. Pap. u. Epigr.* 2 (1968) 231-255; and most recently in extenso A. Dihle, *Hermes* 97 (1969) 257-261. A short note of M. L. West, *Zs. f. Pap. u. Epigr.* 6 (1970) 171-173, follows Dihle's interpretation and criticizes K. Alpers, *Glotta* 47 (1969) 170-174.

Νεστορος : ε[ ]ι : ευποτ[ον] : ποτῆριον  
 hos δ'α τῶδε πιῆσι : ποτῆρι[ο] : αυτικά κῆνον  
 ημερος hairēsei : καλλιστε[φα]νῶ : Αφροδιτῆς

thus confirming restorations already made by the original editors and others. In the remaining lacunae, their restorations ευποτ[ον] and καλλιστε[φα]νῶ incorporated in lines 1 and 3 are universally admitted; that of genitive ποτῆρι[ο] in line 2 is admitted by everyone but Page (*CR* n.s. 6 [1956], 95–97), whose ποτῆρι[ον], however, must be excluded for reasons both of the available space and of grammar (Dihle 260 n. 1). It is this text which must serve as the point of departure for further discussion.

It seems to have gone altogether unnoticed in the linguistic literature that the new fragment establishing πιῆσι is a “glänzende Bestätigung,” in the same sense as the famous Arcadian 1 sg. opt. ἐξελαυνοια (*IG* V ii 343; Schw. 665; Buck 21); for it removes the asterisk from a whole class of subjunctive endings presupposed by Jakob Wackernagel for Homeric grammar in 1897.<sup>2</sup> Subjunctives ἐθέλῃσι, φέρῃσι, \*πίῃσι in the Homeric textual tradition reflect \*ἐθέλῃσι, \*φέρῃσι, πιῆσι with long vowel and primary ending -ησι < \*-ητι = (or ≅) Indo-Iranian -āti. Before the discovery of the confirmatory fragment, π[ιῆ]σι rather than π[ιῆι]σι was indeed already correctly restored by E. Handley (in Buchner and Russo 227), and to his and their credit the two editors did appreciate its significance. But the point is completely obscured by authors like Webster (above, n. 1, p. 253 n. 1), who asserts that the new find “confirms πίῃσι.” Rüter and Matthiessen also take cognizance of the form, but their statement “πίῃσι bewahrt das später ausgefallene intervokalische σ” betrays a lack of linguistic sophistication. Dihle, most recently, simply prints π[ιῃ]σι, πιῃσι without comment.

The corresponding long-vowel subjunctive with secondary ending, IE \*-ē(-t?) (similarly remade in Hom. πίῃ κ 328) is found in the early Boeotian metrical vase inscription of Μογεᾶ: πιῆ, *IG* VII 3467<sub>4</sub>, Schw. 441, Buck 38.5. The linguistic reality of the long-vowel thematic subjunctive endings, as in πιῆ, πιῆσι, can no longer be questioned; how they are to be historically accounted for is a separate issue.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>2</sup> *Vermischte Beiträge zur griech. Sprachkunde* 50–51. Cf. Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.* 1.661, 791; Chantraine, *Gr. hom.* 1.461; and Watkins, *Idg. Gr.* III 1.61, 125.

<sup>3</sup> At the present I am still inclined to regard the secondary ending as basic and to derive \*ἐθέλῃσι, πιῆσι from \*ἐθέλῃ + σι, πιῆ + σι, like ἐθέλωμι from ἐθέλω + μι, as a Greek innovation.



status of  $\pi\epsilon\sigma\iota$  as a linguistic archaism would appear to exclude a dating of the graffito itself to as late as the sixth century, in which the Ionic 3 sg. subjunctive ending was  $-\epsilon\iota$  ( $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\phi\sigma\epsilon\iota$  on the lekythos of Cumae, IG XIV 865, Schw. 786, Buck 10).

## II

The central point of A. Dihle's recent discussion of the inscription is concerned with the restoration of the beginning of line 2. For  $\text{hos } \delta \alpha \text{ } \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\epsilon\sigma\iota : \text{ποτῆρι}[\omicron] \dots$  M. Guarducci had proposed  $\text{hos } \delta' \alpha \langle \nu \rangle \text{ } \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\epsilon\sigma\iota : \text{ποτῆρι}[\omicron]$ , which gained general acceptance.<sup>4</sup> To this Dihle objected on the one hand that  $\alpha\nu$  is superfluous or at any rate not obligatory in "iterative" relative clauses with the subjunctive, citing Chantraine, *Gr. hom.* 2.246 and *E* 407, *E* 81; on the other hand, and more important, that the (partitive) genitive with  $\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$  in Greek can refer only to the drink itself, not to the drinking vessel. He therefore proposed to correct the verse to read  $\text{hos } \delta' \alpha \langle \text{πο} \rangle \text{ } \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\epsilon\sigma\iota : \text{ποτῆρι}[\omicron] \dots$

To this suggestion several serious objections can be raised. Such a miswriting "als eine Art von Haplographie . . . *ΑΠΟ ΤΟΔΕ*" is less than credible in a writer who has just successfully negotiated *EYIIOT[ON] : ΠΟΤΕΡΙΟΝ* at the end of the preceding line, with the *E* of *ΠΟΤΕΡΙΟΝ* written over an *O*; the writer would have been particularly sensitive at that point to precisely the sequence *ΠΟΤΟ*. Haplography would carry conviction only if the text had had *ΑΠΟΠΟΤΕΡΙΟ*, which it did not. On the other hand, the omission of the *N* of *AN* before homorganic stop is readily explainable.

The superfluous nature of  $\alpha\nu$  in this construction is not borne out by the two Homeric parallels adduced by Dihle, both of which are generalizing, proverb-like relative clauses: *E* 407,  $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \delta\eta\nu\alpha\iota\delta\varsigma \delta\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\iota\sigma\iota \mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\tau\alpha\iota$  *E* 81  $\beta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \delta\varsigma \phi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\omega\nu \text{ } \rho\omicron\phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\nu \eta\grave{\epsilon} \acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{\omega}\eta$ . The sentence  $\text{hos } \delta' \alpha \langle \nu \rangle \dots \pi\epsilon\sigma\iota \dots \kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu \mid \text{ } \eta\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma \text{ } \chi\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota$ , where the relative clause with  $\alpha\nu$  and the subjunctive has the force of a condition and the main clause or apodosis is in the future, has a perfect parallel in the sixth-century lekythos of Cumae cited above:  $\text{hos } \delta' \alpha\nu \mu\epsilon \kappa\lambda\epsilon\phi\sigma\epsilon\iota \text{ } \theta\upsilon\phi\lambda\omicron\varsigma \text{ } \epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ . From Homer cf. *S* 270,  $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma \gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho \acute{\alpha}\phi\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$  "Ιλιον ἱρῆν  $\delta\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \phi\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta$ , and Chantraine's comment, *Gr. hom.* 2.247: "Dans ces exemples, c'est l'avenir qui est envisagé, et un cas éventuel

<sup>4</sup> Webster's note (above, n. 1, p. 253 n. 1), that a new fragment "confirms  $\delta' \alpha\nu$ " is simply wrong, perhaps a lapsus for  $\text{ποτῆριον}$  of line 1: *HOΣΔΑΤΟΔΕΠΙ* was unequivocal from the initial finds.

souligné par *κε*, au lieu que le subjonctif seul convient plutôt à un énoncé général." Note in addition *ὅς κε πῖν κ* 328, likewise with verse-initial relative pronoun, and the same verb.

Furthermore, there is the objection that the more usual preposition with a drinking vessel is not *ἀπό*, but *ἐξ*. Compare *I* 469, *πολλὸν δ' ἐκ κεράμων μέθυ πίνετο*; *H* 480, *οἶνον δ' ἐκ δεπᾶων χαμάδις χέον*; *Pi. Fr.* 166, *ἐξ ἀργυρέων κεράτων πίνοντες*; *Hermipp. fr.* 43, *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κέρατος αὖ μοι δὸς πιεῖν*. The only example I find of *ἀπό* in this use in Homer is before a pronoun: *Π* 225–226, *ἔνθα δέ οἱ δέπας ἔσκε<sup>5</sup> τετυγμένον οὐδέ τις ἄλλος / οὔτ' ἀνδρῶν πίνεσκεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ αἶθοπα οἶνον*. Here it is perhaps noteworthy that we have also the only case in the *Iliad* of hiatus (*αὐτοῦ*, \**αὐτόο*) before the formula *αἶθοπα* (*F*)*οἶνον* in its normal (8 times out of 9) fixed position between bucolic diaeresis and verse end. The validity of *Π* 226 as a parallel is thus somewhat suspect.

Consider finally the usage with *ἀφύσσω* 'draw (a liquid)', and mixing or storage vessels. We find *ἀπό* where the source vessel alone is mentioned, and no recipient as destination: *A* 598, *οἶνοχόει γλυκὺ νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσω*; *K* 578–579, *ἀπὸ δὲ κρητῆρος Ἀθήνη / πλείου ἀφυσσόμενοι λείβον μελιγδέα οἶνον*. Where both source vessel and recipient are designated, we find *ἐξ* for the former and the dative (-locative) for the latter:<sup>6</sup> *T* 295–296, *οἶνον δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφυσσόμενοι δεπάεσσιν / ἔκχεον*; *ι* 9–10, *μέθυ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσω / οἶνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι*. And where only the recipient is mentioned, we find in the *Odyssey* *ἐν* with the dative(-locative): *β* 349, *ἄγε δὴ μοι οἶνον ἐν ἀμφιφορεῦσιν ἄφυσσον*; *β* 370, *οἶνον ἐν ἀμφιφορεῦσιν ἄφυσσεν*; *ι* 164, *πολλὸν γὰρ ἐν ἀμφιφορεῦσιν ἕκαστοι / ἠφύσαμεν*; *ι* 204, *οἶνον ἐν ἀμφιφορεῦσι δυώδεκα πᾶσιν ἀφύσσας*. But in one passage in the *Odyssey*, where *ἀφύσσω* is in the passive and the source alone is mentioned, we find precisely the genitive(-ablative) without preposition: *ψ* 305, *πολλὸς δὲ πίθων ἠφύσσετο οἶνος* (cited already by Buchner and Russo, p. 227). This has nothing to do with the passive; the same construction is found with an active verb of drawing-off in *Archil.* 4.7 *W*: *κοίλων πώματ' ἄφελκε κάδων*. There is

<sup>5</sup> Note that here *ἔσκε* is not an Ionic iterative imperfect like *πίνεσκεν*, *σπένδεσκε* of the following lines, but the substantive verb. Compare *ἦσκε* in the same function in *Alcman* 74 *P*, and in the construction with the dative of possession *ἔνθα δέ οἱ δέπας ἔσκε*, compare Old Latin *ast ei custos nec escit* (*XII Tab.* 5, 7b), on which see E. Fraenkel, *Kl. Schr.* 2.445–446, and Watkins, *To honor Roman Jakobson* 2191–2198.

<sup>6</sup> For the apparent dative (-locative) alone, of *ξ* 112, *σκύφον ᾧ περ ἔπινεν*, see below.

surely no great syntactic or semantic leap from  $\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\omega\nu \eta\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\tau\omicron \omicron\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ,  $\pi\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau'$  ἄφελκε κάδων, to  $\tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\iota\epsilon\sigma\iota \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\iota[\omicron]$ .

I conclude that both grammar and palaeography distinctly favor the accepted reading  $\hbar\omicron\varsigma \delta' \alpha\langle\nu\rangle \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\iota\epsilon\sigma\iota : \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\iota[\omicron]$ , and thereby necessarily exclude the emendation  $\alpha\langle\pi\omicron\rangle \tau\omicron\delta\epsilon \pi\iota\epsilon\sigma\iota : \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\iota[\omicron]$ .

Some remarks from comparative syntax are perhaps in order.<sup>7</sup> In Vedic Sanskrit, as in Homeric Greek (and contemporary Russian), the verb 'to drink' may take either an accusative or a partitive genitive of the liquid drunk, reflecting an inherited semantic opposition: *RV* 1.47.3, 5, *pātām sōmam* 'drink the soma'; 1.46.5, *pātām sōmasya* 'drink of the soma'.<sup>8</sup> To drink from a vessel is expressed in Vedic by the verb *pā-*, with the vessel in the ablative and the liquid in the accusative: *RV* 1.15.1, *pibata . . . potrād* 'drink from the vessel of the potṛ'; 2.36.4, *pibāgnīdhrāt* 'drink from the vessel of the agnidh'; 2.37.1, 2, 3, *hotrāt* (*/potrāt/neṣṭrāt*) *sōmam . . . piba* 'drink the soma from vessel of the *h./p./n.*'. In the succeeding strophe of the same hymn a series of potations (with the ablative) is transformed into a set by the completive force of the ordinal, and the final vessel is this time in the accusative, to express complete participation of the entity in the message, total consumption: 2.37.4, *āpād dhotrād utā potrād amattotā neṣṭrād ajuṣata . . . turīyam pātram . . . pibatu* 'he drank from the vessel of the hotṛ, caroused from the vessel of the potṛ, tasted from the vessel of the neṣṭṛ . . .; let him drink the fourth vessel'. The compound *ā pā-* has the same sense: *RV* 2.36.6, *praśāstrād ā pibataṃ somyām mādhu* 'drink the Somic sweetness from the vessel of the praśāstar'. Later Vedic shows *nīṣ pā-*: *TS* 2.3.11.4-5, *hīraṇyād* (5) *ghṛtām nīṣ pibaty āyur vāi ghṛtām amṛtam hīraṇyam amṛtād evāyur nīṣ pibati* 'From the gold he drinks away the ghee; ghee is life, gold is ambrosia; verily from the ambrosia he drinks away life' (tr. Keith). The verbal adjective is used of a vessel exactly like *ευποτον ποτῆριον* in *ŚB* 1.6.3.16, *nīṣpīto dṛtīr iva* 'like a leather bottle drained of its contents' (tr. Eggeling).

A clear Vedic analogue to the Homeric formula *ἐνθεν ἔπιον* (to be

<sup>7</sup> The essential on this was already stated for Indic, Greek, and Latin by B. Delbrück, *Abl. Loc. Instr.* 13-14 (Berlin 1867), and for Indic, *Altind. Syntax* 109 (Halle 1888). But since Delbrück had in part changed his mind by 1893, and the presentation in the *Vergl. Syntax* (= *Grdr.* 3) 1.211, 250 is much less detailed, it is worthwhile reexamining the data, and supplementing them from other languages of the family.

<sup>8</sup> These two particular examples, followed by a line-final epithet of 4 and 3 syllables respectively, indicate that at least to some extent the original semantic contrast was being neutralized in Vedic in favor of purely metrical considerations.



discussed below), noted already by Delbrück in 1867 but not mentioned since, is the use of the ablative adverb *tātaḥ* 'from there' (*-taḥ* functionally = *-θεν*, formally and functional = Lat. *-tus* in *funditus*, etc.) in *RV* 8.5.19 *yó ha váṁ mádhuno dṛtiḥ . . . tātaḥ pibātam* 'the leather bottle of sweetness . . . drink therefrom!'<sup>9</sup>

In early Latin the ablative is frequent: Plaut. *Stich.* 693–694, *quibu' diuitiae domi sunt, scaphio et cantharis / batiocis bibunt, at nos nostro Samiolo poterio* (note the borrowing of *ποτήριον*); *ibid.* 730, *uno cantharo potare, unum scortum ducere*; *Pers.* 821, *bibere da usque plenis cantharis*; Lucilius 303 Marx, *poclo bibo eodem*. Bennett, *Synt. of Early Lat.* 2.328, inclines to taking these as old instrumentals rather than old ablatives, invoking Delbrück, *Grdr.* 3.250 (who however is quite equivocal: "Es kann aber auch der ablativ sein"). But that we have a true ablative here is indicated by the demonstrative in Cato, *Agr.* 127.1, *oblinito amphoram et post dies XXX aperito et utitor . . . hinc bibito quantum uoles sine periculo*. Latin *hinc* has the same ablatival reference as Greek *ἐνθεν* and Vedic *tātaḥ*.

In Old Norse the expression is *drekkja* plus *ór* (Gmc. *\*uz*) with the "dative" of the vessel, continuing the Indo-European ablative: *Grímnismal* 7<sup>3</sup>, *þar þau Óðinn ók Sága drekkja um alla daga / glöð ór gollnom kerom* 'There O. and S. drink every day gladly from golden cups'; *Fáfnismal* 30.2, *drakk han blóð ór undinni* 'he drank blood from the wound'. Compare German *trinken aus*. 'To drink off, quaff' (cf. German *austrinken*), with the vessel understood from the context, is expressed in Old Norse by *drekkja af*, used absolutely: *Grímnismal* Prol. 35ff, *Agnarr gekk at Grímní ók gaf hánom horn fullt at drekkja . . . Grímnir drakk af* 'A. went to G. and gave him a full horn to drink . . . G. drank [it]'; *Sinfjötla* 12, *Sigmundur tók hornit ók drakk af* 'S. took the horn and drank [it]'. These absolute uses exactly parallel those of *ἐκπίνω* in the *Odyssey* κ 237 = 318 (cf. ι 361), *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δῶκέν τε καὶ ἔκπιον*; ι 353 *ὁ δ' ἔδεκτο καὶ ἔκπιεν*. Where in later Greek the vessel is overtly expressed with *ἐκπίνω*, it is in the accusative expected to express total consumption; Alcaeus 376 L-P (in *tmesi*), *ἐκ δὲ ποτήριον πώνης*; *Soph. frg.* 483, *ἐκπίνοντι χρύσειον κέρας*.

<sup>9</sup> On the other hand to drink from a natural source is expressed by the genitive alone: *SB* 9.3.1.24, *ya etāsāṁ nadinām pibanti* 'those who drink from these rivers'. This suggests that the genitive in the equivalent Greek construction, as in *Theognis* 962, *ἀλλης δὴ κρήνης πόμαι ἢ ποταμοῦ*, is an inherited genitive, rather than an original ablative with Buchner and Russo, p. 227. The point is of some interest for Indo-European syntax, and further collections from other languages would be welcome.

In Old Irish, where the abstract local case categories have come to be expressed by prepositional phrases, 'to drink from (a vessel)' is expressed by *ibid* (\**pibeti*, oldest 1 sg. *i(u)bu* < \**pibō*-, *AL* 2.19, 20) with the preposition *a* (\**eks*) and the "dative": Vita Brigittae §26, *tuc dam mo chuad feisin isi n-ibim lán de uisciu* 'bring me my own vessel out of which I drink, full of water'; *AL* IV 356x, *conid asa bais uile hebhait* 'and it is out of her hand they all drink' (leg. *uili'ebat* [Bergin's law]). The gloss at *AL* V 408, 13 is found also in O'Davoren 539, and despite the late form of the conjugated preposition probably incorporates traditional material (cf. V. Hull, *ZCP* 29 [1964] 321-324, with references): *cnoe gnoe* .i. *cno mora aibinde*; 7 *ní eistib eabar in t-aircitol*, *acht is díb* 'fair nuts, i.e. great, beautiful nuts, and it is not out of them poetry is drunk, but it is from them.' Here it is possible to suggest that *eis(t)ib* continues an old ablative and *díb* an old genitive, though the prepositions themselves are of course inherited (\**eks*, \**dē*). We may note that the preverb *ass-* (\**eks*) is used with *ibid* in place of normal *ro* to express perfectivity (Thurneysen, *OIr Gram.* § 534); in this respect it is semantically and formally identical with Gk. *ἐκπινω*, and may be an inheritance.

In Old Hittite we find two constructions as well: the accusative of the vessel to express total consumption, and the instrumental of the vessel to express drinking from it. For the accusative (pl. nt.): *KBo* XVII 74 +, ed. E. Neu, *StBoT* 12 (1970) IV 33'-34' (restored from the duplicate *KBo* XVII II IV 15', in old ductus) *šu-wa-a-ru ku-e GAL<sup>BI.A</sup> ak-ku-uš-ki-iz-zí ta a-pí-e-pát e-ku-zi* 'Whatever vessels he [the king] usually drinks (in) full, those he drinks.' For the instrumental, in the same text (cf. Neu's n. 15, p. 13): III 42' *GAL<sup>BI.A</sup> IŠKUR šu-up-pí-iš-du-wa-ri-it a-ku-an-zi* 'They [king and queen] drink from the pure<sup>10</sup> vessel of the Storm-God'. The phrase *IŠ-TU BI-IB-RI* 'from a rhyton' with the graphemic convention for logogram in the instrumental is common in rituals: *KBo* XVII 75 IV 21' *IŠ-TU BI-IB-RI GUD GUŠKIN e-ku-zi* 'he drinks from a golden cow-rhyton'; *KBo* IV 13 VI 1-2 *IŠ-TU BI-IB-RI UR.MAH<sup>1</sup> a-ku-wa-an-zi* 'they drink from a lion-rhyton'; *KBo* XIX 128 IV 35 et passim (ed. Otten, *StBoT* 13) *IŠ-TU BI-IB-RI GUD/UR.MAH<sup>1</sup>/ŠEG<sup>9</sup>.BAR a-ku-wa-an-zi* 'they drink from a cow-/lion-/wild sheep-rhyton.'

Now in Hittite the ablative and instrumental cases partially overlap in function (Friedrich, *Heth. Elem.*<sup>2</sup> 125), and have completely merged in Luvian, with the generalization of the (perhaps more recent?) ending

<sup>10</sup> For the translation of *šuppištuwara-* (Neu, "glänzend?") see my note 4 in "The Indo-European family of Greek *ῥυγίς*," *BSL* 70 (1975) 13.

-*tī* corresponding to the Hittite ablative ending -*z* < \*-*tī*. The Hittite instrumental ending -*it*, -*et*, -*t* is cognate with the -*d* of Indo-Iranian ablative -*ād*, Old Latin -*ōd*, etc. That this ending is more basic to the ablative function in Hittite is suggested by its presence in the pronominal constituents (instr. *ket*, *kīt* 'this') of Old Hittite phrases like *ke-e-et* *ÍD-aš* 'on this side of the river' and *ki-it-pa-an-ta-la-za* 'from this time on', on which see Ph. Houwink ten Cate, *RHA* 79 (1966) 123-132 and F. Josephson, *ibid.* 133-154 (though I disagree with their analyses and interpretations).

In view of the overt ablative in the earliest Indic, the preposition *ór* plus ablative "dative" in Old Norse and other Germanic languages, the preposition *a* (\**eks*) in Irish, and the instrumental (-ablative) in -*t* of Old Hittite, we are entitled to conclude that the construction with the ablative of the vessel was a normal syntactic means — by no means necessarily the only one — of expressing 'to drink from a vessel' in Indo-European itself. In Greek the genitive continues the functions of the Indo-European ablative, as is well known (cf. μέλιτος γλυκίων = *melle dulcior* = *ghṛtāt svādīyas* 'sweeter than ghee', ἐκ / ἀπό τινος = *ex/ab, ē/ā quō*); I suggest it is precisely this inherited Indo-European construction that we find in "Nestor's cup": *hos δ' α<ν> τῷδε πιῖσι ποτῆρι[ō]*. In a text from the eighth century B.C. this is not a construction to be emended out of existence; it is a precious vestige, a primary document for the historical syntax of the Greek language.

We have in Homer indirect testimony for the same inherited ablative construction, in the use of πίνω with the relative adverb ἔνθεν 'whence, from which': δ 220, αὐτίκ' ἄρ' εἰς οἶνον βάλε φάρμακον, ἔνθεν ἔπινον; τ 62, καὶ δέπα,<sup>11</sup> ἔνθεν ἄρ' ἄνδρες ὑπερμενέοντες ἔπινον. In ἔνθεν we have the same ablative suffix as in relative ὅθεν, interrogative πόθεν 'whence', etc.; see M. Lejeune, *Les adverbes grecs en -θεν* 375ff. In ἔνθεν ἔπινον we have precisely the equivalent of Vedic *tataḥ pibātam* and Old Latin *hinc bibito*, which assures both the ablative nature of the construction in Greek, and the fact of its inheritance. Formally ἔνθεν is a Greek innovation; functionally, it has replaced an older ablative of the relative in this construction, in the formula ἔνθεν ἔπινον, between bucolic diaeresis and verse end. (In τ 62 the formula has been "split.") I suggest that we have an indirect trace of the original ablative of the relative, in the same formula and the identical metrical slot, in ξ 112, καὶ οἱ πλησόμενος δῶκε σκύφον ᾧ περ ἔπινον. That is

<sup>11</sup> The neuter plural δέπα in its three Homeric attestations (ο 466, τ 62, υ 153) is always followed by a word with initial vowel, and should presumably be printed δέπα', elided from the expected \*δέπαα. Cf. the Mycenaean dual *dipae*.



to say that  $\tilde{\omega}$  of the Vulgate here conceals the Common Greek ablative of the relative pronoun  $\tilde{\omega} < *i\tilde{o}d = \text{Ved. } y\tilde{a}d$ , which is well attested in West Greek, both in literary Doric (e.g. Theocr. 3.10-11,  $\tau\eta\nu\tilde{\omega}\theta\epsilon$  [ $\tau\eta\nu\tilde{\omega}$  δέ? v. Gow ad loc.]  $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu \tilde{\omega} \mu' \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\nu \kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu \tau\tilde{\upsilon}$ ) and in dialect inscriptions (e.g. the Cretan laws of Gortyna [IC 4.72] 10.36  $\alpha\pi\omicron \tau\tilde{o} \lambda\alpha\tilde{o} \tilde{o} \alpha\pi\alpha\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu\tau\iota$  'from the stone whence they make proclamations'; Locrian [Schw. 362, Buck 57],  $\epsilon\nu \tau\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\iota} \pi\omicron\lambda\tilde{\iota} \hbar\tilde{o} \kappa' \tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}$  'in the city from which he is'). The ablative in  $-\omega$  of  $\tilde{\omega}$ ,  $\tilde{o}\pi\omega$  (and note especially Delphic  $\Phi\omicron\iota\kappa\omega$ , Schw. 323, Buck 52 C 23) has not been identified in any non-Doric dialect of alphabetic Greek. But it has been suggested for Mycenaean,<sup>12</sup> and it is clear from the documents of this dialect and isolated vestiges like loc. plur.  $\text{Μεγαροῖ}$  'in  $\text{Μέγαρα}$ ' that the functional syncretisms which resulted in the five-case system of Homeric and classical Greek must have taken place largely in the four centuries between Mycenaean and Homer, and that Common Greek in all likelihood possessed a case-system fully as rich as that of Indo-Iranian or Hittite. In eighth century Ionic  $\hbar\omicron\varsigma \delta' \alpha\langle\nu\rangle \tau\tilde{o}\delta\epsilon \pi\iota\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\iota \pi\omicron\tau\tilde{\epsilon}\rho\iota[\tilde{o}]$  we probably have a synchronic genitive, and no longer the formal reflex of the Common Greek ablative in  $-\tilde{o}$ , which I suggested was preserved in the Homeric formula  $*\tilde{\omega} \pi\epsilon\rho \tilde{\epsilon}\pi\iota\nu\epsilon\nu$  (whence at some point in the tradition  $\tilde{\omega} \pi\epsilon\rho \tilde{\epsilon}\pi\iota\nu\epsilon\nu$ ). But in the construction  $\tau\tilde{o}\delta\epsilon \pi\iota\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\iota \pi\omicron\tau\tilde{\epsilon}\rho\iota[\tilde{o}]$  we have still the functional reflex of the Common Greek ablative, itself continuing a syntactic construction of Indo-European antiquity.

### III

Lines 2 and 3 of the Nestor's cup inscription are dactylic hexameters, and demonstrate the same skill and artistry of their author qua  $\alpha\omicron\iota\delta\acute{o}\varsigma$  in varying epic formulae as the author of the Dipylon vase inscription. Compare his framing of line 2 between  $\hbar\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\tilde{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ , the pronominal constituents of the bipartite relative sentence; placing  $\kappa\tilde{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$  in line-final position, where it is not found in Homer, creates an artistic tension of enjambment between meter and syntax. Verse-initial  $\hbar\iota\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma \hbar\alpha\iota\rho\tilde{\epsilon}\varsigma\epsilon\iota$  stands in creative contrast with Homeric  $\tilde{\iota}\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma \alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$  and variants, always verse-final. The word  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\phi\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma$  makes its first appearance here; its second is in the *Hymn to Demeter*

<sup>12</sup> See A. Morpurgo, *RAL* 15 (1960) 33-61; A. Morpurgo Davies, *Proc. Camb. Conf. Myc. Stud.*, eds. L. R. Palmer and J. Chadwick (1966) 191-202; P. Ilievski, *SMEA* 12 (1970) 88-116; M. Lejeune, *RPh* 39 (1965) 14-20 = *Mém. de philol. mycén.* III (Incun. Graeca 43, Rome, 1972) 13-20.

(251, 295), as an epithet of that goddess. For Aphrodite cf. *θ* 267, *ἔυστεφάνου τ' Ἀφροδίτης*, and in the *Hymn to Demeter* 102, *φιλοστ-εφάνου Ἀφροδίτης*.

J. A. Notopoulos, *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 196, was the first to note the relevance of our text to the theory of "oral poetry"<sup>13</sup> and formulaic composition. Dihle's objection that the use of the non-epic word *ποτήριον* proves this is non-formulaic poetry does not follow;<sup>14</sup> the little poem on the skyphos is not an epic. Greek melic poetry has an ancient tradition of phraseology and meter independent of epic,<sup>15</sup> and the canons of admissible vocabulary in Greek melic poetry are different from those in epic: Sappho's *ὄλισβος* (99.5 L-P) comes to mind. The same papyrus fragment of Sappho (line 13) probably attests the likewise non-epic *χρηστήριον*; the only Homeric word with the suffix of *ποτήριον* is *θελκτήριον*.<sup>16</sup>

It is curious that in the two hexameters the first word-divider to occur in each line marks rather the caesura of the verse: *HOΣΔΑΤΟΔΕΠΠΕΣΙ*·, *HIMEPOΣHAIPEΣΣΕΙ*·. The editors originally restored *HIMEP-[OΣ:HAIP]EΣΣΕΙ*·, but the subsequent join filling the lacuna showed the word-divider absent. The point is perhaps of some theoretical interest for students of metrics.

Buchner and Russo, and virtually all subsequent commentators save Jeffery, regard line 1 of the inscription as also metrical, and specifically as a slightly irregular iambic trimeter. Compare Dihle's recent statement (p. 257): "Die erste Zeile, deren Charakter als der eines Trimeters trotz der durch den Eigennamen verursachten Unregelmässigkeit kaum zu bezweifeln sein dürfte . . ."; West's (n. 1, above) is even more concise: "Der erste Vers der Inschrift ist sicher ein Trimeter . . .". With these views in general I am in complete agreement; I should only like to focus attention on the apparent irregularity from a historical perspective.

<sup>13</sup> I would prefer to avoid this term since its connotations for many imply the absence of literacy. This is unwarranted: the context of the composition of poetry in Ireland down to Elizabethan times, a country that had been in principle literate for a millenium, should alert us to the fundamental irrelevance of literacy to the nature of poetic composition in archaic societies.

<sup>14</sup> His statement that the equally non-epic word *εὐποτος* on the other hand is a "vielleicht sogar altepisches Epitheton" is scientifically arbitrary, even if possibly correct.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. G. Nagy, *Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter* (Cambridge, 1974), and the remarks of C. H. Whitman, *ibid.* p. xi.

<sup>16</sup> On the word *ποτήριον* and its further peregrinations into other languages of Italy (*ποτερεμ* in Bruttium, 5th or 4th cent.) see M. Lejeune, *REA* 75 (1973) 1-8.



That line 1 is the beginning of the poem is clear; the δ(ε) of line 2 surely indicates that it is a continuation of the poetic message. For the combination of iambic trimeter with dactylic hexameter attention has rightly been drawn to Archilochus (with distichs da hex/ia trim; cf. Horace, *Ep.* 16) and especially to the Margites (Allen fr. 1 p. 156)

ἦλθέ τις εἰς Κολοφῶνα γέρων καὶ θεῖος ἀοιδός  
Μουσάων θεράπων καὶ ἐκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος  
φίλην ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν εὐφθογγον λύραν.

Since we have no way of telling what preceded or followed this fragment, we cannot infer a strophic structure; and it is clear from the papyrus fragment of the Margites (*POxy* 22.2309), and the description in Hephaistion cited by Lobel ad loc., that the Margites did not have a strophic structure. But the Nestor's cup inscription with its system ia trim/2 da hex furnishes us, like the Dipylon vase from the same century, with a hitherto unknown lyric form.

Line 1 of the inscription reads *Νεστορος* : ε[ ]ι : *ευποτον* : *ποτῆριον*. The most frequent restoration is ε[ιμ]ι or ε̄[μ]ι (v. below); in any case it is clear that a word or words shaped   ⌣ or    alone is possible. We have thus a verse-line   ⌣⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣. As is proper to the archaic iambic trimeter, the verseline is isosyllabic, a dodecasyllable. We may note the same archaic distributional constraint on word-break as observed by Nagy (p. 292) in the older Iambographoi: when word-break occurs after syllable 5, it may occur after syllable 8 but not 7

*Νεστορος* ε[ ]ι || *ευποτον* || *ποτῆριον*

and conversely when it occurs after syllable 4, it may occur after syllable 7 but not 8, as in the Margites line

*φίλην ἔχων* || *ἐν χερσὶν* || *εὐφθογγον λύραν*.

What then of the initial *Νεστορος*, producing a choriambic metron which violates the canonical   ⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣  ⌣ shape of the iambic trimeter? Dihle suggests simply that we have an irregular "license" to accommodate a personal name that would otherwise not fit. As a synchronic statement this is adequate, and can certainly be invoked to explain the occasional such practice in the later tragedians; Russo (p. 229) cites trimeter-initial *Ἰππομέδοντος* (Aesch. *Sept.* 488) and several other instances. But one may wonder if there is a diachronic explanation for this license, and for its restriction to verse-initial. The disproportionately large percentage of such "licenses"

on metrical inscriptions simply reflects the function of such inscriptions, which naturally focus on the personal name in initial position. The presence of the same license in literary texts shows that it is a property of the meter, not of inscriptions. I suggest that the preservation of this license in verse initial is a reflex of the Indo-European free initial in octosyllabic and dodecasyllabic verse with iambic closing.<sup>17</sup> As I stated thirteen years ago in *Celtica* 6 (1963) 206 with n. 1: "It is only the direction of this restriction, the maximal differentiation of  $\cup \cup$  into  $\cup \_$  and  $\_ \cup$ , which is responsible for the development of these two familiar types in Classical Greek lyric... The pattern  $\cup \cup \cup \cup \cup \_ \cup \cup$ , as in Vedic, was differentiated into either  $\cup \cup \cup \_ \cup \_$  (iamb. dim.) or  $\cup \cup \_ \cup \cup \_ \cup \cup$  (glyc.)... That the iambic dimeter verse has a further restriction on the quantity of syllable 2 (always long) may be viewed as a later development."

The "license" of allowing proper names with a short in syllable 2 is precisely the reflex of the primitive iambic line pattern  $\cup \cup \cup \_ \cup \_ \cup \cup$  posited above. Put another way, it attests the previous existence of an iambic trimeter and dimeter with an "Aeolic base," verse initial  $\# \cup \cup$ . That is to say that the underlying form of the iambic trimeter in the immediately preliterate period of Greek was, in the light of the previous discussion, alternatively

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccc} \cup & \cup & \cup & \_ & \cup & \parallel & \_ & \cup & \_ & \parallel & \cup & \_ & \cup & \cup \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & & 6 & 7 & 8 & & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 \end{array}$$

or

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccc} \cup & \cup & \cup & \_ & \parallel & \cup & \_ & \cup & \parallel & \_ & \cup & \_ & \cup & \cup \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & & 5 & 6 & 7 & & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 \end{array}^{18}$$

The question naturally arises whether the attested verse-initial *Νεστωρος* is to be interpreted synchronically as a "license," or rather as directly attesting the underlying metrical scheme just presented. A definitive answer is not possible, but one fact speaks for the latter. The poet is composing a line of iambic trimeter, to be immediately followed

<sup>17</sup> That trimeter verse is historically to be derived from dimeter verse is argued, independently and on different grounds, by H. S. Anathanarayana, *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia* 14 (1973) 155-170, and G. Nagy (n. 15, above) 39 and passim.

<sup>18</sup> Nagy's view (p. 38) that the normal Greek anceps in syllables 5 and 9 (already attested in the Margites) is an "archaism" is not supported by any comparative evidence that I know; syllable 5 in the Indic trimeter is regularly long only if 4 is (irregularly) short (Arnold, *Vedic Metre* 12). The Nestor's cup inscription in any case, our only eighth-century iambic line, attests only the short in these syllables.

by a line of dactylic hexameter. If a dactylic sequence at the initial of the iambic trimeter at the time were merely a quite rare but tolerated irregularity, as it is three centuries later, then it is hard to understand why an accomplished poet in the eighth century would begin a line with *Νεστορος* which he could without great difficulty have continued as a perfect dactylic hexameter: *Νεστορος* —  $\overline{\cup\cup}$  —  $\cup$  || *ποτῆριον* *ευποτον* ε[ ]ι. That the line continues the way it does is more in harmony with the assumption of a free initial in the trimeter, i.e. a synchronically underlying "Aeolic base."

## IV

We come finally to the interpretation of the epigram as a whole, which has naturally claimed the greatest attention of commentators heretofore, and hinges on the restoration of the critical lacuna in line 1:

*Νεστορος* : ε[ ]ι : *ευποτ[ον]* : *ποτῆριον*  
*hos δ' α<ν> τῷδε πιῆσι* : *ποτῆρι[ο]* : *αυτικά κῆνον*  
*ἡμερος ἡαιρῆσει* : *καλλιστε[φά]νῳ* : *Ἀφροδιτῆς*.

The restorations proposed hitherto are listed in Rüter-Matthiessen, p. 245, to which must be added *E[ΣΤ]I* mentioned but rejected by the original editors, and suggested, though not adopted, by Dihle.<sup>19</sup> Both most recent treatments, Rüter-Matthiessen and Dihle, follow Jeffery and Schadewaldt respectively in assuming that, as is so frequently the case, the object itself is speaking, and restore *E[M]I* or *E[IM]I*. West (n. 1, above) accepts ε[ιμ]ι, commenting only on the hiatus after it; this may be taken as the prevailing, if not necessarily unanimous, opinion today.

The discussion hitherto can be reduced to three questions, each of which has two possible answers. These are: (1) Does *Νεστορος* refer to a Nestor, or to *the* Nestor? (2) Is the restoration 1 sg. or 3 sg.? (3) Does *ποτῆριον* in lines 1 and 2 refer to the same cup or to two different cups?

(1) That *Νεστορος* in an eighth century verse inscription refers merely to a resident of Pithekoussai who happens to go by that name (Dihle, accepted by West) is more or less a null hypothesis. It is inherently far more likely that an accomplished αοιδός with demonstrated familiarity with the Homeric repertoire, who begins his first

<sup>19</sup> Of these, *E[ΠΡΟ]I* (ἐπποι) is unlikely on semantic, syntactic, and usage grounds; *M[E]N* (μὲν/μην) which is unmetrical and *E[(?)ΤΟ]I* do not furnish the expected verb; with *E[N(?)Τ]I* (ἦν τι) or *E[N(?)ΤΟ]I* (ἦν τοι)—for which there is scarcely enough room—we should expect the dative of the possessor, \**Νέστορι*, as Dihle notes.

line with *Νεστορος* (a frequent position of the same name in the same and other grammatical cases in the hexameter), had the Homeric hero in mind, and would assume his audience would. The same familiarity with Homeric repertoire renders it more plausible that he knew *Α* 628ff or an equivalent, than the converse. This need not imply that he knew the *Iliad* as we know it; only that *Α* 628ff, where the description of Nestor's cup (632-637) is framed in archaic ring-composition style between two thematically archaic and closely related formulas referring to the performance of a sacral, ritual act (631, *παρὰ δ' ἀλφίτου ἱεροῦ ἀκτῆν*; 640, *ἐπὶ δ' ἄλφιστα λευκὰ πάλυνε*), is in the fullest sense traditional.<sup>20</sup>

(2) In favor of restoring the verb as a 1 sg. are to be sure the numerous epigraphic parallels of the type *τοῦ δεῖνᾶ εἰμι* cited or referred to by Rüter-Matthiessen and Dihle. Note that a 1 sg. here necessarily implies the first alternative in question (3): the reference would be to the same cup in both lines. But there are serious difficulties with *εἰμι*. The photographs and most recent facsimile indicate, and most commentators have agreed, that the space is really too large for *E[M]I*, the expected and indeed universal early Ionic spelling. Interpreters since Schade-waldt have therefore proposed *E[IM]I*, and following Jeffery have not been disturbed by the spelling, since it is found already in the seventh century in Old Attic *θαριῶ εἰμι ποτῆριον* (*Hesperia* 5 [1936] 33). But Old Attic *εἰμι* was consciously perceived as different from contemporary Ionic *ἔμι*, as is proved by the early sixth century bi-dialectical inscription from Sigeum (Schw. 731, Buck 1), where the two versions have respectively *Φανοδικῶ ἔμι* and *Φανοδικῶ εἰμι*. Old Attic *εἰμι* is a real problem, indicating a dialectal reinterpretation, for whatever reason, of the underlying form; cf. perhaps Mid. Welsh *wyf* 'I am' < \**eimi* 'I go'. But the phenomenon is confined to Attic alone, and only sporadically there. It is for this reason very doubtful that *EIMI* could have existed in an Ionic colony in the eighth century.

<sup>20</sup> Beside the secular *κρί λευκόν* note the sacral *ἄλφιστα λευκά* and the transferred epithet: *ἄλφι* is cognate with Latin *albus*. But the real antiquity of these formulae in their thematic content becomes apparent only when we confront them with the terms of the cognate Roman (and Hittite) ritual:

<i>Α</i>	631	<i>ἀλφίτου ἱεροῦ ἀκτῆν</i>	= <i>far pium</i>
<i>β</i>	355	<i>μυληφάτου ἀλφίτου ἀκτῆς</i>	= <i>far molitum</i>
<i>ξ</i>	429	<i>παλύνας ἀλφίτου ἀκτῆν</i>	= <i>far sparsum</i>

on which see "Latin *ador*, Hittite *ḫat-* Again," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 181-187. Cf. also Hes. *Op.* 597, 805, *Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτῆν*, which in the "Motionslosigkeit" of the adjective preserves an archaic shape of the formula itself.



There is the further difficulty in pronominalization: τῷδε is not the most natural resumption of the pronoun in ε[ιμ]ι. We should rather expect a personal pronoun, as in *Ταταιῆς ἔμι λῆρυθος hos δ' αν με κλεφσεῖ θυφλος εσται* (Schw. 786, Buck 10). In Boeotian *Γοργινιος ἔμι ο κοτυλος* (Schw. 440), where ο has the force of ὅδε (A. Morpurgo-Davies, *Glotta* 46 [1968] 77), we have apposition, not resumption.

None of the above difficulties is encountered by the alternative answer to question (2), that we have a 3 sg. ε[στ]ι.<sup>21</sup>

(3) If we assume, as did the original editors, that two cups are being contrasted in the poetic message, a cup of legend and the cup before us, we get in the first place a much better poem.<sup>22</sup> This judgment was made independently of the previous scholarship, by the students in my Language of Homer course in the fall of 1974, of whom Michael W. Taylor deserves special mention for his particularly apt remarks. The demonstrative force in the contrastive *ποτῆριον ~ τῷδε ποτῆριῷ* becomes completely natural, and is reinforced by the δ(ε) of line 2. In the eighth century, when the later article is still a demonstrative, τῷδε has stronger deictic force.

We obtain furthermore an immediate reason for the choice of meters: the contrast of iambic trimeter and dactylic hexameter is iconic to the contrast of the two *ποτήρια*,<sup>23</sup> and the ascending hierarchy of relative "nobility" of the two meters mirrors the relative evaluation of the two vessels in the poetic message. The dactylic first word *Νεστορος* is metrically intentionally ambiguous, bi-directional, and the poet can continue in trimeter or hexameter; that he continues in a trimeter reflects a conscious choice.

<sup>21</sup> Note that the restoration ε[στ]ι gives us a double phonetic figure in the line: ν *ΕΣΤ* ορος *ΕΣΤ* ιεν *ΠΟΤ* ον *ΠΟΤ* εριον. Such phonetic figures are the verbal icons of a geometric aesthetic. They are particularly notable in Alcmæon, writing some three-quarters of a century after our inscription: *Parth.* 43, *ΦΑΙΝΗΝ ἐμεδουτε ΠΑΙΝΗΝ*; 76, *δομ ΑΡΕΤΑ τ ΕΡΑΤΑ τεφανθεμς*; 74 P, *η ΣΚ ετι ΣΚ αφεν Σ φανι ΣΣ ων*. Note especially *Parth.* 36, *εσ ΤΙΤΙΣ θεων ΤΙΣΙΣ*, which looks like a much older geometric proverb (earlier Doric . . . *τιτις* . . . \**τιτις*, Common Greek \* . . . *tik<sup>w</sup>is* . . . *k<sup>w</sup>itis*) beginning with an existential predication *es-* (logical *∃*) and a quasi-palindrome *tik<sup>w</sup>is* . . . *k<sup>w</sup>itis* on both sides of *theōn* (in the relational case), iconic to the reciprocal nature of *τίσις*. We have the same sort of phonetic palindrome in the same thematic and cultural context in *Parth.* 83, *θεων γαρ ᾱ ν ᾱ*.

<sup>22</sup> Let me acknowledge a lifelong debt to Frank O'Connor, who first forcefully and eloquently brought home to me the necessity of such a simple argument, when we were discussing textual criticism of early Irish poetry on a walk across the Brooklyn Bridge some twenty years ago.

<sup>23</sup> An observation I owe to J. Schindler.



The balance distinctly favors the second alternative in each of the three questions above. I therefore propose to read

*Νεστορος* : ε[στ]ι : ευποτ[ον] : ποτῆριον  
*hos* δ' α<ν> τῷδε πιῆσι : ποτῆρι[ῶ] : αὐτικά κῆνον  
*himeros hairēsei* : καλλιστε[φά]νῳ : Ἀφροδιτῆς

and to translate

Nestor's cup is good to drink from;  
 but he who drinks from *this* cup, forthwith him  
 will seize desire of fair-garlanded Aphrodite.

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SOPHOCLES *OEDIPUS TYRANNUS* 80-81

LOWELL EDMUNDS

- IE. ἀλλ' εἰς καλὸν σύ τ' εἶπας, οἶδε τ' ἀρτίως  
 Κρέοντα προσστείχοντα σημαίνουσί μοι.  
 OI. ὦναξ Ἀπολλων, εἰ γὰρ ἐν τύχῃ γέ τω 80  
 σωτήρι βαίῃ λαμπρὸς ὥσπερ ὄμματι.  
 IE. ἀλλ' εἰκάσαι μὲν, ἡδύς. οὐ γὰρ ἂν κάρα  
 πολυστεφῆς ᾧδ' εἶρπε παγκάρπου δάφνης.

All the commentaries, with one exception,<sup>1</sup> and all the translations which I have been able to consult follow the scholiastic interpretation of 80-81: εἶθε οὖν παραγένοιτο Κρέων ἐπὶ τινι σωτηρίῳ τύχῃ λαμπρὸς ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καταστάσεως φαεινός ἐστι. The scholiast takes ὄμματι in 81 to refer to the countenance of Creon, and this traditional interpretation has never been questioned. Jebb paraphrases 80-81 thus: "may his radiant look prove the herald of good news."<sup>2</sup> In the context, however, the priest's reply to Oedipus (82-83) is nonsensical if the traditional interpretation of 80-81 is correct, for the priest replies: ἀλλ' εἰκάσαι μὲν, ἡδύς. "Well,<sup>3</sup> to all seeming,<sup>4</sup> he brings good news."<sup>5</sup> These words might seem to be a cautious confirmation of what Oedipus has just said (viz., according to the traditional interpretation, that Creon's countenance gives promise of

<sup>1</sup> M. L. Earle, *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles* (New York 1901) ad loc.; but his paraphrase shows that he was not aware of the idiom that I shall discuss.

<sup>2</sup> R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments*, Part 1: *The Oedipus Tyrannus* (Cambridge 1914) ad loc.

<sup>3</sup> This is the "assentient" ἄλλά, "which introduces the substantiation by the second speaker of an hypothesis or wish expressed by the first . . .": J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1966) 20. We are not dealing here with the collocation ἀλλά . . . μὲν discussed by Denniston on p. 378. Note that all of Denniston's examples of this collocation have a preceding negative. The words of Oedipus to which the priest is replying do not contain a negative.

<sup>4</sup> I have borrowed the translation of Jebb (n. 2, above), which gives some sense of the force of μὲν. This is a well-known type of μὲν *solitarium* "with words denoting opinion, appearance, or probability . . .": Denniston (n. 3, above) 382.

<sup>5</sup> The commentators have correctly explained ἡδύς. See also LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. ἡδύς II.1.

good news). The priest goes on, however, to explain his first four words in 82, in such a way that the traditional interpretation of 80-81 cannot be correct. His use of γάρ shows that he is supporting the truth of the assertion that he has just made:<sup>6</sup> "For otherwise he would not be coming with his head covered with berry-laden laurel." Now the priest's explanation is surely inconsequent if Oedipus has already observed the facial expression of Creon; the priest would only be confirming more certain evidence (the facial expression) by less certain (the crown). Furthermore, the traditional interpretation of 80-83 assumes, contrary to optical reality, that Oedipus could see the expression on Creon's face before the priest could see the crown on his head.

The traditional interpretation of these lines rests on a failure to perceive a certain idiom in 80-81. The idiom is, in the most general terms, the nonrepetition of the preposition in the second member of various constructions.<sup>7</sup> One category of this idiom is the nonrepetition of the preposition in the second member of comparisons employing such particles as ὥς, ὥσπερ and ἤ. This category can be divided into two variants. In the better known of these two,<sup>8</sup> the comparative particle precedes the first prepositional phrase, and the second prepositional phrase, with preposition omitted, follows immediately. Schematically: particle of comparison — preposition — object of preposition — [preposition] — object of preposition. The second of the two variants is not so well-known, though Kühner-Gerth give several examples.<sup>9</sup> They believed that it was an Attic idiom, though they had an example from Herodotus, but it occurs also in Lesbian and in the Ionic of Heraclitus, as my examples will show. In this second variant, the comparative particle occupies a different position. Schematically: preposition — object of preposition — particle of comparison —

<sup>6</sup> Denniston (n. 3, above) 63.

<sup>7</sup> Schwyzer 2.433 gives a general description of the idiom. For practical purposes, this description is far too general and must be supplemented by Kühner-Gerth 2.1.551-552 (section 451.6). Both Schwyzer and Kühner-Gerth wrongly give the impression that the category of this idiom with which I am concerned is confined to prose.

<sup>8</sup> C. G. Cobet, *Variae lectiones quibus continentur observationes criticae in scriptores graecos*<sup>2</sup> (Leiden 1873) 163-166 applied his understanding of this variant of the idiom to the emendation of various passages. H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge 1959) 1673 gives two examples of each of the variants. G. M. Browne, "Coptico-Graeca: the Sahidic Version of St. Athanasius' *Vita Antonii*," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 59-64 at 60-61 called attention to the first variant.

<sup>9</sup> See n. 7, above.

[preposition] — object of preposition. As I shall suggest, this is the idiom in Soph. *OT* 80-81.

The first variant does not require much discussion. Prose examples will be found in Kühner-Gerth. *Ar. Lys.* 993, cited by Smyth, suggests that the idiom was colloquial. I shall quote only one example here, from a satyr play. In Eur. *Cyc.* 433, Odysseus describes the Cyclops as "caught on the cup as if on birdlime": ὥσπερ πρὸς ἱξῶ τῇ κύλικι λεληγμένους.<sup>10</sup>

The second variant is not so well-known and requires more illustration.

(a) Sappho 5.9-11 L-P:

φάος δ' ἐπί-  
σχει θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἁλμύραν  
ἴσως καὶ πολυανθέροις ἀρούραις.

"The moon spreads her light over the salt sea as *over* fields rich in flowers." Since English idiom requires repetition of the preposition, translation makes its nonrepetition in the Greek quite obvious.

(b) Heraclitus B44 D-K: μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος. "The people should fight for the law as if *for* their city-wall."<sup>11</sup>

(c) Herodotus 9.101 (cited by Kühner-Gerth): ἦν ἀρρωδίη σφι οὔτι περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν οὔτω ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων. "They were not so terrified about themselves as *about* the Greeks."

(d) Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus* 247-248: ἐν ὕμμι γὰρ ὡς θεῷ / κείμεθα τλάμονες. "On you as *on* a god we depend, wretched as we are."

To return to *OT* 80-81, the idiom just illustrated occurs in these lines. ἐν should be understood before ὄμματι, and ὄμματι will thus refer not to Creon's countenance but to Oedipus' own sight of Creon,

<sup>10</sup> Correctly explained by G. Ammendola, *Euripide: Il Ciclope* (Florence 1952) ad loc.: "πρὸς: va sottinteso con κύλικι." Difficulties arise when it is a preposition governing the genitive: cf. Browne (n. 8, above). For example, John Burnet in the Oxford Classical Text gives for Plato, *Phaedo* 67d1: ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δασμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σάματος. Yet Schwyzer (n. 7, above) cites this place as an example of the repetition of the preposition. Unfortunately, he does not give other examples of the repetition of the preposition after the comparative particle. The numerous examples of the non-repetition of the preposition in this situation in classical prose must decide the issue. Burnet's instinct was good, but he should have bracketed the second ἐκ, not the first.

<sup>11</sup> I have used, with slight alterations, the translation of Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford 1956) 27.

for the phrase [ἐν] ὄμματι is a form of the well-known expression, ἐν ὄμμασι.<sup>12</sup> I have not been able to find another example of the singular in this expression, but both the singular and the plural of ὄμμα are used after ἀπό and κατά in similar expressions.<sup>13</sup> Lines 80–81 may be translated: “May he come bright<sup>14</sup> with saving fortune as he is bright<sup>15</sup> to view.”<sup>16</sup>

Once it is understood that line 81 refers to Oedipus’ sight of Creon, as Greek idiom requires, lines 78–82 present a logical and dramatically effective sequence. In 78–79, the priest tells Oedipus that attendants have indicated the return of Creon. In 80–81, Oedipus’ words show that Creon can now be clearly seen. In 82–83, as Creon draws still closer, the priest is able to perceive Creon’s crown of laurel. In 84, Oedipus says that Creon is now within earshot.

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<sup>12</sup> See LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. ὄμμα I.1 (cf. s.v. ὀφθαλμός I.1).

<sup>13</sup> LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. ὄμμα I.1.

<sup>14</sup> λαμπρός must obviously have different senses in the two parts of the comparison. For its sense in the first, optative part, see LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. λαμπρός II.3.

<sup>15</sup> In the second, indicative part of the comparison, λαμπρός means “conspicuous”. Cf. Ar. *Pax* 859 (n.b. verbs of seeing in the context); Eur. *Heracl.* 280; Soph. *El.* 685.

<sup>16</sup> Lewis Campbell, *Sophocles*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 1 (Oxford 1879) ad loc. suggests: “Either (1) ‘in his eye’ . . . Or (2) ‘in appearance,’ ‘to the view.’” He refers to his introductory essay on the language of Sophocles, p. 99. This place (see 5 under ὄμμα) confirms the implication of the note just quoted that, despite the translation, “to the view,” Campbell understood the last word in OT 81 to refer to the appearance of Creon, and not to Oedipus’ sight of Creon.



ATTRIBUTION AND ACTION IN ARISTOPHANES  
*CLOUDS* 723-796

M. W. HASLAM

IT is generally accepted that 700-706, 708, and 716, assigned in the manuscripts to Socrates, belong to the Chorus. The same reattribution of 727-729 has found much favor. In this note I propose it also for 740-742, 743-745, and 761-763.<sup>1</sup> I shall have to assume that the reader has a text at his elbow.

Strepsiades is on the bug-ridden *κίμπους*. Socrates has told him to think, and left him to it (698). The Chorus give him practical advice on how to set about this unaccustomed activity, "thinking." He should twist himself in a tight ball and whenever he meets an *aporia* should quickly leap on to another thought. (The bugs, meanwhile, see to it that Strepsiades' actions meet the Chorus' words. The mental contortions required are not only described in terms of physical contortions, but are acted out in those terms too. Strepsiades' bug-regulated behavior is mimetic of the behavior of the mind.) The interjections of 708 and 716 are expressions of concern and comfort like those of a chorus doing its ineffectual best to cope with a wailing Euripidean heroine.

Back comes Socrates at 723, finds that Strepsiades has not yet discovered a thought, and "bobs back into the school" (Dover). We have to remove Socrates from the action at this point (726) so that he can reenter it at 731. (Whether he actually leaves the stage or merely goes into a state of abstraction there is little to show, and it does not much matter. In what follows, I shall talk in terms of physical departure.) Lines 727-729 are thus to be assigned to the Chorus or Chorus leader (first Willems).<sup>2</sup> A welcome result of this attribution is its accounting for the difference in tone between these lines and Socrates' *ἀπολεῖ κάκιστα* in the previous line. For Socrates to pass from threats to encouragement in the course of half a line (as Dover puts it) would be a strange departure from the brusqueness he has so far shown and will

<sup>1</sup> I first suggested this at a seminar held at the Center for Hellenic Studies in October 1975 by Mr. K. Reckford. I am very grateful to him and to the Director and my fellow Fellows of the Center for their comments.

<sup>2</sup> A. Willems, *Notes sur les Nuées d'Aristophane* (Brussels 1906) 33-35.

continue to show.<sup>3</sup> The Chorus, on the other hand, are incomparably well suited to advise and encourage; and, I submit, they continue to perform this function throughout the scene.

At 731 Socrates comes back for the second time to see how Strepsiades is getting on. (He speaks as if he is starting on a round of his *mathetai*.) Still nothing. Socrates' exasperated injunction to get a move on and *think* something (735) elicits a desperate plea for guidance, and the unhelpful response again leaves Strepsiades making plaintive comments at Socrates' retreating back, as at 726. Lines 740-742 follow on very oddly if they come from Socrates' mouth, but are quite of a piece with what the Chorus has said at 727 and 700ff. Similarly with 743-745: advice on what to do in an *aporia*, as at 703-704.

Strepsiades finally finds the object of his hunt, the "aposteretic" thought. He leaps out of bed (so schol. RV) and goes to call Socrates, ὦ Σωκρατίδιον φίλτατον (746). The suitability of 746 to my reconstruction needs no emphasizing. Strepsiades expounds his solution (an exposition punctuated by sharp interjections from Socrates: "What?" "Just how would that help you?" "How so?"); Socrates expresses his approval (εὖ γέ, 757), and sets him another *problema*.

Once again the Chorus advise Strepsiades on his method of search: this time he is not to concentrate, but to let his mind roam (761-763). There is nothing in the text to indicate whether Socrates went off again at the end of 759. If he did, then Strepsiades' cry of Eureka (764) recalls him instantly. The student's solution is again approved, and enthusiastically (773). He is getting along splendidly. His third problem offers him no difficulty at all (778), and he can solve it on the spot. Unfortunately, he blows it, and flunks out. The Chorus, appealed to, offer a last piece of advice: let him send his son instead.

The manuscripts have more than once in this play assigned to Socrates lines which by universal consent must belong to the Chorus. In this scene, not only 700ff and 727ff but also 740ff and 761ff must be removed from Socrates (and he from them) and reassigned to the Chorus or Chorus leader. This distribution is in conformity with the indications of the text, and once it is effected, the scene makes better sense. Socrates' propensity for abandoning his apprentice is already established at 698 and 726, in defiance of the transmitted attributions. (It will be signaled again just before the agon, 887.) The further

<sup>3</sup> Dover, however (while supporting the attribution to the Chorus), says that "such a change of mood, often required for a succession of different kinds of joke, would be characteristic of comedy." But it is not required for a succession of different kinds of joke here, nor for any other reason.

retribution proposed here continues this characterization, just as it continues the characterization of the Chorus established in 700ff: it gives to Socrates and to the Chorus roles which are individually consistent and mutually distinct. The scene thereby gains the sort of coherence one would expect of it; and its dramatic plausibility is irreproachable.

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## SOPHOCLES' *PHILOCTETES* AND THE TEACHINGS OF THE SOPHISTS

PETER W. ROSE

*For Adam Parry In Memoriam*

WITH few noteworthy exceptions Sophocles' response to the sophists has been viewed as fundamentally hostile.<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Nestle seems to have set the pattern in this century:

... he [Sophocles] can go along with it [i.e. the Sophistic] a little way, namely, when it concerns itself solely with empirical inquiry. But as soon as the Sophistic sets about drawing conclusions based on the results of its inquiry — conclusions about a worldview and about practical conduct — their paths part. The poet then sees in it the open enemy ...<sup>2</sup>

Along the same lines Sophocles has more recently been characterized as "the last great exponent of the archaic world-view."<sup>3</sup> In a rather

<sup>1</sup> For bibliographical information on works cited, see note 110. Except where specifically noted, I follow the text of Jebb.

I would like to express here my deep sense of gratitude for helpful comments offered me on earlier drafts of this paper by Eva Coles, Michael Gagarin, Richard Hamilton, Douglass Parker, Cedric Whitman, and Reginald Pepys Winnington-Ingram. My dedication reflects my indebtedness to the friend who read the very first draft and gave me much-needed encouragement. Mention of these individuals should in no way be construed as implying their agreement with my argument; and, naturally, all errors are my exclusive responsibility.

<sup>2</sup> Nestle, "Sophokles" 134; cf. *Mythos* 451-455. Nestle's view is echoed with slight modifications by Busse, who in turn is cited with full approval by Webster *Introduction* 52; cf. Weinstock 13, Bowra 272, Ehrenberg 64f, Opstelten 67, Pohlenz 159f, Lesky *Dichtung* 272, Kitto *Sophocles* 63.

<sup>3</sup> Dodds *Greeks* 49. He goes on to offer a significant qualification: "the true cleavage" marking the end of the Archaic Age falls "with the rise of the Sophistic Movement . . . In his thought, though not in his literary technique, Sophocles (save perhaps in his latest plays) still belongs to the older world" (50. n. 1). More recently in *Progress*, Dodds goes out of his way to stress his belief that "Sophocles was no humanist, and the *Antigone* is no Protagorean tract for the times" (8). Winnington-Ingram's "Tragedy and Greek Archaic Thought" is described by its author as a "gloss" upon Dodds' view in *Greeks*. Though this is far too modest a description, the emphasis is decidedly upon the more archaic aspects of Sophocles' assumptions.



striking departure from what one might call the Nestle consensus, Cedric Whitman argues:

... if the Sophistic rationalism destroyed Euripides, its effect on Sophocles was quite the reverse . . . Sophocles stood his ground and thought through the implications of religion as a human invention and man as the measure of all things. The grace and power with which his intellect moved amid and transcended the rabid theorizing of the avant-garde is one of the miracles of artistic history . . ."<sup>4</sup>

Apart from enthusiastic praise by Friis Johansen, Whitman's view had apparently little impact.<sup>5</sup>

In the following article I would like to take account of a deeper analysis of the sophists themselves than was available to Whitman. In the light of that analysis I will examine anew the relation of sophistic thought to Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. What emerges from my examination of the play is a view of Sophocles that implies neither a pious polemic against the sophists nor a whole-hearted endorsement of their fundamental assumptions. Rather, to use Whitman's phrase, Sophocles "thought through" a great deal more of sophistic thought than their attacks on religion or their fascination with rhetoric. In particular I believe that he was profoundly influenced by their comprehensive materialist analysis of the origin and development of human society and behavioral patterns, an analysis which had fascinated him at least since the time when he composed the *Antigone*.

It is difficult not to be deterred from even discussing the sophists by the sheer weight of potential problems: the relative paucity and ambiguity of the sources, the often radical differences between the views of particular sophists on particular topics, the limitations of the very term "sophist"<sup>6</sup> in dealing with some important topics which were of interest to almost all pre-Socratic thinkers. Havelock's brilliant presentation of the case for a more comprehensive and fundamentally sympathetic conception of the sophists met with some intemperate

<sup>4</sup> Whitman *Sophocles* 228-229.

<sup>5</sup> Friis Johansen 161. This is not to say that no one has offered significant qualifications of the traditional view. For example, Segal in "Praise of Man" related Sophocles' view to those of the sophists along lines similar to my view of the *Philoctetes* and offers excellent brief comments on the *Philoctetes* in his article on "Nature" (38-39). A. Long concludes: "the use he [Sophocles] made of Presocratic thought . . . the interest he shows in sophistic attitudes and arguments exemplify a mind which was completely involved in the intellectual life of fifth-century Athens" (166-167).

<sup>6</sup> Hereafter I will use "sophists" to refer to the whole group of relevant pre-Socratic thinkers.

invective, but generally — almost worse — with widespread disregard. Yet the broad outlines of his thesis, particularly with regard to the role of anthropological speculation in the sophists' conception of society, have been confirmed by the punctilious scholarship of Cole and accepted, with only occasional grumblings, by Guthrie.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps then old polemics may be laid aside, and we may begin the process of reevaluating the relation of the sophists' thought to that of major fifth-century figures.

I will begin my efforts in that direction by offering a brief, necessarily schematic summary of what I consider the major sophistic views of human society and values in order to set in clear relief both Sophocles' indebtedness and his very individual response to those views in the *Philoctetes*. This summary will then be followed by a detailed analysis of the play.

For the sake of clarity, the sophistic analysis of society may be divided into three stages:<sup>8</sup> first, the origin of the species and the early struggle to survive; secondly, the establishment of a social compact which enabled the development of cities; and thirdly, the functioning of contemporary — primarily Athenian — social, economic, and educational mechanisms.

A central feature of the sophistic analysis of society was a materialist

<sup>7</sup> Guthrie *Sophists* 10 n. 1 cites with apparent approval L. Strauss's bizarrely ferocious attack, which rejects every major thesis of Havelock's book, especially, the existence of a significant body of anthropological speculation in the fifth century. But Guthrie's own treatment of the sophists remains deeply indebted to Havelock's work and contains (79–84) a useful appendix of passages, ultimately derived from the sophists, descriptive of human progress. As for Cole's work, while some (e.g. Furley 147, Dodds *Progress* 11) have raised legitimate doubts about the centrality of Democritus to fifth-century anthropological speculation, there is no longer room for the sort of doubt expressed by Strauss about the comprehensiveness, subtlety, and extensive influence of this body of thought in the fifth century. In my own discussion I will simply cite what I believe is a reasonable sampling of the ancient evidence. For a defense of the admittedly not always obvious relevance of some of these sources, the reader must consult the detailed discussions of Havelock (esp. 405f), Cole *Democritus* (passim), and Guthrie *Sophists* (esp. 60f and the bibliography at the end of the volume).

<sup>8</sup> The so-called "great speech" of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue, one of the most important sources for the sophistic analysis of society, does in fact divide pretty clearly into those three stages: one (320c8–322b8); two (322b9–d5); three (322d6–328d2). In the case of Democritus, Cole *Democritus* posits many further substages, but his far more detailed analysis is not incompatible with the three broad stages I describe. In the case of other fifth-century thinkers the evidence is far more fragmentary, but such evidence as there is seems to me to fit well into this general pattern.

anthropology, a speculative account of the origin of human society based on the assumption that human beings began as animals,<sup>9</sup> and like all other animals confronted the problems of survival with no special metaphysical or supernatural resources or direction. Characteristic of sophistic anthropology was a detailed and highly evocative picture of the horrors of human existence at a presocial stage of their evolution.<sup>10</sup> Without the natural defenses of other animals against predators and the natural elements, primitive human beings are pictured as engaged in a desperate struggle to find shelter from storms and the winter's cold as well as to contrive weapons for self-defense and for acquiring food, which their natural helplessness rendered a perpetual source of anxiety. The development of hunting, medicine, agriculture, and, above all, the discovery of fire with its associated technologies, were presented as the chief means of escaping from the worst horrors of the battle for survival.

In the various accounts of this presocial stage, a fairly consistent terminology indicates the fundamental ideas.<sup>11</sup> The driving force is "need" (χρεία) or "necessity" (ἀνάγκη); the only relevant human goal, "survival" (σωτηρεία); the sole criterion, what is "useful" (χρήσιμον), "helpful" (ὠφέλιμον) or "advantageous" (συμφέρων) toward the end of "supplying" (πορίζω) adequate "sustenance" (τροφή) and other fundamental needs. The decisive human contribution to survival is the "practical intelligence" (σοφία) which enables them to "learn" (μανθάνω, διδάσκειν) from chance "discoveries" (εὕρισκω) and convert them into "contrivances" (μηχανή) and "technologies" (τέχνη).

A second stage posited by the sophistic anthropology has frequently been described by the term "social contract" or, as Guthrie prefers, "social compact."<sup>12</sup> Technology might secure the food supply and protection from the elements and beasts, but human beings were still

<sup>9</sup> Anaximander *D-K* A30; Xenophanes *D-K* 29 and 33; Anaximenes *D-K* B3; Archelaus *D-K* A 4.5; Democritus *D-K* A139; cf. Plato *Prot.* 321c3-4. The kinship with divinity brought in later (322a3-4) does seem extraneous, and Havelock is probably right to see Platonic contamination there (91-92).

<sup>10</sup> Aeschylus *PV* 442-468, 476-506; Sophocles *Ant.* 332-364; Euripides *Sup.* 201-213; *On Ancient Medicine* 3.20-30; Plato *Prot.* 321c1-322b8; Diodorus 1.8; Moschion, *TrGF* 97F6 (Snell).

<sup>11</sup> I am aware that all of the words here cited are extremely common in non-anthropological contexts, and in that sense they do not constitute a special vocabulary. What is noteworthy, however, is the consistent nexus of ideas revealed by the frequent combination of these terms in the anthropological accounts.

<sup>12</sup> Guthrie *Sophists*, chap. 5 for general discussion, 135 n. 1 for term.



prey to the violence of other human beings. Accordingly the survival of the race required the establishment of agreed rules of nonaggression (to put it most negatively),<sup>13</sup> or as the older and generally more optimistic thinkers put it, bonds of affection (φιλία), like-mindedness (ὁμόνοια), pity (τὸ οἰκτεῖρειν), the substitution of persuasion (πειθῶ) for violence (ὑβρις, βία, κράτος), the subordination of narrowly conceived self-interest (κέρδος, τὸ συμφέρον) to respect (αἰδώς) for others, right conduct (δίκη), and a sense of the common good (τὸ κοινόν, τὸ ξυνόν).<sup>14</sup> The development of language itself out of inarticulate cries seems associated with this phase in some sources, while others include the development of religion.<sup>15</sup> Though some later fifth-century thinkers may have presented this contract stage as a conspiracy of the weak and inferior majority to protect themselves from the superior and stronger few,<sup>16</sup> I believe it is legitimate to say that the dominant note in the accounts of this stage is a benign and idealistic emphasis on the natural unity of the human species, a celebration of all the ties that bind.

In the most complete accounts we have of this early anthropological speculation, the "lessons" and terminology of the first and second stages are applied to the radically new realities of contemporary Greek and specifically Athenian society. Here again, toward the later part of the fifth century, views which express deep disillusion or extreme cynicism are associated with specific sophists and presented as typical, yet the evidence indicates that the major proponents of anthropological theories applied them to a fundamentally optimistic — even utopian — analysis of Athenian society. Democracy,<sup>17</sup> with its egalitarian thrust

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Glaucon's account, Plato *Res.* 358e1–359b5.

<sup>14</sup> Affection: Aeschylus *P.V.* 11, 123; Plato *Prot.* 322c1–3; Democritus *D-K* B186 with Cole's discussion (117); Aristotle *E.N.* 8.1159B25–1162A14 with Cole's discussion (134f). Like-mindedness: Democritus *D-K* B186, 250, 255; Gorgias *D-K* B8; Thrasyarchus *D-K* B1; Antiphon *D-K* A2, B44a. Pity: Aeschylus *P.V.* 239 (the hero's sole motive in helping man) cf. 68, 238, 246, 352, 435, 648 for the persistence of the motif; Democritus *D-K* B255, cf. B107a and 293 with Havelock's discussion (144f). Persuasion instead of force: Democritus *D-K* B181; Gorgias *D-K* B11.8; cf. Plato *Gorg.* 451d1f; *Prot.* 337a2f and 337e2f (parody of Hippias); *Anon. Iamb.* 6–7 (see Cole "Anonymous"). Association of ethics with the common good: Plato *Prot.* 322c2–5, 322e2–323a4; Democritus *D-K* B179, 252, 293; *Anon. Iamb.* 6–7.

<sup>15</sup> Language: Sophocles *Ant.* 353–356, whereas in Diodorus 1.8.3 it precedes fire. Religion: Prodicus *D-K* B5; Critias *D-K* 25.9.15 = *TrGF* 43F19 (Snell).

<sup>16</sup> Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias* (483b4–c6) describes the social contract so forcefully in these terms that generations of classicists have been convinced he articulates the sophistic view!

<sup>17</sup> Protagoras' whole "Great Speech" is specifically called forth in defense of the democratic practice of the Athenian assembly (*Prot.* 322d5f). The fact that

and structural dependence on verbal persuasion in the assembly, was felt to be in harmony with the anthropological "facts" of the human condition: the necessity for cooperation, mutual respect, and the substitution of persuasion for force. The same general sentiments seem to underlie the call for panhellenic unity often associated with the sophists.<sup>18</sup> The importance of persuasion and the general celebration of human intelligence in anthropology validated the primary activity of the "sophist" in the narrowest sense of the term, i.e. teaching rhetoric and political science to those who aspired to power in the democracy.<sup>19</sup> The sophists' egalitarian perspective and their pragmatic analysis of the socialization process — education in the broadest sense of the term — often led to a marked disparagement of the claims of the aristocracy to inherited excellence.<sup>20</sup> Finally, the practical, utilitarian, and generally materialist assumptions underlying the anthropological analysis of human progress through time readily lent themselves to a relativist analysis of ethics based on enlightened self-interest or hedonistic calculus<sup>21</sup> and, correspondingly, a distrust of absolutist values supported by traditional religion. At the same time, traditional religious views and traditional values seem most often to have been reinterpreted and redefined rather than openly repudiated.<sup>22</sup>

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Aeschylus casts the enemy of human culture and technological advancement as a tyrant in keeping with the general pro-democratic bias of the anthropological thinkers. Cf. Democritus *D-K* B252.

<sup>18</sup> Gorgias *D-K* B8a; parody of Hippias in Plato *Prot.* 337b7f.

<sup>19</sup> The *Protagoras* makes the clearest connection between the "anthropology," where πολιτική τέχνη is presented as essential to survival (322b6–7), and the actual content of the sophist's teaching (318e5–319a7). Democritus' description of education as a means of building σωτηρίη for one's possessions and life has an anthropological ring (*D-K* B28c).

<sup>20</sup> Democritus *D-K* B57, 242, 277, and 33 (on this see G. Vlastos "Ethics" II 55f); Kritias *D-K* B9; Antiphon *D-K* B60. Protagoras *D-K* B3 sounds "middle of the road" on the issue, but in Plato's dialogue the whole thrust of the sophist's analysis of the socialization process is to demonstrate its priority over inherited characteristics. Moreover, like Democritus (cf. *D-K* B56, 85, 109, 183), he undercuts the special pride of aristocratic birth by using terms like φύσις, ἀφύης and εὐφύης to designate natural endowments which are not associated with descent from a particular family line, but a matter of chance (e.g. 327b4–c3). See Adkins *Many* 94, and further discussion in my text below.

<sup>21</sup> Democritus *D-K* B71, 74, 76, 172, 173, 188, 211, 219, 235, 237; Plato *Prot.* 334a3–c6; *Dissoi Logoi* passim.

<sup>22</sup> On the general topic see Guthrie *Sophists* chap. 9. On Democritus' use of religious language see Vlastos "Ethics" I 581f. Prodicus does appear to have been a radical atheist: see Henrichs 107ff. Apropos of Protagoras' allegedly equivocal religious views Dodds *Progress* 97 aptly quotes Diogenes of Oenoanda:



The late fifth-century stereotype of the sophist as a self-seeking, double-talking relativist, a dangerous atheist committed to corrupting the minds of the young for exorbitant fees, may represent a logical, but not necessarily inevitable, development from the philosophic assumptions of the anthropologically-oriented older sophists. The impact of a long war on any sort of optimism is surely a more relevant consideration than the usual clichés about the sophists ruining Athens. In any case, as I hope my analysis will demonstrate, Sophocles was affected not simply by that later development, but also clearly grasped and was deeply impressed by the entire three-stage conception of human society and human values.

Sophocles was of course a poet, a dramatist — not a philosopher, political scientist, or a pamphleteer. He expressed himself through the fullest possible exploitation of the fundamental elements of his chosen medium — through plot choice and construction; setting; imagery both verbal and visual; verbal sound effects; characterization through action, interaction, speech, silence, and even inarticulate sound. Too many recent discussions of this play seem based on the assumption that the sole “intention” of this poet’s careful artistry was to entertain his audience with a good play — as though the meaning of “entertainment” and “good” drama for Sophocles’ audience in 409 B.C. was self-explanatory. Thus innovations in the myth are, we are told, designed to create “intrigue,” heighten “dramatic tensions” or “ironic tensions,” endow the plot with “concentration,” or simply to “make a good scene.”<sup>23</sup>

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“to say that you have no means of knowing whether gods exist amounts in practice to saying that you know they do not exist.”

<sup>23</sup> T. Wilamowitz and his spiritual descendent Waldoock are often taken to task for an approach directed purely at dramatic technique (e.g. on the former see Schmidt 51 n.28). Yet too often their detractors really only berate them for daring to *criticize* Sophocles from that perspective. Schmidt devotes considerable space — and admittedly it is one of the more useful aspects of his dissertation — to demonstrating Sophocles’ artistic mastery in the *Philoctetes* by comparative analysis of roughly paralleled or contrasted scenes in other plays by Sophocles. Schlesinger, who like Shucard is primarily concerned with “intrigue,” is much indebted to Knox’s analysis of the plot structure in terms of the relation between *πειθῶ*, *βία*, and *δῶλος*. Innovations in the plot or difficult actions are viewed as a means for the “Dramatiker . . . die Spannung zu erhöhen” (99) or “das Ende der Intrigenhandlung hervorzuheben” (106). Among recent discussions of the play, Gellie is perhaps most fully in the tradition of T. Wilamowitz and Waldoock, e.g. “At this point the play badly needs an injection of new material for the principal characters to chew on . . . Whatever its weaknesses, the scene plays well” (142). Spira, whose point of departure (12) is a defense of Sophocles specifically against T. Wilamowitz’ denunciation of the

While I yield to no one in my admiration for Sophocles' mastery of his medium and I concede readily that I have learned much from such discussions, "intention" conceived at so low a level seems to me worse than a fallacy. "Pure" art is a dubious concept at best for any period; it is a flagrant absurdity in dealing with the drama of fifth-century Athens. Ironically, only in the case of Sophocles have scholars been tempted to claim that, unlike Aeschylus, Euripides, and Aristophanes, here was a poet who achieved a proper Parnassian distance from the intellectual, social, and political revolutions which absorbed his contemporaries. One's point of departure and the constant test of one's views must be the text left by the poet, not any *a priori* assumptions about his alleged intentions. Yet adequate consideration of the text itself must include the poet's use of and departures from traditional material known to his audience. It must also include the connotations for a contemporary audience of the word and image-clusters he uses. Such consideration in turn involves awareness of the social and political realities shared by the poet and his audience. Though Sophocles' relation to these realities is often far subtler than in the case of his fellow dramatists, it is no less genuine and profound.

To sketch broadly my argument in advance, I believe Sophocles' two<sup>24</sup> major innovations in the traditional myth — first, the presentation of an uninhabited Lemnos, and second, the inclusion of Neoptolemos — reflect a conscious attempt to juxtapose dramatically the three stages of the sophistic analysis of society. The first stage is concentrated in the

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*deus ex machina*, speaks on one level of the necessity of bringing in "a new theme [Motif] once the themes set forth in the exposition are exhausted [erschöpft]" (29). On another — equally abstract — level he emphasizes the "ethopoietischen Interessen des Dichters" which explain Sophocles' willingness to bring the action to an "Absurdität" (30) before resorting to the *deus*. Character-drawing, like plots of intrigue, is, it seems, a self-explanatory interest; and the implications of the particular characters drawn for the realities facing Sophocles' audience are presumably as irrelevant as the implications of an image of life dominated by intrigue.

<sup>24</sup> Schlesinger with some justice presents the use of the *deus ex machina* at the end of the play as Sophocles' third major innovation. As I hope will emerge clearly from my discussion below in the text, Sophocles' use of Heracles grows organically from the poet's complex examination of and response to the sophists' view of society. This "innovation" in my view is thus a direct if not inevitable consequence of the two prior innovations. But however one interprets the scene or however drastically the scene affects one's understanding of the play, it remains a dramatic surprise at the very end of the play and takes up at most one twenty-fourth of the dramatic action. The desolation of Lemnos and the addition of Neoptolemos are introduced with heavy emphasis in the opening lines of the play and are dramatically relevant virtually every minute of the play.

full presentation of Philoctetes' battle to survive on Lemnos in total isolation, aided solely by his bow and the knowledge of fire-making. This stage grimly returns in the later part of the play where lyric laments evoke the imminent death of Philoctetes through starvation or from predatory beasts due to the absence of his bow. The second stage is dramatized in the bonds — both real and feigned — established between Philoctetes and, chiefly, Neoptolemos, but also, more ambivalently, the chorus. The third stage, the only one where a relation to sophistic thought has received much critical attention, is focused in the figure of Odysseus and emerges in the educational relationship to Neoptolemos and in his role as spokesman for the state in his dealings with Philoctetes.

Though the three stages of sophistic anthropology profoundly affect Sophocles' structuring and development of the traditional myth, in his handling of each stage he transforms the ideas of the sophists in such a way as to offer his audience a passionate and highly personal affirmation of a reformed version of traditional aristocratic absolutism.

#### THE PRIMITIVE BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL

The absence of human inhabitants on Sophocles' Lemnos (verses 2, 221), the island's lack even of seaports (221, 302), is a drastic innovation, contradicting Homer, the versions of Aeschylus and Euripides, and the common knowledge of virtually every member of the audience.<sup>25</sup> The reasons usually offered seem inadequate. The isolation of the hero is seen primarily as contributing to the pathos of his situation and perhaps

<sup>25</sup> See Jebb's notes on verses 2 and 302 and introduction, xxx-xxxi. Obviously embarrassed by the innovation, he suggests, citing a scholiast, that Sophocles may have assumed the size of the island would make it possible for Philoctetes to *think* it was uninhabited though in fact it was not. Nothing in the text supports this view, and the silence of both Neoptolemus and Odysseus about any other inhabitants strongly militates against it. Nonetheless Maguinness defends his proposed emendation of line 546 (reading *πέδον* for *πέδον* giving the new sense "off the same part of the land") on Jebb's literal-minded assumption that Sophocles could not possibly have implied the whole island was unfrequented by ships. Professor Henrichs has called my attention to ancient lexicographical explanations of the epithet *ἀμιχθαλόεις* applied to Lemnos at *Iliad* 24.753 as meaning *ἀ-λίμενος*. Jebb on *Phil.* 302 comments that the epithet was probably understood in antiquity as "inhospitable." Since serious debate over the precise meanings of words began in the fifth-century among the sophists (cf. Plato's malicious parody of Prodicus at *Prot.* 337a1-c4), it is possible Sophocles was aware of these views of the word in *Iliad* 24.753. But this takes us no nearer explaining away *Iliad* 7.467; 14.230; 21.40, 58, 79 or for that matter the context of 24.753, which clearly involves a commercial activity on Lemnos.



better justifying his extreme resentment against those who marooned him there. Others find a symbol for an alleged psychological flaw in the hero. Still others see merely an attempt by Sophocles to avoid by this daring device the infelicities in the dramatic presentations of his predecessors. The extraordinarily persistent focus on the physical setting is described as romantic coloring and perhaps even a compensation for the inadequacy of the plot.<sup>26</sup> To be sure, any such element is "overdetermined," but I suggest that Sophocles, in presenting Philoctetes' battle for survival in utter isolation from other human beings, is primarily offering an image of the human condition which derives ultimately from the sophists' speculations about the conditions of human life in the primitive, presocial stage. The constantly recurring references in the play to beasts, cave-dwelling, rocks, harsh weather, the difficulties of obtaining food, the absence of all but the most primitive herbal medicine, and the pathos of isolation keep relentlessly before the audience the most basic conditions of the presocial struggle to survive.

The opening lines of the play do not merely identify the setting; they underline its total lack of human inhabitants with emphatic fullness:

This is the shore of a sea-girt land,  
Lemnos, untrod upon, uninhabited by mortals. (1-2)<sup>27</sup>

Odysseus describes Philoctetes' rocky cave home (16-21) in terms of two basic necessities of survival: protection against the extremes of weather (ψύχει . . . θέρει, 16-17) and supply of water (ποτὸν κρηναῖον, 21). Neoptolemos' examination reveals that the cave is empty, but his phrase assumes its function as a human dwelling (. . . κενὴν οἴκησιν ἀνθρώπων δίχα, 31), and Odysseus' next question focuses on the whole range of factors which would distinguish this cave as a human habitation (οὐδ' ἔνδον οἰκοποιός ἐστὶ τις τροφή, 32). Neoptolemos first finds evidence of the most primitive bedding, the impress on leaves, then more decisive evidence of human presence: crude technology (τεχνήματ'

<sup>26</sup> Pathos: Pohlenz 386; Kitto *Form* 115; Opstelten 107; Segal "Nature" 38-39; Musurillo 122; Ronnet 239 and 254. Psychological flaw: Feder 40-41, Biggs 234, Gellie 145. Avoidance of predecessors' infelicities: Jebb on verse 2; Opstelten 107; Letters 273; Kitto *Tragedy* 321. Romantic coloring: Letters 273. Inadequacy of plot: Waldock 208.

<sup>27</sup> My translations make no pretense at meter or elegance. I do, however, try as far as possible to follow the content and emphasis of the original lines and therefore indent the lines of my translations as if they were verse whenever two or more whole lines are involved. Occasionally I italicize words which receive special emphasis in the Greek either from particles, position in the verse, or the addition of personal pronouns not required by sense alone in an inflected language.

ἀνδρός) and materials for making fire (35–36). The only reasons they can imagine for his absence are either need for food (φορβῆς, 43) or relief of pain, and the latter suggests the most primitive medicine achieved by mental observation, namely, “some pain-killing leaf” (44). Thus the prologue introduces Philoctetes in terms of the primitiveness of the conditions in which he must struggle to survive.

Despite what would seem a dramatically adequate description of his cave home in the prologue, a primary focus of the ensuing dialogue between Neoptolemos and the chorus is the nature of Philoctetes' cave and the harsh conditions of his existence. Neoptolemos invites them to examine the place (144–146); then they ask — with redundancy remarkable even for a Greek chorus — what his dwelling is like (αὐλὰς / ποίᾱς ἐνεδρος ναίει / καὶ χώρον τίν' ἔχει . . . τίς τόπος, ἢ τίς ἔδρα, 152–157). If one adds to this Neoptolemos' preceding reference to μελάρων (147) and his reply (οἶκον μὲν ὄρᾱς τόνδ' ἀμφίθυρον / πετρίνης κοίτης, 159–160), one almost gets the bizarre idea that Sophocles was trying to offer a survey of all the possible Greek terms for dwelling! This is not mere elegant variation; it functions as a means of giving the greatest possible emphasis to the harsh conditions of Philoctetes' struggle to survive conditions which are explored in the dialogue that follows.

Neoptolemos repeats and expands Odysseus' earlier inference that Philoctetes' absence must result from his need for food (φορβῆς χρεία, 162). The “essential character of his life” (βιοτῆς . . . φύσιν, 164–165) consists wholly in this quest for food through hunting (θηρσβολοῦντα / πτηνοῖς ἰοῖς, 165–166), and his total isolation is imagistically focused in his lack of anyone to heal his ills (167–168). The chorus picks up and expands this grim evocation of Philoctetes' isolation. He is devoid of both human companionship and aid (170–171), he is “always alone” (172), and is “at a loss in the face of each need (χρείας) as it arises” (174–175). The repetition of χρεία so soon after φορβῆς χρείας above (162) reinforces the focus upon the absolute necessities of survival. In this context the chorus asks the question which embodies a major dramatic interest in the first half of the play: how in the world does the poor man endure? (176). If the MSS reading of the next phrase (ὦ παλάμαι θνητῶν, 177) is correct,<sup>28</sup> the words

<sup>28</sup> Jebb and Webster *Philoctetes* both accept Lachmann's emendation θεῶν for θνητῶν but Jebb at least recognizes the true force of the MSS reading: “παλάμαι θνητῶν if sound, would mean ‘the resources of men’ (as shown by Philoctetes) so Theognis 630 . . . Cp. the praise of man as παντοπόρος in Ant. 360.”



express their admiration for the human resourcefulness to which the chorus attribute his survival. The chorus's ensuing lament focuses once more on Philoctetes as "unaccommodated man" (πάντων ἄμμορος ἐν βίῳ, 182). His isolation is again stressed (183), but this time the idea is expanded upon by the contrast to his association with "dappled or shaggy beasts" (184-185), by further allusion to physical pain, hunger, and "incurable and uncared-for sorrows" (185-186).<sup>29</sup> Then, climactically, they imagine the babbling echo that is the only answer to his bitter cries (186-190). As Philoctetes himself is heard approaching, the chorus reverts to this image of a cry in pain which no one hears and denies specifically the pleasant pastoral<sup>30</sup> associations which isolation might have for a contemporary audience: he comes "not with a pipe-song, like a shepherd pasturing in the fields" (213-214). At a time when Euripides, Aristophanes, and perhaps others were exploring the idea of a life of peaceful isolation from man in the friendly company of beasts,<sup>31</sup> Sophocles seems to have been at pains to emphasize the horrors of real, total isolation from human society.

Philoctetes' passionate greeting to Neoptolemos and the chorus sustains this emphasis on the horrors of being alone, desolate, friendless, and miserable (μόνον, / ἔρημον ὧδε καῖφιλον κακούμενον, 227-228).<sup>32</sup> His

<sup>29</sup> So D. L. Page 39; accepted by Webster *Philoctetes* ad loc.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the suggestion of Professor Dover "even long before Theocritus a shepherd's life and music may have been proverbially idyllic and cheerful," quoted by Robinson 39.

<sup>31</sup> The motif of escape — usually to some isolated spot — from an intolerable human situation by means of a fantasied transformation into a bird is of course a commonplace of tragedy, especially in Euripides, e.g. *Hipp.* 732f, *An.* 862; *Hel.* 1478f, *Ion.* 796f; cf. Sophocles fr. 476 (Pearson) and *O.C.* 1081f. In the *Helen* passage the imagery of escape as a bird is combined with an explicitly "pastoral" metaphor, i.e. "obeying the shepherd's pipe" (1484-1485). *Ion*'s long monody (*Ion* 82f) goes further. He evokes in sacral and distinctly asocial terms a happy life in relation to springs, groves, and birds — though the latter are to be sure partly viewed as a nuisance. Aristophanes' *Birds*, though it embraces far more than a quest for pastoral bliss, does certainly contain this element (see Whitman *Aristophanes* 168f). On the other hand, plays like Euripides' *Cyclops* and presumably Pherecrates' *Agrioi* (alluded to in Plato *Prot.* 327d) suggest the popularity of exploring discontent with "advanced" culture by juxtaposing it to its opposite. In particular, the type of the ferociously misanthropic recluse seems to have emerged in the last quarter of the fifth-century (see Handley on *Dyskolos* 6). Sophocles here too seems to take advantage in an original way of available contemporary responses.

<sup>32</sup> Schlesinger 150 points out that *μόνος*, *ἔρημος*, and *ἄφιλος* occur in all the extant tragedies of Sophocles, but in no other do they play so significant a role as in the *Philoctetes*. He might have added that nowhere else are these terms given so literal a force.

allusion to his wild appearance (ἀπηγριωμένον, 226) recalls the chorus's evocation of his life among shaggy and dappled beasts (184-185). His long subsequent narrative of his life on Lemnos (279-299) not only suggests the pathos of his awful isolation but also narrates in detail the *process* by which he has maintained his life in these forbidding circumstances. It thus answers in part the chorus's earlier rhetorical question, how could he endure? (176).

Philoctetes focuses relentlessly on the bare necessities of human survival. He is left by the Greeks in the protection of a cave with the crudest coverings and a small amount of food (βορᾶς / ἐπωφέλημα<sup>33</sup> σμικρόν, 275). The greatest horror of Philoctetes' awakening is the lack of human aid (280-282). He ironically sums up his total helplessness in terms of his discovery (ἡῤῥισκον, 283) in the course of an exhaustive search (282) of an "abundant provision" (πολλὴν εὐμάρειαν, 284) of "suffering" (283). Almost immediately he proceeds to recount the literal "discovery" of the barest necessities of survival through the agency of his weapon, the decisive nature of which is emphasized by its personification (γαστρὶ μὲν τὰ σύμφορα / τόξον τόδ' ἐξηύρισκε, 287-288). After shelter and food, his next need is water and fire to protect him from the extremes of winter. Painfully he contrives (ἐμηχανώμην, 295) to win water and wood. Finally, his laborious achievement of fire is made the climactic item in his triumph over the most elemental forces of destruction:

Next, there would be no fire at hand.

But by striking stone on stone at long last

I'd make shine forth the hidden flame, which saves me always.

Truly, a livable chamber with fire besides

provides me with *everything* — except escape from my disease. (295-299)

The emphatic play on ἔφην' ἄφαντον φῶς, the suggestive inclusiveness of the phrase ὃ καὶ σώζει μ' αἰεί, the literal sense of which is explained further in πυρὸς μέτα / πάντ' ἐκπορίζει, rhetorically give to fire a role in Philoctetes' survival which may appear disproportionate to its warmth-giving function or even its function in cooking, to which no direct allusion is made. But in the context of Sophocles' anthropologically based metaphor of the presocial struggle for survival, fire constitutes an almost inevitable climax.

The relentless focus in the opening three hundred lines of the play

<sup>33</sup> The strong poetic emphasis of this unique coinage is well stressed by Long 98. However, he does not recognize the distinctly anthropological associations of the ὠφέλ- ("help") concept in the context of a struggle to survive.

upon the harsh absolutes of Philoctetes' mode of survival — his rocky cave, his isolation except for beasts and birds which constitute his sole diet, his total dependence on his bow — recurs with a grimly altered emphasis in the last third of the play when he is deprived of his bow. Much of the audience's reaction to the callousness of the chorus in proposing to leave Philoctetes without his bow (833f) and Odysseus' ironically accommodating release of him to "tread his Lemnos" (1054–1060) depends upon a full acceptance of the bow as his only means of survival. It is explicitly in these terms that Philoctetes first describes Neoptolemos' act:<sup>34</sup> ἀπεστέρηκας τὸν βίον τὰ τόξ' ἐλών . . . τὸν βίον με μὴ ἀφέλῃ (931, 933). Twice earlier (189–190, 216) the chorus had sympathetically imagined Philoctetes' agonized cries to surroundings devoid of human life. Now when he is again denied a human response (934), we hear him directly lament to the ever-present but isolating water, the rocky harshness of the land, the impossible "companionship" of wild beasts — all in language which recalls the imagery of his successful struggle depicted in the early section of the play:

O watery havens and headlands, O companionship  
of mountain beasts, O jagged, broken rocks,  
to you — for I know none other to address —  
to you my usual companions I raise my cries . . . (936–939)

Initially, Philoctetes' lament centers on the human outrage which has been perpetrated against him; the harsh environment is invoked merely as a witness. But when a second appeal to Neoptolemos again meets with silence (951), a second apostrophe to the physical environment (952f) becomes a meditation on the active hostility it will manifest against a man who is now stripped of defense (ψιλός, 953) and by the same token without means for acquiring sustenance (τροφήν, 953). His rocky home with its two openings (951) is now the chamber in which he must wither away from starvation, or, as he considers more closely, fall victim to his own former victims. He focuses with relentless parallelism and alliteration on the primitive "law of the jungle" which it will soon be his lot to illustrate:<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Robinson 43f well defends the play on βίον and βιόν against Jebb, who denied it was even present. For me it is decisively confirmed by Philoctetes' later bitter allusion to Odysseus χερὶ πάλλων / τὰν ἐμὴν μελέου τροφάν (1125–1126). Henry 4 adds plausibly *Phil.* 1416–1417 where he sees a further pun.

<sup>35</sup> ῥύσιον (959), a word which occurs in Homer (*Il.* 11.674) to designate the rough-and-ready justice of seizing cattle in reprisal for stolen cattle, seems from

I myself, alas,  
by my death will furnish a feast for those on whom I fed,  
and those I used to hunt will now hunt me:  
alas! I will pay by my death the blood-price of their deaths.  
(956-959)

In the long kommos beginning at 1081, the transformation of the environment implicit in 951-959 is evoked again and explored more fully. The cave's changes in temperature, so appealingly described by Odysseus (16-19),<sup>36</sup> now appear in a more intensified aspect ("now hot, now icy-cold," 1084). What was earlier a home is now a rock hollow that will witness his death. The birds and beasts, his former prey, are now free to move or rest at will (1092-1094, 1146-1155), while he is fixed in his cave (1149-1150). The most marked contrast between the man and the beasts is with respect to food. Man without weapons has no hope of food (1090-1091); nowhere can he seek sustenance (*βιοτά*, 1159); he must feed on air (1059). The beasts, once the threat of the human weapon is removed, will take their full vengeance on his corpse (1156-1157). This reversal has been alluded to earlier, but now the pathetic helplessness of man in isolation is further heightened by the suggestion that the very land itself feeds the beasts (cf. *οὐρεσιβώτας*, 1148) while unaccommodated man cannot enjoy any of the advantages of "life-giving earth" (*βιόδωρος αἶα*, 1161).<sup>37</sup>

This broad contrast between the conditions of a barely successful human struggle to survive in the opening portion of the play and the prospect of total obliteration of man by environmental forces in the later section constitutes what I consider a strongly anthropological framework within which the drama is played out. The imagistic emphasis on beasts, food, shelter, weapons, medicine, and fire; the terminological focus on need, advantage, discovery, contrivance, supply, resourcefulness; the relentless emotional evocations of loneliness, fear, anxiety, and pain — all echo the anthropological speculations

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its use in tragedy (e.g. Aes. *Ag.* 535, *Supp.* 728) to have retained connotations of direct retaliation unmediated by legal institutions.

<sup>36</sup> Webster, *Philoctetes*, on verse 16 well comments, "Odysseus describes the cave like a house-agent, implying that its desirability mitigated his cruelty." For a contrasting view see Ronnet 259 who takes Odysseus' description as proof that "toute l'humanité possible" is employed in the accomplishment of his duty.

<sup>37</sup> We may recall that in Protagoras' myth the special point of the puns on the names of Epimetheus and Prometheus is the contrast between all other animals, who are perfectly equipped by Epimetheus with the physical means to survive, and man who is "naked, barefooted, homeless [literally 'bed-less'], and weaponless" 321c5-6.



of the pre-Socratics and sophists about the circumstances of presocial human life.

#### ARRIVING AT THE SOCIAL COMPACT

The relationships which develop as the play unfolds between Philoctetes and Neoptolemos and between Philoctetes and the chorus are dramatically complicated by the deception to which Neoptolemos and the chorus are committed at the outset; it renders much of what they say of questionable sincerity. This deception is not extraneous to the sophistic matrix of the play, but it does, as I will try to illustrate later, represent an intrusion from the third or contemporary level of sophistic sociology into the second stage. The situation is further complicated by Sophocles' addition of clearly nonsophistic elements, which I should also like to discuss later. Despite these complications, the major dramatic thrust and much of the emotional power of the interaction of these characters derive in no small measure from Sophocles' exploitation of the second stage of sophistic sociology. Against the background of Philoctetes' isolated struggle for minimal survival, human bonds are established on the basis of spontaneous pity for a suffering fellow human being, spontaneous affection between human beings of the same race and same language, and, at the highest level — when deception and force have been repudiated — on the basis of sincere persuasion aiming at the best interest of one's friends. This level is only achieved by the emergence of fundamental agreement about ethical and religious values: what is "just," what is "holy," and what is "pious." The ultimate goal of the compact established at this level remains the same as the goal of Philoctetes' isolated struggle: survival.<sup>38</sup>

We noted earlier the climactic role given Philoctetes' achievement of the "salvation-light" (*φῶς*) of fire, which "saves" him always (*ὁ καὶ σῶζει μ' αἰεί*, 297) and suggested that emphasis reflects the anthropologists' sense of the decisive role of fire in human survival at the presocial level. But the most frequent occurrence of the verb *σῶζειν* in the play is in the appeals of Philoctetes and the promises of his interlocutors for "salvation" from the horrible isolation of primitive life on Lemnos.

<sup>38</sup> Avery 296 includes a brief appendix demonstrating the importance of the theme of salvation but seems to have little idea what to do with his data. Jameson 224 n. 16 alludes to *σωτηρία* as a contemporary political slogan, but neither he nor Bieler, from whom he gets the idea, notes the specifically sophistic character of the emphasis on *σωτηρία* in many of the contexts cited by Bieler, particularly those from Thucydides.



For Philoctetes this means a return to the society and kin ties of his home and father; for Neoptolemos, through most of the play, and for the chorus throughout the play, it means a return to the society of the Greek army at Troy and full participation in their common attempt to destroy Troy. Despite these differences over the best kind of "salvation," the grounds for "saving" Philoctetes are consistently examined in terms of the sophistic analysis of human ties outlined above.

The chorus, "strangers in a strange land" (135) anticipate with some anxiety encountering a man they have every reason to expect will be "full of suspicion" (136). Their leader too alludes apprehensively to the coming of the "frightening traveler" (147). But as soon as they hear the account of his grim way of life they are overcome with pity (οἰκτίρων νιν ἔγωγ', 169); as they meditate on his mode of life (170f), he becomes for them a frightening example of the fragility of the human condition (178f), an awesome reversal of the social order (180f). Summing up the pains and anxieties of his life, they again pronounce him "pitiful" (οἰκτρός, 186).

Neoptolemos, however, seems at first to be made of sterner stuff; to their meditation on human suffering he opposes the brisk certainty of a divine plan (191-200).<sup>39</sup> But whether disposed to distrust, sympathy, or cold indifference, the chorus and Neoptolemos in particular must be shaken by the dramatically unexpected<sup>40</sup> outpouring of affection from Philoctetes upon his arrival. Over and over again he expresses the love inspired by all the factors that create a bond between them: their Greek dress is προσφιλεστάτη (224); their Greek speech is φίλτατον φώνημα (234); the very wind that brought them together is φίλτατος (237); Neoptolemos' father is φίλτατος (242) and his homeland is φίλη χθών (242). Philoctetes appeals immediately for pity on the simple grounds of his sheer misery and isolation:

... showing pity for a man wretched and alone,  
suffering this way, isolated and friendless (227-228).

<sup>39</sup> Kitto *Form* III-III2 is especially good on the defensive smugness of Neoptolemos' attempt to counter the chorus's expression of pity. He perhaps follows Linforth 107.

<sup>40</sup> Well emphasized by Avery 280f. The surprise derives in part from the contrast to Euripides' more "obvious" assumption (cf. n. 31, above) that Philoctetes would be misanthropic, highly suspicious, and consider Greeks his worst enemies (see Dio. Chrys. *Or.* 59.6-7). Philoctetes' capacity, nicely stressed by Biggs 231, for a warm response to fellow human beings in spite of all he has suffered is the best refutation of the common view (cf. Gellie 153) that Philoctetes is too psychologically warped to participate in society.

When the chorus and Neoptolemos hesitate to reply, he begs them to speak on the grounds that it is not *εἰκός* for them not to speak to each other, implying that their humanity involves the reasonable "probability" of communication.<sup>41</sup>

After his full narrative of his abandonment by the Greeks and his long struggle to survive, Philoctetes prepares indirectly for his first appeal to be "saved" by describing the island and the behavior of the few previous chance arrivals. The island is not a place one chooses to visit for profit (*κέρδος*) or personal comfort (303). The few who have landed against their will have offered him only verbal pity (*λόγοις* / *ἐλεοῦσι*, 307–308) since their pity (*οἰκτίραντες*) extended only to the point of token gifts of food or clothing (308–309); they always balked at the fundamental service, the salvation of conveyance home (*σῶσαί μ' ἐς οἴκου*s, 311).

The chorus, with a naiveté<sup>42</sup> that is dramatically ironic, declare that they pity him (*ἐποικτίζειν*, 318) in equal measure (317) with those former arrivals. Neoptolemos, however, in pursuance of the deception, appears to ignore the hint and proceeds to lay the foundation for the only bond between himself and Philoctetes conceived of in the original scheme, namely, a shared hatred of Odysseus and the Atreidae.<sup>43</sup> But in the course of his lie, he is again confronted by Philoctetes' spontaneous expressions of a shared love and sympathy. Neoptolemos mentions in passing his father's death only to be interrupted by Philoctetes' deep distress both for the father and the son. Disconcerted, perhaps, Neoptolemos dourly suggests Philoctetes has enough troubles

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Guthrie *Sophists* 178f on the sophists' invention of and fascination with the argument from probability.

<sup>42</sup> Many readers (e.g. Fuqua 105, Schmidt 79) assume that here the chorus is doing their calculating best to adhere to Neoptolemos' injunction to back him up in his lies (148–149). The ambiguity of their responses as in the case of Neoptolemos' real feelings (see below in the text and n. 51) is a delicate interpretative problem throughout most of the play; and it is perhaps pointless to offer dogmatic judgment where the poet has clearly created an atmosphere full of ambiguity. On the other hand, the poet gives us more data than is sometimes perceived. We have heard this chorus moved to a strong expression of pity (169f) by the mere sight of Philoctetes' dwelling when there can be no question of deceit. The direct exposure to Philoctetes' pathetic appearance and speech seem dramatically more than adequate to move this chorus of Papagenos to pity.

<sup>43</sup> Alt 150 correctly notes the emphasis in this scene on a shared hatred, but fails to distinguish between the bond of hatred prepared for by Odysseus (59f) and the bonds of affection and pity which arise spontaneously and have consequences very much contrary to Odysseus' intentions.

of his own "not to grieve at the sufferings of his neighbor" (340). Despite his explicit denial, the very generality of his declaration in this context invites a consideration of the bases for shared feelings between human beings in proximity.<sup>44</sup>

The sympathetic response of Philoctetes, when Neoptolemos' whole narrative (343-390) and the chorus's supportive lyric (391-402) are over, leads unexpectedly to a further revelation of shared affections. Philoctetes asks about various heroes whom he would have expected to act as Neoptolemos' allies: Neoptolemos' cousin the greater Ajax (411), Philoctetes' "noble old friend" Nestor, Achilles' beloved Patroklos (433-434). In each case Philoctetes expresses strong sympathy for the death or misfortune of Neoptolemos' natural allies among the Greeks. The reflections of Neoptolemos about the consequences of war (435-437) may still in part represent his deceitful pose, but it is hard not to see as well a perception genuinely shared with Philoctetes about who are the "good men" (τοὺς χρηστούς, 437). Neoptolemos' farewell to Philoctetes, calculatedly brusque as it is, nonetheless expresses a corresponding concern that the gods bring him relief in the way "he himself wishes" (461-463). The dramatic irony of this casually uttered phrase foreshadows the only viable basis on which the bond between these two friends can become functional, namely, a sincere respect for the real interests of one's friend.

Philoctetes now makes a direct appeal for σωτηρία — the verb σώζειν recurs like a leitmotif through his speech (488, 496, 501). This appeal uses the formulae of traditional supplication; but these are transformed by the untraditional circumstances from which he pleads for rescue, namely, his isolated struggle to eke out a bare existence on Lemnos. As a ἰκέτης, he begins with the traditional appeal in the name of his addressee's parents. His rhetorical expansion of that appeal (πρὸς τ' εἴ τί σοι κατ' οἶκόν ἐστι προσφιλές, 469) echoes his own earlier outpouring of affection (cf. 224, 234, 237, 242) and by its very generality almost invokes a principle of affection. He appeals not to be spared death on the battlefield, not for protection from some powerful human enemy, not even for a simple material boon; rather he appeals first and foremost not to be left *alone* in the wretched conditions which he has endured:

. . . do not leave me alone like this —  
destitute, in the miserable circumstances you see here  
and those you have heard surround my daily life. (470-472)

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Democritus *D-K* B293; Antiphon *D-K* B59.

To support his appeal, Philoctetes enlists a whole array of traditional ethical terminology which particularly evokes the world of Homeric "shame culture";<sup>45</sup> τό τ' αἰσχρὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστὸν εὐκλείες . . . ὄνειδος οὐ καλόν . . . πλεῖστον εὐκλείας γέρας, (476-478). He calls for the heroic virtue of τόλμα (475, 481) and associates proper ethical behavior with the aristocratic class term γενναῖος (475). Yet the content of the "daring," the "nobility," and the "glory" he envisions is worlds away from either traditional heroic virtues or the values of the third stage or contemporary world of the Trojan war. There, as is clear to the audience which has watched the scheme against Philoctetes arranged in the prologue, there is no "glory,"<sup>46</sup> associated with the "daring" or "nobility" that is involved in an act of kindness to a suffering fellow human being — especially when that kindness amounts to enduring the physical disgust occasioned by a festering wound. Indeed the poet seems to invite recognition of the pathetic disparity between the ethical assumptions of Philoctetes and those of the "real" world by the very emphasis on "heroic" terminology. What Philoctetes presents as meritorious behavior is in fact a more private sort of behavior in which pity and friendship based on common humanity, rather than the expectation of public acclaim, must play the decisive role. And it is precisely this "calculation" of human interdependence in the face of a hostile and dangerous world that forms the climax of Philoctetes' appeal:

. . . you save me, you pity me, seeing  
that the state of everything is fearful for mortals,  
full of danger that after joy must come its opposite.  
One who stands free of pain must look out for disasters,  
and while he lives, then keep guard on his life —  
in case it be totally ruined before he knows it. (501-506)

Pity is highlighted in the chorus's response (οἴκτιρ', ἄναξ . . . 507) but combined with a crude, "third-stage" variation of the idea of calculation of self-interest: it is profitable (κέρδος, 511) to help Philoctetes

<sup>45</sup> The term was first applied to Homeric values by Dodds *Greeks* 17. His analysis of those values has been considerably extended by Adkins in *Merit* chaps. 2-4, a whole series of articles, *Moral Values* chap. 2, and *Many*. In *Merit* Adkins frequently cites the *Philoctetes* to illustrate "the confusion of values of which Sophocles here makes use" and which Adkins sees as simply "part of the moral scene at this period" (189).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. the fine "reputation" Odysseus promises Neoptolemos for a day's shamelessness (83-85), discussed below in the text. I am indebted to Winnington-Ingram for reminding me of this clearly intentional parallelism of phrasing.



because he is the enemy of their alleged enemies, the Atreidae. Their expression of pity may be genuine in view of their previous sympathy expressed in his absence; but in the context of the deceit that they are helping to work against him, it is not without shabbiness. Yet their hypocrisy is as nothing compared to the smug snobbery of Neoptolemos, whose reply apes the aristocratic, heroic flavor of Philoctetes' untraditionally humane ethics. It would be *αἰσχρά* for him to prove inferior to the chorus in taking pains in the interest (*τὸ καίριον*) of a stranger (525).

The apparent selflessness of this act is met by Philoctetes with an ecstatic expression of his affection (*φίλτατον . . . ἡδιστος . . . φίλοι*) and his wish to be able to prove in action the love they have inspired in him (*ὥς μ' ἔθεσθε προσφιλῇ*, 530–532). The embarrassing naiveté of Philoctetes' openness to the bond of *φιλία* in this feigned social compact is immediately juxtaposed, with tremendous dramatic power, to a proud invitation to Neoptolemos to learn (*μάθης*) of his own real daring (*τληῖναι*), the harsh schooling (*προὔμαθον*) he has gradually gained under the necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) of the grim circumstances of his struggle to survive (*ἀφ' ὧν διέζων*) in his primitive non-home (*ἄοικον εἰσοίκησιν*, 533–538).

The conception of friendship as affectionate mutual service articulated in this scene is echoed several times (557–558, 582–583, 587–588) in more cynical, third-stage terms during the scene with the disguised agent of Odysseus.<sup>47</sup> The concept reemerges on an idealistic plane after the merchant departs, as Neoptolemos takes his first step toward gaining control of the bow. Neoptolemos phrases his request to handle the bow in the language of religious awe (*προσκύσαι . . . ὥσπερ θεόν*, 657). Philoctetes treats the request as a welcome opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to the self-interest (*ὅποῖον ἂν σοι ξυμφέρη γενήσεται*) of his friend (658–659). When Neoptolemos displays some hesitation whether his request is *θέμις*, a word which nicely equivocates between religious sanction and proper human behavior, Philoctetes' grateful reply defines holiness (*ὅσια*), right action (*θέμις*), and human excellence (*ἀρετή*) in terms of an act of kindly service (*εὐεργετῶν*) to a friend, such as he thinks he is receiving from Neoptolemos and such as he himself had performed for Herakles in winning the bow (662–670). Thus the bow, which in the absolute battle for primitive survival had emerged as a symbol of the technology

<sup>47</sup> Laurenti 46–47 well emphasizes that the merchant and Odysseus “speak a different language” from that of Philoctetes. Cf. Parlavantza-Friedrich 59.

that separates man from beast, becomes here a symbol of the service to a suffering friend which is held up as the fundamental basis both for affection and for a shared ethics in a social compact.<sup>48</sup>

The reply of Neoptolemos also defines friendship in terms of mutual service, but adds special emphasis to the idea of enlightened self-interest:

I am not sorry that I met and took you as my friend:  
for he who knows the art of making fair return for fair service  
must prove a friend worth more than any possession. (671-673)

The audience's knowledge of the intended crass exploitation of this "friend" by Neoptolemos<sup>49</sup> inevitably sharpens the dramatic contrast between the two definitions of friendship.

The smugness of Neoptolemos' false friendship is immediately juxtaposed to a further reminder of Philoctetes' long struggle to survive. The chorus at 676f, "the only proper stasimon of the play" as Jebb noted, sustains the relentless focus on the harsh reality of Philoctetes' situation for ten years alone on Lemnos. Thus it holds up for the audience a touchstone against which to test both the second-stage values of pity and friendship as well as the more ruthlessly utilitarian values of the third stage. After insisting on the absolutely undeserved character of Philoctetes' sufferings by the negative paradigm of Ixion, the chorus repeat their earlier expression of awe at Philoctetes' capacity to endure, then narrow their focus to a further exploration of a central theme of the anthropologists' account of the presocial battle to survive, namely the

<sup>48</sup> I completely disagree with Harsh's whole interpretation of the symbolism of the bow, and in particular with the notion that it is "an objective and unchanging symbol." Part of the richness of the symbolism is precisely that it changes with the different stages of society envisioned in different scenes. Musurillo 121f is much better on the range of symbolic associations of the bow.

<sup>49</sup> Webster assures us *ad loc.*, "Again the emotion is genuine: Neoptolemos feels a natural sympathy for Philoctetes as a like-minded hero." Similarly Kirkwood describes the lines as "heartfelt" (60). Reinhardt's comment *apropos* of an earlier passage seems to me valid here too: "Sogar die Gnomik stellt sich in den Dienst des falschen Spiels" (179). Parlavantza-Friedrich 58 speaks more bluntly of Neoptolemos' repeated use of "Gemeinplätzen." But at the same time that the smugness of tone in the immediate context deserves to be stressed, it is also true that in the broader context the lines reflect the clear dramatic irony that characterizes much of this section of the play: the terms of the deceit are in fact the terms on which real friendship will at last be established. Neoptolemos will reject the *ῥῆδν κτήμα* of victory offered by Odysseus (81) for the friendship of one ready to risk his life for the man who has saved his life (cf. 1404-1408 and my discussion below in the text).

lack of an abundance of material resources (εὐμάρεια . . . πόρου, 704-705). In particular, the theme of food is developed in the second strophe in terms which suggest the anthropologists' account of the second stage of social development. The chorus offers a sustained contrast between the pathetically haphazard food and drink (i.e. game and standing water) of an isolated individual and the food and drink (i.e. bread and wine) which are a consequence of the organized work of civilization (706-718).<sup>50</sup>

For the chorus there seems to be no sense of conflict between their expressions of pity for Philoctetes and the personal advantage they expect to win from him without his consent through their elaborate lies.<sup>51</sup> Neoptolemos, though he appears earlier to be even more smugly confident in the pursuit of his own advantage,<sup>52</sup> now begins to break

<sup>50</sup> Professor Henrichs has called my attention to the excellent, nearly contemporary parallel in Teiresias' "Prodician" discourse on Demeter and Dionysos (Eur. *Ba.* 274-285 with Dodds' note). See also Diodorus 1.8.6-8; *Ancient Medicine* 3.7 and 13; Lucretius 5.944-945 and Cole's discussion (*Democritus* 36-38). The emphasis in the *Philoctetes* on hunting alone rather than on gathering fruits and nuts represents, I believe, Sophocles' concentration of dramatic interest on the bow.

<sup>51</sup> Reinhardt's attempt (191) to defend the chorus by distinguishing a double function (supporting the intrigue, stressing the sufferings of Philoctetes) pinpoints a problem rather than solves it. Linforth's attempt to exonerate the chorus (127-130) and in particular his argument that they only express Neoptolemos' suppressed sympathies (cf. Schlesinger 138) gives us a curious sort of psycho-drama which totally obscures Sophocles' sharp sense of a class difference between the perceptions and emotions of the chorus and those of the son of Achilles (see further discussion below in the text).

<sup>52</sup> In general I agree with Erbse's brilliant refutation (189-190) of attempts such as those of Alt and Schmidt to find mitigating hints of Neoptolemos' pity as early as possible in the play. Winnington-Ingram has stressed to me the implications of the repetition of πάλαι (806, 906, 966) in Neoptolemos' expressions of pity and shame. Seale too speaks persuasively of the "sustained ambiguity which forms the basis of the dramatic tension, allowing two possible interpretations of the behaviour of Neoptolemos and the Chorus, deception or sincerity" (98). Of course a good actor playing the part of Neoptolemos would attempt to exploit this dramatic possibility to the hilt, and it is equally true that Neoptolemos' "conversion" must be dramatically credible. At the same time defenders of Neoptolemos tend, in my view, to take inadequate account of the far more impressive dramatic tension between, on the one hand, the shabbiness and narrow selfishness of Neoptolemos' conversion to Odysseus' goals and means in the prologue (see my discussion below in the text) and, on the other hand, the terrible misery, amazing inner strength, and decency of the victim constantly before our eyes to whom Neoptolemos keeps lying so long and so effectively. Whatever hints of distress might be conveyed by gesture and however much ambiguity the initial conflict of values with Odysseus in the prologue

down in the face of a direct experience of Philoctetes' hideous suffering from a sudden attack of his disease. One of the fundamental dramatic ironies built into Sophocles' plot lies in the fact that it is precisely the direct experience of Philoctetes' hideous scream<sup>53</sup> of pain — the reason alleged by the rest of the Greeks for abandoning him — that precludes Neoptolemos' abandoning him. It sweeps away his narrowly selfish defenses against the genuine pity and affection he has begun to feel for Philoctetes. Thus conditions for a genuine social compact between them begin to emerge. Philoctetes' agonized cry for pity (οἴκτιρέ με, 756) and Neoptolemos' own inability to help him (757) elicit from Neoptolemos a highly emotional, heavily alliterative lament: ἰὼ ἰὼ δύστηνε σύ, / δύστηνε δῆτα διὰ πόνων πάντων φανείς (759-760). His own long-suppressed pain at the pain of his friend is soon expressed openly in terms that echo, with great dramatic irony, his own earlier injunction to Philoctetes not to "groan at the pains of his neighbor" (cf. 340): "I have long been in pain, groaning at your sufferings" (806).

Philoctetes now swoons into unconsciousness, after entrusting his bow to his friend with a strong affirmation of their mutual dependence (772-773) and exacting a pledge (πίστω, 813) that Neoptolemos will stay. The split between the chorus and Neoptolemos at this point emerges sharply. He refuses to accept their broad hints<sup>54</sup> that he take the bow and leave the man. Yet at this point there is only a hint that his motives involve a fundamental agreement with Philoctetes about ethical values: he echoes emphatically Philoctetes' transformed moral

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may lend to Neoptolemos' situation, the actual content of his words and behavior toward the helpless and trusting Philoctetes remain morally shocking until the attack of the disease finally breaks down his defenses. Grene puts it well: "... it is surely remarkable how very sharply Sophocles has chosen to mark the limits of Neoptolemos' decency . . . He takes a very long time to come to himself, to realize that he cannot win his objective at such a price of torturing another human being" (145).

<sup>53</sup> Knox 130-131 has a powerful discussion of this scream, yet his own irony blurs the dramatic irony in the play; he declares "we understand now fully why the Achaeans abandoned him" (131). Ronnet 256 even defends as valid the "religious scruple" alleged for abandoning Philoctetes.

<sup>54</sup> Hinds 175-176, though excessively tentative about it, correctly refutes Linforth's absurd defense of the chorus on the grounds that they don't explicitly say "Take the bow and leave the man." There are obviously good reasons for being vague when one makes so cruel a suggestion. Jones 83-84 nicely reminds us that Hera fetches Hypnos from Lemnos (*Il.* 14.230-231) to aid her seduction of Zeus. He suggests plausibly that in their hymn to Hypnos (827f), the chorus have in mind the ambiguity of his role as (1) bringing relief from pain and (2) rendering his victims helpless and vulnerable to trickery.



terminology of the shame culture (αἰσχρὸν ὄνειδος, 842: cf. 476-477).<sup>55</sup> The chorus perceive only a simple choice between something that involves fear (φοβῶν, 864) and pain (πάθη, 854) on the one hand, and on the other an opportunity for their advantage (καιρός, 837; καίρια, 862). Philoctetes' ecstatic praise of Neoptolemos upon regaining consciousness sharpens further the conflict of values. For Philoctetes, the fact that Neoptolemos has remained transforms the light he now sees again into a symbolic victory light (φέγγος), confirming, beyond expectation, the bond between them based upon a new kind of heroic endurance (τληῖναι) which in turn consists of pity (ἐλεινῶς) and cooperative help (ξυνωφελοῦντά μοι, 867-871).

In Neoptolemos' ensuing painful confession of fraud, in the dramatization of his gradually completed alienation from Odysseus and his achievement of a full compact with Philoctetes, the decisive factors are precisely pity, cooperative help, and a deeply transformed heroic ethic. Neoptolemos at first insists that his real intention in taking Philoctetes to Troy still includes the humane motive of "saving" him (σῶσαι, 919). But when Philoctetes demands back the bow which is his only means of survival on Lemnos, Neoptolemos refuses on the grounds that obedience to the army involves a harmony of proper behavior (τὸ ἔνδικον) and private advantage (τὸ συμφέρον 926). A scathing denunciation by Philoctetes and his pathetic lament, evoking the death he must suffer without his bow, force Neoptolemos to acknowledge the terrifying pity (οἷκτος δεινός) that has "attacked" him (965-966). Throughout this exchange a noteworthy series of verbal echoes underlines the fact that for Neoptolemos, locked into the crass calculations and manipulations that characterize "advanced" society, spontaneous feelings of pity and decency occasion an inner "agony" (806, 906, 913), a "terrifying attack" (965), a sense of inner "disgust" (902) which directly contrast with the physical agony (e.g. 283, 732f) which attacks (699) Philoctetes and the physical disgust (473, 900) occasioned by his wound. This careful symbolism of a wound in Neoptolemos' psyche resulting from his association with a corrupted society suggests the inherent implausibility of the popular interpretation of Philoctetes' wound as a symbol

<sup>55</sup> Winnington-Ingram "Tragica" 49 offers the attractive suggestion that Neoptolemos' use of hexameters here suggests not the sudden insight of an oracle (Bowra 281), but "heroic" action. "There is a discord between the Homeric metre and the unheroic enterprise in which the son of Achilles has allowed himself to be engaged." This view does not I think conflict with my argument that the context of Philoctetes' unusual predicament and his entire interaction with Neoptolemos substantially have altered the moral content of these "shame culture" terms.

of the hero's alleged pathological incapacity to relate to society.<sup>56</sup> On the contrary, as we have noted, Philoctetes' unexpectedly generous outpouring of affection for human strangers, his readiness to trust and serve his new-found friends suggest he has all the social instincts that can reasonably be expected of any human being. His wound represents one of those arbitrary, inexplicable impositions of forces external to and beyond human control — an amoral *ἀνάγκη*<sup>57</sup> which is as much a given as the harshness of the physical environment unmediated by society. The consistent personification of the wound as itself a beast<sup>58</sup> involves a symbolic intensification of the hostile presocial world from which Philoctetes must wrest his survival. Only in this sense does it symbolize his need for society — but clearly not just any society. His afflictions, both general and specific, require a society characterized by decency and pity.

Neoptolemos' vulnerability to these essential social emotions of pity and moral shame now opens up the possibility for genuine social bonds. Philoctetes immediately fastens onto the idea of pity (*ἐλέησον*, 967) and links it, just as he had in his first appeal to be saved (cf. 476–478), with the shame culture ethic (*ὄνειδος*, 968). Neoptolemos now is morally paralyzed and can only exclaim "What am I to do?" (969), "What are we to do?" (974). But from the angry exclamation of Odysseus, who now intervenes, Neoptolemos seems to have been in the process of returning the bow. After the intervention of Odysseus, pity seems something

<sup>56</sup> The view was first popularized in Wilson's famous essay, "The Wound and the Bow" 257f. Biggs, despite excellent perceptions of the ways in which Philoctetes' disease is sharply differentiated from those of Ajax and Heracles, still speaks of "the poison of deep grief" and interprets the emphasis on the stench of the wound as symbolic of the hero's "fostering" of his own self-pity and hate which "makes association with the sufferer so difficult" (233). Schlesinger also cautiously sets forth a psychological explanation of the wound symbolism (154f). Although some of the verbal parallels between the literal wound of Philoctetes' and the inner wound of Neoptolemos are commonly noted, no one, as far as I can recall, has drawn attention to the difficulties they pose for a psychological interpretation of Philoctetes' wound.

<sup>57</sup> Of itself belief in "necessity" implies neither an Archaic, "demonic" view of the world nor an anthropological view. But Biggs 233 rightly notes that although Philoctetes can speak in generally pessimistic terms of the gods (e.g. 452), he does not, in contrast to Ajax and Heracles, attribute his wound to divine persecution or punishment. Only Neoptolemos raises such a view (191f), and it is strongly undercut in its dramatic context. The chorus's meditation on the contrast to Ixion (676f) emphasizes the difficulties of a moral/religious interpretation of the wound. In Neoptolemos' later allusion to a vaguely "divine" source of Philoctetes' sufferings (1316–1317) the emphatic use of *τύχας* precludes a moral view.

<sup>58</sup> This symbolism is beautifully worked out by Kamerbeek.

Philoctetes can only pray for from the gods (1042). But his desperation as Odysseus, Neoptolemos, and the chorus prepare to abandon him leads to a further appeal — first to Neoptolemos, then, when he fails to respond, to the chorus:

O strangers, will I really be left behind — desolate like this —  
by you as well, and will you show me no pity? (1070–1071)

Their reply affirms once more (cf. 139f, 963–964) their total dependence on the judgment of Neoptolemos. Once again the pity felt by and acted upon by Neoptolemos plays a decisive role in the unfolding of the drama: he orders his men to remain with Philoctetes in the hope he will change his mind, but comments: “True I will have it said of me that my nature is full of pity / — said by *this* man, but all the same stay . . . ! (1074–1075). His assumption that this act of pity will win him a bad “reputation” (*ἀκούσομαι*) in the eyes of Odysseus contrasts ironically with Philoctetes’ earlier, apparently naive assumption that a failure in pity would bring Neoptolemos “reproach in the eyes of mankind” (*βροτοῖς ὄνειδος*, 968).

In the ensuing lyric dialogue between Philoctetes and the chorus, the themes of friendship and pity are set in sharp relief against the full, grim evocation of Philoctetes’ inability to survive on Lemnos without his bow: the apparent breakdown of the social compact leaves him no longer able to confront successfully the presocial conditions of existence. The chorus chides him for rejecting their affectionate feeling for him (*φιλότητ’*, 1122), they declare that they draw near him with complete concern for his best interest (*εὐνοίᾳ πάσα πελάταν*, 1164), and describe the doom awaiting him on Lemnos as “pitiful” (*οἰκτρά*, 1167). Yet they deny they have had any part in a deception (*δόλος*, 1117) of Philoctetes, reject any criticism of Odysseus (1140f), and twice<sup>59</sup> express their great eagerness to leave Philoctetes to his fate (1177f, 1218). Indeed, the idiom they first choose to express this eagerness (*φίλα μοι, φίλα . . .* 1177) seems to embody the poet’s ironic comment on the insincerity of their *φιλότης* for Philoctetes.

The consequence of this delay won by Neoptolemos’ pity is of course not the submission of Philoctetes, but the completion of Neoptolemos’ break with Odysseus. In the staccato exchange between the returning Neoptolemos and the unsuccessfully obstructive Odysseus,

<sup>59</sup> “Twice,” that is, if the much suspected (see Jebb ad loc.) lines 1218–1221 are retained. Taplin (39–44) has renewed the attack on them. It is hard to say how much his conviction of their irrelevance and inappropriateness is affected by his false view that the chorus’s attempt at persuasion has been “honest” (38).



Neoptolemos describes his earlier behavior as a crime (ὅσ' ἐξήμαρτον, 1224; cf. 1248) involving "shameful deceptions" (ἀπάταισιν αἰσχροῖς . . . καὶ δόλοισι, 1228, 1234, 1249) and contrary to right (δίκη, 1234). He declares his imperviousness to fear (1251), even of the entire army (1243), as long as he is allied with "what is right" (τῷ δικάῳ, 1251).

This passage is not uncommonly cited<sup>60</sup> as marking a definitive repudiation of sophistic thought. It does clearly mark a particularly self-conscious internalization of the heroic "shame" ethic: terms which normally derive their validity from the approval or disapproval of the group are here held up as a basis for defying the group's opinion. The attempt to found a more inner-directed morality based on traditional terminology is generally associated with the name of Socrates, who in turn is presented by Plato as the very antithesis of a sophist. Yet the process, never complete, by which the traditional shame-culture's ethical terminology was transformed into a set of mental constructs affecting the *psyche* of an individual apart from witnesses was longer and more complex than Plato suggests. The anthropologically-oriented thinkers who explored the origin of ethics in the survival needs of the group also examined the subtle socialization process by which necessary values are internalized in members of the group. They recognized that without some internalization of ethical values no social intercourse is possible, and instead of relations based on persuasion, there would be only deceit or brute force.<sup>61</sup> Thus despite the clear admixture in the ethical assumptions of the *Philoctetes* of nonsophistic or even anti-sophistic elements, the dramatization of the break between Neoptolemos and Odysseus is in harmony with significant aspects of the sophistic analysis of the social compact. The emergence of fundamental agreement about ethical matters between Neoptolemos and Philoctetes is presented as an integral factor in the establishment of bonds of true friendship and sincere pity, which in turn are the prerequisites for the "survival" and joint action of these two men.

<sup>60</sup> E.g. Knox 136, Pohlenz 335. Opstelten 108-109, though he does not specifically cite this passage, seems to have it particularly in mind. Again Nestle "Sophocles" (155) seems to have set the pattern.

<sup>61</sup> Adkins' chapters (4 and 5 in *Many*) on the pre-Socratics and sophists are disappointing on this topic, due in part, I suspect, to his ignorance or disregard of Havelock's work. Adkins does not even discuss anthropological speculation until he deals with the Epicureans and deals only superficially with a few of the ethical fragments of Democritus (e.g. pp. 101, 107, 110). Guthrie too is deficient on this topic for similar reasons: he is unduly hesitant to take Democritus seriously (*HGP* II 489f). On Democritus see Vlastos. On the whole topic see Havelock, esp. chaps. 6-8.



The break with Odysseus is followed by the dramatization of the process of reestablishing bonds of pity and friendship, based on a concern for the best interest of one's friend, presupposing fundamental agreement about ethics and directed toward the "salvation" of both. Thus, just as there were two views of the presocial battle to survive — one successful with the bow, the other impossible without the bow — so there is a double dramatization of the process of establishing the social contract: one perverted by the intrusion of deceit, the second purged of suspicion caused by previous deceit. In this second version there is an important difference of opinion between friends on a matter which affects the "survival" of each. Thus this scene dramatizes the problem of the grounds of persuasion, which is presented as a fundamental need if human beings are to survive in a group.

Neoptolemos begins by expressing his desire to "persuade through speech" (1278) and a desire to speak *πρὸς καιρὸν* (1279), which in this context implies to Philoctetes' advantage. Philoctetes at first rejects<sup>62</sup> persuasion on the grounds that Neoptolemos' previous deception precludes genuine friendship, i.e. friendship based on sincere concern for the friend's best interest (*εὖνον*, 1281). But once Neoptolemos has returned the bow and restored to Philoctetes the means of minimal survival, spontaneous affection (*ὦ φίλτατ' εἰπών*, 1290) begins to return.

Once this bond is reestablished, Neoptolemos sets about the task of serious persuasion (1315f). He begins by setting forth quite abstractly the conditions under which human beings merit pity (*ἐποικτίρειν*, 1320), namely, when their sufferings are imposed and enduring them is inevitable (*ἀναγκαῖον*, 1317). Philoctetes, he argues, by refusing professed social ties, demonstrates the characteristics of a beast (*ἡγρίωσαι*, 1321). Bestiality is further defined as a refusal to accept joint decision-making by failing to distinguish friend from enemy. The whole argument recalls sophistic attempts to define what is peculiarly human as a basis for exploring the foundations of human social bonds.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> The thesis of Knox 119f that Odysseus' choice of *δόλος* over *βία* or *πειθώ* precludes the success of *πειθώ*, which might have worked if it had been tried first, is taken up by Schlesinger, who adds a suggestive analysis (103f) of the embassy in *Iliad* 9 as a parallel and a useful discussion of the ambiguity of persuasion in Gorgias (123f). The thesis is attractive insofar as it casts light on the meanness of Odysseus' assumptions, but Schlesinger in particular tends to argue the matter as if the primary "intention" of Sophocles were to display his cleverness in writing a drama of intrigue.

<sup>63</sup> The gist of Neoptolemos' argument has some affinities with Protagoras' analysis of faults which merit pity and those which are punished (*Prot.* 323c8–324c1), the unusual character of which is well emphasized by Havelock (174)

After Neoptolemos has raised these general preliminaries to persuasion, he catalogues a series of concrete advantages which will accrue to Philoctetes if he returns to Troy. These include cure for his malady and winning supreme renown as the sacker of Troy. The agonized reply of Philoctetes is first a wish he were dead. The very intensity with which he states his predicament frees him of the charge<sup>64</sup> that he lacks human susceptibility to the kindly-intentioned (εὖνους) advice of a friend:

Ah me, what am I to do? How can I distrust speech  
coming from *this* man, who has advised me with good will?

(1350-1351)

Without denying the advantages cited by Neoptolemos, Philoctetes implies, through a series of passionate rhetorical questions, that the most elementary social intercourse (προσῆγορος, 1353; ξυνόντα, 1356) is unthinkable with men who have treated him as Odysseus and the Atreidae have. Nor is he simply motivated by bitterness for past crimes; it is the strong probability — based on their previous behavior — of equally unjust treatment in the future which seems to preclude social ties and joint action with such men (cf. 1359-1361).<sup>65</sup>

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and Guthrie *Sophists* 67. For the beast analogy see Democritus *D-K* B57, 198, 278 and, perhaps, Antiphon *D-K* B48.

<sup>64</sup> Philoctetes' use of the virtual formula for tragic *aporia* (τί δράσω; cf. Aeschylus *Choe.* 899), echoing Neoptolemos' earlier pained declarations of helplessness (908, 969, 974), dramatically underlines the intensity of his dilemma. This very strong expression of Philoctetes' openness to genuinely friendly persuasion is undervalued by those who present Philoctetes as impiously stubborn and/or psychologically damaged by his hatred of his enemies (e.g. Bowra 293, Ronnet 255-258). To be open to the persuasion of friends is the mark of a true aristocrat (see *Ajax* 330), but to refuse — in the face of the strongest inducements — to allow a criminal society to define one's role is the special characteristic of the Sophoclean hero; see Knox chaps. 1 and 2 esp. pp. 8-9. Alt 169 has a good appreciation of Philoctetes' vulnerability to Neoptolemos here: if he gave in at this point, it would be only out of friendship, not hope of a cure.

<sup>65</sup> At 685 Jebb accepts Schultz' and Lachmann's ἴσος ὦν ἴσοις for the reading of L, ἴσως ἐν ἴσοις, and specifically denies that the text "implies that he dealt with ἴσοι in one way and ἄδικοι in another." Yet Philoctetes' argument at 1355f seems to imply precisely that familiar code. Thus the reading of A rec, ἴσος ἐν ἴσοις, or Hermann's ἴσος ἐν γ' ἴσοις (to correct the meter) are not only closer to L, but more accurately describe Philoctetes' conception of fairness with a nice touch of dramatic irony: the chorus, like their political leaders, are not among the ἴσοι and will accordingly have no claim on Philoctetes.

Philoctetes now turns the tables on Neoptolemos. It is not to Neoptolemos' advantage to associate with such men, much less give them help (ἐπωφελῶν, 1371). Neoptolemos acknowledges the plausibility of Philoctetes' arguments,<sup>66</sup> but appeals simply for trust (πιστεύσαντα, 1374) and reaffirms the bond of a friend (φίλου . . . ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε, 1375). Once more he declares his own belief that a return to Troy represents the best interest of both Philoctetes and himself (1381). The issue of whose benefit (ὠφελούμενος, MSS 1383; ὄφελος, 1384) sparks further debate and provokes from Neoptolemos a strikingly relativistic<sup>67</sup> argument: the Atreidae, who have cast Philoctetes from society, will "save him back" into it (πάλιν σώσουσ', 1391).

When agreement on this sort of "salvation" seems impossible, Neoptolemos declares he sees no alternative but to leave Philoctetes in his present circumstances, which he describes as "living" (ζῆν) but living without the "salvation" of social supports (ἄνευ σωτηρίας, 1396). Philoctetes now insists on Neoptolemos' abiding by his earlier dishonest promise to convey Philoctetes home. By his agreement now, however reluctant, the social compact of these two men is formally set in complete opposition to the third or contemporary stage of Greek society at large. Indeed it is the assumed hostility of that larger society which elicits the fullest mutuality in the bond between these two friends. When Neoptolemos asks how he shall escape the attack of the Greeks, Philoctetes pledges his presence. Using a solemn polysyllable,<sup>68</sup> a unique coinage that emphasizes the significance of the concept, Neoptolemos asks "What act of helpfulness will you perform?" (τίνα προσωφέλησιν ἔρξεις, 1406). Philoctetes replies by pledging to hold off the Greeks with the arrows of Heracles. Thus the weapon which Philoctetes had earlier defined in terms of mutual aid (cf. 662-670) is confirmed<sup>69</sup> in that function as the final basis of their compact.

<sup>66</sup> Lesky *Dichtung* 245 well remarks on the artistically fine irony that it is Neoptolemos' own previous lies that render Philoctetes' arguments against participating in the Greek army even more plausible. Schlesinger 133 goes even further, suggesting that the details of the lie which Neoptolemos tells Philoctetes, inasmuch as they recall Agamemnon's theft of Achilles' γέρας and Odysseus' defeat of Ajax in the judgment of the arms, turn out to be a poetic image of the real relationship of Neoptolemos to the Atreidae and Odysseus.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. n. 21 above. Democritus *D-K* B172 and 173 are particularly suggestive of the peculiar delight in paradox characteristic of sophistic relativism.

<sup>68</sup> See Long 67 and n. 33 above.

<sup>69</sup> I cannot agree with those who like Harsh 408f, Knox 139-140, and Alt 172 see Philoctetes' commitment here as a misuse of the bow of Heracles. The bow has not been defined in this play in terms of civilizing service to Greece at large, but of special service of one friend to another. Nothing in Sophocles'



In the foregoing discussion of the relations of Philoctetes to the chorus and to Neoptolemos, I have tried to underline several dominant, interrelated themes: spontaneous affection and pity, concern for the best interest of one's friends, the exploration of true persuasion, the process of arriving at agreement about ethical values. I believe that these themes, presented in constant juxtaposition to Philoctetes' isolated struggle to survive on Lemnos, constitute a dramatic exploration of the fundamental ties between human beings which reflects the anthropological speculations of the pre-Socratics and sophists. Those speculations, as we noted, posited a presocial struggle to survive followed by a social-compact stage during which the achievement of human ties enabled successful escape from the insecurity, isolation, and physical discomfort of the presocial stage.

#### CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE SOPHIST'S WAY TO "SURVIVE"

Though I have postponed full consideration of the many transformations by which Sophocles sets his own very distinct stamp upon the sophistic matrix he employs in the *Philoctetes*, a few of the poet's changes are already obvious. We noted the intrusion of the deceit from the contemporary sphere into the more naive and spontaneous interactions which characterize the bonds established between Philoctetes and Neoptolemos. Moreover, despite what I consider the dramatist's emphasis on the peculiarly sophistic bases of those ties, it is obvious that a bond between the two men against the whole world is very

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play suggests that the destruction of Troy is inherently a service to the common good — indeed, the very worth of the commonality as embodied in Odysseus and the Atreidae is very much in question (see further discussion below). Certainly patriotic appeals are conspicuous by their absence here. This is particularly striking in view of the emphasis on patriotism in Euripides' version (cf. Dio. Chrys. *Or.* 52.13 and 59.1, *πνεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας καὶ νίκης*) presented at the very outbreak of the war in 431 B.C. Of course, there is a strong likelihood, since we are dealing with Euripides, that these sentiments would emerge as heavily ironic if we had the whole play (see Webster *Euripides* 61). The date of Aeschylus' version is unknown, but it is hard to imagine an Aeschylean treatment of such a theme not being strongly patriotic. I do agree that the reference here to Heracles is one of several preparations for his later appearance; but his words consistently focus on the greater destiny awaiting Philoctetes and Neoptolemos. Troy is the proper arena for the exercise of Philoctetes' *aretē* and that in turn is seen as in accord with the slow-moving "justice" of Zeus; but the common good of Greece is not presented as a specific component of that "justice," rather the punishment of the guilty and the reward of the best (cf. 1425–1426 and discussion below in the text).



different from the spirit of the older sophists' view of a broad social compact based on common human needs. In Sophocles' version, the consolidation of the bond between Philoctetes and Neoptolemos before the entrance of Heracles seemed, as we noted, to imply irreconcilable alienation from Odysseus and more broadly the Atreidae and the whole Greek army. Sophocles' sense of a gap and perhaps even of open hostility between, on the one hand, the social and ethical implications of the first two stages and, on the other, the contemporary world represented by Odysseus colors the entire dramatization of that contemporary world, giving it at times the air of a diatribe.

We come then to the point where most discussions of the sophistic influence on the *Philoctetes* begin and end, namely, the character of Odysseus and the educational implications<sup>70</sup> of the addition of Neoptolemos to the traditional myth. As we noted earlier, the sophists' interest in the presocial struggle to survive and in the bases for a social compact constituted a philosophic or pseudo-historical prop for their analysis of the technique of "survival" — of acquiring and exercising political power — in contemporary society, especially democratic Athens. Odysseus is unmistakably presented as a contemporary politician imbued with sophistic doctrines. He has distinctive ethical views and his own clear terminology of "survival." In relation to Neoptolemos he clearly enacts the role of teacher, and his difficulties in "teaching" are emphatically presented as a consequence of Neoptolemos' inherited "nature," thus dramatizing a fundamental issue in the educational debate of the fifth century. Finally in his relation to Philoctetes, where he functions in large part as the spokesman of state authority, Odysseus brings into sharp focus the sense of a potential conflict between the

<sup>70</sup> E.g. Nestle "Sophokles" 154-155; Weinstock 100; Pohlenz 334-335; Lesky "Erbe" 370-373; Bengt 144-146. Ronnet is the only work I have seen which undertakes to refute the association of Odysseus with the sophists (259f). Her main arguments are Odysseus' lack of eloquence and brusque reliance on threats and force in his one sustained encounter with Philoctetes (974-1080) and even in his interactions with Neoptolemos. She speaks instead of Odysseus' "laconisme" (261). This argument ignores the strong Athenian associations of his allusion to Athena Polias (134), but her emphasis on his relative lack of (flowery) eloquence, his open disparagement of long speeches (1047f), his reliance on force and threats is valuable. It closely parallels the role of the Athenian spokesmen in the Melian Dialogue, a passage where, as far as I know, sophistic influence has never been doubted. In fact, Bowra 286 cites this passage as an illustration of Odysseus' character. Moreover, a distinction must be made between "eloquence," reserved as in Sophocles' other plays for the hero, and effective manipulation of arguments. At this Odysseus is quite impressive, as Knox 125 well emphasizes.

"natural" needs of the individual and the impositions of the community. This conflict, often loosely associated with all the sophists under the tag *φύσις/νόμος*,<sup>71</sup> probably became a central concern only toward the last quarter of the fifth century where its most radical implications were explored by the sophist Antiphon. Thus we should note that even what appears to be the strongly antisophistic opposition in Sophocles' play between the first two societal stages and the third stage probably has its roots largely in the thought of more radical late fifth-century sophists.<sup>72</sup>

Odysseus' ethical views and terminology of "survival" are consistently juxtaposed to those of Philoctetes and gain much of their pejorative or ironic color from the implicit contrast to the grimness of the reality or "necessity" which conditions Philoctetes' struggle to survive.

The chief means by which Odysseus expects to achieve success he calls at the outset of the play his *σόφισμα* (14; cf. *σοφισθῆναι*, 77), which he himself redefines as *τεχνᾶσθαι κακά* (80). Neoptolemos immediately echoes this description by alluding to Odysseus' plan as *ἐκ τέχνης πράσσειν κακῆς* (88). This pejorative sense of *τέχνη* as a deceitful contrivance is of course as old as Homer, but it gains special ironic point already in the prologue by the contrast to Philoctetes, whose rough wooden cup is described as a *φλαυρουργοῦ τινος / τεχνήματ' ἀνδρός* (35-36). Similarly, Odysseus' Homeric aspect as a *πολυμηχάνου ἀνδρός* (1135) is given a particularly negative force, not only by its association in the immediate context with "shameful deceits"

<sup>71</sup> Fuqua 55, 70, 215f maintains that this antithesis is the "underlying organizational principle" of the play. In the rather loose sense in which he uses the terms I would agree. He appears, however, completely unaware of the decisive role of anthropological speculation both in the formulation of the antithesis and in the structure of the play. In particular, despite a lengthy summary of the views of *φύσις* set forth by Diller, Lesky, Heinimann, Alt, Muth, and others, there does not emerge from his argument a clear sense that the sophistic use of the term *φύσις* grew directly out of an anthropological orientation that saw in the individual's basic physical and emotional needs a common core of fundamental similarity between all human beings and a link with "other animals" (see especially Antiphon *D-K* B44). As the scholars cited by Fuqua have noted, Sophocles' uses of the term are strongly aristocratic in flavor, emphasizing the moral factors that establish a rigid social hierarchy. Sophocles' juxtaposition of the needs of this aristocratic *φύσις* to the impositions of organized society thus involves a virtual subversion of the egalitarian thrust of sophistic/anthropological *φύσις*. It is just possible that Sophocles contributed more to the assumptions of a Callicles than did any sophist.

<sup>72</sup> Moulton has argued recently and persuasively for a closer relationship between Democritus' views of the potential conflicts between the individual and society and the views of Antiphon. He does conclude, however, "Democritus was certainly more optimistic about *nomos* . . ." (139).

(1136), but by the contrast to Philoctetes' more fundamental "contrivance" of the bare necessities of survival (cf. *ἐμηχανώμην*, 295).

Philoctetes' primary weapon in his very physical struggle to survive is of course his bow. Odysseus' "weapon" in the battles of the contemporary world is his tongue, as he explains to Neoptolemos what he has learned:

Son of a noble father, I too once, when young,  
kept my tongue unemployed and my hand a hard worker.  
Now that I've come to the test, I see that  
the tongue, not action, has total sway over men. (96-99)

Certainly the commitment to speech as opposed to the violence of weapons was a cardinal element in the more benign pro-democratic sociology of the older sophists. But Sophocles' characterization of Odysseus' commitment to speech<sup>73</sup> clearly implies not progress but degeneracy; for it is relentlessly associated with trickery (*δόλος*, 91, 101, 102, 107, 608, 948, 1112, 1117, 1228, 1282), deceit (*ἀπάτη*, 1136, 1228), and lying (*ψεῦδος*, 100, 108, 109, 842, 1342), not only in the view of others, but often in Odysseus' own language. Indeed, his first description of Neoptolemos' goal (*τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ / ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων*, 54-55) is closely paralleled by Gorgias' triumphant allusion to *λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας* (*D-K B11 = Praise of Helen* 8). While this "sophistic" aspect of Odysseus is frequently noted, scholars often ignore the fact that this aspect is counterpointed in the play to a full celebration of the triumph of sincere *πειθῶ* over both verbal deceit and physical violence in the bonds of mutual support established between Neoptolemos and Philoctetes. Thus here too Sophocles seems to have exploited a contrast between the humane enlightenment implicit in the anthropological speculations of the older sophists and the ferocity he perceived in the contemporary application of sophistic doctrines.

Ferocity is not too strong a term for Odysseus' behavior, since perhaps Sophocles' most pointed contrast between the contemporary and presocial struggles for survival is in his handling of the hunting motif. Not only is hunting constantly associated with Philoctetes' isolated struggle, but we recall how his bow is personified as "discovering the things needed for his belly" (*γαστρὶ μὲν τὰ σύμφορα / τόξον τόδ' ἐξήρυσκε*, 287-288). Odysseus' weapon being his tongue, his

<sup>73</sup> Podlecki, though he begins his article with a line from Gorgias, fails to set his survey of the allusions to speech and persuasion in the *Philoctetes* within the context of the fifth-century sophistic explorations of those ideas.

“discoveries” are in fact nothing but the invention of ingenious, lying arguments (οἶα καῖξανευρίσκεις λέγειν, 991).<sup>74</sup> His values, goals, and achievements are relentlessly characterized as hunting, fundamentally the hunting of human beings.

The metaphor is first introduced to underline dramatically Neoptolemos’ decision to accept Odysseus’ assessment of the situation: “If that is the case, it would appear they are worth hunting for” (θηρατέα 116). The verbal adjective is applied with heavy dramatic irony to the τόξα (113) of Philoctetes, which Odysseus asserts is the only means by which Neoptolemos will be able to sack Troy.

It is not until after the audience has been fully exposed to Philoctetes’ literal hunting of birds and beasts with this same bow (165, 185, 288–290) that the hunting metaphor is applied directly to Odysseus. The alleged ship captain describes how “tricky” (δόλιος) Odysseus seized the noble son of Priam, Helenos, and displayed him in the midst of all the Greeks, a “fine catch” (θήραν καλήν, 609). Neoptolemos’ first effective turning away from Odysseus’ views echoes ironically his own earlier use of the metaphor (116) as well as the passage just quoted. Despite the urging of the chorus, he perceives that the bow alone without the man is a futile “catch” (θήραν) for them (839–840).

But it is reserved for the man himself, Philoctetes, to articulate the bitter reversals of nature involved in Odysseus’ theft of his bow: not only will he, the hunter of beasts, become the hunted of beasts (956–958), but he has been reduced to this subhuman state as a result of being “hunted” (συνθηρώμεναι, 1005; ἐθηράσω, 1007) himself by a fellow human being who has used the unknown youth as his “hunting screen” (πρόβλημα, 1008).<sup>75</sup>

Sophocles further underlines the anthropological character of the paralleled activities of Odysseus and Philoctetes by summing up the goals of each by forms of the term σωτηρία. When Neoptolemos objects in the prologue to Odysseus’ scheme on the grounds that it is “shameful,” Odysseus retorts that it is not, if the lie achieves at least “safety” (τὸ σωθῆναι, 109). Having won Neoptolemos to his position, Odysseus leaves the stage at the end of the prologue with a prayer which dramatically sums up his guiding principles in the contemporary battle for survival:

<sup>74</sup> Cf. the *Hēttōn logos* in the *Clouds* who boasts he will gain victory over the *kreittōn logos* “by inventing bizarre arguments” (γνώμας καινὰς ἐξευρίσκων, 896). Forms of εὕρισκω are not surprisingly very common throughout the *Clouds*.

<sup>75</sup> See Jebb’s note ad loc.



- May tricky Hermes be our guide and leader,  
and Victory, and Athena-of-the-polis, who always saves me.  
(133-134)

Odysseus defines himself in terms of deceit (δόλιος) and a commitment to victory (Νίκη). For his "safety" he counts on Athena "Polias," an epithet which implies broadly the supports of organized political life but also strongly suggests contemporary democratic Athens. This final phrase of Odysseus' credo (ἡ σῶζει μ' αἰεί) is later echoed in Philoctetes' equally climactic summation of his triumph over the primitive forces of the environment by making fire (ἔφην' ἄφαντον φῶς, ὃ καὶ σῶζει μ' αἰεί, 297).

This sustained parallelism between Odysseus' vocabulary for successful political manipulation and Philoctetes' description of his isolated struggle for minimal survival is one of the crucial factors unifying the intellectual matrix of the play. The inherent bitterness of the juxtaposition is made explicit again by Philoctetes. When he first realizes the full import of the trick perpetrated against him, his outburst against Neoptolemos treats him as if he were Odysseus himself and strikingly combines the notions of fire, artifice, and deceit:

You fire! You total monster! You utterly hateful  
contrivance of clever criminality! Look what you've done to me!  
How you've tricked me! (927-929)

Fire (πῦρ), the symbol of his salvation through a literal technology of survival, is transformed here into the symbol of Philoctetes' destruction through the contrivance (τέχνημα; cf. 36) of a liar. The word "monster" (δελμα) may further suggest the "bestiality"<sup>76</sup> which characterizes the behavior of "advanced" society toward "wild" Philoctetes.

The contrast between the values of Odysseus and Philoctetes is of course most sharply focused in their respective relationships to Neoptolemos. This aspect<sup>77</sup> of this much studied play has been dealt with especially fully, but I would like to set that exploration of sophistic educational theory within the broader framework of sophistic anthropology and sociology on which Sophocles draws in the play. As we noted earlier, for the anthropologically-oriented sophists, their own activity as educators received philosophic validation in the fundamental role played by the learning process in the presocial battle to survive and

<sup>76</sup> Jebb cites a parallel (Aristophanes *Lys.* 1014) for the use of πῦρ where θηρίον would correspond to δελμα here. Cf. Euripides *HF* 700 δελματα θηρών, noted by Webster *Philoctetes* ad loc.

<sup>77</sup> I find Erbse's article the most penetrating discussion, but he has nothing to say about the sophistic background.

by the educational process which inculcates the skills and ethical values essential for the preservation of the social compact. At the same time their views and activities were deeply involved in the class conflicts of fifth-century Greece, particularly those of democratic Athens.

The relation of the sophists to the class divisions of Athens is rather complex and explains in part the almost universally negative view preserved of their educational role: there was something about them to offend every class sooner or later. As we noted earlier, the general thrust of their anthropology was egalitarian, and most sophists are associated with a pro-democratic perspective. On the other hand, their large fees and foreign status precluded their serving the *demos* directly. Whatever their sentiments, they served the interests of those who had money, and accordingly seem to have been mistrusted by the *demos* rather early.<sup>78</sup> Within the monied classes, their readiest pupils would appear to come from the "newly rich," who were in a hurry to achieve political power in the democratic assembly and lacked the traditions of public life which characterized the older aristocratic families.<sup>79</sup> To this bond with the "newly rich" we might reasonably attribute in part the tendency of several sophists to downgrade or openly disparage "inherited" characteristics. We may reasonably attribute to the same cause the common hostility of the "born" aristocrat to the very activity of teaching and in particular teaching by sophists. Here we should stress that the qualities which a Greek aristocrat claimed "by birth" were not primarily physical but moral and political, a point that is especially clear in the poetry of Pindar, whose genre would seem to invite emphasis on purely physical inherited superiority.

At the same time, the association of the sophists with the non-aristocratic rich is sometimes exaggerated. Protagoras and Anaxagoras were closely associated with Pericles, whose lineage was second to none; and Plato's picture of the sophists' clientele includes many scions of aristocratic families. The sophists in fact seem to have been very closely associated with what we might call the "liberal" wing of the ruling class, those who, regardless of their lineage, were open to employing the most up-to-date sentiments and methods — including professional education and brain-trusters — in order to maintain or extend their power.

<sup>78</sup> See Guthrie *Sophists* 35f. Whether Protagoras' book was ever burned (D. L. 9.52 = D-K A1) or Anaxagoras was ever in serious danger (Plu. *Per.* 32.2 = D-K A17) is much disputed. But it does seem a reasonable inference from Aristophanes *Clouds* that the *demos* had no love for sophists.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Adkins *Many* 94.

It is in the light of these divergent trends — on the one hand, sophistic education as a vehicle for the new rich to achieve power and, on the other, sophistic education as an enlightened means of maintaining the status of the existing ruling class — that we should view Sophocles' second major innovation in the traditional plot of the Philoctetes myth, namely, the inclusion of Neoptolemos. The relentless emphasis on Neoptolemos' "noble nature," inherited from his noble father Achilles — an emphasis no study of the play can ignore — is by no means incompatible<sup>80</sup> with an important trend in sophistic educational theory. On the contrary, the use of stories about the offspring of famous noble heroes to illustrate educational doctrines seems a particular feature of sophistic teaching. Rather than attacking the pretensions of the aristocrats, they chose to set them in a new context which stressed the need for the noble *physis* to be supplemented by *paideia*.

We know that the sophist Hippias wrote a dialogue in which Nestor lays down the proper pursuits by which young Neoptolemos may show himself an ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ (*D-K* 86A2.4). Prodicus' educational myth of Heracles' choice is especially suggestive of Sophocles' treatment of Neoptolemos.<sup>81</sup> Baseness (*Kakia*) addresses Heracles first with words which perfectly sum up the dramatic interest of Neoptolemos in Sophocles' play: "I see, Heracles, that you are at a loss (ἀποροῦντα) what path to turn to for your life." She then proceeds to offer him the pleasantest (ἡδίστην) and easiest path (*D-K* 84B2.23). Excellence (Ἀρετή) begins her subsequent appeal to Heracles by an emphatic allusion to his high ancestry and early upbringing: "I too have come to you, Heracles, knowing your parentage (τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε) and having observed the nature (φύσιν) that is yours through your education (ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ). On these grounds, I have hope that you . . ." (*D-K* 84B2.27). Prodicus implies no sharp Pindaric antithesis of education and inherited qualities. He grants and builds on the idea that noble parentage

<sup>80</sup> Here I am most at odds with Diller 245–246 and Lesky "Erbe" 370–373. While there is no explicit modification of his earlier view in the newest edition of *Dichtung* (246), Lesky was far more definite in the earlier edition which was translated into English (*Greek Tragedy*, London 1965): as his final comment on the *Philoctetes* he cited Pindar *O* 9.100 and concluded, "This world of thought is a complete contrast to that of the sophists and of Socrates" (126). Bengt 142 cites and echoes much the same view from an even earlier edition of Lesky.

<sup>81</sup> Ronnet goes out of her way to denounce a "Manichean" view of the play presenting "the two protagonists as Goodness and Evil between whom the young man hesitates" (258–259). Sophocles is, to be sure, subtler than Prodicus, yet the absolutism of the antithesis and of Sophocles' own moral judgment is parallel — as is the explicitly educational focus of Sophocles' version of the myth.

augurs well. But, true to his profession, he attributes the actual *physis* of Heracles to his early education. This combination of high birth and the proper early rearing will, given the appropriate encouragement in early manhood by the right mature voice, achieve greatness. At the same time, the specific point of the myth is to emphasize the threat to the noble nature of the youth which is ready at hand in the appeals to short-term pleasures.

Those who see in Neoptolemos' final rejection of Odysseus a simple, old-fashioned affirmation of aristocratic *physis* and an equally simple repudiation of sophistic educational theory ignore the structure and dramatic development of the myth. Neoptolemos is on stage with Odysseus for a mere 134 lines and in fact it takes only some 80 lines for Odysseus to lay out his plan and overcome Neoptolemos' objections by offering something ἥδύ (81). After this very brief "education" by Odysseus, Neoptolemos, despite Philoctetes' compliments to his parentage and early rearing (242-243), despite his outpouring of affection and truly pitiful circumstances, displays consummate skill as a liar and hypocrite. He is on stage with Philoctetes an extraordinary amount of dramatic time — more than 1,000 lines — before he is fully won over to Philoctetes' side. The painfully slow process by which he moves from his initial callous readiness to use brute force (90) — a revealing indication of the content, so to speak, of his untutored *physis*<sup>82</sup> — to a radical surrender of all the ambitions natural to such a youth is a primary dramatic interest of the play, and there is nothing automatic about the emergence of his good *physis*. His rejection of the chorus's invitation to steal the bow and leave the man does force him to reveal the truth to Philoctetes, but as we have seen, he still insists on following Odysseus' order and insists on a basic harmony of his own narrow self-interest and what is right (926). When pity makes him waver, the mere appearance of his first mentor, Odysseus,<sup>83</sup> seems

<sup>82</sup> Well emphasized by Knox 122-123. Erbse 187 remarks that what Neoptolemos calls his *physis* in the prologue is nothing more than a "claim" (Anspruch) which for a considerable part of the play he lacks the courage to validate. This seems an improvement over Diller's declaration that the real theme of the play is "die Unveränderlichkeit der Physis gegenüber äusserem Einfluss" (245). But the inadequacy of this formula is that it too accepts at face value the poet's verbal insistence on the emergence of Neoptolemos' noble *physis* as if it were a fixed, unalterable entity while ignoring the full dramatization of a fundamentally different and richer content imparted to that *physis* by "good" education — not to mention its vulnerability to "bad" education.

<sup>83</sup> Taplin 35 nicely emphasizes the visual presentation of Neoptolemos' vulnerability to Odysseus' influence, who stops him in the very act of returning the bow and reduces him to silence for almost the whole rest of the scene.



adequate to suppress all but the most hesitant gesture of sympathy (1074f). Neoptolemos' return with the bow is definitely a calculated dramatic surprise,<sup>84</sup> and even then he attempts persuasion before actually returning the bow. Despite all the particularly Sophoclean emphasis on Neoptolemos' inherited nature, Sophocles has controlled the action in such a way as to dramatize the educational dictum of Antiphon: "one must necessarily become, with respect to character (τοὺς τρόπους), of the same sort as the person with whom he spends the greatest part of the day" (*D-K* 87B62).<sup>85</sup> Sophocles in the *Philoctetes* is far nearer to Plato's sense (particularly in the *Republic*) of profound anxiety for the fate of the excellent nature in the corrupting environment than to Pindar's confident affirmation that "thanks to birth the noble temper shines forth in sons from their fathers" (*P.* 8.44-45). Like Plato and the sophists, Sophocles dramatizes the absolute necessity of such a nature's meeting with the right education.

But uniquely in Sophocles' play the conflict of the values between which the pupil, Neoptolemos, must choose is explored within the framework of learning to "survive" in three stages of the development of human society. Philoctetes has had to "learn" to acquiesce in sufferings imposed by necessity during his long struggle to eke out bare survival in isolation (538). In order to be "saved" out of that isolated struggle into a civilized human compact, both Philoctetes and Neoptolemos must, as we have seen, establish bonds based upon pity, affection, and a sincere concern for each others' best interest. At this stage too they must reach agreed definitions of "daring," "noble," "right," "shameful," and "holy." The "content," so to speak, of the good *physis* which has been tested and educated in terms of this anthropological vision of reality emerges as radically more complex than could be inferred from Neoptolemos' initial commitment to truth, success, and violence.

The education which Odysseus attempts to give Neoptolemos on "survival" in the contemporary world at times echoes these same terms but in a strikingly different sense, and at times directly repudiates them. Pity and affection are not in Odysseus' vocabulary. He occasionally<sup>86</sup>

<sup>84</sup> I find Robinson 45f especially good on this point.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Democritus' emphasis on education by imitation and association (*D-K* B154, 39, 79, 184) and Protagoras' similar focus on the consequences of association (*Prot.* 316c5-d3). Concern for the "right" company was of course, as Guthrie (*Sophists* 250-251) stresses, an aristocratic idea too; but he underestimates the special emphasis of the sophists on the *decisive* role of socialization in determining character.

<sup>86</sup> Avery (285) counts two instances: τέκνον at 130 and παῖ from Neoptolemos' lie at 372. He omits παῖ at 79, an emendation, and those where the addition of a

takes a paternal tone, addressing Neoptolemos as "son" (παῖ, τέκνον), but words in φιλ- come not from his lips. We have no reason, given Odysseus' past and present treatment of Philoctetes, to believe that Neoptolemos is mistaken in assuming pity to be grounds for reproach from Odysseus (1074-1075). Odysseus does attempt unsuccessfully to define the term "noble" (γενναῖον, 51) in a self-consciously new (καινόν, 52) sense, but soon frankly acknowledges that the inherited φύσις (79-80) of Neoptolemos is an obstacle. Later he expresses a fear that this very nobility (γενναῖός περ ὦν, 1068) may ruin everything. The situation with "daring" is a bit more complex because the idea itself is ambiguous and, depending on context, can imply heroic courage or behavior that flies in the face of public opinion. Odysseus urges Neoptolemos to be daring (τόλμα, 82) in the pursuit of victory (81) which sounds a bit heroic, but the action is soon frankly described as "shameless" (ἀναιδής, 83).<sup>87</sup> Odysseus equivocates about the term for "right" (δίκαιος) behavior, now claiming it irrelevant for the present (82), later amplifying this relativism by the assertion that when circumstances require it, he can be as devoted to "right" behavior as anyone (1049-1051). But at one point, where the tone of his sophistry approaches broad comedy,<sup>88</sup> he attempts a definition of "right" which would guarantee him the fruits of a theft on the grounds that he had planned it (1247-1248). Holiness (εὐσέβεια) he first presents as virtually synonymous with δίκαιος and like that value, irrelevant in the present, but available when the circumstances require (85; cf. 1051). The chorus, speaking of the arms of Achilles which the Atreidae allegedly gave Odysseus improperly, describe them as an "object of religious awe" (σέβας, 402) for Odysseus. This suggests a pointed contrast to the religious awe (656-662) which both Neoptolemos and Philoctetes express in relation to the bow of Heracles, there explicitly defined in terms of helping friends (εὐεργετῶν, 670). Odysseus later claims with great solemnity that his behavior is the will of Zeus (989-990) and attempts to prevent Neoptolemos from returning the bow by calling the gods to witness (1293). Finally, when it comes to what is "shameful,"

reference to his father (50, 96) tempers the potentially affectionate tone. In contrast he finds 52 instances of the paternal address from Philoctetes.

<sup>87</sup> Kirkwood 234-235 n. 23 is especially good on the contrasts in the use of these terms.

<sup>88</sup> Lesky — without explicitly saying the scene is comic — notes (*Dichtung* 244) the similarity to Old Comedy. Cf. Taplin 36-37, who goes further, and argues, rightly I believe, that both this scene and Odysseus' final exit are so close to the style of brief defeats of villains in Old Comedy that they dramatically confirm the impression of his baseness.

Odysseus is only mildly equivocal. In pointed contrast to Philoctetes who asks Neoptolemos to endure less than one whole day of physical distress in return for the *πλείστον εὐκλείας γέρας* of saving a fellow human being (cf. 478–480), Odysseus asserts that if Neoptolemos gives himself over to Odysseus “shamelessly” (*εἰς ἀναιδές*) for the short space of a day, he will in the future have the reputation of being the “most pious of all mortals” (83–85). But generally Odysseus characterizes himself and is characterized by others as completely indifferent to the shame ethic.

The terms in which Odysseus first expresses that indifference strongly state what is also the primary basis on which his values and his behavior have been defended.<sup>89</sup> He urges Neoptolemos, when he meets Philoctetes, to say of Odysseus the worst possible insults. With true sophistic bravado he casts the issue in terms of a hedonistic calculus (*ἀλγυνεῖς* vs. *λύπην*):

You will *hurt* me not at all by this. But if you do  
not do this, you will impose *pain* on all the Argives. (66–67)

The chorus, in its lyric dialogue with Philoctetes when he has been stripped of his bow and abandoned, defends Odysseus in just these terms, namely, his service to the group as a whole (*κοινόν*). But here alone Odysseus' relationship to the group echoes the theme of social bonds based upon a tie of *φιλία* (cf. *φίλους*, 1145):

That man, one from many —  
ordered by their behest —  
achieved general rescue for his friends. (1143–1145)

If we were able to ignore the context and take their view at face value, then the sense of a deep conflict between the social bonds that will save Philoctetes and the social bonds governing the contemporary world of the Greek army at Troy would be, as many readers have argued, merely an illusion of the psychologically disturbed Philoctetes, who must then be seen as the truly bad teacher.

Odysseus, true to the reasoning of most of the anthropological thinkers, does assume a complete harmony between his own best interest and the best interest of the community as a whole. But to stress this attitude

<sup>89</sup> Most recently and fully by Ronnet 259f. Cf. Norwood 162: “It is easy but mistaken to label Odysseus the ‘villain.’ In reality he is the State personified.” It is precisely in that role that he emerges as a “villain.” Muth's attempt to defend Odysseus on religious grounds (653f) is even less satisfactory. Even Bowra (287) whom Muth otherwise follows closely, recognizes the play's implicit indictment of Odysseus' self-serving egoism.

as a basis for arguing that Odysseus is dramatically justified by the whole of the play is to ignore the thrust of the whole play. The very myth of the play — even if it were free of innovations — confronts us with an initially negative image of the society in whose interest Odysseus claims to act; and at the same time Sophocles takes pains to dramatize through his characterization of Odysseus the underlying selfish individualism, hypocrisy, and brutality of that society.

Sophocles normally presents Odysseus' conception of success not in terms of the anthropological standards of what is "useful," "helpful," or "advantageous," but in the strongly pejorative terms of commercial "profit" and a markedly unheroic "victory." Odysseus uses the term for "advantageous" only once and in a context which has distinct dramatic irony when contrasted to Philoctetes' struggle to find what is "advantageous" to his belly (287-288) or his generous commitment to whatever "brings advantage" to his friend (659). Odysseus, having won Neoptolemos to his scheme, tells him that in the event of a delay, he will send someone who "having practiced deception on his clothing" (*μορφὴν δολώσας*, 128-129) will look like a captain and "speak craftily" (130). Neoptolemos should "constantly take up whatever is advantageous in his words" (*δέχου τὰ συμφέροντα τῶν αἰεὶ λόγων*, 131). Apart from this calculation in trickery and lying, Odysseus' materialism has a less anthropological flavor. He tells Neoptolemos that "victory" is a "sweet possession" (81); and when his attempt to argue against ethical compunctions seems to fail, he cites "profit" (*κέρδος*) as the consideration that should override hesitation (111). Philoctetes describes the island on which Odysseus marooned him as a place where no merchant can find a business profit (*ἐξεμπολήσει κέρδος*, 303). It is as a groveling merchant that Odysseus' representative soon appears and his devious manner inspires in Philoctetes an all too legitimate fear that he is being "sold in speech" by this merchant (579). The instant Philoctetes recognizes Odysseus, he exclaims, "I've been bought and sold!" (978). That this view of Odysseus' behavior is not merely Philoctetes' illusion is strongly suggested by the cruel sarcasm with which Odysseus releases Philoctetes to die alone on Lemnos without his bow:

But victory is my natural need in every case —  
 except yours. Now to *you* I shall willingly yield place.  
 Release him! Keep your hands off him from now on!  
 Let him stay. We don't even need *you* any more,  
 inasmuch as we have this *bow*. For there is  
 Teucer among us with this particular skill  
 and *I*, who consider myself not a bit your inferior



at wielding this bow or at aiming it straight.

Yes! what need is there of you? Walk about Lemnos and good luck!

We must be on our way. And perhaps your heroic prize

may award to me the honor that ought to have been yours.

(1052-1062)

One may debate<sup>90</sup> whether this is a further deception aimed at "persuading" Philoctetes to come to Troy or a true statement, as I believe, of Odysseus' spur-of-the-moment decision to exploit for his own advantage (see 1069) Philoctetes' intransigence. But the narrowly selfish cruelty of his line of reasoning is indisputable. Nothing Odysseus does or says elsewhere in the play contradicts the impression that this speech really represents his characteristic way of thinking. Yet Odysseus' — and to a lesser degree the chorus's — calculations and values constitute the only evidence we have in the play for those that predominate in the society of the Greek army as a whole. Odysseus' reasoning here is the ugly obverse of the sophistic thought which viewed society as founded on mutual human need. I have stressed Sophocles' dramatization of the humane consequences in the bonds of pity and affection established between Philoctetes and Neoptolemos. Here we see a callous calculation of what is *not* needed (οὐδὲ σοῦ προσχρήζομεν, 1055; τί δῆτα σοῦ δεῖ, 1060). Philoctetes becomes society's first throw-away person. Odysseus is the man who undertakes here, as he had ten years before, to handle the disposal operations and to glory in the personal profit he will gain from it; for "victory" is all he "needs" (χρήζων, 1052).

A more obvious aspect of Sophocles' dramatic emphasis on the hypocrisy of Odysseus' claim to work only for the public good is the ironic contrast between Odysseus' and Philoctetes' respective relationship to "necessity." Philoctetes, as we have seen, knows the "necessity" of his day-to-day struggle to survive the threats of the elements (538) and to endure the physical pain imposed on him by circumstances (1317). But in relation to human beings he displays an iron commitment to personal freedom which is proof against bribery, force, the threat of death, or the sincere appeal of a friend. The social bonds he adheres to involve freely volunteered service to his friends, Heracles (670) and Neoptolemos (1404-1406). His participation in the Trojan expedition is

<sup>90</sup> Lesky *Dichtung* 243-244 says cautiously that the poet gives us no clear answer to this question. Linforth argues (135-156) emphatically that Odysseus must be only bluffing here. So too Kitto *Form* 124, Hinds 177. Opposing views, Wilamowitz 304-307, Bowra 286-287, Knox 134f and Robinson 45f (whom I find particularly persuasive).

pointedly presented as this same sort of freely volunteered service (1027). Odysseus, in sharp contrast, himself acknowledges that he participated in the expedition "out of necessity" (ἐξ ἀνάγκης, 73), and Philoctetes reminds the audience that in fact Odysseus had to be tricked as well as forced to participate (1025). This is the man who repeatedly describes himself as a mere servant following orders.

The society of the Greek army as a whole is characterized almost exclusively as an entity that gives orders. The first of these which we hear of in the play is the callous<sup>91</sup> order to maroon Philoctetes (6). This same society requires that Neoptolemos "serve" the orders of Odysseus (53, 93-94). Nowhere does Odysseus associate — as most of the anthropologists do — this obligation to subordination with the idea of compensating long-term advantages in a civilized policy. Those advantages are an important theme in the play; but only the chorus, Neoptolemos, and Heracles are permitted to articulate them in contexts where they are explicitly hostile to or override the political dominance of Odysseus and the Atreidae. Thus Sophocles seems perhaps in the very choice of his myth and certainly in his development of it to echo the most pessimistic of the sophists, Antiphon and perhaps Thrasymachos.<sup>92</sup> The state, through a crass calculation of its own needs — which seem synonymous with the convenience of its rulers — imposes horrible suffering on a citizen who is not merely guiltless (676f) but ready to contribute generously to a common effort (1027). It exacerbates rather than relieves his physical pain; and when the occasion arises which requires a reversal of his exclusion from society, the state is ready to give orders (1144) that violate his self-respect by deceit and force. Like Zeus in the *Prometheus*,<sup>93</sup> the state is cast in the image of a brutal tyrant, hostile to all the advantages of human society which are symbolized in the hero.

It is possible to surmise an evolutionary solution of the apparently irreconcilable conflict in the *Prometheus*, but as we have seen, Sophocles seems to treat his myth in a way that, on the one hand, evokes anthropological speculation about the development of human society, but on the other, precludes a positive view of the third or contemporary stage of that process. The fascination, frustration, and much of the tragic

<sup>91</sup> Cf. n. 53 above.

<sup>92</sup> Havelock 23-29 on Thrasymachos and chap. 10 on Antiphon. See also Moulton on the shift towards pessimism. Guthrie *Sophists* esp. 91-92 makes an interesting case for a more sympathetic view of Thrasymachos as parodied in the *Republic*.

<sup>93</sup> Pohlenz 330 and 332 also notes a parallel to Prometheus. The parallel was first suggested to me by Alan Brown, formerly a student of mine.

pathos of this play depend upon Sophocles' paradoxical exploitation of sophistic anthropological speculation. His dramatization of Philoctetes' grim, isolated struggle to survive the threats of beasts and harsh elements poses most absolutely, almost "scientifically," the *need* of human beings for society; yet the only "society" available is characterized as subhuman.

THE WAY OUT: A SUMMARY OF SOPHOCLES' DEBTS AND DEPARTURES  
FROM THE SOPHISTS

If there is any real resolution of this dilemma — and many sensitive modern readers see none<sup>94</sup> — we may approach it by attempting to summarize Sophocles' debts to the sophists and his departures from them. The case with Sophocles seems to me to have a great deal in common with Plato's relation to the sophists, though I realize there is a danger in trying to elucidate one controversial point by a perhaps even more controversial analogy.

Plato, like Sophocles, owes to the sophists and pre-Socratics a loss of naïveté about the origin, purposes, and structures of society. Needless to say, the material conditions resulting from a century of more or less constant warfare were in themselves powerful destroyers of naïveté. But the sophists offered a thoroughgoing and compelling *analysis* which precluded a simple return to an archaic Pindaric concept of a social hierarchy dominated by the values and political power of the "best" people because they were ultimately descendents of the gods and were constantly able to validate their claims through divine favor. Since Plato, like Sophocles and unlike the sophists, deeply regretted the loss of the Pindaric world view, he set about reconstructing it on a new footing which exploited the analytical tools of the sophists in order to repudiate their egalitarianism and relativism.

He attempts in the *Republic* to analyze society in terms which take account of the sophistic emphasis on "need," but adjusts that principle in such a way as to arrive at a rigidly hierarchical social compact.<sup>95</sup> The

<sup>94</sup> Linforth's whole study of the play has the primary aim (see esp. 95-97) of demonstrating that Sophocles did not and could not accept the traditional ending of the myth, i.e. the return of Philoctetes to Troy, as true to the "logic" of the rest of the myth. The ending we have then is a more or less cynical bow to tradition. So Wilamowitz 311, Ronnet 274. Whitman 187-188 offers the most impressive defense of the ending. Pratt (esp. 286f) is also quite good though less dramatic. Cf. Kirkwood 39. For Spira's "defense" of the ending see n. 23 above.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Havelock 93-101.

social hierarchy is perpetuated, on the one hand, by a "scientific" system of elaborately controlled human breeding and, on the other, by the fullest conceivable manipulation of the socialization process from the moment of birth to full maturity, which for the Greeks began in one's forties. Plato thus answered the two major sophistic attacks on the doctrine of inherited excellence, namely, the demonstrable haphazardness of a process whereby great men often had mediocre sons and, secondly, the enormous impact of upbringing, formal education, and social contacts on the actual character of the individual. The ethical values and "skills" with which Plato's pupils were to be indoctrinated have the same names as the old heroic virtues celebrated in Pindar, and they are explicitly associated with divinity. Yet the actual social and political content of those virtues owes far more to the sophistic analysis of society than to the mythic, aristocratic tradition that preceded them.

Sophocles' response to the sophists is of course not so thorough nor explicit, yet it moves along the same lines. He exploits, as we have seen, the sophistic analysis of the origin and development of society in such a way as to imply a strong condemnation of the sophist in contemporary society. Although the main thrust of sophistic anthropology was egalitarian, we have seen evidence that some sophists were willing to equivocate about aristocratic birth in their attempt to demonstrate that even the "well-born" need professional education. Sophocles in turn exploits this equivocation in such a way as to offer a militant affirmation of inherited excellence. Similarly, he exploits the sophistic analysis of ethical values along lines which culminate in aristocratic absolutism for which divine validation is claimed.

Sophocles' major transformations of the presocial struggle for survival consist of his downgrading the heavily intellectual emphasis of the sophists and stressing the extraordinary *aristocratic* superiority of Philoctetes. Thus, despite the relative obscurity of Philoctetes' family in the broad spectrum of Greek heroes, he is described almost at the outset of the play as "perhaps second to none in his noble origins" (180-181). Similarly, though we have noted the careful use of the technological vocabulary (*τέχνημα*, *μηχανάομαι*, *ἐξευρίσκω*, *πῦρ*, etc.) to give Philoctetes' struggle an anthropological coloring, Sophocles does not celebrate primarily the intellectual ingeniousness<sup>96</sup> of his hero but

<sup>96</sup> Letters 273-274 dourly speaks of Philoctetes as "not just a skill-less Robinson Crusoe, though he has spent so many years without any recorded improvements in his savage economy" and then, more blatantly ignoring the strong emphasis in the play on the struggle to survive, concludes: "the introvert of Sophocles' play finds occupation enough in brooding over his wrongs."



his unique courage, which differentiates him and sets him above his enemies. Thus when Philoctetes thinks he is about to leave, he is anxious that his young friend look at his cave-home to learn (μάθης) how he manifested his uniquely courageous nature (ὥς . . . ἔφυν εὐκάρδιος — the verb is more than a variation on εἰμί) and in particular his qualities of daring and endurance (τλήναι): he has learned day-to-day acquiescence in sufferings which no one else could even stand to look at (cf. 533–538).

The aristocratic slant Sophocles gives to his exploration of the social-compact stage is even more striking. While the chorus, representing in this context the ordinary mass of human beings, are open to spontaneous feelings of pity, they are incapable of acting independently, caught in playing out the lies concocted by their superiors, and in the final analysis, committed only to time-serving. It is only Neoptolemos, “son of the best of the Greeks” (3), possessed of “primeval god-sanctioned royal power” (139–142), who is able at last to validate the implications of his *inherited* nature by responding to pity and affection sufficiently to make the ultimate commitment to his friend's interest. The relentless linguistic emphasis throughout the play on such aristocratic ethical terminology as γενναῖος, εὐγενής, and φύω / φύσις in the context of pervasive allusions to paternity<sup>97</sup> tends to mask the sophistic core with a Pindaric overlay. For, as we have noted, the content of the ethical choices which Philoctetes imposes on Neoptolemos owes more to the sophists than to Homer or Pindar; and the dramatization of the impact of Philoctetes' experience and character on Neoptolemos owes much to sophistic theorizing about educational *synousia*. Yet the bond established between Neoptolemos and Philoctetes is neither explicitly educational nor explicitly a “social compact”; it is rigorously cast in the

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Sophocles in fact has a special problem in his chosen material: He must sharply differentiate his hero's arts of survival from those of the mythic figure who is most traditionally associated with all sorts of *sophia* — indeed Vlastos “Ethics” II 61 speaks of Democritus' concept of *sophia* as “Ulysses-like resourcefulness.”

<sup>97</sup> γενναῖος, 51, 475, 799, 801, 1068, 1402; εὐγενής, 336, 604, 874; φύω, 79, 88, 326, 558, 910, 1052, 1074, 1244, 1372; ἐκφύω, 89, 996; φύσις, 79, 874, 902, 1310; πατήρ, 3, 96, 242, 260, 347, 362, 434, 453, 468, 492, 625, 996, 1284, 1311, 1314, 1365, 1371, 1430; Achilles, 4, 50, 57, 62, 260, 331, 364, 542, 582, 940, 1066, 1220, 1237, 1312; Poias, 5, 263, 318, 329, 461, 1230, 1261, 1410, 1430; Sisyphos, 384 (by implication), 417, 1311. Not every instance in a Greek tragedy of address to a character by reference to his paternity must be seen as implying a belief in inherited excellence, of course. In this play, however, where the theme is so explicit, I do believe the cumulative impact of these allusions is significant.

mold of traditional heroic, aristocratic friendship. Tacitly parallel to the friendship of Achilles and Patroklos (434), it is more explicitly modeled on the friendship of Heracles and Philoctetes (670, cf. 1405-1408). Sophocles thus seems at pains to imply that the "natural" consequence of this interaction of two heroic friends is the confirmation of an excellence of character in Neoptolemos that is already his by birth. Neoptolemos' shockingly hypocritical and manipulative behavior is, on the other hand, repeatedly presented as an intrusion from the contemporary world: he is the victim of *bad* education (971, 1014-1015) by Odysseus, who, as we have seen, is explicitly characterized as a sophist.

Generally, bad education and low birth are presented as the chief faults of the third or contemporary level of society. Bad education by the leaders is offered as an explanation for all the city's and the entire army's misconduct (385-388), and the subservience of the chorus to their leaders confirms the fact that this indictment is not merely a lie concocted by Neoptolemos for the immediate situation. The inhumane and manipulative conduct of Odysseus is associated not only with his "sophistry" (14, 77; cf. 431, 1015, 1244), but repeatedly with his low birth from Sisypheos (384, 417, 1311). Finally, Sophocles ignores a minor detail of the mythic tradition in order to associate Odysseus with the virtual paradigmatic figure of low birth, Thersites.<sup>98</sup>

Sophocles' "solution" of the conflict between the implications of the first and second stages of his "anthropology" and those of the third stage lies in this radically hierarchical perspective which he has built into that analysis of society and which he develops through his control of the dramatic action. By the end of that action he has claimed, with an archaizing self-consciousness nearer Plato than Homer, the absolute validation of this social and political hierarchy in the will of Zeus.

The low point of pessimism in the play occurs in a "digression" of some fifty lines (410f) on the effects of war, a passage which has long been recognized as vividly contemporary in its impact. Achilles is dead, Ajax is dead, Antilochos is dead, and his father Nestor has lost his position as a respected advisor. Patroklos too is dead. But Diomedes, Odysseus, the Atreidae, and Thersites flourish. The obvious human "lesson" (ἐκδιδάξω) from these facts is stated first by Neoptolemos:

In a brief saying  
I'll draw the lesson: of its own will War  
seizes no worthless man, but takes the good always. (435-437)

<sup>98</sup> Here I agree with Gellie 291-292 n. 6 against Huxley.

The bitter, despairing implications for the government of the universe are in turn stated by Philoctetes:

... nothing *bad* has ever perished.  
Rather, the gods carefully bundle them up to shield them  
and somehow take delight in turning back from Hell  
the jaded, criminal elements; while the right-acting,  
the decent sort they dispatch there constantly.  
What reckoning must I make of this? How shall I praise, when  
in setting praise on divinity, I find the gods bad? (446-452)

And as if the point had not been made clearly and sweepingly enough, Neoptolemos sums up the case for despair in the form of a neat, redundant Gorgianic truism:<sup>99</sup>

where the might of the worse makes heroes seem fools  
the worthy all perish and the trickster rules. (456-457)

Commentators and critics have been at pains to cite the contemporary evidence which would justify so bitter a view of the effect of a long war.<sup>100</sup> What is rarely pointed out is how fully these sentiments correspond to Odysseus' analysis of present realities:

Son of a noble father, I too once, when young,  
kept my tongue unemployed and my hand a hard worker.  
Now that I've come to the test, I see that  
the tongue, not action, has total sway over men. (96-99)

All three major characters look at the "reality" of the war and conclude that moral values and courage in action count for nothing in the struggle for survival and success. Both Odysseus — with his commitment to verbal manipulation and his guardian gods, Tricky Hermes and Political Athena — and Philoctetes, with his direct experience of gross injustice apparently triumphant, infer that the gods uphold such an analysis. But it is precisely the full exploration of Philoctetes' own successful battle to overcome the worst assaults of a corrupt contemporary society, and finally, his capacity to inspire the emergence of the highest social virtues in his promising noble pupil, which lay the emotional and intellectual foundations for the tremendous affirmation

<sup>99</sup> I retain the *δewός* of the MSS in line 457. My translation here is necessarily quite free in order to suggest in English the jingling effect of the original with its abstractions, heavy alliteration, and homoeoteleuton.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Jebb on 435f; Webster *Philoctetes* on 436; Bowra 277 and 286f. Jameson's article contains a wealth of contemporary data.

of aristocratic human worth — an affirmation that sweeps away the pettiness and viciousness of Odysseus in the epiphany of an apotheosized Heracles.<sup>101</sup>

Philoctetes himself has come to recognize the invasion of a reality overriding the short-sighted calculations of the Atreidae. Though he rejects bitterly what he perceives as Odysseus' cynical exploitation of religion for gross ends (991–992),<sup>102</sup> he is soon moved from his despair to perceive an implicit divine concern for "right" (1036) in the "divine goad" (1039) that has prodded Odysseus to come for the crippled, foul-smelling man who had interfered with their rituals (1031f). It is the "scientific," existential demonstration of Philoctetes' absolute superiority in circumstances where he is stripped of every social and religious support that renders this divine validation something more solid than pious wish-fulfillment. By the end of the play, it is dramatically credible that Philoctetes is *needed* by the Greek army, not just through some quirk of fate or, as Odysseus seems to think, by virtue of the fact that he happens to possess a magic weapon. Philoctetes is clearly the best human being left alive,<sup>103</sup> and the bow of Heracles is not the cause of his superiority but the clearest external symbol of it. Similarly, Philoctetes' wound is the clearest symbol of his need for society, of the intolerable pain of isolation from the positive virtues of communal life.

The appearance of Heracles confirms on an absolute plane the data resulting from Sophocles' aristocratic exploration of the presocial and social-compact phases of the struggle to survive. Though this solution grows organically from Sophocles' particular "thinking through" sophistic social and political teachings, the appearance of Heracles is the most self-consciously archaizing aspect of the play: "epic," "heroic," "aristocratic," "religious" — the antithesis of the style and values one associates with the sophists. The tonality of the play is decisively shifted from a world apparently dominated by the Atreidae and Odysseus.

<sup>101</sup> I had hoped to pass over in well-deserved silence the absurd thesis of Errandonea II 85f that the appearance of Heracles represents in reality the final ploy of a disguised Odysseus; but alas the very most recent discussion I have seen of the play, namely, Shucard's, informs us: "Errandonea . . . brilliantly shows that Heracles is actually Odysseus" (135 n. 20). I really do not know how one would set about "refuting" so inherently preposterous a view; I only record here that I am aware of it and do not see any merit in it.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Spira 22.

<sup>103</sup> Kirkwood 77 is surely right in describing Helenus' prophecy as "a commentary on Philoctetes' greatness, just as his possession of the weapons of Herakles is."



Though critics have often spoken crudely of "orders"<sup>104</sup> from Zeus delivered by Heracles, his tone of address recalls the deferential courtesy of some Homeric exchanges between gods and heroes.<sup>105</sup> His first words, responding to Neoptolemos' injunction to Philoctetes to "bid the land farewell and start out" (1408), emphasize the option of their proceeding on their chosen course: "not yet, at least until you have heard our tale" (1409-1410), then add a deferential vocative, "son of Poias." Again, after explaining who he is and why he has come, he uses a polite Homeric injunction for a sympathetic hearing (ἐπάκουσον).<sup>106</sup> After a play shot through with sophistic explorations of the power and limitations of λόγος, Heracles describes his speech — and Philoctetes repeats the word — by the archaic, heroic term μύθοι (1410, 1417, 1447).<sup>107</sup> Heracles' prime motive in coming is designated by a word (χάρις), which conveys the reciprocity of concern characteristic of heroic friends and at the same time the peculiar Greek notion of a divine "grace" reserved for heroes, for winners by birth. The phrase used for the will of Zeus (τὰ Διὸς . . . βουλευματα) recalls the Διὸς βουλή of the *Iliad*, which in most contexts describes Zeus' commitment to validating Achilles' absolute superiority in the face of rejection and injury by the highest political authority in his society.

Like traditional heroic advisors such as Nestor or Phoenix who can be and sometimes are ignored, Heracles prefaces his detailed advice with a paradigmatic tale. In this case, the tale is the speaker's own career and recalls broadly Heracles' similar exhortation to the heroic Odysseus in the underworld (*Odyssey* 11.615-626). Here the specific inducements cited by Heracles are strictly individual and heroic: "immortal success," (1420) and a "life of glory" (1422). Philoctetes' real superiority will be validated by the whole community — thus answering earlier legitimate fears of the probability of further mistreatment by the Atreidae and Odysseus. The phrase used to express this (ἀρετῇ τε

<sup>104</sup> T. Wilamowitz 311 speaks misleadingly of Heracles' coming to "command" (*befehlen*) Philoctetes to go to Troy. He is followed by Grene 140 and Gellie 157 among others. Alt 173 emphasizes rightly the purely persuasive tone of Heracles' speech; but since Kitto *Form* 137 (cf. *Tragedy* 308) seems to have convinced too many readers that there is nothing of interest in Heracles' speech, I have considered it in some detail.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Snell 32.

<sup>106</sup> *LSJ* s.v. 4. suggests the de facto sense of "obey" citing this passage; but the only pre-Sophoclean passages cited, *Il.* 2. 143 and Hes. *Op.* 275, do not justify more than the usual confidence conveyed by the word that a careful hearing will win agreement. In the case of the Hesiodic passage, the author is clearly whistling in the wind.

<sup>107</sup> See Winnington-Ingram "Linforth" 633 n. 1.

πρῶτος ἐκκριθεὶς στρατεύματος, 1425) recalls a Pindaric description of a winner in the great games (N. 7.7) and, combined with a promise of winning the ἀριστεία (1429), offers reassurance that the dark fate of Ajax alluded<sup>108</sup> to earlier in the play (410f) will not be repeated in the case of Philoctetes. The honorific allusion to Philoctetes' father with which Heracles began is echoed in the full reassurance that not only is Poias alive but Philoctetes — unlike so many other heroes — will succeed in returning to his father and his home (1430). Heracles proceeds to lay a specific obligation on Philoctetes, namely, to dedicate a thank-offering from the spoils for Heracles' bow at the scene of his funeral pyre (1431–1433). The allusion reinforces the personal sense of χάρις at the outset of the speech (1413) by reminding the audience of Philoctetes' service that won him the bow. Enjoining a parallel mutual dependence on Philoctetes and Neoptolemos expressed with a heroic lion simile, Heracles announced that he will personally send the divine doctor to cure Philoctetes' wound. This action is linked causally to the only explicit allusion in the speech to the "fate" of Troy's fall: "For it [Ilion] is fated a second time to be taken by my bow" (1439–1440). The very vagueness of such a fate — its air of sheer mystery and fetishism — should preclude reading into this speech the faintest hint of divine concern for the interests of the Atreidae and Odysseus. Indeed the final solemn injunction to show reverence to the gods in the sacking of Troy (1440–1444) is distinctly ominous. It recalls the many desecrations of the final night of Troy that spell later disaster for so many Greek chieftains including the Atreidae, Odysseus, and Neoptolemos himself. The allusion is at best only implicit,<sup>109</sup> but if it is present, it focuses awesomely the final ambiguity of Sophocles' vision: on the one hand, the divine validation of the good Philoctetes and punishment of the evil powers that marooned him are reaffirmed; on the other hand, the fragility — the terrible vulnerability to corruption — of the noble young *physis* is confirmed in a dark allusion to Neop-

<sup>108</sup> It is not necessary to retain the normally bracketed lines at 1365–1367 (see Jebb's appendix ad loc.) to see in the allusion to Ajax in the context of Neoptolemos' emphasis in his lie on Odysseus' possession of his father's arms adequate reference for the audience to the Ὀπλων κρίσις. See n. 66 above.

<sup>109</sup> Jebb cites with apparent approval the observation of the scholia: "this warning derives force from the tradition that, after the fall of Troy, Neoptolemos 'slew Priam, when he had taken refuge at the altar of Ζεὺς ἑρκείος.'" Neither Jebb nor, as far as I can recall, has any one else explored the important implications for the whole "educational" motif in the play of finding such an allusion here in the text.

toleμος' subsequent development into the most impious of all the criminals at Troy.

Apart from this possible dark note, Philoctetes' full achievement of σωτηρία and Neoptolemos' realization of the best potentialities of his noble φύσις are clearly the dominant dramatic motifs of the play. Heracles furnishes absolute, i.e. "divine" confirmation of both by recalling in style and content the whole aristocratic tradition of myths celebrating the dependence of society on the single superior individual and the intense suffering which that unique superiority entailed. The pragmatic political consequences of such an ending may appear to be a simple glorification of the old-time religion and the old-time ruling class. Yet anyone who responded to the agonizing and profound exploration of all the new intellectual and political realities threatening the underlying assumptions of the old views must have recognized that the affirmation of the ending is not naively or cheaply won.

Philoctetes' final farewell to his island is in one sense a reminder of the whole anthropological metaphor which framed the hero's struggle to survive and make social ties possible. At the same time, the transformation of the formerly harsh, impersonal arena of that isolated struggle into a mythic, animate, and benign array of divine presences who may guarantee the σωτηρία implicit in the hero's return suggests the poet's will to transcend and leave behind the sophists from whom he had learned so much.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>110</sup> The following works, which have contributed to the formulation of my views, are cited throughout the notes by the author's name alone or by abbreviated title in cases where an author has written more than one relevant work: K. Alt, "Schicksal und φύσις im *Philoktet* des Sophokles," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 141-174; A. W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (Ithaca 1970); A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960); A. W. H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (New York 1972); H. C. Avery, "Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus," *Hermes* 93 (1965) 279-297; H. Bengt, "Erbgut und Umwelteinflüsse," *NJAB* 5 (1942) 142-149; L. Bieler, "A Political Slogan in Ancient Athens," *AJP* 72 (1951) 181-184; P. Biggs, "The Disease Theme in Sophocles' *Ajax*, *Philoctetes* and *Trachiniae*," *CP* 61 (1966) 223-235; C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944); A. Busse, "Kulturgeschichtliche Anschauungen in den Dramen des Sophokles," *NJBB* (1927) 129-135; T. Cole, "The Anonymous Iamblich and His Place in Greek Political Theory," *HSCP* 65 (1960) 127-163; T. Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology* (Ann Arbor 1967); H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (11th ed. Berlin 1964; hereafter cited as *D-K*); H. Diller, "Der griechische Naturbegriff," *NJAB* 2 (1936) 241-257; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951); E. R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford 1973); V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford 1954); I. Errandonea, "Philoctetes," *Emerita* 23 (1955) 122-164;



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## THE BROKEN VICTIM: EURIPIDES *BACCHAE* 969-970

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IN Euripides' *Bacchae* 966-970, Pentheus and Dionysus engage in an ἀντιλαβή, in which Pentheus persistently misunderstands the prophetic statements of Dionysus concerning Pentheus' immediate future. The audience, however, aware of the coming σπαραγμός, easily comprehends Dionysus' hints. Pentheus will be ἐπίσημος πᾶσιν (967) and φερόμενος . . . ἐν χερσὶ μητρός (968-969). All these details specifically refer (as we would expect) to the nasty physical aspects of Pentheus' return.<sup>1</sup> Pentheus then says (969): καὶ τρυφᾶν μ' ἀναγκάσεις. Dionysus replies: τρυφάς γε τοιάσδε. These lines are generally interpreted as follows (Sandys): P. "You will force me even to luxury." D. "Strange luxury, indeed." *Τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς*, then, refer to the σπαραγμός only indirectly — Dionysus will pamper Pentheus in a novel way. All the previous details, however, have been directly physical presentiments of a gruesome fate. Would it not be weak and inconsistent if the crowning detail — the physical ripping apart of the victim — were not expressed as graphically? Perhaps it would be worthwhile to look at *τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς* more closely.

*Τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς* are derived from *θρύπτω*, which, in its basic sense, means "break into small pieces." Plato uses the word this way in *Parmenides* 165b: θρύπτεσθαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. As *θρύπτω* developed, it came to mean "enfeeble, corrupt" (LSJ); that is, "break one's character into pieces." This usage occurs frequently, as in Xen. *Sym.* 8.8: ἐπεὶ ὁρῶ σε ἐρῶντα οὐχ ἄβρότῃτι χλιδαινομένου οὐδὲ μαλακίᾳ θρυπτομένου . . . Now, the relationship of *τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς* to *θρύπτω* is very close. A Greek, accustomed to automatically making such alternations as *θρίξ*/*τριχός*, *ταχύς*/*θάσσω* (a reflex described by Grassman's Law), would consider *θρύπτω* and *τρυφῶ* nearly identical, etymologically.

*Τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς*, then, are not straightforward, literal expressions, but metaphors. We say "his character is dissolute." They said "his

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the statement of the messenger (1139ff): κρᾶτα δ' ἄθλιον, / ὅπερ λαβοῦσά τυγχάνει μήτηρ χεροῖν, / πῆξας' ἐπ' ἄκρον θύρσον ὥς ὀρεστέρον / φέρει λέοντος (that is, he is ἐπίσημος πᾶσιν, φερόμενος ἐν χερσὶ μητρός!).

character is broken into little pieces." An accurate interpretation of these words in a literary context must consider the terms in which the metaphor is cast.

In surveying the range of meaning inherent in *τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς*, it is useful to take a look at the parallel word *θρύψις*, which has explicitly retained the meaning it got from *θρύπτω*. *Θρύψις* can mean "a breaking into small pieces." Aristotle uses it that way in *GC* 316<sup>b</sup>30: οὐτε δὴ κατὰ μέρος διαιροῦντι εἴη ἂν ἄπειρος ἡ θρύψις. It can also mean "a dispersion," as in Aristotle, *De An.* 419<sup>b</sup>23: ἡ θρύψις τοῦ ἀέρος. Chrysippus (*SVF* II 550) uses it in tandem with *διάλυσις*. But *θρύψις*, like *τρυφή*, can also mean "softness," "weakness," "debauchery," as in *X. Cyr.* 8.8. 15–16. There, the *θρύψις* of Xenophon's Asiatic contemporaries is presented as a direct continuation of Median *μαλακία* (16): σαφηνίσαι δὲ βούλομαι καὶ τὴν θρύψιν αὐτῶν. ἐκείνοις γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς εὐνὰς οὐ μόνον ἄρκει μαλακῶς ὑποστόρνυσθαι . . . Another good example of this usage occurs in Plut. *Dem.* 4: ἀπαίδευτος δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσθένειαν καὶ θρύψιν. *Θρύψις*, which explicitly retains the basic meaning derived from *θρύπτω*, clearly shows us just how the metaphor worked in the Greek mind: the character of a degenerate is thought of as being broken into little pieces.

Metaphors, of course, through frequent use, tend to lose their original vividness (as *τρυφᾶν* and *τρυφάς* undoubtedly have) so that their basic meaning is no longer ordinarily considered (as in the English expression "he has paved the way for . . ."). But the basic meaning is nonetheless latent, and can be recalled when the need arises. The audience knows by line 966 that the *σπαραγμός* of Pentheus is imminent; lines 967ff are laden with double meanings and redolent with hints of future disaster. In this context, when Pentheus says, καὶ τρυφᾶν μ' ἀναγκάσεις and Dionysus replies, τρυφάς γε τοιάσδε, the underlying meaning is apparent: "You are going to compel me to be broken into pieces (morally)." "And what a breaking-up it will be (physically)!"<sup>2</sup>

Euripides in the *Bacchae* seems particularly interested in wordplay. For example, there is the play on "Pentheus" in 367–368 and 507–508: "Pentheus," besides being the name of the king, is closely related to the verb meaning "to grieve" (*πενθέω*). One can further note the elaborate series of "etymologies" in 292ff: μέρος, ὄμηρον, μηρῶ, ὠμήρευσσε. It is also worthwhile to point out that in line 1375 of the *Ion*, Euripides puns the same word (*τρυφᾶν*) in a context which has a marked similarity to that in the *Bacchae*:

<sup>2</sup> Cf., in the description of Pentheus' death, ῥηγνύσα σάρκας (1130).



χρόνον γὰρ ὃν με χρῆν ἐν ἀγκαλαῖς  
μητρὸς τρυφῆσαι καὶ τι τερφθῆναι βίου,  
ἄπεστερήθην φιλότατης μητρὸς τροφῆς.

Here, too, the action of the verb *τρυφᾶν* takes place in a mother's arms; here, too, *τρυφᾶν* is punned: with *τερφθῆναι* and *τροφῆς* (a *τροφή* is a *τροφή*!). Of course, in this situation, where no dark meaning need be intimated, *τρυφᾶν* is used only in its developed, metaphorical sense. But it is a word Euripides liked to play with.

Lines 967-970 represent a richly allusive passage, in which it is right to expect every word to carry its full range of meaning. It is not coincidental, one feels, that in 969-970, when Euripides is alluding to the climax of the action, the *σπαραγμός* of Pentheus, he uses words which have the underlying meaning "to break into little pieces."

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## THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE MOTU ANIMALIUM*

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WHEN I began a commentary on Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*, I did not intend to produce an entirely new critical edition. The treatise had been edited in the nineteenth century by Bekker, and three times in the twentieth: by Jaeger (1913), Torraca (1958), and, most recently, Louis (1973). In addition, the Oxford Translation of Farquharson (1912) included a careful discussion of textual problems.<sup>1</sup> As I examined these editors' analysis of the manuscript tradition, however, checking their collations against the manuscripts and reading manuscripts which they had not consulted, I soon realized that a completely new apparatus was necessary. Bekker's numerous errors in collation have been passed on to all subsequent editors; though some have proven better text critics, none has reread the manuscripts with any care. And though Torraca collated one new manuscript to add to Bekker's four, it became apparent to me that there were others among the forty-four containing the treatise which had a contribution to make both to our understanding of the text tradition and to the establishment of the text itself. I have collated five new manuscripts, three of which — L, O<sup>d</sup>, and H<sup>a</sup> — are of particular interest, and have re-examined all of those previously collated by others. On this basis I have attempted to work out a coherent account of the manuscript families and subfamilies. This article is a summary of my results.<sup>2</sup> I shall first point to some of the shortcomings of previous editions, and then

<sup>1</sup> Bekker ed., *Aristoteles Graece* I (Berlin 1831) 698–704; W. Jaeger, ed., *Aristotelis De Animal. Motione, De Animal. Incessu, De Spiritu* (Leipzig 1913); Luigi Torraca, ed., *Aristotele De Motu Animalium* (Naples 1958); Pierre Louis, ed., *Aristote: Marche des animaux, Mouvement des animaux* (Paris 1973); A. S. L. Farquharson, tr., *Aristotle, De Motu Animalium*, The Oxford Translation of Aristotle V (Oxford 1912).

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed account of these questions can be found in my thesis, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Harvard 1975), which also contains a translation, full commentary, and essays on problems of central philosophical interest. The textual section is fuller than this article primarily in its paleographic descriptions of the manuscripts, its discussion of minor manuscripts, and its complete collation listings for manuscripts not all of whose readings are included in the apparatus.

present my own analysis of the manuscript families, and a complete positive apparatus, which I assume most readers will use along with Louis' Budé text. In a final section I will discuss some particular textual problems, and defend my suggestions for their solution.

### I. PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THE *DE MOTU*

Until the beginning of this century, the prevailing view that the *De Motu* was a spurious work discouraged both text critics and commentators from studying it as seriously as other works of Aristotle contained in the same manuscripts.<sup>3</sup> Bekker neglects for the *MA* an important manuscript (L) which he does examine for other works of the *PN*, apparently convinced of the *MA*'s lesser importance. And his text suffers, even with respect to the manuscripts it does examine (EYSP) from surprisingly numerous errors in collation and a reactionary approach to textual problems.

The work of A. S. L. Farquharson and W. Jaeger reawakened interest in the treatise. Farquharson's elegant Oxford translation, published in 1912, remains the most ambitious and serious attempt at elucidating the work in modern times. For the text, he was the first to consult William's translation and Albertus' commentary, and he makes numerous suggestions of his own, usually bold and interesting, sometimes correct. His copious notes are an important contribution; any commentator on the work must owe him a great debt.

Jaeger's edition, published in the same year as his influential *Hermes* article (1913), is a clear improvement over Bekker's in punctuation and in selection of readings. He abandons Bekker's principle of following the *a* family, and especially E, wherever possible, and produces a more judicious analysis of the tradition. But unfortunately, while he recognizes Bekker's defects as an editor, he usually defers to him as a collator. Of sixteen incorrect readings and twenty-three omissions of significant variants in the Jaeger apparatus, all the omissions and all but four of the errors derive from Bekker's apparatus.<sup>4</sup> There is more

<sup>3</sup> Its authenticity is now generally accepted. The arguments for and against are discussed at length in my thesis. See also W. Jaeger, "Das Pneuma im Lykeion," *Hermes* 48 (1913) 31-70, and L. Torraca, "Sull' autenticità del *De mot. an.* di Aristotele," *Maia* 10 (1958) 220-233.

<sup>4</sup> Bekker and Jaeger read E incorrectly at 699<sup>b</sup>7, 700<sup>a</sup>15, 33, Jaeger alone at 698<sup>e</sup>23 and 703<sup>b</sup>3; in Y, both have incorrect readings of the title, and of 700<sup>a</sup>15, 26, <sup>b</sup>4, 10, 703<sup>b</sup>34; in S at 698<sup>a</sup>8, <sup>b</sup>16, 700<sup>a</sup>15; in P at 700<sup>b</sup>34, 703<sup>a</sup>7; Jaeger alone misreads P at 702<sup>b</sup>14 and 703<sup>a</sup>21. Significant variants are omitted in E at 698<sup>b</sup>4, 17, 27, 699<sup>a</sup>3, 700<sup>a</sup>2, 13, <sup>b</sup>2, 701<sup>b</sup>13, 29, 703<sup>a</sup>33, 36, <sup>b</sup>16, 37 *bis*; in Y at



than one occasion where Jaeger selects the correct reading but believes he has less manuscript support for it than there in fact is, since he follows Bekker, who errs in support of his incorrect choice.<sup>5</sup>

There is some evidence that Jaeger did examine the manuscripts himself: his new errors, for example, and a few descriptions of corrections in the manuscripts (e.g. in S at 700<sup>a</sup>15) which are not contained in Bekker. But his diligence does not seem to have been sufficient to justify the claim made in his introduction: "Relegi Romanos codices omnes librorum *περὶ κινήσεως ζώων* . . . Bekkeri apparatus non semel correctum ad codicum fidem leges."<sup>6</sup> He is, however, responsible for collating the readings offered in Michael's commentary and Leonicus' translation.

Of Jaeger's improvements to the text, we might make special mention of his emendation *αὐτῷ αὐτό* at 700<sup>a</sup>26, now confirmed by the MSS of the *b*<sub>2</sub> group. He also improves on Bekker in choice of readings at 698<sup>a</sup>8, 16, 698<sup>b</sup>1, 16, 699<sup>b</sup>25, 700<sup>a</sup>15, 26, 700<sup>b</sup>4, 10, 701<sup>a</sup>21, 702<sup>a</sup>20, 31, 702<sup>b</sup>19, 703<sup>b</sup>22-23, 36; in punctuation at 699<sup>b</sup>5, 701<sup>a</sup>28-32, 703<sup>a</sup>23-24, 33-36. Bekker seems better at 698<sup>a</sup>11, 700<sup>a</sup>27, 701<sup>a</sup>3, 703<sup>a</sup>31. Neither editor makes any attempt to solve the difficult problems at 701<sup>b</sup>3-4. It is particularly unfortunate that Jaeger did not have access to the work of Farquharson in the preparation of his sometimes admirable edition, since some of Farquharson's useful conjectures would probably have won acceptance.

The Loeb Classical Library edition of E. S. Forster, published in 1937,<sup>7</sup> does not contain a full apparatus, and reprints Bekker's text, noting all divergences from it. A number of Jaeger's contributions are accepted. Forster makes interesting conjectures of his own at 699<sup>a</sup>12, 700<sup>b</sup>3, 700<sup>b</sup>4, and 702<sup>b</sup>19, and improves the text at 699<sup>b</sup>7-8.

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698<sup>b</sup>16, 27, 700<sup>a</sup>27, 33; in S at 699<sup>a</sup>20, 700<sup>a</sup>1; in P at 698<sup>b</sup>27, 699<sup>a</sup>6, 703<sup>a</sup>6. A few of these errors may seem too trivial for inclusion; but Jaeger customarily includes variants even of this sort in his apparatus; their absence can be taken as evidence of omission.

<sup>5</sup> At 700<sup>a</sup>15, Bekker prints a reading *ἄλλ'*, which he claims to be that of ESY; all these manuscripts actually read *ἄλλ'*. *ἄλλ'* is nowhere attested. Jaeger selected the undoubtedly superior *ἄλλ'*, but claims it as an emendation. At 700<sup>b</sup>4 and 34, Bekker's misreadings again lead false support to his inferior selections.

<sup>6</sup> Jaeger remarks that Littig collated EYSPL for the *MA*, and that he uses Littig's results. (He does not, however, make any use of the contributions of L; if he really did have access to its readings, he is dishonest in claiming responsibility for the restoration at the opening of ch. 5.) So even where Jaeger shows a familiarity with the MSS beyond what he could have gathered from Bekker, it is not necessarily firsthand work.

<sup>7</sup> E. S. Forster, tr., *Aristotle, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1937).

Luigi Torraca's edition with Italian translation and notes appeared in 1958. It includes an edition of the William of Moerbeke translation, for which gratitude is due Mr. Torraca. His edition of the Greek text has been given an excellent discussion by I. Düring.<sup>8</sup> I agree with Mr. Düring that Torraca has favored the readings of the *b* family a bit too often, and in particular that X, the one new manuscript he collates, is not worth the favor he shows it. Düring's detailed particular observations are extremely useful. To his criticism of Torraca I might add that it is evident Torraca did not read any of the manuscripts except for X, and that his collation of X, a particularly clear manuscript, as he himself points out, contains sixteen errors or omissions.<sup>9</sup> This, for such a brief treatise, is unfortunate. As for the other MSS, in addition to inherited collation errors, his apparatus is marred by incompleteness. Many readings noted by Jaeger are omitted, on no evident principle of selection. The apparatus is not only less informative than Jaeger's, it is sometimes also positively misleading. For only one example, at 699<sup>b</sup>25 Torraca writes that P and M<sup>c</sup> omit αί, but fails to note that P's reading is not ὑπερέχουσαι but ὑπερβάλλουσαι.

Torraca's choice of X as the one further MS to collate would seem to require some defense, since it turns out to be an idiosyncratic member of a family for which superior manuscripts, L and H<sup>a</sup>, are available. But Torraca gives us no hint that there are *any* other manuscripts of the *MA*, except for the "worthless" Neopol. 286, which he mentions in a footnote.

The most recent work on the *MA* is the Budé Edition of Pierre Louis, 1973. Louis, like his predecessors, does not reexamine EYSP. He occasionally includes the readings of X, but sometimes seems strangely ignorant of them. The reason for this seems to be that he copies large portions of his introduction from Jaeger, who did not know X, thus causing strange inconsistencies to appear between the introduction and the apparatus. For example, the introduction cites three passages where E is alone in showing the correct reading. In all three of these, X also has the reading. I have examined Louis' text

<sup>8</sup> I. Düring, "Aristotelis *De Motu Animalium* a cura di Luigi Torraca," *Gnomon* 31 (1959) 415-418. Another valuable review of Torraca was written by Moraux, *AntCl* 28 (1959) 363-366.

<sup>9</sup> Torraca fails to note variant readings in X at 698<sup>b</sup>16, 25, 700<sup>a</sup>33, <sup>b</sup>1, 8, 16, 20, 701<sup>b</sup>19, 27, 702<sup>a</sup>21, <sup>b</sup>36, 703<sup>b</sup>2, 22. He cites many other readings of X no more important as variants than the more trivial of these. I think it fair to assume he means to cite all its variant readings. Readings are incorrectly noted at 700<sup>a</sup>30, 701<sup>a</sup>14, and 702<sup>b</sup>30.

and translation at length in a review.<sup>10</sup> But to summarize: the text is constituted along reactionary lines, and emerges looking very much like Bekker, undue favor being given to E. Louis himself makes no useful suggestions, and his introduction about the filiation of the MSS is seriously misleading, deriving as it does from E. Mioni's brief sketch of the Venetian MSS (see below), which was never meant to be the final judgment of a critic, but only an encouragement to critics to look more closely at some neglected members of the *b* family.

It seems clear, then, that although we have had recent editions of the *De Motu* there has been little substantial progress, and much work remains to be done. No effort has been made to correct Bekker's reading of the manuscripts, and little to study other manuscripts of interest, or to produce a more satisfactory analysis of the MS families, incorporating the findings of recent paleographic studies — for example Dieter Harlfinger's excellent monograph, which deals at length with many manuscripts containing the *De Motu*.<sup>11</sup> The text critical efforts of Jaeger and Farquharson remain superior to more recent work; Farquharson's contributions, especially, have not always been sufficiently recognized. And there are several major textual difficulties which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved; in some cases serious corruptions have gone unrecognized because no editor was also producing a detailed analysis of the arguments.<sup>12</sup> The superior interest of Farquharson's work on the text can often be traced to his superior awareness of its plan and content, the thinness of Torraca and Louis to their apparent lack of interest in philosophical issues. In this article textual suggestions will, of necessity, be lifted out of the body of the running commentary; but I hope enough will remain to indicate their basis in a comprehensive reading of the whole work.

## II. THE MANUSCRIPT FAMILIES

The *MA* is extant in forty-four Greek manuscripts.<sup>13</sup> Many of these are late, and of no importance in constituting the text. Here I shall examine only the manuscripts extensively consulted for this edition. I have collated H<sup>a</sup>, O<sup>d</sup>, S, Y, V, L, N, P, and, for selected passages,

<sup>10</sup> *JHS* 95 (1975).

<sup>11</sup> Dieter Harlfinger, *Die Textgeschichte der pseudo-aristotelischen Schrift Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν* (Amsterdam 1971).

<sup>12</sup> See especially my remarks on 701<sup>a</sup>36ff and 701<sup>b</sup>17ff.

<sup>13</sup> These are listed by Louis, 47–48, in approximate chronological order. I shall in several cases take issue with these datings, but see no reason to repeat the list itself, which is substantially correct. Cod. Bodl. Canon. 107, however

Z<sup>a</sup> in situ, E and X from microfilm and photographic reproduction. After an analysis of the manuscript families, I shall briefly discuss the contributions of the commentary of Michael of Ephesos and of the Latin translations of William of Moerbeke and Nicolaus Leonicus.

Hermann Diels, in an influential paper,<sup>14</sup> sought to explain the origin of our major families of Aristotle manuscripts by postulating a single majuscule manuscript, produced between A.D. 600 and 800, and provided with variants, from among which selections were later made by copyists. Paul Moraux,<sup>15</sup> while agreeing with Diels' main thesis — the independent importance of the indirect tradition preserved in the early Greek commentators — argues that Diels' hypothesis cannot explain the fact that the variations between our two major families are more often stylistic than substantive. He suggests the following picture: at the time of *metacharakterismos*, scriptoria, rather than following an eclectic procedure, selected as exemplar a single uncial manuscript judged superior, leaving aside the others, which soon disappeared. Drawing neat family lines remains difficult, however, because of the eclectic nature of the later tradition.

For the *MA*, as for the *DC* and many other Aristotelian works, we find two reasonably well-defined families: the family *a*, whose oldest extant member is E (Par. gr. 1853), dating from the mid-tenth century; and the family *b*, which for the *DC* has as its earliest witness our oldest Aristotle manuscript, J (Vindob. phil. gr. 100), from the middle of the ninth century. Though there is some evidence (see below) that J once included the text of the biological works, this portion of the manuscript does not survive. For the *MA* we must rely on a number of later manuscripts of this family, which fall into fairly well-defined subgroups. There is, in addition, a tradition independent of both major families, represented occasionally in P and Γ (William's translation), though both of these belong for the most part in the *b* family. In the indirect tradition, there is little of any use.<sup>16</sup> (But see 702<sup>b</sup>19,

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(his no. 40) is a printed edition and should not be included. See also A. Wartelle, *Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs* (Paris 1963). Wartelle also cites Cod. Par. Coisl. 166, a MS which, however, contains only the last few lines of the *MA*.

<sup>14</sup> H. Diels, "Zur Textgeschichte der aristotelischen Physik," *AbhBerl* 1882, 1-42. See also W. D. Ross, ed., *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford 1936) 102ff.

<sup>15</sup> P. Moraux, ed., *Aristote, Du Ciel* (Paris 1965) clxvi-clxxi.

<sup>16</sup> The term "indirect tradition" should be used to refer only to works of Greek commentators who predate the establishment of the major MS families (in the ninth century) and therefore may serve to indicate readings of lost



703<sup>a</sup>22 for examples of some support from the commentators for contested readings.) Michael's commentary, Leonicus' translation, and the paraphrase of Albertus Magnus all belong to the *b* family, or are eclectic.

#### THE *a* FAMILY

The members of *a* contain, individually, fewer peculiar errors than the single members of *b*. When, however, we examine the readings which separate the two families, we find that *a* has the better reading in only nine passages, *b* in twenty-four. Bekker's general policy of favoring *a*, and especially E, in doubtful cases seems unjustified, and leads him into error at 699<sup>b</sup>7, <sup>b</sup>32, 700<sup>a</sup>15, 700<sup>b</sup>9, <sup>b</sup>10, 702<sup>a</sup>22, 702<sup>b</sup>1, 703<sup>b</sup>24. In citing the readings of *a* I will always mean readings shared by E and Y; these are usually shared by V, which, however, is eclectic (see below) and cannot be trusted.

Inferior readings of *a*: 698<sup>b</sup>1: ἦ *b*: ἡ *a*; 698<sup>b</sup>18: νεῦσις *b*: πλεῦσις *a*; 699<sup>a</sup>14: αὐτόν *b*: αὐτό *a*; 699<sup>a</sup>15: θιγγάνον κινεῖν *b*: θιγγάνειν *a*; 699<sup>a</sup>35: καὶ καθ' *b*: καθ' *a*; 699<sup>b</sup>13: ὥς *b*: om. *a*; 699<sup>b</sup>32: τι ἀκίνητον *b*: ἀκίνητόν τι *a*; 700<sup>a</sup>27: καὶ *b*: om. *a*; 700<sup>b</sup>9: λοιπόν *b*: λοιπὸν δ' *a*; 700<sup>b</sup>11: ὅλου *b*: λόγου *a*; 700<sup>b</sup>28-29: ἀγαθοῦ——29 ἀγαθόν om. *a*; 701<sup>a</sup>7: νοῶν *b*: νῦν *a*; 701<sup>a</sup>22: τόδε, τόδε· καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς *b*: τόδε καὶ τόδε πράττει εὐθύς *a*; 701<sup>b</sup>15: καὶ πάλιν συστελλομένων διὰ *b*: καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ *a*; 701<sup>b</sup>22: μόνον *b*: om. *a*; 702<sup>a</sup>32: ἡ post φυγῆς om. *a*; 702<sup>b</sup>1: καὶ post μὴ om. *a*; 702<sup>b</sup>15: ἡ om. *a*; 702<sup>b</sup>19: τὰς *b*: τὰ *a*; 702<sup>b</sup>23: συμμεταβάλλει *b*: συμμεταβάλλειν *a*; 703<sup>b</sup>5: οὐχ om. *a*; 703<sup>b</sup>13: ὥστ' *b*: ὥστε μὴ *a*; 703<sup>b</sup>24: γὰρ om. *a*; 703<sup>b</sup>36: ὅτι *b*: ἔτι *a*.

Inferior readings of *b*: 698<sup>a</sup>1: περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν *a*: αὐτῶν περὶ ἕκαστον *b*; 698<sup>a</sup>16: οὖν om. *a*; 698<sup>a</sup>24: ἡ α καὶ γ *b*: ἡ αγ *a*; 698<sup>b</sup>1: ἡ πρὸς ὃ *a*: ἡ πρώτῃ, ἡ πρώτῳ, ἡ πρόσω, vel om. *b*; 699<sup>a</sup>13: εἶναι τε δεῖ *a*: εἶναι θέλει *b*; 699<sup>a</sup>30: συμβαίνοι *a*: συμβαίνῃ *b*; 699<sup>b</sup>3: δεῖ om. *b*; 700<sup>b</sup>22: ὀρεξεῖς *a*: ὀρέξεῖς *b*; 701<sup>b</sup>21: ὄν om. *b*.

Louis gives preference to *a* on the grounds that there are three passages where E alone contains the right reading: 698<sup>b</sup>5, 700<sup>b</sup>14, and 700<sup>b</sup>25. A dubious policy even if based on accurate data, this is in fact derived from Jaeger's preface (vi), which is on these points now outdated. Louis, who reviewed Torracca's edition,<sup>17</sup> has not checked his apparatus: for in all three cases Torracca's X, a member of *b*, has the

majuscule MSS. Louis (49) is wrong to include Michael's twelfth-century commentary in this category.

<sup>17</sup> In *RevPhil* 33 (1959) 312.

correct reading. We may now add that in all cases all members of  $b_2$  share the reading; they are joined by  $\Gamma$  in 698<sup>b</sup>5, by N in the other two passages. The authority of  $a$  diminishes as our knowledge of  $b$  increases. (In another passage, 699<sup>b</sup>19, cited by Torraca as one where  $a$  alone has the correct reading, we now find it joined by N, a member of  $b$ .) And yet  $a$ 's principal exemplars, E and Y, are two good early manuscripts, relatively free from idiosyncratic error. We should abandon once and for all the questionable procedure of preferring one of these families to the other in a general way; each passage must be judged on its merits. We will turn now to a more specific discussion of the individual manuscripts in this family.

- E Cod. Par. gr. 1853. s. x, xv. 453 fol. Membr. 350/55 × 245/60 mm. *Ph.* (3); *DC* (69); *GC* (106<sup>v</sup>); *Meteor.* (129); *DA* (175<sup>v</sup>); *Sens.* (203); *Mem.* (210); *Somn., Insomn., et Div. Somn.* (212<sup>v</sup>); *MA* (221); *Metaph.* (225<sup>v</sup>); *Theophrasti Metaph.* (309); *Col.* (312<sup>v</sup>); *PA* (318); *GA* (352); *IA* initium tantum (393); *EN* mutili (393); *MM* (437).

This frequently used and much-praised manuscript has recently received an excellent and thorough analysis from Paul Moraux, published together with photographic reproductions showing samples of its different hands.<sup>18</sup> To this one must refer for a detailed account. The tenth-century portion of E, which extends to 344<sup>v</sup>, is the work of four hands: E I (1–186<sup>v</sup>, 187, 196–202<sup>v</sup>); E II (187–195<sup>r</sup>, 306–337); E III (203–306); and E IV (337–344<sup>v</sup>). In addition, Moraux has established that E belongs to the middle or end, rather than (following the catalogues, as had previous critics) to the beginning of the tenth century, and that its four hands are roughly contemporary and from the same scriptorium. Although E I shows much more uncial corruption than the other three, the work of Follieri<sup>19</sup> has shown this to be in such cases a dangerous criterion for dating, as Moraux agrees. Nor is E likely to have been copied directly from an uncial manuscript, as was alleged by Fobes, and, more recently, by Jaeger, Düring, and Torraca.<sup>20</sup> As Moraux points out in his edition of the *DC*, certain of

<sup>18</sup> P. Moraux, "Le Parisinus Graecus 1853 (Ms. E) d'Aristote," *Scriptorium* 21 (1967) 17–41 and plates 3 and 4.

<sup>19</sup> E. Follieri, "La reintroduzione di lettere semionciali nei piu antichi manoscritti in minuscola," *BAPI* 3 ser. 1 (1962) 15–36.

<sup>20</sup> F. H. Fobes, "Textual Problems in Aristotle's Meteorology," *CP* 10 (1915) 213–214; W. Jaeger, ed., *Aristotelis Metaphysica* (Oxford 1957) viii; I. Düring,

its errors could have arisen only from a confusion of minuscules; and the tenth-century correcting hand E<sup>2</sup> (in all sections) uses an entirely different MS, not the original, whereas a transliterated copy would probably have been collated with the original. (Furthermore, E can easily be shown not to be the archetype of the *a* family: L for the *DC*, Y and V for the *MA* are independent descendants of a common ancestor.)<sup>21</sup> E seems to be a rather negligent copy of a minuscule manuscript which, itself, was either the transliterated copy or a direct descendant.

E III, the hand which copied the *MA*, is a careful hand, relatively free of uncial corruption. His work shows certain distracting peculiarities: the substitution of  $\epsilon$  for  $\alpha\iota$ , of  $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \epsilon\iota \\ \eta \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$  for  $\iota$ , of  $\iota$  for  $\epsilon\iota$ ,  $\omega$  for  $\omicron$ ,  $\omicron$  for  $\omega$ . Some of his blunders produce impossible grammar, or nonexistent words. Accents, and especially breathings, are carelessly done, most probably by the original scribe. There are occasional corrections in red by E<sup>2</sup>.<sup>22</sup>

Y Cod. Vat. gr. 261. s. xiii–xiv. 227 fol. Chart. 317 × 232 mm.  
*PA* (1) cum Michaelis Ephesii comment.; *IA* (84<sup>v</sup>); *Sens.* (98);  
*Mem.* (112); *Somn.* (116<sup>v</sup>); *Insomn.* (123); *Div. Somn.* (128);  
*MA* (131); *GA* (139).

Y has generally been assigned to the thirteenth or fourteenth century. Dieter Harlfinger now argues soundly that on the basis of its watermarking it should be dated to around 1300.<sup>23</sup> Although it is clearly a major source for the *GA*, which E contains only in its fifteenth century portion, its value for works contained in E's older part has long been disputed, some scholars believing Y to be a mere copy of E, others claiming it has independent value.

ed., *Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium* (Göteborg 1943) 42ff; L. Torraca, ed., *Le Parte degli Animali* (Padua 1961) x.

<sup>21</sup> Moraux, *DC* ccxxiii.

<sup>22</sup> For further description of E, see also the *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae* II (Paris 1746) 410–411; fairly full descriptions of many of these manuscripts, and useful bibliography, can be found in two books by P. Siwek: *Les manuscrits grecs des Parva Naturalia d'Aristote* (Rome 1961), and *Le De Anima d'Aristote dans les manuscrits grecs* (Vatican 1965). Siwek's own analyses of the manuscript families are, however, often labyrinthine and unconvincing.

<sup>23</sup> Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 252.

Ingemar Düring has argued at length that Y is simply an edited version of E, produced by a scholarly man who set out to normalize Aristotle's diction.<sup>24</sup> But even for those portions of Y with which Düring was directly concerned, his arguments have been vigorously attacked.<sup>25</sup> And no editor who has worked with the *MA* portion has failed to find Y of independent value.<sup>26</sup> The hasty and continuous hand suggests that the copyist used a single manuscript; there is no sign of the eclectic procedure and the careful editorializing alleged by Düring.<sup>27</sup> A study of Y's readings for the *MA* shows that it is clearly an independent member of the *a* family, of equal value with E. The errors which characterize the *MA* portion are errors due to haste and carelessness; the transpositions and rewritings mentioned by Düring are much more characteristic of P (see below).

Where E and Y differ, E has the better reading in twenty-one places, Y in twenty-eight (of which five are differences of breathings only). E is never alone in preserving the correct reading, but Y (with V) is alone in reading, correctly, τοῦ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχή at 702<sup>a</sup>22.

E superior to Y: 698<sup>a</sup>10: ὅτεπερ E: ὅτε Y; 698<sup>a</sup>11: τίς E: τί Y; 698<sup>a</sup>25: τὸ ante κέντρον om. Y; 698<sup>b</sup>15: ὑποδόσει E: ὑπενδώσει YE<sup>2</sup>; 698<sup>b</sup>25: πνέων E: πνέωσιν Y; 698<sup>b</sup>25: τύχοι E: τύχοι τις Y; 699<sup>b</sup>32: δεῖ E: καὶ δεῖ Y; 700<sup>a</sup>26: μόνῳ E: μόνον Y; 700<sup>a</sup>27: αὐτοῦ E: αὐτοῦ Y; 700<sup>a</sup>35: ἄλλου E: ἄλλων Y; 700<sup>b</sup>7: δέ E: μὲν Y; 700<sup>b</sup>14: καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ E: καὶ γὰρ αἱ Y; 700<sup>b</sup>25: τὸ ante τοιοῦτον om. Y; 701<sup>a</sup>26: ἐφιστᾶσα E: ἐφεστῶσα Y; 702<sup>a</sup>33: ἔχειν E: ἔχει Y; 702<sup>b</sup>29: μέλλει E: μέλλοι Y; 702<sup>b</sup>30: κινεῖσθαι E: κινήσεσθαι Y; 702<sup>b</sup>30: ἐν ἄρα δυνάμει ὃν E: ἄρα δυνάμει ἐν Y; 703<sup>b</sup>22: τούτου E: τοῦτο Y; 703<sup>b</sup>37: αἵτιον E: αἵτιον δέ Y; 704<sup>a</sup>1: ἐνυπάρχειν E: ὑπάρχειν Y.

Y superior to E: 698<sup>a</sup>24-25: γ——εἶναι om. E; 698<sup>b</sup>4: τὸ γόνυ Y:

<sup>24</sup> Düring, *PA* 50-52. Similar verdicts have been reached by C. Thurot ("Observations critiques sur le traité d'Aristote *De part. an.*," *RA* 16 [1867] 197), R. Mugnier ("La filiation des manuscrits des *Parva Naturalia*," *RevPhil* 26 [1952] 38), W. D. Ross (*Aristotle, Parva Naturalia* [Oxford 1955] 61-62), and others.

<sup>25</sup> See J. Freudenthal, "Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristoteles *Περὶ τῶν κοινῶν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργων*," *RhM* 24 (1869) 87; H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotelis De Insomniis* (Leiden 1947) xlviii f; Siwek, (above, n. 22) 109-110.

<sup>26</sup> Bekker, Jaeger, Torraca, and Louis all cite its variants; Jaeger (vi) offers a vigorous defense, as does Drossaart Lulofs (see above) with specific reference to the *MA*.

<sup>27</sup> For a more detailed description of the MS, see J. Mercati and P. Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codices manuscripti* (Rome 1923) 342-343, and C. Brandis, "Die aristotelischen Handschriften der Vaticanischen Bibliothek," *AbhBerl* 1831, 65.



τοῦ γόνυ E; 698<sup>b</sup>9: ἔξωθεν Y: ἔξω E; 698<sup>b</sup>13: τι om. E; 698<sup>b</sup>17: πρόεισιν Y: πρόισιν E; 699<sup>a</sup>9: καὶ om. E; 699<sup>b</sup>7: καὶ ἡ Y: καὶ αἱ E; 699<sup>b</sup>25: αἱ ὑπερέχουσιν Y: αἱ περιέχουσιν E; 699<sup>b</sup>26: ταῦτα ὑπ' Y: ταῦτ' ἅπ' E; 700<sup>a</sup>2: ἐξάπτεσθε Y: ἐξάπτεσθαι E; 700<sup>a</sup>8: αὐτά om. E; 700<sup>a</sup>13: τῶν ἔξω τι Y: τὸν ἔξω τι E; 700<sup>a</sup>27: δεῖ τι μένειν Y: δὲ ἐπιμένειν E; 700<sup>b</sup>2: αὐτῷ Y: αὐτῶ E; 701<sup>a</sup>32: ποτέον Y: ποντόν E; 701<sup>b</sup>13: τὸ αὐτό Y: τὸ αὐτῶ E; 701<sup>b</sup>29: τοιοῦτον Y: τοιοῦτο E; 701<sup>b</sup>30: ἐν post μέγεθος om. E; 702<sup>a</sup>14: ἀπολίπη Y: ἀπολείπη E; 702<sup>a</sup>22: τοῦ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχή Y: μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχή E; 702<sup>a</sup>29: τι Y: τινα E; 702<sup>a</sup>33: αὐτοῦ Y: αὐτοῦ E; 702<sup>a</sup>36: αὐτοῦ Y: αὐτοῦ E; 703<sup>b</sup>1: αὐτῶν Y: αὐτῶν E; 703<sup>b</sup>8: ἐκουσίους Y: ἐκουσίως E; 703<sup>b</sup>15: θερμότητές τε καὶ Y: θερμότητες καὶ E; 703<sup>b</sup>16: παρὰ τὸν λόγον Y: παρὰ τῶν λόγον E; 703<sup>b</sup>37: οὐ, αἴτιον τὸ Y: οὐ αἴτιον E.

There is another manuscript of the *a* family which may be of some independent value:

V Cod. Vat. gr. 266. s. xiv. 240 fol. 293 × 198 mm. Chart.  
*Col.* (1); *LI* (8<sup>v</sup>); *Long.* (13); *Juv.* (15<sup>v</sup>); *IA* (23); *Sens.* (36);  
*Mem.* (47); *Somn.*, *Insomn.*, et *Div. Somn.* (50<sup>v</sup>); *MA* (60<sup>v</sup>);  
*PA* (68); *GA* (118); *DA* (203).

Critics agree in assigning V to the fourteenth century. Harlfinger establishes that its watermark places it between 1282 and 1328; it is one of the earliest manuscripts with watermarks.<sup>28</sup> There are between twenty-eight and thirty-one lines to the page. Numerous pages have been damaged and repaired, and the first letters at some of the margins have been lost. The entire portion containing the *MA* is, like much of the manuscript, badly faded; the original ink is black-brown, but there are numerous corrections, scholia, and fillings-in of illegible places in black.<sup>29</sup> The corrector has improved the sense in a number of passages where the *a* family is particularly corrupt: e.g. at 700<sup>b</sup>11, 701<sup>a</sup>7, 701<sup>a</sup>22, 701<sup>b</sup>15, 703<sup>b</sup>5, and 703<sup>b</sup>36. The first hand in V agrees with E in error against Y only once: at 700<sup>a</sup>27; and even here the error is not identical to that in E (δὲ ἐπιμένειν E; δεῖ τι ἐπιμένειν V). It agrees with or is closer to Y in ten places (698<sup>a</sup>11, <sup>b</sup>5, <sup>b</sup>16, <sup>b</sup>23, <sup>b</sup>25, 699<sup>b</sup>25, 700<sup>b</sup>14, 25, 702<sup>a</sup>22 — where only YV have the correct reading — and 703<sup>b</sup>22). But V does not seem to be, for the *MA*, an apograph of Y, as Drossaart

<sup>28</sup> Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 133.

<sup>29</sup> See also Mercati 347-350 and Brandis (above n.27) 65.

Lulofs claims.<sup>30</sup> Sixteen significant errors of Y are not reproduced by V (698<sup>a</sup>10, 25, <sup>b</sup>16, 25, 699<sup>b</sup>32, 700<sup>a</sup>26, 27, 33, 35, 700<sup>b</sup>7, 701<sup>a</sup>26, 702<sup>a</sup>33, <sup>b</sup>29, 30, 703<sup>b</sup>37, 704<sup>a</sup>1). V has fourteen peculiar errors of its own. V's characteristic errors do not agree with *b* with any regularity; two of the three agreements are with *b*<sub>2</sub> (701<sup>a</sup>12, 24; 701<sup>b</sup>10 is shared with S). But V's *b* manuscript, from which the corrections were made, was almost certainly connected with *b*<sub>1</sub> (see, e.g., 698<sup>b</sup>1, ἡ πρώτη.) We may conclude that V is a member of the *a* family of some independent value, closer to Y than to E, but not a copy of it. Because of its faded character and the difficulty of discerning the original readings beneath repairwork and correction, it is not a good witness. But it is often of use in confirming the reading of one *a* manuscript against another. In the apparatus I shall cite those of its readings which seem to be of help in reconstructing the *a* archetype.

Other manuscripts containing the *MA* which are known to be in the *a* family are: G<sup>a</sup> (Marc. gr. Z 212), Q (Marc. gr. Z 200), and f (Marc. gr. Z 206). The first is shown by E. Mioni<sup>31</sup> to be a copy of Y. Mioni's partial collation shows that it shares characteristic errors of Y at 698<sup>b</sup>16, 25, 699<sup>b</sup>32, and 704<sup>a</sup>1. After Bessarion emended G<sup>a</sup>, it became the exemplar for the manuscripts Q (1457) and f (1467).

#### THE *b* FAMILY

Within the *b* family, whose characteristics have already been noted, there are two well-defined subfamilies: *b*<sub>1</sub>, containing the manuscripts S and O<sup>d</sup>, and *b*<sub>2</sub>, containing X, L, and H<sup>a</sup>. In addition, there are two manuscripts, P and N, which are closer to *b*<sub>2</sub> than to *b*<sub>1</sub>, and seem to descend from a common archetype with the *b*<sub>2</sub> manuscripts, though P has access to an independent tradition as well (as does the manuscript used by William of Moerbeke). Also in *b* are the sources of Michael of Ephesos and of Leonicus' translation.

It is very likely that the source of the *b* family was the collection of Aristotle's biological writings corresponding to the collection of physical writings which constitutes our oldest Aristotle manuscript, J (Vindob. phil. gr. 100). Jean Irigoin<sup>32</sup> has convincingly dated this manuscript to the ninth century, and has judged the hand to be the same as that of the two-page fragment of an early manuscript of the

<sup>30</sup> Drossaart Lulofs, *Insomn.* xlviii-xlix.

<sup>31</sup> Elpidio Mioni, *Aristotelis codices Graeci qui in Bibliothecis Venetis asservantur* (Padua 1958) 57-59, 127-128.

<sup>32</sup> J. Irigoin, "L'Aristote de Vienne," *JOBG* 6 (1957) 5-10.

HA, to be found as folia 13-14 in Par. suppl. gr. 1156. Moraux has demonstrated for the DC the dependence of some *b* group manuscripts with which we are working (e.g. H<sup>a</sup>) on J.

# THE GROUP *b*<sub>1</sub>

The symbol *b*<sub>1</sub> designates the shared readings of the manuscripts S (Laur. Plut. 81, 1) and O<sup>d</sup> (Marc. gr. Z 209). This group is alone in showing the correct reading at 701<sup>b</sup>4 (ὀχούμενος). Together with *a*, it alone among *b* manuscripts has the correct reading at 698<sup>a</sup>19 (ἐν ᾧ ἦ), 698<sup>b</sup>19 (τοῦτο ἕτερον εἶναι), 700<sup>b</sup>3 (ἐστίν), 700<sup>b</sup>20 (ἔχουσι, διαφέρουσι), 701<sup>b</sup>2 (γενομένης), 702<sup>a</sup>13 (ὁπόταν), 703<sup>b</sup>4 (κινεῖται δέ τις καὶ ἀκουσίους), 703<sup>b</sup>22 (ἔχουσιν), and 704<sup>b</sup>2 (εἰρήκαμεν τὰς αἰτίας). And with EY alone, as opposed to V, it has the correct reading διὰ at 701<sup>a</sup>24. The group is characterized by thirty-one distinctive errors.<sup>33</sup> We shall now proceed to a closer examination of the major manuscripts of the *b*<sub>1</sub> family, O<sup>d</sup> and S.

O<sup>d</sup> Cod. Marc. gr. Z 209. s. xiii in. 140 fol., lineis plenis 24-5. Chart. 250 × 165 mm.  
DA (1); MA (65); Sens (74); Mem. (92<sup>v</sup>); Somn. (98); Insomn. (105); Div. Somn. (111<sup>v</sup>); 115-118 blank, followed by three works of Plotinus.

This manuscript was not consulted at all by Bekker. De Corte called it M, Siwek O<sup>d</sup>, and Mioni E<sup>m</sup>. Rejecting M in this case as causing confusion with the symbol for Michael's readings, we shall follow Siwek's choice, which is also the designation for this manuscript in his 1963 edition of the PN. O<sup>d</sup> should be assigned to the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.

The manuscript is badly damaged on almost every page: inner and upper extremities have deteriorated from humidity, and some leaves have been repaired and filled in. This was done carelessly, with large pieces of opaque paper, with the result that much more than the actually damaged part is now illegible. Every page of the MA has its indecipherable sections, ranging from bits of one or two lines to all of six or seven lines on a page.

De Corte<sup>34</sup> was the first to suggest that this was a valuable manuscript.

<sup>33</sup> In the title, and at 698<sup>a</sup>1, 12, <sup>b</sup>1, 5, 16, 23, 699<sup>a</sup>10, 19, 20, 26, <sup>b</sup>2, 6, 31, 37, 700<sup>a</sup>25, 28, <sup>b</sup>13, 15, 26, 702<sup>a</sup>11, 29, <sup>b</sup>21, 30, 32, 703<sup>a</sup>7, 25, <sup>b</sup>15, 34.

<sup>34</sup> Marcel de Corte, "Études sur les manuscrits du traité de l'âme d'Aristote," *RevPhil* 7 (1933) 151-160.

He observed its close relation, for the text of the *DA*, to the frequently consulted *S*, and expressed the opinion that *O*<sup>d</sup>, being a superior copy of a common source, should be collated instead of *S* henceforth. Siwek<sup>35</sup> reaches similar conclusions for the text of the *PN*. Mioni<sup>36</sup> has, however, argued, on the basis of collating a very few passages of the *MA*, that *O*<sup>d</sup> is a copy of *S* for this treatise. Our results strongly support the conclusions of De Corte against those of Mioni.<sup>37</sup>

*S* Cod. Laur. Plut. 81, 1. s. xii-xiii. 213 fol. Chart. 336 × 243 mm. *EN* (1); *Meteor.* (33); *DC* (58); *PA* (77); *IA* (101); *DA* (105); *Sens.* (117<sup>v</sup>); *Mem.* (122<sup>v</sup>); *Somn., Insomn., et Div. Somn.* (124); *MA* (128<sup>v</sup>); *GA* (131); *Long.* (162); *Juv.* (163<sup>v</sup>); *Metaph.* (169).

*S* is written in two hands. The first seventy-six folia, and also the *Metaphysics*, are in the hand of Joannes Panaretos (thirteenth-fourteenth century). Folia 77<sup>r</sup>-166<sup>v</sup> are in an older hand ascribed by Bandini to the twelfth century, by Jaeger and Moraux to the twelfth or early thirteenth. Moraux has written me that he considers the older hand to be archaizing, but certainly earlier than Panaretos.<sup>38</sup>

*S* was first collated for the *MA* by Bekker, whose errors have been noted above. A comparison of the readings of *S* and *O*<sup>d</sup> shows that, where they differ, *S* has the better reading in only eight passages, *O*<sup>d</sup> in twenty-five.

*S* superior to *O*<sup>d</sup>: 698<sup>b</sup>13: μέλλει *S*: μέλλοι *O*<sup>d</sup>; 698<sup>b</sup>16: ἐν τῇ ἄμμῳ *S*: ἐν τοῖς ἄμμῳ *O*<sup>d</sup>; 698<sup>b</sup>18: ἀντερείδοι *S*: ἀντερείδει *O*<sup>d</sup>; 700<sup>a</sup>24: ποιοῦσιν οἱ πτόντες *S*: οἱ πτόντες ποιοῦσιν *O*<sup>d</sup>; 700<sup>b</sup>10: κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα *S*: τὸ σῶμα κινεῖ *O*<sup>d</sup>; 701<sup>a</sup>14: βαδίζει *S*: αὐτὸς βαδίζει *O*<sup>d</sup>; 702<sup>a</sup>31: ὁ βραχίων *S*: βραχίων *O*<sup>d</sup>; 702<sup>b</sup>21: διὰ om. *O*<sup>d</sup>.

*O*<sup>d</sup> superior to *S*: 698<sup>a</sup>6: τῶν ζώων *O*<sup>d</sup>: τῶν ζώντων *S*; 698<sup>a</sup>23: μένοι *O*<sup>d</sup>: μένει *S*; 698<sup>b</sup>15: ὑποδώσει *O*<sup>d</sup>: εἰ ποδώσει *S*; 698<sup>b</sup>26: πνέων *O*<sup>d</sup>: πλέων *S*; 698<sup>b</sup>27: αὐτοῦ *O*<sup>d</sup>: αὐτοῦ *S*; 699<sup>a</sup>5: τῶν *O*<sup>d</sup>: τό *S*; 699<sup>a</sup>23: καὶ om. *S*; 699<sup>a</sup>24: δυοῖν *O*<sup>d</sup>: δυεῖν *S*; 699<sup>a</sup>30: τοῦτο *O*<sup>d</sup>: τοῦτον *S*; 699<sup>b</sup>19: ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης *O*<sup>d</sup>: ἐπὶ τοὺς σελήνης *S*; 699<sup>b</sup>22: μέν *O*<sup>d</sup>: γάρ *S*; 700<sup>a</sup>1: μάλα πολλὰ κάμοιτε *O*<sup>d</sup>: μάλλα πολλὰ κάκάμοιτε *S*; 700<sup>a</sup>12: αὐτοῖς *O*<sup>d</sup>: αὐτοῖς *S*; 700<sup>a</sup>20: ἄδηλον *O*<sup>d</sup>: εὐδηλον *S*; 700<sup>b</sup>15: ἐνεκά τινος

<sup>35</sup> Siwek, (above, n. 22) 57ff.

<sup>36</sup> Mioni (above, n. 31) 57-59.

<sup>37</sup> See also A. M. Zanetti and A. Bongiovanni, *Graeca D. Marci Bibliotheca codicum manuscriptorum* (Venice 1740) 113.

<sup>38</sup> In a letter to me, 22 February 1973; see also A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus codicum Graecorum Bibliothecae Laurentianae* (Florence 1770) III 219-220.



O<sup>d</sup>: ἔνεσταί τινος S; 701<sup>a</sup>17: οἰκία δ' ἀγαθόν· ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς O<sup>d</sup>: οἰκία δὲ ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν· οἰκίαν εὐθύς S; 701<sup>b</sup>10: κινούνται O<sup>d</sup>: κινεῖται S; 701<sup>b</sup>15: συστελλομένων O<sup>d</sup>: συστελλόμενον S; 702<sup>a</sup>27: οὖν om. S; 702<sup>b</sup>9-10: ἡ ἀρχή—χειρὶ om. S, add. r. marg.; 702<sup>b</sup>14: αὐτῷ O<sup>d</sup>: αὐτῷ S; 702<sup>b</sup>30: ἐν ἄρα δυνάμει ὄν O<sup>d</sup>: ἄρα δυνάμει ἐν S; 703<sup>a</sup>5: ἡ om. S; 703<sup>a</sup>10: πνεῦμα O<sup>d</sup>: πνεύμονα S; 703<sup>b</sup>22: τούτου O<sup>d</sup>: τοῦτο S.

Some of the errors of O<sup>d</sup> as against S are so minor as to allow the possibility, not excluded by considerations of date, that S is, in fact, a copy of O<sup>d</sup>: e.g. at 698<sup>b</sup>13, 16, 18, 701<sup>a</sup>31, and 702<sup>b</sup>21, all of which might have been corrected by a later copyist. 700<sup>b</sup>10 and 700<sup>a</sup>24 are more substantial; being merely stylistic variants, they would be unlikely to have been corrected in an apograph. As for Mioni's suggestion that O<sup>d</sup> was copied from S, it simply will not hold up to an examination of the evidence. In addition to puerile confusions of the sort noted for other portions of the MS by Förster<sup>39</sup> (for example those at 698<sup>b</sup>15, 26, 699<sup>b</sup>19, 700<sup>a</sup>1, 703<sup>a</sup>10), from which O<sup>d</sup> is fortunately free, we can point to the more serious errors at 700<sup>a</sup>20, 700<sup>b</sup>15, 701<sup>a</sup>17, which could not possibly have been corrected by a copyist. S and O<sup>d</sup> descend from a common source, but O<sup>d</sup> is by far the more careful copy. I do not, however, follow De Corte's suggestion that only O<sup>d</sup> should be cited in the apparatus, first because of the extensive damage to portions of O<sup>d</sup>, second because of the historical importance of S's readings for the *MA* text.

#### THE GROUP *b*<sub>2</sub>

The symbol *b*<sub>2</sub> in the apparatus designates the shared readings of the manuscripts XH<sup>a</sup>L. This group has a rather large number of shared errors, but also contributes some readings of value. Its three main manuscripts are alone in preserving the correct reading at 700<sup>a</sup>26 (αὐτῷ αὐτό), thus confirming the excellent emendation of Jaeger. With E they preserve the right reading at 698<sup>a</sup>5, with N at 702<sup>a</sup>20 and 701<sup>b</sup>30, with PN at 698<sup>b</sup>6, with EN at 700<sup>b</sup>14. X alone has the correct reading at 702<sup>b</sup>19 (καὶ πρὸς) — though the καὶ is also to be found in N. The group as a whole is characterized by twenty-eight errors.<sup>40</sup> In addition, it shares eleven errors with P and N, whose relationship to

<sup>39</sup> A. Förster, ed., *Aristotelis De Anima* (Budapest 1912) xi.

<sup>40</sup> At 698<sup>a</sup>11, 12, <sup>b</sup>1 (bis), 16, 21, 23, 26, 699<sup>a</sup>2, <sup>b</sup>19, 700<sup>a</sup>26, 34, <sup>b</sup>16, 17, 18, 29, 701<sup>a</sup>2, 12, 13, 14, 28, 36, <sup>b</sup>35, 702<sup>a</sup>9, 18, 703<sup>b</sup>10, 19, 20.

the group will be discussed more fully later.<sup>41</sup> Two errors are shared with P, but not with N.<sup>42</sup>

The only manuscript of this group which has been previously collated for the *MA* is X. Torraca's numerous errors in reading it are discussed above. X should not have been collated alone, in preference to H<sup>a</sup> and L, not even mentioned by Torraca. Torraca had not even any reason to think it older than these, though the excellent research of Dieter Harlfinger now makes this seem likely. The three manuscripts all appear to be copies of a common source, independent of each other; but X is, of the three, the worst copy. We will examine the manuscripts in what now seems their correct chronological order, and then go on to investigate their relationships.

- X Cod. Ambrosianus 435 (H 50 sup.). s. xii-xiii. 149 fol. Membr. 241 × 175 mm.  
*DA* (1); *Sens.* (55); *Mem.* (75<sup>v</sup>); *Insomn. et Div. Somn.* (89<sup>v</sup>); *MA* (99<sup>v</sup>); *Long.* (110); *Juv.* (114<sup>v</sup>); *Col.* (135<sup>v</sup>).

X is assigned by Mugnier to the twelfth century, by Siwek to the early thirteenth. Others, like the catalogue, hesitate between these alternatives.<sup>43</sup> The manuscript is clearly written in a single hand.

- H<sup>a</sup> Cod. Marc. gr. Z 214. s. xiii-xiv. 238 fol, binis columnis, lineis 52. Membr. 332 × 230 mm.  
*EN* (1); *Metaph.* (40); *Phys.* (92); *GC* (127); *DA* (137<sup>v</sup>); *Rhet.* pars prima (149<sup>v</sup>); Cleomedes, *Meteor.* (151); *Sens.* (170<sup>v</sup>); *Mem.* (176<sup>v</sup>); *Somn.* (178<sup>v</sup>); *Insomn.* (181); *Div. Somn.* (183); *MA* (184); *Long.* (187<sup>v</sup>); *Juv.* (189); *Resp.* (190<sup>v</sup>); *Col.* (196); *LI* (200<sup>v</sup>); *Mech.* (203); *Spir.* (210); *DC* (214<sup>v</sup>).

The manuscript is carefully and clearly written, in double columns throughout. Harlfinger claims to have found two different hands in the manuscript. Though he admits they are extremely similar, he claims that a sharp break can be seen between 142<sup>r</sup> and 142<sup>v</sup>.<sup>44</sup> I think

<sup>41</sup> At 698<sup>a</sup>1, 19, 700<sup>a</sup>24, <sup>b</sup>3, 20, 21, 701<sup>a</sup>24, 702<sup>a</sup>13, 703<sup>b</sup>4, 22, 704<sup>b</sup>2.

<sup>42</sup> At 701<sup>b</sup>22 and 704<sup>b</sup>2.

<sup>43</sup> See A. Martini and D. Bassi, *Catalogus codicum Graecorum Bibliothecae Ambrosianae* (Milan 1906) I 525-526; R. Mugnier, "Les manuscrits des *Parva Naturalia* d'Aristote," *Mélanges Desrousseaux* (Paris 1937) 327-333; Siwek, *PN* (above, n. 22) 30, 36.

<sup>44</sup> Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 166ff and plate 19.

this is probably correct, though the similarity between the hands is so great as to leave room for doubt.

The dating of H<sup>a</sup> has been a subject of controversy. Earlier scholars dated it anywhere from the eleventh to the fifteenth century. But Harlfinger's recent discussion argues convincingly for a date between 1270 and 1370. The number and type of abbreviations on certain pages, as he shows, makes an eleventh or twelfth century date impossible, despite the double column arrangement, which influenced other critics in favor of an early date.

Mioni is a vigorous champion of this manuscript, of which he writes, "Tropo trascurato dagli studiosi, per alcune opere merita di stare accanto ai migliori codici aristotelici."<sup>45</sup> For the *MA* he suggests, on the basis of the most sketchy examination, that we should collate H<sup>a</sup> in place of P. His estimate of the importance of P is inaccurate, though his criticism of its copyist is justified (see below). His verdict has been uncritically accepted by Louis, who does not, however, actually collate H<sup>a</sup> or throw out P. H<sup>a</sup> does not deserve the neglect with which it is often treated, but Mioni's estimate of its importance is excessive, and partially based on his erroneous dating of H<sup>a</sup> to the twelfth century.

L Cod. Vat. gr. 253. s. xiv in. 269 fol. Chart. 241 × 164 mm.  
*DC* (1); *GC* (54<sup>v</sup>); *Meteor.* (81<sup>v</sup>); *DA* liber III (155); *Sens.* (168);  
*Mem.* (184<sup>v</sup>); *Somn.*, *Insomn.*, *Div. Somn.* (196); *MA* (203<sup>v</sup>);  
*Long.* (211<sup>v</sup>); *Juv.* (215); *Resp.* (218<sup>v</sup>); *Col.* (237); *LI* (241);  
*Mech.* (246<sup>v</sup>); *Spīr.* (262<sup>v</sup>).

L has been variously dated, but can now be confidently assigned to the early fourteenth century. As Harlfinger was the first to point out, the hand which copied L is the same as the first hand in N, which is one of the earliest manuscripts with watermarks, and can be dated to between 1282 and 1328. (But the hand is *not*, as Harlfinger suggests, the same as that which copied the portion of N which includes the *MA*.)<sup>46</sup> Editors of the *PN* and the *DA* concur in regarding L as one of our most valuable manuscripts for these works.<sup>47</sup>

Each of these three manuscripts appears to be an independent descendant of a common source. Each has peculiar errors, and coincidences

<sup>45</sup> E. Mioni, *Manoscritti e Stampe Venete dell' Aristotelismo e Averroismo* (Venice 1958) 5.

<sup>46</sup> Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 165-166 and plates 10, 11.

<sup>47</sup> See also Mercati (above, n. 27) 330; Brandis (above, n. 27) 66.

in error are not sufficiently numerous to indicate dependence. L has six errors not shared by X or H<sup>a</sup> (698<sup>a</sup>3, 699<sup>b</sup>4, 14, 700<sup>a</sup>30, 702<sup>b</sup>10, 703<sup>a</sup>32); H<sup>a</sup> has twelve not shared by the other two (698<sup>a</sup>22, <sup>b</sup>3, 29, 31, 700<sup>a</sup>27, 700<sup>b</sup>21, 701<sup>a</sup>11, 37, <sup>b</sup>34, 702<sup>a</sup>3, <sup>b</sup>30, 703<sup>b</sup>15); X has nineteen not shared by L or H<sup>a</sup> (698<sup>a</sup>17, <sup>b</sup>26, 27, 699<sup>a</sup>4, 9 *bis*, <sup>b</sup>7, 700<sup>a</sup>2, 11, <sup>b</sup>1, 13, 701<sup>a</sup>28, 32, <sup>b</sup>8, 13, 27, 702<sup>a</sup>21, 703<sup>a</sup>4, <sup>b</sup>3). X and L share errors not in H<sup>a</sup> at 700<sup>b</sup>8, 702<sup>a</sup>14, 702<sup>b</sup>31, and 703<sup>b</sup>7. The H<sup>a</sup> copyist could easily have corrected all of these, though the last would have required more ingenuity than the others. X and H<sup>a</sup> agree in error against L at 701<sup>b</sup>11 and 16. The change required for L to correct the first is minimal, and the second could easily be remedied on the basis of the sentence which follows, in which *aisthesis* precedes *phantasia*. L and H<sup>a</sup> share five errors not in X: 699<sup>b</sup>32, 700<sup>a</sup>30, <sup>b</sup>11, 701<sup>a</sup>28, 702<sup>b</sup>19. At 700<sup>a</sup>30, X had the erroneous reading, but has corrected it. X's *συλλογισάμενοι* at 701<sup>a</sup>28 is clearly an attempt to improve on the error of the common source. At 702<sup>b</sup>19, where X alone has the correct reading, it may be the result of conjecture — though the more distantly related N also has *καὶ*, without *πρός*. The passage is difficult, and many editors have preferred a reading without *καὶ*. So even if the *καὶ* is not a conjecture, LH<sup>a</sup> may have dropped it to improve (as they thought) the sense. The error at 700<sup>b</sup>11 would have been an obvious one for the scribe of X to correct, and nothing can be built on either 698<sup>b</sup>27 or 699<sup>b</sup>32.

None of these manuscripts should be neglected. It would be arbitrary to select one rather than the others for inclusion in the apparatus. If a choice had to be made, L, though probably the latest, should be chosen, as the least cluttered with peculiar errors. I prefer to use the symbol *b*<sub>2</sub> for the numerous passages in which the three agree, and to note the errors of all.

#### RELATED *b* MANUSCRIPTS

- P Cod. Vat. gr. 1339. s. xiv. 460 fol. Membr. 280 × 200 mm.  
*PA* (1); *GA* (72); *IA* (165); *DA* (178); *Sens.*, *Mem.*, *Somn.-Insomn.-Div. Somn.* (214); *MA* (245); *Long.-Juv.-Resp.* (252<sup>v</sup>); *Col.* (269<sup>v</sup>); *LI* (277<sup>v</sup>); *Mech.* (281<sup>v</sup>); *Spir.* (294); *De Mundo* (299); *HA* (310<sup>v</sup>).

This has been one of the most controversial among Aristotle manuscripts with regard both to its date and its value. It is written in a neat, apparently early hand, which has been variously appraised by editors.



Maas and Jaeger confidently place P in the twelfth century; Mercati writes:

La preparazione della pergamena e il carattere artefatto e bastardo della scrittura, insomma l'aspetto esterno del MS lascia a me, e così al collega Sr. Comm. Pio Franchi de' Cavalieri, l'impressione che il codice è del Rinascimento. Però non scenderei di molto oltre la metà del secolo xv.<sup>48</sup>

Again, the efforts of Harlfinger prove decisive. After much searching, he found another manuscript in the same hand: Vindob. Hist. 16, which, like P, is the work of a copyist by the name of Ioasaph. (Marie Vogel<sup>49</sup> conjectured that the 5-7 letter erasure at the end of P (f. 460) contained this name. Harlfinger with ultraviolet light could not confirm this conclusively, but the find of Vindob. Hist. 16, where the name is plain, confirms Mme Vogel's guess.) The copyist of Vindob. Hist. 16, on folio 1<sup>r</sup>, uses briefly a later style of writing, with numerous abbreviations, before shifting into his amazingly successful imitation of an archaic style. On the basis of this page, we can date that manuscript, and P as well, to the second half of the fourteenth century.<sup>50</sup>

P's value, and its relationship to other manuscripts, have equally been debated. Though Dittmeyer denied it any independent value, De Corte claimed that P, while late, is the direct copy of an extremely early manuscript, a representative of the tradition at a stage before the two families divided. Ross supports this judgment, while others (for example, Biehl, Düring, and Mugnier) acknowledges at least that it is to some extent, in some passages, independent of both families.<sup>51</sup> For the *MA*, however, Jaeger, Torraca, and Louis too hastily include it simply in the *b* family, while Mioni claims it is a copy of H<sup>a</sup>, deformed by many arbitrary editorial alterations.<sup>52</sup>

It has already been noted that P shares (usually with N) sixteen errors otherwise distinctive of the *b*<sub>2</sub> group. There are also numerous

<sup>48</sup> Maas' opinion is cited in Drossaart Lulofs' OCT of the *GA* (1965) vii; Mercati's is taken from a letter to W. Lorimer, cited in Lorimer's *The Text Tradition of Pseudo-Aristotle De Mundo* (Oxford 1924) 5 n. 1. Within these limits, every possible period has been defended by some critic or other — for summaries see Harlfinger, 247ff, and my thesis, 102.

<sup>49</sup> See Vogel and V. Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (Leipzig 1909) 221.

<sup>50</sup> See Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 253-254.

<sup>51</sup> L. Dittmeyer, ed., *Aristotelis De Animalibus Historia* (Leipzig 1907) xii; De Corte (above, n. 34) 265-266, 277-278; Ross, *PN*, 64-65; W. Biehl, ed., *Aristotelis Parva Naturalia* (Leipzig 1898) vi; Düring, *PA*, 38 *Gnomon* (above n. 8) 417; Mugnier, *Mél. Des.* (above, n. 43) 327, *RevPhil* (above n. 24) 36ff.

<sup>52</sup> Mioni, *Arist.* (above, n. 31) 57-59.

characteristic errors of that group, some major, which it does not share. It contains an amazingly large number of errors of all sorts. I have counted eighty-three which appear in no other manuscript of the *MA* which I have consulted. As Mioni observed, a large proportion of these are arbitrary stylistic rewritings: small shifts in word order, syntactic corrections of questionable value. At 698<sup>a</sup>6 and 702<sup>a</sup>29, the copyist seems to be rewriting the argument as well, towards what he supposes is a greater consistency with other Aristotle passages. As Düring observed in his review of Torraca, P is extremely unreliable as an aid to reconstructing the archetype of *b* when unsupported by other manuscripts. Jaeger, misled perhaps by his erroneous dating, relies too much on P in six passages where it is at variance with the rest of the manuscripts: 698<sup>a</sup>11 (καθόλου om. PM<sup>1</sup>), 699<sup>b</sup>30 (καὶ ante κατὰ add. P), 700<sup>a</sup>29 (πρώτην κίνησιν PM<sup>c</sup>), 700<sup>b</sup>10 (ἡ ante ἀρχή add. P), 700<sup>b</sup>33 (τὸ ante πρώτως add. P), and 703<sup>a</sup>31 (συστή P: στή cett.).

There can be no doubt, however, that P has access to an independent source, probably also used by *Γ*. It is just possible that William's manuscript was, in fact, P's source for these readings, but, I think, unlikely, since P seems to have the better text at 700<sup>b</sup>23-24 (see note ad loc.). There are two passages where *PF* have, alone, the correct reading:

700<sup>a</sup>23-4: ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ διανοητόν· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, ἀλλὰ . . . P

quare movet primum quod appetibile et quod intellectuale. Non omne autem intellectuale, sed . . . *Γ*

In other manuscripts, the passage is hopelessly corrupt:

ὥστε καὶ τὸ διανοητόν· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, ἀλλὰ . . . *ab*<sub>1</sub>,  
ὥστε καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ . . .  
*b*<sub>2</sub>*NIA.M.*

ἔσται καὶ τι διανοητόν προαιρετόν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν διανοητόν προαιρετόν,  
ἀλλὰ . . . *M*<sup>P</sup>

The reading of P could not, it seems, be the result of a correction of those mutilated readings; such ingenuity would be astounding. The reading is surely correct; no editor has even questioned this. Apparently in some source of both our families, -ινεῖ—ὀρεκτὸν, at least, had dropped out or become illegible. Groups *ab*<sub>1</sub> attempt the minimal correction, while *b*<sub>2</sub>*NIA.M.* are more ambitious, attempting to link it with the context. If Mioni had examined this passage, as he did not,

he could not still have maintained that P is derivative from H<sup>a</sup>. The other passage which gives strong evidence of P's independence is 700<sup>b</sup>35: *πρὸς ἕτερον* P, *ad alterum* Γ: *πρότερον* cett. *πρότερον* alone cannot be defended, though there have been attempts at emendation. *πρὸς ἕτερον* is, however, to be preferred.


In addition, at 698<sup>b</sup>1, with *πρόσω*, P comes closest of any *b* manuscript to *πρὸς ὄ*, the correct reading, preserved in *a*; at 699<sup>b</sup>25, only P and M<sup>c</sup> correctly omit *αἱ*. In three passages only P agrees with *a* in the correct reading: 700<sup>a</sup>20, 701<sup>b</sup>27, 702<sup>b</sup>30. At 703<sup>b</sup>26, P comes closest to Jaeger's *ταυτά*.

We may conclude that P is, for the most part, a heavily edited manuscript of the *b* family, which descends, ultimately, from the same source as the archetype of the *b*<sub>2</sub> group. Its ancestor was, however, probably not the same as the manuscript which became the common source of *b*<sub>2</sub>N. It can therefore be quite useful, where it supports one subgroup against another, in reconstructing the source of *b*, and further is invaluable in those places where it draws on a tradition independent of both *a* and *b*. Nonetheless, it presents an appalling number of worthless variants, with which previous editors should not have burdened the apparatus. The editor must carefully consider the possibility that any given peculiar reading might contain something of real value, but he must be highly selective.

There is another manuscript which, though of rather poor overall quality, can occasionally be useful in reconstructing *b* family readings:

N . Cod. Vat. gr. 258. s. xiv. 325 fol. Chart. 228 × 155 mm.  
*LI* (1); *Col.* (7); *Mir. Aud.* (18<sup>v</sup>); *Mem., Somn., Insomn.*; et  
*Div. Somn.* (36<sup>v</sup>); *MA* (57<sup>v</sup>); *GC* (70); *Meteor.* (99); *PA* (157);  
*IA* (217); *GA* (226<sup>v</sup>); *Long.* (310<sup>v</sup>); *Juv.* (313<sup>v</sup>); *Spir.* (316).

On the basis of its watermark, we may date N to between 1282 and 1382.<sup>53</sup> It appears to be a descendant of the same source as that of the *b*<sub>2</sub> manuscripts; P was probably connected with the branch at one more remove:



<sup>53</sup> See Harlfinger (above, n. 11) 131-132, and plates 10 and 11; also Mercati (above n. 27) 338-340, Brandis (above n. 27) 64.

N shares fourteen errors with the  $b_2$  manuscripts alone, and twelve others with the  $b_2$  manuscripts and P. It shows fifty-eight peculiar errors, including three major omissions, each totaling about sixty-five letters. N's other errors seem to result from carelessness, rather than from P-style editorializing. It is an unusually messy manuscript. Nonetheless, N preserves the correct reading alone with  $a$  at 699<sup>b</sup>19 (ἀδύνατόν φάμεν εἶναι); alone with  $ab_1$  at 698<sup>a</sup>11 (τῷ λόγῳ καθόλου); with  $b_2$  at 701<sup>b</sup>30 (εἰ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ) and 702<sup>a</sup>30 (διὰ τὸ τὸ); with E and  $b_2$  at 700<sup>b</sup>14 (καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ). N can obviously be an important witness, but must be used with great care. As in the case of P, I have chosen to omit most peculiar readings. N is never alone in providing a correct reading, and has, unlike P, no independent source.

One other manuscript which I have examined should, because of its relatively early date, perhaps be mentioned, if only to be discounted:

Z<sup>a</sup> Cod. Laur. Plut. 87, 21. s. xiv. 64 fol. Membr. 148 × 113 mm. MA ff. 43-51<sup>v</sup>, between *Div. Somn.* and *LI*.

This manuscript, a palimpsest (the text is written over an eleventh-twelfth century *Iliad*, which is, in turn, over an as yet unidentified uncial text) has usually been dated to the fifteenth century, but Harlfinger confidently places it in the first half of the fourteenth, comparing it to Laur. 5.10 of the same date.<sup>54</sup> Though Apelt considered it of great importance, Bekker, Siwek, and Harlfinger concur in finding it unusually careless and confused, of little value. Harlfinger calls its degree of corruption "fast hoffnungslos," and Siwek remarks, "Nous y rencontrons à chaque pas une telle abondance de leçons particulières que l'esprit en devient encombré."<sup>55</sup>

I have read through this manuscript for the MA, and would confirm that, though of some interest to the paleographer, it is (although Harlfinger's dating seems correct) of none to the text critic. It is the sloppiest manuscript of Aristotle I have ever examined; the text is so incoherent, so far from the original, that it is difficult to identify it with any particular group. But it seems closer to P and N than to any other manuscript and may very well be a copy of some immediate ancestor of P, many of whose characteristic errors it incorporates. It does not, however, contain P's readings from the independent source.

<sup>54</sup> Harlfinger (above n. 11) 146ff.

<sup>55</sup> Siwek, *PN* (above, n. 22) 125ff; see also Bandini (above, n. 38) III 407ff.



For just one example of what one can expect from this manuscript: At 701<sup>a</sup>18, for the whole passage ἱματίου δέομαι. οὐδ' δέομαι, ποιητέον. ἱματίου δέομαι ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρῶξις ἐστίν. πράττει δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, Z<sup>a</sup> gives us simply: ἱματίου δέομαι ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. πρῶξις ἐστίν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.

MICHAEL OF EPHEOS (M)<sup>56</sup>

Michael's manuscript was from the *b* family, as is confirmed by readings such as περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν at 698<sup>a</sup>1, θέλει at 699<sup>a</sup>13, τι ἀκίνητον at 699<sup>b</sup>32, καὶ at 700<sup>a</sup>27, τὰς at 702<sup>b</sup>19. The one link with *a* (ἡ *AG*, 698<sup>a</sup>24) is not sufficient to suggest contamination, especially since it is a correct reading. There are, in addition, some readings linking it with the *b*<sub>2</sub>PN family as against *b*<sub>1</sub>: 698<sup>a</sup>23 (ἡ ante *Δ* om.), 701<sup>a</sup>8 (ἡ om.), 701<sup>b</sup>2 (γινομένης), 702<sup>b</sup>30 (ὄντα τὰ *AE*). The following readings suggest that it is closer, in particular, to P: 698<sup>a</sup>11 (καθόλου om.), 699<sup>b</sup>25 (αἱ om.), 700<sup>a</sup>29 (πρώτην κίνησιν), 702<sup>b</sup>3 (χειρί: ἀρχῇ). Michael does not, however, have P's correct readings where P has access to the independent source; nor does he share numerous errors of the P copyist. His manuscript is probably drawn from an intermediate copy of the *b*<sub>2</sub>PN source, from which the eclectic P was later copied.

WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE (Γ)<sup>57</sup>

William's manuscript, as shown above, shares with P access to an independent tradition. In addition, it seems to be eclectic between *a* and *b*. Most of its readings concur with *b*: e.g. ἡ *A* καὶ *Γ* at 698<sup>a</sup>24, θέλει at 699<sup>a</sup>13, θιγγάνον κινεῖν at 699<sup>a</sup>15, ἄν om. at 699<sup>a</sup>19, μὲν ἐστι τοῦ μὲν ἀρχῇ at 702<sup>a</sup>22, τὰς at 702<sup>b</sup>19. But at 701<sup>a</sup>15, where *b* reads καὶ πάλιν συσσελλομένων, *aΓ* have the inferior καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ. This

<sup>56</sup> Michael is probably not a pupil of Psellus, as has previously been assumed by most scholars, but is to be associated instead with the twelfth-century circle of Aristotelians around Anna Comnena. See Robert Browning's persuasive discussion in "An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena," *PCPS* n.s.8 (1962) 1-12. His activity as a commentator is discussed in my thesis; the *MA* commentary is edited by M. Hayduck in XXII 2 of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin 1904).


<sup>57</sup> William's translation was edited by Torraca and included with his edition of the Greek text. My thesis presents a detailed analysis of his usage. The major source for William's life and work is M. Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke, O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele* (Rome 1946).

cannot have been coincidence. Within *b*, *Γ* seems affiliated with *b*<sub>1</sub>: e.g. ἡ πρώτη at 698<sup>b</sup>1, πάντων at 700<sup>a</sup>1, καὶ γὰρ αἱ at 700<sup>b</sup>14, εἶναι om. at 701<sup>a</sup>21 — though since all of these but the first are also *a* readings, this could show further contamination. At 698<sup>b</sup>21, *Γ* agrees with *b*<sub>2</sub> against *b*<sub>1</sub>. At 703<sup>a</sup>2, only *Γ* and *Δ* have the important εἰν; at 703<sup>a</sup>22, again, only *Γ* and *Δ* point to the correct reading, ἐλκτική. At 698<sup>b</sup>25, *Γ* is alone in the error *Circius*. It is not possible to tell whether *E* or *Y* is the source of the *Γ* contamination.

#### LEONICUS (*Δ*)<sup>58</sup>

Leonicus' translation may have been made consulting more than one manuscript; in any case the tradition it indicates is eclectic, and of little weight. It shows agreement with *a* at 698<sup>a</sup>24, 700<sup>b</sup>22, and 703<sup>a</sup>36; with *Y* in particular at 698<sup>b</sup>25, and possibly 704<sup>a</sup>1, though the reading ὑπάρχειν is shared by *N*. Its readings agree with *b* at, e.g., 699<sup>a</sup>15; *b*<sub>2</sub> in particular at, e.g., 698<sup>b</sup>1, 700<sup>a</sup>23–24, 701<sup>a</sup>21.

#### STEMMA



### III. THE APPARATUS

To review what I have remarked in the preceding discussion about my procedure in setting out the apparatus: I have chosen to include

<sup>58</sup> Nicolaus Leonicus Thomaeus (ca. 1456–ca. 1533) is the author of the Latin translation of the *MA* printed in vol. III of the Berlin Aristotle (1831) 342<sup>a</sup>–45<sup>b</sup>.

all the readings of the following manuscripts: EYSO<sup>d</sup>H<sup>a</sup>XL. For the numerous passages where EY agree, the symbol *a* is used; for agreement among SO<sup>d</sup>XH<sup>a</sup>LPN, the symbol *b* is used. The symbol *b*<sub>1</sub> represents agreement of SO<sup>d</sup>. Were O<sup>d</sup> not so severely damaged, the readings of S might have been omitted, and O<sup>d</sup> collated alone. The readings of XH<sup>a</sup>L are all included because each is a worthy manuscript, none too burdened with peculiar error, and because it would have been arbitrary to select one above the others as representative of what I call the *b*<sub>2</sub> group. The symbol *b*<sub>2</sub> is used for brevity and convenience; it should not be allowed to mislead the reader concerning the stemma. It can be seen that the later manuscripts N and P descend at different removes from a source which also eventually provides the source for the *b*<sub>2</sub> manuscripts. For the sake of economy I have not given any particular names to these intermediary sources.

N and V are mentioned in the apparatus where their readings help establish that of their source. Their numerous errors are omitted. With P I have followed a similar procedure, but have of course retained all those readings which might possibly give evidence of value concerning P's independent source.

My choice of readings and my criteria for inclusion of variants in the apparatus differ significantly from those of Louis; I assume his will be the text against which most readers will check this apparatus. I therefore present a full positive apparatus; in every case the first reading cited will be the reading I admit.

#### SIGLA

E = cod. Par. gr. 1853, s. x.

E<sup>2</sup> = quae in eodem codice manu altera (s. x) addita vel correctae leguntur.

H<sup>a</sup> = cod. Marc. gr. Z 214, s. xiii-xiv.

L = cod. Vat. gr. 253, s. xiv in.

O<sup>d</sup> = cod. Marc. gr. Z 209, s. xii-xiii.

S = cod. Laur. Plut. 81, 1, s. xii-xiii.

X = cod. Ambr. H 50 sup., s. xii-xiii.

Y = cod. Vat. gr. 261, s. xiii-xiv.

Raro citantur N = cod. Vat. gr. 258, s. xiv. in.

P = cod. Vat. gr. 1339, s. xiv.

V = cod. Vat. gr. 266, s. xiv.

V<sup>2</sup> = quae in eodem codice manu recentiore correctae leguntur.

$a$  = EY

$b$  = O<sup>d</sup>SXH<sup>a</sup>LPN

$b_1$  = O<sup>d</sup>S

$b_2$  = XH<sup>a</sup>L

$M^c$  = Michaelis citationes

$M^1$  = Michaelis lemmata

$M^p$  = Michaelis paraphrasis

$\Gamma$  = Guilhelmi Moerbekensis translatio

$\Delta$  = Nicolai Leonici translatio

A.M. = Alberti Magni paraphrasis

Fq. = Farquharson

Düring = I. Düring, *Gnomon* 31 (1959), 415-418.

MorauX = P. MorauX, *AntCl* 28 (1959), 363-366.

Platt = A. Platt, *JP* 32 (1912-1913), 295.

Wilson = J. Cook Wilson, *JP* 32 (1912-1913), 137-165.

Title περι ζώων κινήσεως] περι τῆς τῶν ζώων κινήσεως  $b_1$ : περι ζώων κινήσεως  
 πρώτων N: de causa motus animalium  $\Gamma$  698<sup>a</sup>1 κινήσεως τῆς τῶν ζώων] τῆς τῶν  
 ζώων κινήσεως  $b_1$  || τῆς om.  $b_2$ PN || αὐτῶν περι ἑκαστον] περι ἑκαστον αὐτῶν  $bM^1$   
 3 αὐτοῖς] αὐτῶν L 6 ζώων] ζώντων S 10 περ om. Y 11 τίς] τί YV || τῷ λόγῳ  
 καθόλου  $ab_1$ N καθόλου τῷ λόγῳ  $b_2\Gamma$ A.M. καθόλου om.  $PM^1$  12 τῶν post καὶ  
 om.  $b_1$  || τῶν αἰσθητῶν] ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν  $b_2\Gamma$  16 οὖν om.  $b$  17 εἰσὶν om. XN 19 ᾧ ἡ]  
 ᾧ ἐστὶν ἡ  $b_2$ PN 22 εἰ τῆς] εἰ τις H<sup>a</sup> 23 ἡ μὲν  $\Delta\Delta$  scripsi: ἡ μὲν  $\Delta$  καὶ  $\Delta$  EV $b_2$   
 PNM<sup>c</sup>: ἡ μὲν  $\Delta$  καὶ ἡ  $\Delta$  E<sup>2</sup>Y $b_1$  || μένοι] μένει S 24 ἡ  $\Delta\Gamma$   $aM^p\Delta$ : ἡ  $\Delta$  καὶ  $\Gamma$   $b\Gamma$ :  
 ἡ  $\Delta\Delta\Gamma$  Wilson 24  $\Gamma$ —25 εἶναι om. E, suppl. E<sup>2</sup> 25 τὸ ante κέντρον om. Y 26  
 κινεῖται P $\Delta$ : κινεῖσθαι cett. 698<sup>b</sup>1 ἀεὶ om.  $b_2\Delta$  || ἡ πρὸς  $\delta$   $a$ : ἡ πρὸς  $\omega$  P: ἡ πρὸς  $\tau\omega$  N:  
 ἡ πρώτη  $b_1$  V<sup>2</sup> $\Gamma$ : om.  $b_2\Delta$  || ἡ] ἡ  $a$  || ἡ ἀρχὴ om. P 4 τὸ γόνυ] τοῦ γόνυ E 5 αὐτῷ  
 $b_2\Gamma$ : αὐτῷ  $b_1$  YVN: αὐτῷ E: αὐτοῖς P 6 ἔσται] ἐστὶ  $a\Delta$ : ἔστι  $b_1$  8 αὐτῷ] αὐτοῖς P  
 9 ἔξωθεν] ἔξω E 13 μέλλει] μέλλοι O<sup>d</sup> 14 τι om. Eb $_2$ N 15 ὑποδώσει] ὑπενδώσει  
 Y: ὑπενδώσει E<sup>2</sup>: εἰ ποδώσει S 16 μυσι(ν) YV $bM^p\Gamma$ : ποσὶ E, Platt: ἐμύσι Diels || μυσι  
 ante τοῖς] μυσὶν ante ἡ, τοῖς om. YV $b_1$  || τῇ ante γῇ om.  $b_2$  || πορευομένοις post ἄμμω]  
 post γῇ  $b_1$ , utrobique Y || πηλῷ scripsi: τῇ γῇ libri τῇ ζειᾷ Fq. || ἐν τῇ γῇ secl. Platt  
 || τῇ ἄμμω] τοῖς ἄμμω O<sup>d</sup> 17 πρόεισιν] πρόισιν E 18 νεύσις] πλεύσις  $a$  || ἀντερείδοι]  
 ἀντερείδει O<sup>d</sup> $b_2$ N 19 τοῦτο ἕτερον εἶναι] ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο  $b_2$ PN 20 μόριον  
 μηδὲν εἶναι] μηδὲν εἶναι μόριον M<sup>c</sup> 21 ποτε om.  $b_2\Gamma$  23 προσβάλλων] προσβάλλον  
 $b_1$  || ἐν] ἐπ'  $ab_1$  || τις ὦν om.  $b_2$  24 οὐδ' Jaeger  $\Delta$  secutus: οὐτ' libri 25 Τίτυος]  
 Κίρκιος Torracca  $\Gamma$  secutus || οὐθ'] οὐδ' S || πνέων] πνέωσιν YV || τύχοι] τύχοι τις  
 Y $\Delta$ : τύχη XP 26 πνέων] πλέων VS || ὄνπερ] ὥσπερ  $b_2$ : ὄν P 27 αὐτοῦ  
 O<sup>d</sup>H<sup>a</sup>LN $\Delta$ : αὐτοῦ EYSXPM<sup>p</sup> $\Gamma$ A.M. 699<sup>a</sup>2 τὸ ῥιπτούμενον ἢ ὠθούμενον] τὸ  
 ὠθούμενον ἢ ῥιπτούμενον  $b_2$  3 αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ E || ἀπεριεδόμενον] ἀποδιδόμενον X  
 5 τῶν] τὸ S 9 καὶ om. EX || ἀποστηρίζεται] ἀποστηρίζεται μένειν X 10 ὠθῶν ἡ  
 ἔλκων] ἔλκων ἡ ὠθῶν  $b_1$  13 τε δεῖ ἀκ. καὶ τοῦτο, <καὶ> Fq.: τε δεῖ ἀκ. τοῦτο, καὶ  
 Forster: τε δεῖ ἀκ. καὶ τοῦτο  $a$ : θέλει ἀκ. καὶ τοῦτο  $bM^1\Gamma$  14 αὐτόν] αὐτὸ  $a$  15  
 θιγγάνον κινεῖν  $b\Gamma\Delta$ : θιγγάνειν  $a$  17 ἔσεσθαι libri,  $\Gamma$ : ἔσται  $\Delta$  19 μόριον]  
 μέρος  $b_1$  || ἄν om.  $b\Gamma$  20 πόλους] πολλοὺς  $b_1$  23 καὶ om. S 26 καὶ om.  $b_1$ P,



Platt || αὐτῶν αὐτῶν Platt 30 τοῦτο] τοῦτον S || συμβαίνει αΓ: συμβαίνει b || κατὰ λόγον] καὶ κατὰ λόγον P 35 καὶ ante καθ' om. a 699<sup>b2</sup> ἐστὶν ἕτερον] ἕτερόν ἐστὶ b<sub>1</sub>P 3 δεῖ om. b || τυγχάνει] τυγχάνη S 4 μέσου] μένειν L 6 ἢ om. b<sub>1</sub> 7 καὶ τῆς b<sub>1</sub>LH<sup>a</sup>PM<sup>p</sup>: καὶ ἡ YVN: καὶ ἡ τῆς X: καὶ αἱ E || καὶ τῆς——8 δέ] ἡ τοῦ κινουμένου <καὶ κινούντος τῆς τοῦ κινουμένου> μὲν μὴ κινούντος δέ Fq. 9 ὁ τε πᾶς οὐρανός] πᾶς ὁ οὐρανός H<sup>a</sup> 13 ὡς om. a 14 ὑπερβάλλη] υπερβάλλη L 16 αὐτῇ] αὐτῇ S, O<sup>d</sup> incertum 19 ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι αN: φαμεν ἀδύνατον b<sub>2</sub>: εἶναι om. b<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>P || ἐπὶ τῆς] ἐπὶ τοὺς S 22 μὲν] γάρ S || ἐξ ἀνάγκης [εἶναι] Bonitz 25 ὑπερέχουσαι M<sup>c</sup>: ὑπερβάλλουσαι P: αἱ ὑπερέχουσαι YVb<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>N: αἱ περιέχουσαι E 26 ὑπ'] ἀπ' E 28 μὴδὲ] μὴδὲν P || εἶναι om. P 29 τί γὰρ κωλύει τοῦτο] τοῦτο γὰρ τί κωλύει H<sup>a</sup> 31 ἔστω] ἔσται b<sub>1</sub> 32 δεῖ] καὶ δεῖ V: δεῖ καὶ Y || τι ἀκίνητον bΓM<sup>1</sup>: ἀκίνητόν τι a || αἰ ante ἀκίνητον add. L 37 ἐρύσαιτ'] ἐρύσεται E: ἐρύσετε b<sub>1</sub> 700<sup>a1</sup> πάντων ab<sub>1</sub>ΓA.M.: μῆστορα πάντων PN: μῆστωρα b<sub>2</sub>A, ex Il. Θ 22 (versus 21.22.20 transp. Aristoteles) || μάλα πολλὰ κάμοιτε] μάλλα πολλὰ κάκάμοιτε S 2 ἐξάπτεσθε] ἐξάπτοισθε X: ἐξάπτεσθαι E 4 λύεται] δύεται aliquo invenit M 7–10 recte distinxit Düring 8 αὐτὰ om. E || αὐτῶν b<sub>2</sub>N: αὐτοῖς P: αὐτοῦ ab<sub>1</sub>Γ 11 θάτερον] θατέρω X 12 ἐαυτοῖς] αὐτοῖς PO<sup>d</sup>: αὐτοῖς S 13 τῶν] τὸν E 15 ἀλλ' ab<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>NM<sup>c</sup>MP: ἀλλὰ P: ἀλλ' Bekker, codd. ESY falso transcriptis || πρώτων corr. e πρώτα S 20 πρώτως] πρώτον b<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>N || ἄδῃλον] εὐδῃλον S 24 ποιοῦσιν οἱ πτύοντες] οἱ πτύοντες ποιοῦσι O<sup>d</sup> || καὶ βήττοντες] καὶ οἱ βήσσοντες b<sub>2</sub>P καὶ οἱ βύσσοντες N 25 καὶ ἐκπνέοντες] καὶ οἱ ἐκπνέοντες b<sub>1</sub> 26 αὐτῷ αὐτό b<sub>2</sub>, em. Jaeg. suo ingenio: αὐτὸ αὐτό EVO<sup>d</sup>PN: αὐτὸ S: αὐτό YM<sup>1</sup> || τι ante κινούντι add. b<sub>2</sub> 27 δεῖ τι μένει] δεῖ μένειν H<sup>a</sup>: δεῖ τι ἐπιμένειν V: δέ ἐπιμένειν E || καὶ om. a || αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ EYP || αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ Y 28 καὶ αὐξανομένῳ] καὶ ἐν αὐξανομένῳ b<sub>1</sub> 29 περ om. b<sub>2</sub> || πρώτη κίνησις ab<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>ΓA: πρώτην κίνησιν PM<sup>c</sup> 30 αὕτη αἰτία ἂν εἴη] αὕτη ἂν εἴη αἰτία H<sup>a</sup>L, corr. X || δὴ Fq.: δέ ab<sub>1</sub> H<sup>a</sup>XN: om. LP 33 εἴ ποτε γίνεται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ αἴτιον, καὶ punct. Fq.: γίνεται, αὐτὸ αὐτῷ αἴτιον, καὶ cett. || γίνεται] γίνηται P. γέννηται b<sub>2</sub>N || αὐτὸ αὐτῷ] αὐτῷ αὐτῷ EY || καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως.] καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως; Platt, Louis 34 ἀνάγκη. αἱ δέ] ἀνάγκη, αἱ δὲ Platt, Louis || καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις om. b<sub>2</sub> 35 ἄλλου] ἄλλων Y 700<sup>b1</sup> αὐτῷ] αὐτῷ EX 3 ἐστὶν om. b<sub>2</sub>PN 4 εἴτε μὴ] ἢ μὴ P 7 δέ] μὲν Y 8 πῶς κινεῖ] πῶς κινεῖται XL 9 λοιπόν] λοιπὸν δ' a 10 κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα] τὸ σῶμα κινεῖ O<sup>d</sup> || τίς ἀρχή] τίς ἡ ἀρχή P 11 ὅλου] λόγου a 13 προσκόπτειν] μὴ προσκόπτειν X 14 καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ Eb<sub>2</sub>N: καὶ γὰρ αἱ YVb<sub>1</sub>PG 15 ἔνεκα] ἔνεσται S 16 αὐτοῖς πάσης] πάσης αὐτοῖς b<sub>1</sub>: αὐτῆς πάσης L: αὐτοῦ πᾶσι P || τῆς om. b<sub>2</sub> || καὶ ante τῆς add. S 17 διάνοιαν καὶ] διάνοιαν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ b<sub>2</sub> 18 βούλησιν] βουλὴν b<sub>2</sub>N || βούλησιν καὶ] βουλὴν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ b<sub>2</sub>N 20 ἔχουσιν] ἔχει b<sub>2</sub>PN 21 διαφέρουσι] διαφέρει b<sub>2</sub>PN || δέ om. H<sup>a</sup> 22 ὀρεξίς αA: ὀρέξεις b 23–4 ὥστε κινεῖ πρώτον τὸ ὀρεκτόν καὶ διανοητόν P: quare movet primum quod appetibile et quod intellectuale Γ: ὥστε καὶ τὸ διανοητόν b<sub>1</sub>: ὥστε καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν b<sub>2</sub>NΛA.M. (τὸ om. N) || προαιρετόν ante ἀλλὰ add. b<sub>2</sub>NΛA.M. || ἔσται καὶ τι διανοητόν προαιρετόν οὐ πᾶν διανοητόν προαιρετόν M<sup>p</sup> 25 διὸ τῷ] διὸ YVb<sub>1</sub>P 28 ἀγαθοῦ——29 ἀγαθόν om. a 29 ἐστὶν om. b<sub>2</sub> 30 ὅτι] ὡς M<sup>1</sup> 31 ἢ] ἢ ὡς b<sub>2</sub>N 32 τὸ Fq. τὰ libri 33 ἀληθῶς καὶ πρώτως ab<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>NG: ἀληθῆς καὶ τὸ πρώτως P 35 πρὸς ἕτερον PG: πρότερον ab<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>M<sup>c</sup>N: τι post πρότερον suppl. Jaeger A secutus 701<sup>a2</sup> καὶ ὅτι] διότι b<sub>2</sub>PN 3 κινήσεων scripsi: κινουμένων P: γινομένων cett. || γινομένοις] κινουμένοις Jaeg. 7 νοῶν] νῦν a 8 κινεῖται] ὅτε μὲν κινεῖται H<sup>a</sup> 12 ἢ om. Yb<sub>2</sub>MP 13 ὅταν νοήσῃ om. b<sub>2</sub> 14 βαδίζει] αὐτὸς βαδίζει O<sup>d</sup> || βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ] βυδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ νῦν b<sub>2</sub> 17 οἰκία δ' ἀγαθόν] ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς] οἰκία δὲ ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν] οἰκίαν εὐθύς S 19 ἰμάτιον ποιητέον] ἰμάτιον ποιεῖ ab<sub>1</sub> 21 εἶναι om. ab<sub>1</sub>Γ 22 τόδε, τόδε καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς] τόδε καὶ τόδε πράττει εὐθύς a: hoc et hoc, et hoc operatur statim Γ, sim.

1 24 διὰ post καὶ om. Vb<sub>2</sub>PN 26 ἐφιστάσα] ἐφεστῶσα Y 28 μὴ λογισάμενοι] μὴ συλλογισάμενοι LH<sup>a</sup>: συλλογισάμενοι X 29 ἐνεργήσῃ γὰρ] γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ PN 32 ποτέον YH<sup>a</sup>L: ποτόν Vb<sub>1</sub>XPNI: ποντόν E 36 ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως] ἢ φαντασίας ἢ νοήσεως b<sub>2</sub> 37 τὰ μὲν——I βούλησιν om. H<sup>a</sup> 701<sup>b</sup>I ὄρεξιν ἢ seclusi 2 γενομένης ab<sub>1</sub>: γινομένης b<sub>2</sub>PM<sup>1</sup> 3 κρουόντων ἄλληλα τῶν ξύλων scripsi: κρουόντων ἄλλῃλας τὰς στρέβλας codd.: κρουουσῶν ἄλλῃλας, secl. τὰς στρέβλας Forster, 1 secutus: κρουόντων ἄλληλα, secl. τὰς στρέβλας Torraca || λυομένων τῶν ξύλων καὶ κρουόντων ἄλλῃλας τὰς στρέβλας Fq. 4 ὁ γὰρ ὀχούμενος Fq., Richards, Ross, ὥσπερ ὀχούμενος b<sub>1</sub>: ὅπερ ὀχούμενον ab<sub>2</sub>NI<sup>m</sup>: ὥσπερ ὀχούμενον P 9 λυομένων] συσσελλομένων Fq. 10 κινούνται] κινεῖται VS 11 τοῖς om. XH<sup>a</sup> 13 ἐκινεῖτο om. X || τὸ αὐτὸ] ταῦτό P. τὸ αὐτῷ E: τὸ αὐτό e τῷ αὐτῷ corr. Y || μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον] ἔλαττον καὶ μεῖζον b<sub>1</sub> 15 συσσελλομένων] συσσελλόμενον S || καὶ πάλιν συσσελλομένων διὰ] καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ aΓ 16 αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις] αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι XH<sup>a</sup> 19 ἔχουσι] ἔχει b<sub>2</sub>N 20 θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ seclusi 21 ὄν om. b 22 καὶ post διὸ om. b<sub>2</sub>P || μόνον om. a 26 ποιεῖ] ποιεῖ τὰς b<sub>1</sub> 27 ἢ om. b<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>N || πρώρας] ὥρας X 30 εἰ καὶ b<sub>2</sub>NA: καὶ cett. || ἐν ταύτῃ] ἐκ ταύτης Platt || ἐν post μέγεθος om. E || ἐν ἀναισθητῷ μορίῳ] in sensibili parte Γ 34 διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτὸν] φευκτὸν καὶ διωκτὸν H<sup>a</sup> 35 νοήσαι] κινήσει b<sub>2</sub> 36 ἀλλὰ——συμβαίνειον post θερμότητος 702<sup>a</sup>I recte transp. Moraux || λανθάνει] λῖαν λανθάνει 1: λῖαν μανθάνει N 702<sup>a</sup>3 λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα] καὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ H<sup>a</sup> 9 ἐξ ὕγρων] ἐκ ξηρῶν b<sub>2</sub> 11 ἐπὶ b<sub>1</sub>M<sup>p</sup> 13 ὅταν b<sub>2</sub>PN 14 ἀπολίπη] ἀπολείπη ELN, corr. VX: ἀπολείπει M<sup>p</sup> 18 ἐπιτηδεύς τὰ πάθη] καὶ ἐπιτηδεύς τὰ πάθη S (O<sup>a</sup> incertum): τὰ πάθη ἐπιτηδεύς P || διὰ τὸ τὸ b<sub>2</sub>N, em. suo ingenio Bz.: διὰ τὸ cett. 21 ἀνάγκη om. X 22 τοῦ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ YV: μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ E: μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχὴ bΓM<sup>p</sup> 23 μὲν] πᾶν Y 27 ὄν om. S 29 κινεῖται] κινεῖται καὶ κινεῖ P: κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ΓA.M. || ἀνάγκη] ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη b<sub>1</sub> || τι] τινα E 30 δὴ om. b<sub>1</sub> 31 ὁ om. aO<sup>a</sup>b<sub>2</sub> 32 ἢ post ψυχῆς om. a 33 ἔχειν τι om. X. || ἔχει Y 34 κινοῖ τις Fq. κινοῖ τὴν codd. 702<sup>b</sup>I καὶ post μὴ om. EY 2 ἐνεστιν] ἐστιν P 3 χειρὶ] ἀρχῇ PM<sup>1</sup> 9 ἢ ἀρχὴ——10 χειρὶ om. S, add marg. sup. 10 ἀνωτέρω] ἀνωτέρα L 13 τῷ] τῷ αἰεὶ ΓM<sup>p</sup> 14 μὴδ' αὖ τῷ O<sup>a</sup>b<sub>2</sub>PM<sup>c</sup>AA.M. μὴδ' αὐτῷ aS 15 ἢ om. EY corr. V 17 τὰς] ταύτας τὰς Platt 18 καὶ κάτω om. Γ, secl. Fq., Torraca, sed habent Alex. Aphr. DA 96, 26–7, Themistius In DA 121, 9 19 καὶ πρὸς X (Fq. suo ingenio): καὶ N (Forster s.i.): πρὸς cett. || τὰς bM<sup>c</sup>Γ: τὰ a 21 ἐνταῦθα εἶναι φαμεν] εἶναι φαμεν ἐνταῦθα b<sub>1</sub> διὰ om. O<sup>a</sup> 23 συμμεταβάλλει] συμμεταβάλλειν EY 29 μέλλει] μέλλοι Yb<sub>1</sub> 30 κινεῖσθαι] κινήσεσθαι Yb<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub> || κινεῖν] ἡρεμεῖν N || ἐν ἄρα δυνάμει ὄν] ἄρα δυνάμει ἐν YS || ὄν τὸ A aP: ὄν τὸ B V: ὄντα τὰ AB V<sup>2</sup>b<sub>1</sub>H<sup>a</sup>: ὄντα τὰ AE XLNM<sup>c</sup> 32 ἅμα τῷ B κινεῖσθαι] ἅμα κινεῖσθαι τῷ B b<sub>1</sub>: ἅμα τὸ B κινεῖσθαι H<sup>a</sup> 35 γὰρ om. b<sub>1</sub> 36 ἄλλῃλας] ἄλληλα b<sub>2</sub> || κινουμένων secl. Platt 703<sup>a</sup>2 ἐν εἶναι ΓA.M.: εἶναι codd.: ἀκίνητον εἶναι Jaeg. 4 αἰτίαν τῆς om. X 5 ἢ om. S 7 μὲν om. b<sub>1</sub>M<sup>1</sup> 10 πνεῦμα] πνεύμονα S 18 ἔχον] ἔχειν b<sub>2</sub>: om. N 22 ἀβίαστος] ἀβιάστως Fq. || συσσελλομένη <τε καὶ ἐκτεινομένη> Fq., coll. Mich. In PA 88, 35. Cf. et M<sup>p</sup> ad loc. (128, 5–6). Them. In DA 121, 14. || ἐλκτική Fq., tractiva Γ, attractiva 1: βιαστική codd. 25 κρατεῖ] κρατεῖται b<sub>1</sub> 31 στῇ ab<sub>1</sub>b<sub>2</sub>N: συστῇ PA 32 τῶν γινομένων] τῷ γινομένῳ L 33 αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ E 35 τῷ] τὸ Vb<sub>1</sub>P ἕκαστον] ἕκαστον <τῶν> Fq. 36 αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ E 37 ψυχὴν] τὴν ψυχὴν N 703<sup>b</sup>I αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν E: αὐτοῦ P 3 ἐκουσίους] ἐκουσίας X 4 κινεῖται δέ τινες καὶ ἀκουσίους] τινες δὲ καὶ ἀκουσίους κινεῖται b<sub>2</sub>PN 5 οὐχ om. EYV, corr. V<sup>2</sup> 7 πολλάκις γὰρ φανέντος] φανέντος γὰρ πολλάκις XLPN 8 ἐκουσίους] ἐκουσίως E 9 καὶ ante ἀναπνοήν om. b<sub>2</sub>N 10 ἀπλῶς om. b<sub>2</sub> 13 ὥστ' ὥστε μὴ a 15 θερμότητές τε καὶ ψύξεις] θερμότητες καὶ ψύξεις E: θερμότης καὶ ψύξις N || αἱ ante ἐντός om.

$b_1H^a$  16 δῆ] δέ  $b_2$  19-20 προσφέρουσι] προφέρει (utroque)  $b_2$  22 τούτου—  
 23 ζωτικὴν recte secl. Jaeg. 22 τούτου] τοῦτο YVS || ἔχουσιν] ἔχει  $b_2PN$  24 γὰρ  
 om.  $a$  28 ἀλλήλας] ἀλλήλα P: ἀλλήλα δέ S (O<sup>a</sup>incert)  $b_2N$  34 τῷ] τὸ δέ  $b_1$ :  
 τὸ δ'  $b_2N$  36 ὅτι] ἔτι  $aA$  || ταῦτά: Jaeger: τὰ αὐτά P eadem Γ: ταῦτα  $ab_1b_2M^1$   
 37 οὐ] οὐ  $EA$  || τὸ om. E || αἰτιον] αἰτιον δέ Y 704<sup>a</sup>1 ἐνυπάρχειν] ὑπάρχειν  $YN\Lambda$   
 2 κοινῆς om. Y 704<sup>b</sup>2 εἰρήκαμεν τὰς αἰτίας] εἴρηται  $b_2PN$  || δέ] δέ καὶ  $b_2P$


## IV. SELECTED TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

I. 698<sup>a</sup> 21-24:

καμπτομένου δὲ καὶ κινουμένου τὸ μὲν κινεῖται ση-  
 μείον τὸ δὲ μένει τῶν ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τῆς  
 διαμέτρου ἢ μὲν  $AD$  μένοι, ἢ δὲ  $B$  κινοῖτο, καὶ  
 γίνοιτο ἢ  $AG$ .

23 ἢ μὲν  $AD$  scripsi: ἢ μὲν  $A$  καὶ  $\Delta$   $EVB_2PNM^o$ : ἢ μὲν  $A$  καὶ ἢ  $\Delta$   
 $E^2Yb_1$  24 ἢ  $AG$   $aM^pA$ : ἢ  $A$  καὶ  $\Gamma$   $b\Gamma$ : ἢ  $\Delta AG$  Wilson

Having already invoked a mathematical model for joints by speaking of the "center" and the "points" in the joints (see *IA* 9), Aristotle now elaborates the model using a diagram like the one reproduced for us in Michael of Ephesos:



The sense of the passage is clear. DAB is the diameter, representing an unbent limb; A is the "center" which represents the joint, DAC an angle which represents the bent limb after the rotation of the lower segment AB around A. J. Cook Wilson<sup>59</sup> proposes the emendation καὶ γίνοιτο ἢ  $\Delta AG$  (accepted by Farquharson), in order that the contrast between the straight and bent limb be more graphically made. He argues further that what "becomes" (γίνοιτο) can only be the whole segment, which is changing from straight to bent. This seems an unnecessary suggestion. The limb *becomes* bent because the movement is such that a new segment, AC, comes to be *simpliciter*. (Louis' "que AC en résultait" is good.)

<sup>59</sup> J. Cook Wilson, "Difficulties in the Text of Aristotle," *JP* 32 (1912-1913) 137-138.

A much more serious problem has until now remained unnoticed. This is that in the *textus receptus* (ἡ μὲν *A* καὶ ἡ *Δ* μένοι, ἡ δὲ *B* κινοῖτο) points are designated by feminine articles. This is a usage unparalleled in Aristotle, and does not even accord with his practice in *MA* 9 and 11. στιγμὴ could, of course, be supplied rather than the more usual σημείον, but σημείον is the word used in this context, so we are given no reason for such an anomalous usage. Now EV<sub>b</sub>PN, as well as M<sup>c</sup>, read ἡ μὲν *A* καὶ *Δ* in 1.23, and, in 24, all *b* and *Γ* have γίνονται ἡ *A* καὶ *Γ*. The καί presumably arose from a misreading of one of the symbols designating a point. If we assume that a parallel corruption has taken place in both lines, we can restore ἡ μὲν *ΑΔ*, a usual Aristotelian expression for a segment. ἡ δὲ *B* would then be not a designation of the point, but elliptical for the whole segment *AB*, i.e. ἡ ἐφ' ἧς κεῖται τὸ *B*. (See Michael 105.3: ἡ δὲ *B* κινοῖτο, τούτεστιν ἡ δὲ *AB* κινοῖτο.) Such ellipses are fairly common: see Bz. 109<sup>b</sup>60–110<sup>a</sup>30,<sup>60</sup> and esp. *Ph.* 258<sup>a</sup>25–30. Note that EV among the *a* family MSS share the reading of *b*<sub>2</sub>PN at 23, and we may suppose the ἡ μὲν *A* καὶ ἡ *Δ* of Yb<sub>1</sub> arose from an attempted correction of this reading.

## 2. 698<sup>b</sup>12–18

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν

αὐτῷ δεῖ τι ἀκίνητον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει κινεῖσθαι, οὕτως ἔτι  
 μᾶλλον ἔξω δεῖ τι εἶναι τοῦ ζώου ἀκίνητον, πρὸς δ' ἀπερει-  
 δόμενον κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ γὰρ ὑποδώσει αἰί, οἷον τοῖς 15  
 μουσὶ τοῖς ἐν πηλῷ ἢ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἄμμῳ πορευομένοις, οὐ  
 πρόεσιν, οὐδ' ἔσται οὔτε πορεία, εἰ μὴ ἡ γῆ μένοι, οὔτε πτη-  
 σις ἢ νεῦσις, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ ἡ θάλαττα ἀντερείδοι.

16 μουσῖ(ν) YVbM<sup>p</sup>ΓA: ποσὶ E, Platt: ἐμυσὶ Diels μυσὶν ante ἡ, τοῖς om. YVb<sub>1</sub> τῇ  
 ante γῇ om. *b*<sub>2</sub> πορευομένοις post γῇ *b*<sub>1</sub>, utrobique Y πηλῷ scripsi: τῇ γῇ libri:  
 τῇ ζειᾷ Fq. ἐν τῇ γῇ secl. Platt

The passage, as it appears in the manuscripts, is corrupt; there have been numerous transpositions and attempts at repair. The sense required is clear: if the medium offers no stable resistance, one cannot move forward. We must ask now (1) what is the sense of the first alternative? and (2) is the subject of the participle πορευομένοις to be construed as μουσί, or “people,” to be supplied? Men walking on sand would provide an appropriate illustration. Mice on earth would not; and γῇ alone can hardly suffice to designate loose earth. Farqu-

<sup>60</sup> This is the standard abbreviation for H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin 1870, repr. Graz 1955).



harson's suggestion ἐν τῇ ζειᾷ (Forster suggests ζέη from the Petrie Papyrus, third century B.C., but the Farquharson form is the one used by Theophrastus) is clever, and accords well with the similar example given by Michael in his commentary on the *IA* (138, 14-18), but must be rejected. ζειᾷ, in its everyday use designating animal fodder, occurs invariably in the plural (Hom. *Od.* 4.4, Hdt. 2.36, etc.). Its only attested use in the singular is a technical name for a species of grain (Theophr. *H.P.* 8.9.2). The plural seems paleographically too unlikely.

Diels' suggested emendation of μωί to ἐμύωι (reported by Jaeger, who accepts it) at first seems a plausible solution. Outside of the works of Aristotle, *LSJ* cites no references to these freshwater tortoises, which would explain scribal confusion. But they were the subject of extensive observation by Aristotle: cf. *Resp.* 470<sup>b</sup>17-18, 475<sup>b</sup>28; *HA* 506<sup>a</sup>19, 558<sup>a</sup>8-11, 589<sup>a</sup>28, 29, 600<sup>b</sup>22; *PA* 654<sup>a</sup>8, 671<sup>a</sup>31, 35; *IA* 713<sup>a</sup>17. The picture Diels wants us to have, presumably, is that, as they come out of the water with wet feet, they slip about on the land. But this does not illustrate Aristotle's point that the resisting surface itself is slipping away beneath the animal. Perhaps, however, Diels means to refer us to *IA* 713<sup>a</sup>17f, where the ἐμύς is mentioned as one of the creatures which live in holes and have their legs attached obliquely for ease in creeping into these. Perhaps Aristotle is thinking of the tortoise slipping as it crawls into a muddy hole, the earth being wet and therefore unstable. There is no clue to this elsewhere in Aristotle; but the emendation remains a possibility.

A. Platt proposes to read ποωί with E and to delete entirely the troublesome ἐν τῇ γῇ ἦ. This gives an adequate sense, but gives us no way of accounting for the tradition as we have it. ποωί is certainly a scribal emendation.

All previous conjectures and *aporiai* share the assumption that μῦς always means "mouse." This assumption has blocked the way to real progress. G. E. L. Owen has pointed out<sup>61</sup> that μῦς, in Aristotle's biological works, is frequently used as the name of a class of shellfish, a type, apparently, of mussel (see Bz. s.v.). Aristotle refers to these μύες seven times as against twenty-seven references to μύες = mice. The word, when used of shellfish, need not be qualified by any adjective; it is not a derivative or metaphorical appellation. On their notion, cf. *HA* 528<sup>a</sup>30ff, which clearly suggests that all "unattached" testaceans were considered self-movers.

<sup>61</sup> In discussion with me.

I think we can use the excellent suggestion that *μῦες* are mollusks, if we concede that the text of ἐν τῇ γῇ is corrupt. The emendation ἐν πηλῷ seems plausible. A subclass of the shellfish *μῦες* are apparently called the *πηλώδεις* (*HA* 547<sup>b</sup>27: the reading is disputed, but is defended by Schneider and Bussemaker on the authority of William's translation). For a similar coupling of mud and sand in a discussion of the behavior of shellfish, see *HA* 599<sup>b</sup>26f: φωλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἄμμῳ τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ πηλῷ. Mud and sand are the two examples of unstable media for walking that would most readily come to mind. Shellfish walk on both with difficulty, and Aristotle's protracted and original observations of their habits to make them a favorite source of illustrative examples. The corruption, which must have been a very early one, may be explained by some damage in an uncial manuscript which made -λῷ illegible; *ΠΗ* easily became corrupted to *ΘΗ* by analogy to τῇ ἄμμῳ, and γῇ was supplied as the usual walking-place of *μῦες*-mice, and a feminine noun of the right length. The corrector, as one would expect, failed to see that shellfish, not mice, might be in question. Alternately, the γῇ in 1.17 might have been the source of the corruption.

### 3. 699<sup>a</sup>12-14:

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, ἄρ' εἴ τι κινεῖ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν,  
εἶναί τε δεῖ ἀκίνητον καὶ τοῦτο, <καὶ> μῆθ' ἐῖναι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μόριον  
μῆδ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ.

13 τε δεῖ ἄκ. καὶ τοῦτο, <καὶ> Fq.: τε δεῖ ἄκ. τοῦτο, καὶ Forster: τε δεῖ ἄκ. καὶ τοῦτο  
a: θέλει ἄκ. καὶ τοῦτο bM<sup>1</sup>Γ

The text of *a* (εἶναί τε δεῖ ἀκίνητον, καὶ τοῦτο) is retained by Bekker and Louis, but seems intolerably awkward. Manuscripts bM<sup>1</sup>Γ read εἶναι θέλει ἀκίνητον, καὶ τοῦτο, which is retained by Jaeger and Torracca. θέλει does not, however, seem to be sufficiently strong for this passage, which is concerned with the hypothetical *necessity* for heavenly motion. θέλει expresses a tendency or disposition (see *Meteor.* 362<sup>a</sup>30, *MM* 1200<sup>b</sup>16, *Metaph.* 1013<sup>b</sup>27, and many other passages). Bonitz remarks that its sense is just about the same as that of πεφυκέναι. Forster keeps δεῖ but shifts the καὶ to the position after τοῦτο. This is perfectly acceptable, but I prefer the emendation of Farquharson, since the retention of the first καὶ is a useful pointer back to the discussion of animals and the conditions for their motion.

4. 700<sup>a</sup>6-11:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ζώων οὐ μόνον τὸ οὕτως  
 ἀκίνητον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινουμένοις  
 κατὰ τόπον ὅσα κινεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτά (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν  
 ἡρεμεῖν τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι), πρὸς ὃ ἀπερειδόμενον τὸ κινούμενον  
 κινήσεται, οἷον ἂν τι κινή τῶν μορίων· ἀπερείδεται γὰρ θάτερον 10  
 ὥς πρὸς μένον θάτερον.

The correct punctuation for this sentence was suggested by Düring.<sup>62</sup> All previous editors print: ὅσα κινεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτά, δεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖν τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς ὃ ἀπερειδόμενον . . . The problem with this, as Jaeger points out, is that πρὸς ὃ ἀπερειδόμενον cannot refer to the part in motion, but it is hard to make it refer back to τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖν. Jaeger conjectures that this passage comes from another recension of the same section. Torraca cites Jaeger's observations, but blithely denies there is any difficulty ("at locus nulla sententiarum discrepantia laborare mihi videtur"). But in his translation, following the lead of Leonicus, he transposes τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖν and τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι so as to remove the difficulty. Farquharson and Forster do the same, and Louis makes a clarifying use of "sur la première." None of them tries to repair the text.

Düring's suggestion solves the difficulty and makes good sense. The main idea is that there must be something in the animal at rest, supporting itself against which what is moved will move: πρὸς ὃ refers back to (τὸ ἀκίνητον) ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινουμένοις κατὰ τόπον. The parenthesis is added to remind us that when we say there is something at rest in the animal, that is because animals, unlike the heavenly bodies, must have an internal division into moving and moved parts. Having found this admirable solution, Düring, however, still retains αὐτοῦ — which makes sense only if it is taken to refer forward to the singular subject of κινή (τὸ κινούμενον is the moving *part*, not the creature). But with δεῖ . . . κινεῖσθαι as a parenthesis it seems even more important to have a plural here, introduced by τοῖς κινουμένοις. We should accept the αὐτῶν of *b*<sub>2</sub>N, or, possibly, the αὐτοῖς of P.

5. 700<sup>b</sup> 17-23.

ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινουῦντα τὸ ζῶον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ  
 προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα  
 ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ  
 αἰσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικά γὰρ 20

<sup>62</sup> Düring, *Gnomon* (above, n. 8) 417.

πάντα, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν ἄλλοις δια-  
φοράς. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμός καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις,  
ἣ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως·

17 καὶ αἴσθησιν post διάνοιαν add.  $b_2$  18 βούλησιν] βουλὴν  $b_2N$   
καὶ θυμὸν post βουλὴν add.  $b_2$

Torraca follows the lead of X (actually all  $b_2$ ) and includes αἴσθησις and θυμός in this original list: διάνοιαν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. The ensuing discussion makes it clear that this is, indeed, the complete list of faculties Aristotle wishes to discuss. But for that reason it is an easy addition for a scribe to have made; nor could we explain why the words would have disappeared in the course of transmission.<sup>63</sup> It seems more prudent to suppose Aristotle's original list was not fully complete. Having included φαντασία, which presupposes αἴσθησις, he might have been led to omit αἴσθησις pro tempore: compare the similar omission at 701<sup>b</sup>35. And of the two species of irrational desire, θυμός always concerns him less centrally than ἐπιθυμία and is omitted in *Metaph.* 1072<sup>a</sup>27–28 (see below), and *DA* 433<sup>a</sup>22–26.

6. 701<sup>a</sup> 2–6:

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ  
ὅτι εὐλόγως ἡ φορὰ τελευταία τῶν κινήσεων ἐν τοῖς γινο-  
μένοις· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ πορεύεται τὸ ζῶον ὀρέξει ἢ προ-  
αιρέσει, ἀλλοιωθέντος τινὸς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν φαν-  
τασίαν.

3 κινήσεων scripsi: κινουμένων P; γινομένων cett. γινομένοις] κινουμένοις  
Jaeg.

No commentator has made fully satisfactory sense of the φανερόν-sentence and its relation to the following one. Farquharson translates: "Wherefore it is plainly reasonable that motion in place should be the last of what happens in the region of things happening, since..." His note on the passage indicates that he takes φορά to be not just the last thing in the animal, but the last in the cosmos as a whole, since animals are at the end of the chain of cosmic cause and effect. But (1) the reading of ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις to mean in the universe is forced and odd; and (2) if one *does* read it this way, φορά cannot be read as meaning the local motion of animals alone; so the whole sentence will not be true.

<sup>63</sup> P. Moraux, *AntCl* (above, n. 8) 364.



Perhaps his "the region of things happening" is meant to pick out the sublunary sphere, as distinct from the first heavens. But I know no parallel for this, and he would have to argue the point a good deal more fully.

Torraca offers a more plausible sense for *γινόμενοις*: "è l'ultima delle forme di movimento che si producono negli esseri soggetti al divenire." He reads the passage as containing reference to the contrast between ontological and temporal priority with regard to the various sorts of change in animals which Aristotle exploited in Chapter 5: in the universe, he writes, locomotion is prior in both senses to other sorts of change. But in animals, growth and qualitative change are temporally prior. But, though correct, why should this follow *εὐλόγως* from what has preceded in this chapter? And why should Aristotle think the following sentence, beginning *κινεῖται γὰρ* provides support for such a claim?

Jaeger emends *γινόμενοις* to *κινουμένοις*, citing as a parallel *IA* 709<sup>a</sup>10, where in *Z* *κινεῖται* has been corrupted to *γίνεται*. Apparently he (with Michael) understands the passage to mean that *φορά* is the last thing that happens in animal movement since, as the subsequent sentence shows, it must be preceded by some activity of cognition (accompanied by a qualitative change) and of desire. This is a possible interpretation, though *ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις* is perhaps a bit oddly general in virtue of the fact that Aristotle has just been talking about a moving being (the *primum mobile*) in whose case *φορά* is *not* preceded by qualitative change. There is another emendation which both has some manuscript support and makes the whole argument more coherent.

P reads *κινουμένων* where other MSS have *γινομένων*. If we instead read *κινήσεων* (*κινουμένων* with an understood internal accusative would be possible, but awkward), we can keep Torraca's translation of *γινόμενοις* and tie the passage to the contrast which has preceded. Among animals, i.e. creatures subject to becoming, *φορά* is the last because the animal moves in consequence of qualitative changes associated with psychic activities. The heavenly bodies are eternal and not subject to qualitative change. *φορά* is their first, last, and only sort of motion. From the remarks about the limited character of animal motion it follows *εὐλόγως* that it involves qualitative change, and *φορά* is last because this qualitative change follows directly on the presentation of the object. *τὸ ζῶον* at 701<sup>a</sup>5 thus neatly picks up *γινόμενοις* at <sup>a</sup>3, whereas in Jaeger's version it would have to designate just a subclass of *τὰ κινούμενα*. The same sense could be kept without emending, but then we would have *γίγνομαι* being used in two different senses in the same brief sentence, which would be unfortunate.

7. 701<sup>a</sup>36-<sup>b</sup>1:

δ' ὁρεγομένωνν πράττειν τὰ μὲν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν τὰ δὲ τῶν  
 δι(α) [ὄρεξιν ἢ] βούλησιν τὰ μὲν ποιοῦσι τὰ δὲ πράττουσι. 701<sup>b</sup>  
 701<sup>b</sup>1 ὄρεξιν ἢ seclusi

ὄρεξις is Aristotle's generic word for "desire." In chapter 6, he has told us that it has three species: βούλησις, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία (700<sup>b</sup>22; see also *EE* 1223<sup>a</sup>26-27, 1225<sup>b</sup>25, *DA* 414<sup>b</sup>21, etc.). Elsewhere he often opposes βούλησις (rational desire) to the other two types of irrational desire (e.g. *DA* 432<sup>b</sup>5, *EE* 1225<sup>b</sup>25ff). The use of ὄρεξις as a species of itself is unparalleled, and inexplicable here, especially in view of τῶν δ' ὁρεγομένωνν πράττειν above. It is better to bracket it and see the τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ as contrasting the actions involving rational wanting with those involving the two irrational species. The corruption may have come about because of the interest of some literary scribe in having two alternatives in each group.

8. 701<sup>b</sup>2-10:

"Ὡς περ δὲ τὰ αὐτόματα κινεῖται μικρᾶς κινήσεως γενομένης, λυομένων τῶν στρεβλῶν καὶ κρουόντων ἄλληλα τῶν ξύλων, καὶ τὸ ἀμάξιον (ὃ γὰρ ὀχοῦμενος αὐτὸ κινεῖ εἰς εὐθύ, καὶ πάλιν κύκλῳ κινεῖται τῷ ἀνίσους ἔχειν τοὺς τρόχους· ὃ γὰρ 5 ἐλάττων ὥσπερ κέντρον γίνεται, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς κυλίνδροις), οὕτω καὶ τὰ ζῶα κινεῖται. ἔχει γὰρ ὄργανα τοιαῦτα τήν τε τῶν νεύρων φύσιν καὶ τήν τῶν ὀστέων, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖ τὰ ξύλα καὶ ὁ σίδηρος, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα ὡς αἱ στρέβλαι· ὧν λυομένων καὶ ἀνιεμένων κινοῦνται.

2 γενομένης *ab*<sub>1</sub>: γινομένης *b*<sub>2</sub>PM<sup>1</sup> 3 ἄλληλα τῶν ξύλων scripsi: ἀλλήλας τὰς στρέβλας *codd.*: κρουουσῶν ἀλλήλας, *secl.* τὰς στρέβλας Forster, *Δ* secutus: κρουόντων ἄλληλα, *secl.* τὰς στρέβλας Torracca λυομένων τῶν ξύλων καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλαις τὰς στρέβλας *Fq.* 4 ὃ γὰρ ὀχοῦμενος *Fq.*, Richards, Ross: ὥσπερ ὀχοῦμενος *b*<sub>1</sub>: ὅπερ ὀχοῦμενον *ab*<sub>2</sub>NGM<sup>c</sup>: ὥσπερ ὀχοῦμενον *P*

The general point of these two examples is this: Just as, in the case of automatic puppets, a small and simple initial movement can, because of the arrangement of the mechanism, set off a complex sequence of different motion of the puppet or puppets, and just as, in the case of the little cart with wheels of unequal size, a simple push forward is, by the nature of the cart itself, translated into motion in a circle, so in the case of animals a small and simple original movement can result in many and varied

motions of the limbs without any further external stimulus, just because of the nature of the mechanism itself. In the case of animals, however, the sequence is from alteration to locomotion, not from one sort of locomotion to another. (See Furley,<sup>64</sup> and Farquharson and Buridan<sup>65</sup> ad loc., for similar accounts of the passage.) The difference between the two examples seems to be primarily one of emphasis: the puppet example underlines the generation of a whole series of motions from a single initial motion, the cart example the change in character of a motion because of the nature of the functioning mechanism. (Both Buridan and Burley substitute for the puppets the example of a weighted clock. Albertus claims that both examples are to be understood only with reference to the "involuntary" motions of chapter 11 — a claim for which there is no evidence in the text.)

*The automatic puppets.* These αὐτόματα, or θαύματα, were a popular curiosity. Their most impressive feature was this apparent automatism: the puppeteer had only to touch off the chains of events and then, even if he departed, the movements would continue, one following another. At *Metaph.* 983<sup>a</sup>12ff, Aristotle mentions them as an example of how we marvel at that whose cause is unseen. (Alexander ad loc. [18.17–18] comments that these θαύματα are τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν δεικνύμενα παίγνια ἃ ἐξ αὐτῶν δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτομάτως κινεῖσθαι.) In Book II of the *GA*, the puppets are mentioned twice to illustrate the principle that the real cause may act at some remove, touching off a chain of events that culminates in the one we observe: one thing moves another in sequence, because the parts in their state of rest possess a certain potential (734<sup>b</sup>11ff, 741<sup>b</sup>9ff).

There are a number of other allusions to these puppets in authors from Plato to Michael. *Republic* 514<sup>b</sup>, in the description of the cave, mentions the screen above which puppeteers presented their shows. And in *Laws I* (644b–45c; cf. VII 804b) Plato draws an elaborate analogy between the human individual and one of these θαύματα: the reason and the passions are like the νεῦρα, or σμήρινθοι, which pull the puppet about; the passions are made of iron, while reason is golden and flexible.

This suggestion that the "sinews" or cables moved the puppets limb by limb is confirmed by a passage in the sixth chapter of *De Mundo*, which compares the activity of god to that of the puppeteer and makes a point similar to that contained in our passage:

<sup>64</sup> D. J. Furley, "Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action," *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists* (Princeton 1967) 216.

<sup>65</sup> For Buridan's commentary, see F. Scott and H. Shapiro, "Jean Buridan's *De Motibus Animalium*," *Isis* 58 (1967) 533–552.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θειότατον τὸ μετὰ ῥαστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς  
κινήσεως παντοδαπὰς ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει  
δρῶσιν οἱ μηχανοποιοί, διὰ μιᾶς ὀργάνου σχαστηρίας  
πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦντες. ὁμοίως δὲ  
καὶ οἱ νευροσπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι ποιοῦσι  
καὶ αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι καὶ χεῖρα τὸν ζῶον, καὶ ὤμον καὶ  
ὀφθαλμόν, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πάντα τὰ μέρη, μετὰ τινος εὐρυθμίας  
(398<sup>b</sup>13ff.)

Galen in *De Usu Partium* presents a similar picture of how the puppets worked, using this to illustrate how the tendons are attached in the arms and legs. In both the arm and the leg, the tendons are connected from one bone, not to the juncture, but to the end of the bone that is going to be moved. So puppeteers attach their μήρινθοι so the limbs will move easily. Galen's word for these puppets is εἰδωλα — or (at section 262) τὰ ξύλινα τῶν εἰδῶλων.

As for the mechanism by which these motions are produced, Michael of Ephesos offers us two descriptions. In his commentary on this passage (117.20), he says that the puppeteer releases the ἀρχή of the cables, and they “strike” (κρούειν) each other in succession, each releasing the next, until the ξύλινα εἰδωλα themselves are moved, and those who are not aware of the arrangement of the cables think they are self-moving. Michael (Ps.-Philoponus) presents a very similar picture at *In GA* 77.11: the puppeteer moves τόδε τὸ ξύλον and goes away, and each ξύλον moves another until one finally moves the εἰδῶλον, which appears to move itself. The confusing reference to cables “striking” each other is drawn, no doubt, from the corrupt text of the *MA* passage (see below), and so the *GA* story of interlocking pegs looks the more reliable. The picture which emerges from all of these passages is the following: the puppets were attached, marionette-fashion, to strings at each separate limb or joint. A complex mechanism of cables, pegs, or both (the *Laws* passage seems to speak of metal rods instead of cables) ensured that, given an initial action of the puppeteer (the untying of a cable, or the freeing of a peg), the puppet performed various complex motions without further direction.

A perplexingly different picture is presented in our only full-length work on the subject, the *Automatopoietica* of Hero of Alexandria (second-first century B.C.). This illustrated treatise<sup>66</sup> gives a detailed account of the mechanism of weights, wheels, and draw-strings which, set beneath a “stage,” operated the puppets, showing how from a single origin

<sup>66</sup> See the Teubner edition by W. Schmidt (Leipzig 1899–1914) I.



varied and differently timed motions were produced. The ἀρχὴ κινήσεως for these puppets is either a torsion cable, which unwinds gradually, or a lead weight which sinks slowly because of the gradual dripping away of sand or grain beneath. A rope from the weight is joined to an iron axle, to which are attached wheels upon which rides the casing of the automaton. More complex configurations demand a greater number of wheels and ropes; and a kind of time-release effect can be achieved by means of a series of loops, gradually drawn out. The problem in reconciling this picture with Plato, Galen, and the *De Mundo* is that these puppets move as single, rigid units on a base, not bending or lifting individual bodily parts. There is no mention of μῆρινθοι or στρέβλαι. And yet Hero claims to be describing what οἱ παλαιοί called θαύματα (I 7, Schmidt 342.2), as improved by contemporary τέχνη. And his description of the puppet shows produced in former days gives an even more primitive picture:

οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι κέχρηται ἀπλῇ τινι διαθέσει·  
ἀνοιχθέντος γὰρ τοῦ πίνακος, ἐφαίνετο ἐν αὐτῷ  
πρόσωπον γεγραμμένον. τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς  
ἐκίνει καμμῶν τε καὶ ἀνάβλεπον πολλάκις, ὅταν δὲ  
πάλιν κλεισθεὶς ἀνοιχθῇ ὁ πίναξ, τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον  
οὐκέτι ἑωρᾶτο, ζώδια δὲ γεγραμμένα ἔς τινα μῦθον  
διεσκευασμένα. καὶ πάλιν ὅταν κλεισθεὶς ἀνοιχθῇ,  
διάθεσις ἄλλη ἐφαίνετο ζωδίων συναναπληροῦσα τοὺς  
ὑποκειμένους μύθους τοὺς ἐξῆς, ὥστε τρεῖς μόνον  
κινήσεις διαφόρους ἐπὶ τοῦ πίνακος γίνεσθαι, μίαν  
μὲν τῶν θυρῶν, ἄλλην δὲ τῶν ὀμμάτων, τὴν τρίτην τῶν  
ἐπικαλυπτόντων (II 22, Schmidt 412. 3).

Even allowing for Hero's tendency to glorify his own τέχνη, this does not describe the sort of show witnessed by Plato, Galen, or the author of the *De Mundo*. Whether Michael's puppets moved individual bodily parts is unclear; he might be describing a "modern" Hero-type puppet show.

The difference it will make to our examination of this passage to decide which sort Aristotle has in mind is this: when he compares cables to sinews, wooden parts to bones, is he drawing an analogy between the animal and the puppets themselves, or between the animal and the entire mechanism? Since the latter is almost certainly correct (the ἀρχὴ of the *whole mechanism* is analogous to the heart, its flexible cables to sinews, its wooden pegs and iron bar — Hero's axle? — to bones, throughout the body, and not just in the extremities), the analogy is compatible with either picture. The question remains a historical curiosity.

We need, then, to imagine a mechanism made up, probably, of an interlocking series of wooden pegs and taut cables, and containing some

iron piece, probably the axle described by Hero. The initial loosening of a cable or cables sets off the mechanism. The word *στρέβλαι* used by Aristotle is not the ordinary word for puppet cables (*σμήρινθοι* or *μήρινθοι*). Since these are analogous to tendons, they must also be ropes or cables of some sort. In this usage the word is unparalleled. In Aes. *Suppl.* 447, it is used for the windlass of a ship (hence, perhaps, the idea of rope wound round a wheel). In other usage it means a machine of some sort involving twisting (a clothes-press worked by a screw, Plut. 2.950a; an instrument of torture, Plb. 18.54.7; et al.). *στρεβλόω* can mean to tighten cables with a windlass (Hdt. 7.36), to tighten the strings of an instrument (Pl. *Rep.* 531b), more often to stretch on the rack or wheel. The implication is that Aristotle's *στρέβλαι* are wound round a wheel or roller. Hero confirms the arrangement. As tendons stretch from bone to bone, so the cables stretch from the iron roller to the *ξύλα* which are moved, whether these are pegs in the mechanism itself, or the wooden limbs of the puppets, or both. (Forster's claim that the *σίδηρος* must be a part of the cart is hence unnecessary.) It seems best to think of at least some of the *ξύλα* as being pegs in the mechanism, since this helps us to emend the corrupt text of 701<sup>b</sup>3. Now for the text itself:

*Line 2:* *γενομένης*. This reading of *a* and *b*<sub>1</sub> is defended by Düring,<sup>67</sup> and seems important in order to indicate a contrast between the single initial movement and the continuing sequence of ensuing motions.

*Line 3:* *λυομένων τῶν στρεβλῶν, καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλα τῶν ξύλων*. The passage, as it stands in all the MSS, is hopelessly corrupt: *λυομένων τῶν στρεβλῶν καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλας τὰς στρέβλας*. The difficulties here are: (1) the pointless and incoherent repetition (especially so together with *ἀλλήλας*) of *στρέβλας*; (2) the wrong gender in the participle *κρουόντων*; (3) the difficult sense of *κρουόντων*: how can we understand one cable to be striking against another? *κρούω* is used of knocking, tapping, or striking, and seems inappropriate for rope. (Even though the *μήρινθοι* in *Laws* I seem to have been of metal, both the meaning of *στρέβλαι* and the parallel with tendons [as well as the contrast with the wood pieces and the iron] rule out that possibility here.)

Farquharson's emendation is the most daring: *λυομένων τῶν ξύλων καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλαις τὰς στρέβλας*. This removes difficulties one and two, and makes the corruption understandable. But three, the most serious difficulty, remains unsolved. And further, at lines 9–10 below it is the *στρέβλαι* which are said to be released, not the *ξύλα*. Forster brackets *τὰς στρέβλας* and emends to *κρουουσῶν*. Difficulty three still remains,

<sup>67</sup> Düring, *Gnomon* (above n. 8) 417.

and it is hard to explain the reading *κρουόντων* in the MSS. Torraca brackets *τὰς στρέβλας* and understands *στρεβλῶν* as the neuter plural of the adjective; he therefore emends to *ἄλληλα*. But this substantivized use of the adjective seems to be attested only once, in Hesychius, where *στρεβλόν*, "the twisted thing," designates a horn made from a conch shell. Jaeger and Louis make no attempt to emend. Louis translates, "Les cordes tendues une fois libérées déclenchent les rouages qui s'entraînent les uns les autres." But it is hard to see how *στρέβλαι* can be now the cables, now the wheels, as he seems to want.

The emendation proposed seems to offer a way out of all the difficulties mentioned, to present a plausible picture of the mechanism insofar as we can reconstruct it, and to be consistent with the ensuing remark about release of the *στρέβλαι*. The phrase *τῶν ξύλων* was apparently dropped out in the course of transmission, leaving the unattached participle to be falsely interpreted as modifying *στρεβλῶν*. This suggestion explains less obviously than Farquharson's the presence of *τὰς στρέβλας*. Presumably *κρουόντων* was felt to require some sort of direct object, and this was supplied.

*Line 4: καὶ τὸ ἀμάξιον.* As Torraca justly remarks, there seems to be no other ancient evidence for the existence of such a toy. All commentators are puzzled until Farquharson, who says he observed such toys in the streets of London. Michael (117, 27ff) offers a misleading analysis: the *ἀμάξιον* is a four-wheeled oxcart whose two back wheels are larger than its front wheels. The result, he thinks, will be that, since the two pairs must cover the same distance in the same time, the larger wheels will have to make more turns than the smaller. In fact, he adds, the smaller will have to wait for the larger to catch up. This is all then compared to the motion of the equator round the stationary poles. It is impossible to interpret this passage charitably, and see him as talking of wheels on one *side* of the cart which are smaller than those on the other. He clearly makes the distinction one between *ἐμπροσθεν* and *ὀπισθεν*, not outer and inner; the cart cannot be going in a circle.

Albertus takes the unequal "wheels" to be the hub and rim of the same wheel, and gives a Phaedrus-picture of the "horses" as parts of the soul. Burley gives a similar picture. Both he and Buridan are misled by William's translation "currus" for *ἀμάξιον*, but Buridan gets the general point right.

The cart apparently has two wheels (see Louis, who writes, "Il faut imaginer . . . une planchette supportée par deux roues de diamètre inégal placées de chaque côté"). The inner wheel is smaller than the outer. The child jumps on it, pushing it straight forward, but it leans over onto the

smaller wheel and begins to move in a circle. (Farquharson seems to be thinking of a four-wheeled cart, but *ὁ γὰρ ἐλάττων* rules this out.)

*Line 4:* *ὁ γὰρ ὀχούμενος αὐτὸ κινεῖ εἰς εὐθύ.* This emendation was suggested independently by Farquharson, H. P. Richards, and W. D. Ross. Group *b*<sub>1</sub> has *ὀχούμενος* preceded by *ὥσπερ*). The reading of most manuscripts, *ὅπερ ὀχούμενον αὐτὸ κινεῖ εἰς εὐθύ*, is retained by Jaeger, Torracca, and Louis, but must be corrupt. The absence of an article with *ὀχούμενον* and the inexplicable (and usually untranslated) *αὐτὸ* are the two most obvious difficulties. Torracca's "che ciò che vi sta sopra, spinge in avanti" and Louis' "que celui qui le monte pousse tout droit" gloss over the problems. Michael senses a difficulty, but explains as: *τὸ ἀμάξιον εἰς εὐθὺ κινεῖ τὸ φερόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* (118.16ff). Forster takes accounts of the problem, inserting *τὸ* before *ὀχούμενον* and translating, "The child that is riding on it himself" — but the *αὐτό* still seems without point.

9. 701<sup>b</sup> 17-22:

αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς

ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὔσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ  
νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γὰρ τινα  
τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ [θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ] ἡδέος ἢ φοβε- 20  
ροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὃν οἶόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκα-  
στον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον.

20 *θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ seclusi*

The thought of something pleasant or painful is of necessity accompanied by heating or chilling (see ch. 8). But it is hard to make sense of the inclusion of "the thought of the hot or cold" in this context. Surely thinking of something hot will inspire desire or revulsion depending just on what hot thing it is that is conceived. Aristotle nowhere suggests that the hot and cold have, in themselves, any particular motivating power as objects of thought. Their inclusion probably originated in a gloss by a scribe anxious to indicate that *θερμόν* went with *ἡδύ*, *ψυχρόν* with *φοβερόν*.

10. 701<sup>b</sup>33-702<sup>a</sup>1:

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ  
πρακτῷ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτὸν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ' ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ  
νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις. τὸ 35  
μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτὸν, τὸ δ' ἡδὺ διωκτὸν [ἀλλὰ λαν-  
θάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον], ἔστι δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ



καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχεδὸν μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος 702<sup>a</sup>  
(ἀλλὰ λανθάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον)).

36 ἀλλὰ—συμβαῖνον post θερμότητος 702<sup>a</sup>1 transp. Moraux

The structure of this argument seems to be as follows: The thought, etc., of the object of pursuit and avoidance is of necessity accompanied by heating and chilling. For we know (for example from our observation of the passions) that the (contemplation of the) pleasant and painful is accompanied almost always by heating or chilling; and the pleasant is an object of pursuit, the painful an object of avoidance. Whether we take this as an attempted proof or only as offering relevant evidence will depend on our reading of 35–36: does it claim just that all pleasure is pursued, or also that whatever is pursued is the pleasant? If the first, Aristotle will just be saying that one kind of evidence for our more general point is this observation about the pleasant, which can easily be made in the case of the passions. The suggestion would be that to establish the physiological conditions for the contemplation of objects of pursuit other than the pleasant might prove more difficult (cf. 701<sup>b</sup> 16–22). If the second, the claim would be that to replace διωκτόν and φευκτόν with ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, which are identical with them, makes the truth of our statement more perspicuous; and one kind of evidence for the general truth can be drawn from the passions. The second leaves the argument looking somewhat better, but the first is more consistent with Aristotle's use of ἡδύ in chapter 6, where he seems deliberately to avoid the claim that every object of desire is such because it is in some sense pleasant (and see the evidence cited in my thesis for a similar view in other works). It is easier to read 35–36 as a prediction, rather than a statement of identity. We must conclude that Aristotle is offering not a conclusive argument for his thesis, but a persuasive example of its operation.

Torraca, following Michael, places 35 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ) to 37 (συμβαῖνον) in parentheses. This destroys the sequence of the argument, which is clear enough. The only remaining problem is in the phrase, ἀλλὰ λανθάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον — which all editors take to be a parenthesis, but which seems to make more sense transposed after θερμότητος, as P. Moraux has suggested.<sup>68</sup> So placed, it clearly means “we are unaware of these heatings and chillings when they take place in very small regions of the body,” and ties in with the observations of chapter 7 about the importance of an alteration in a small portion of an ἀρχή. This is how Torraca, Farquharson, and Forster understand it,

<sup>68</sup> Moraux, *AntCl* (above n. 8) 366.

even without the transposition. Only Louis attempts a translation which will link it more closely to its context: "Mais quand la différence est minime [namely, between the pleasant and the painful], il arrive qu'elle échappe." This appears an unnatural translation, and makes an extraneous point.

11. 702<sup>b</sup> 15-20:

ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ

μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς κινούσης· ἀμφοτέρων  
γὰρ τῶν ἄκρων τὸ μέσον ἔσχατον. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει πρὸς τὰς  
κινήσεις τοῦτο καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, οἷον τὰς  
ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς ῥάχεως τοῖς ἔχουσι  
ῥάχιν.

18 καὶ κάτω om. Γ, secl. Fq., Torraca, sed habent Alex. Aphr. *DA*  
96, 26-7, Themistius *In DA* 121, 9 19 καὶ πρὸς X (Fq. suo in-  
genio): καὶ N (Forster s.i.): πρὸς cett. τὰς bM<sup>o</sup>Γ: τὰ α

The middle part is similarly (i.e. similarly to the way it is related to movements from left and right, hence symmetrically) related to motions from above and below, and also to the various movements that proceed (so to speak) from the spine in creatures which have a spine. Having argued that the origin of motion from left and right must actually be in a middle section of the body, and having suggested that it is more or less equidistant from both (16-17), Aristotle now extends the discussion of symmetry: it should also be more or less centrally located with regard to up and down, and also with regard to all those motions involving bones which are attached to the spine in creatures which have a spine. This last is an argument for finding it in the center of the trunk — i.e. higher than the "center" for the whole body, including legs. In other words, this argument, more than those which preceded it, gives support for the actual location of the heart within the body, in particular for its being higher than the body's center of gravity (see *PA* 665<sup>b</sup> 18-20).

The correct text of this passage is found only in X, but the presence of καὶ in 702<sup>b</sup> 19 is confirmed by the reading of N. Only Louis attempts to translate a text without the καί, but reading τὰς: "Ce centre joue le même rôle à l'égard de tous les mouvements, qu'ils viennent d'en haut ou d'en bas, par exemple ceux qui viennent de la tête par rapport à ceux qui viennent de la colonne vertébrale, chez les animaux qui en ont une." I cannot make sense of this; certainly movements from the spine would be a poor example of those ἀπὸ τοῦ κάτω, if that is what is meant. The καί seems crucial, if τὰς is read in line 19. If τὰ is read, then we can

understand the example of ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω to be "motions that proceed from the head to the bones that branch out from the spine." This is the reading adopted by Jaeger (from EY, possibly also M<sup>p</sup>). But then it is unclear just what motions are in question, and such a strange example is unnecessary to make the simple point that the origin of the motions is "above." Forster's substitution of καί for πρὸς (now found to be the reading of N) yields adequate sense, and is possible, though X is generally the superior manuscript, and so perhaps to be preferred. (But Forster's translation, which makes the motions from the spine the example of ἀπὸ τοῦ κάτω, must be rejected in any case.)

Farquharson prefers τὰ to τὰς on the grounds that Aristotle could not talk of motions as being ἀπὸ τῆς ῥάχεως since he did not know about the central nervous system. His interpretation is that the heart is symmetrically situated both with regard to movements from above (he omits καὶ κάτω), and with reference to the bones that are linked up with the spine. This is possible, but the rest of the argument deals with κινήσεις, and there seems to be no reason to see a shift here. ἀπὸ is used loosely throughout the passage, the whole point of which is that the real source of all motions is in the heart area. ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς does not mean that the head is really the origin: the passage has just argued there cannot be independent regional origins. If Aristotle can speak of the ῥάχης as the ἀρχή for all the bones (HA 516<sup>b</sup>10, PA 654<sup>a</sup>32), it is not surprising that he should speak of the motions involving the bones as being "from the spine," especially when he is so clearly stating where the ἀρχή really is. Once καὶ dropped out, τὰς was probably emended to τὰ to make sense of the text, as sketched above. The MSS which retain καί both read τὰς.

Γ omits καὶ κάτω, and Farquharson and Torracca follow, objecting that the only example given is of a motion from above. But how can Aristotle be making a point about symmetry with but one point of reference? There seems to be no real difficulty in understanding Aristotle to have given only a single example, when the other can easily be supplied. In addition to having the unanimous support of the extant MSS, καὶ κάτω is twice attested in the indirect tradition (Alex. DA 96. 26-27, Them. In DA 121. 1).

12. 703<sup>a</sup> 1-3:

ἀλλὰ τὸ κινεῖν ἄμ-  
φω ἀναγκαῖον <ἐν> εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕτερον μὲν οὐσα  
τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ τοιούτου, ἐν τούτῳ δ' οὐσα.

703<sup>a</sup>2 ἐν ΓΑ.Μ. ἀναγ. <ἀκίνητον> εἶναι Jaeg.

See William: "Set movens ambo necesse esse unum," Albertus Magnus (Borgnet X 343): "oportet autem in omnibus talibus, quod unum aliquid sit primum movens ambo." Farquharson and Torraca, on this authority, insert *ἐν*. Louis and Forster do not emend the passage; the former ascribes *ἐν* in his apparatus to the authority of Leonicus, rather than the much greater authority of William. (He errs similarly with the omission of *καὶ κάτω* at 702<sup>b</sup>18). Jaeger inserts *ἀκίνητον*. But then this is just a repetition of <sup>b</sup>34-35; and *ἐν* seems necessary to make sense of the argument.

Louis observes that Michael (126. 15-25), whom he oddly, however, calls Philoponus, does not seem aware of the last sentence. He mentions Carteron's contention<sup>69</sup> that it is a gloss. I concur with Louis in rejecting this supposition.

13. 703<sup>a</sup>21-24:

τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πνεύ-  
ματος φύσις· καὶ γὰρ ἀβίαστος συστελλομένη <τε καὶ ἐκτεινομένη>, καὶ  
ἐλκτική  
καὶ ὠστική διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ἔχει καὶ βάρος πρὸς  
τὰ πυρώδη καὶ κουφότητα πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία.

22 ἀβιάστως Fq. <τε καὶ ἐκτεινομένη> Fq., coll. Mich. In PA 88, 35. Cf. et M<sup>p</sup> ad loc (128, 5-6), Them. In DA, 121, 14. ἐλκτική Fq., tractiva Γ, attractiva Δ: βιαστική codd.

Farquharson's two emendations vastly improve the passage. All MSS read *βιαστική*; but this word is used elsewhere in Aristotle only of the violence of predators (PA 655<sup>a</sup>12, 662<sup>b</sup>3) and once of the compelling force of an argument (Top. 105<sup>a</sup>18). *ἀβίαστος* . . . *βιαστική* would surely be oddly paradoxical and disturbing to the argument. The translations *tractiva* in Γ and *attractiva* in Δ suggest the superior *ἐλκτική*. Leonicus has just translated *ὦσις καὶ ἔλξις* by *impulsus et tractus*; *ὠστική* here is *impulsoria*. *Sine vi* is, however, his translation for *ἀβίαστος*. William uses *pulsio* and *tractio* for *ὦσις* and *ἔλξις*, *pulsiva* for *ὠστική*, but *sine violentia* for *ἀβίαστος*. *ἐλκτικός* will be *ἄπαξ* in Aristotle, it is true; but it is used both by Plato (Rep. 523a) and by Theophrastus (CP 3.17.3) in an apposite sense. The addition of *τε καὶ ἐκτεινομένη* is justified with reference to Michael In PA 88.35: *τοῦ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πνεύματος ἐκτεινομένου καὶ συστελλομένου, ὡς ἐν τῇ περὶ ζώων κινήσεως δέδεικται*, and by Michael's paraphrase of this passage: *συστέλλεται γὰρ καὶ ἐκτείνεται κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ βία* (128.5-6).

<sup>69</sup> H. Carteron, *La notion de force dans le système d'Aristote* (Paris 1923) 121.



Support may possibly also be derived from Themistius *In DA* 121.14 (in a discussion of the *MA* with reference to the *DA* III 10 summary): ἐκτείνοντα γὰρ καὶ συστέλλοντα παρὰ μέρος τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ εὐώνυμα οὕτω πορεύεται.

Farquharson does not really explain why he emends to ἀβιάστως (surely Leonicus' *sine vi* does not give him the support he claims). He strangely remarks that ἀβιάστος is a word found only in Antoninus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. It occurs, in fact, in Plato's *Timaeus*, 61a6-7: βία δὲ ἀέρα σύσταντα οὐδὲν λύει πλὴν κατὰ τὸ στοιχείον, ἀβιάστον δὲ κατατῆκει μόνον πῦρ. This seems to constitute suitable precedent for the use of the adjective to mean "without compulsion" here.

14. 703<sup>b</sup>20-26:

μάλιστα δὲ τῶν 20

μορίων ταῦτα ποιεῖ ἐπιδήλως διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ ζῶον κεχω-  
ρισμένον ἐκάτερον εἶναι τῶν μορίων. [τοῦτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἔχου-  
σιν ὑγρότητα ζωτικήν.] ἡ μὲν οὖν καρδιά φανερόν δι' ἣν αἰ-  
τίαν· τὰς γὰρ ἀρχὰς ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων· τὸ δὲ μόριον τὸ γεν-  
νητικὸν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἐξέρχεται ἐξ 25  
αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ τι ἡ τοῦ σπέρματος δύναμις.

22 τοῦτου—23 ζωτικὴν secl. Jaeger

Jaeger brands this sentence as an interpolation, and is seconded by Forster. Torracca defends it, citing parallels to show the connection between these organs and two sorts of "vital moisture": the blood which, in circulating nourishment throughout the body, supplies ὕλη for all the body (651<sup>a</sup>12ff), and the semen, which, of course, has the capacity to engender another creature. His observations are correct, and ζωτική is used in similar contexts at *Resp.* 473<sup>a</sup>9-10 and *GA* 733<sup>a</sup>11, 739<sup>b</sup>23, and 761<sup>a</sup>27. But the real problem with the sentence is not that it expresses an un-Aristotelian sentiment, but that it does not fit with the context, which already provides reasons for saying heart and penis are like separate animals: the heart because it contains in itself the ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, the penis because the force of the semen rushes out of it like some sort of animal (25-27). If we keep the sentence in, we would have vital moisture alleged as a reason for saying each is a separate animal; then the two reasons just mentioned would follow on this, making it seem that these give reasons for saying the two have vital moisture — which clearly they do not. If we just had some weaker statement with, e.g. σημεῖον for the heart, we might accept Torracca's view that, since blood is known to be involved in sensation, the fact that

the heart contains the *ἀρχαί* of sensation could give us one reason to believe it had vital moisture. But to say, "It's clear for what reason the heart has this moisture, for it contains the *ἀρχαί* of sensation," would be to confine the role of the blood to its relatively minor part in sensation (*PA* 648<sup>a</sup>3), and to omit the really obvious reason, its crucial role in nourishing, which justifies calling the moisture vital. As for the semen, if what was wanted was evidence for vital moisture in the genitals, only the presence, and not the activity, of semen need be mentioned. *καὶ . . . δύνಾಮις* gives a reason for saying the organ is like a separate animal.

15. 703<sup>b</sup>29-33:

αἱ οὖν κινήσεις

καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχεῖον τῶν ἐπιγεγραμμένων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν 30  
 ἀφικνούνται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς κινουμένης καὶ μεταβαλ-  
 λούσης (ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ δυνάμει ἐστίν), ἡ μὲν τοῦ Β [ἀρχή]  
 ἐπὶ τὸ Β, ἡ δὲ τοῦ Γ ἐπὶ τὸ Γ, ἡ δ' ἀμφοῖν ἐπ' ἄμφω.

32 ἀρχή secl. Fq.

*ἀρχή* is obviously a gloss. It may, as Farquharson suggests, have been meant originally to go along with *ἐπεὶ πολλὰ δυνάμει ἐστίν*, as the ambiguous translation of William suggests: "quum multa virtute est principium ipsius b ad b . . ." Here *κίνησις*, not *ἀρχή*, should be supplied. Only Farquharson excises *ἀρχή*, but Forster, keeping it, translates, "the origin of movement in C goes to C," evidently understanding Aristotle to be using *ἀρχή* derivatively of a motor impulse. This seems forced.

Two other problems of particular interest cannot be dealt with here because they would require too extensive a discussion of surrounding arguments: first, the difficulties of 699<sup>a</sup>6-10, with my defense of the reading *καὶ τῆς* (*b*<sub>1</sub>LH<sup>a</sup>PM<sup>p</sup>) at <sup>a</sup>7; second, the problems of text and punctuation in the whole of the cryptic fifth chapter. It is worth notice that Michael's commentary, which usually leaves much to be desired, has incisive and, I believe, substantially correct analyses of both these passages. It is hard to believe that this writer, who often shows little grasp even of trivial problems, should have solved by himself the two textual problems in the treatise which require the clearest understanding of Aristotle's arguments. We know Michael was fond of incorporating, without attribution, large sections of works of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most philosophically distinguished of the Greek commentators.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> The opening of his *De Memoria* commentary reproduces large portions of Alexander on *De Sensu*, and reference to "his own" work *περὶ ὁρμῆς* turn out to

Perhaps here we have yet a further proof that Michael was a clever borrower from Alexander as well as a successful imitator of his style — claims both of which at least one critic<sup>71</sup> has denied on the grounds that no Christian author would deliberately deceive us.<sup>72</sup>

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be taken verbatim from Alexander's *De Anima*. See P. L. Donini, "Il *De anima* di Alessandro di Afrodisia e Michele Efesio," *RivFC* 96 (1968) 316-323.

<sup>71</sup> J. Freudenthal, "Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles," *AbhBerl* 1884, 1-134.

<sup>72</sup> I would like to thank the many people who assisted me during this research: especially Paul Moraux for his very helpful correspondence, and G. E. L. Owen for his invaluable contributions to every part of my thesis. My *De Motu* text, translation, and commentary, with the accompanying philosophical essays, will be published in 1977 by the Princeton University Press.





## SYMPOSIUM AT SEA

It is a curious fact, but nobody ever is seasick on land.

J. K. Jerome, *Three Men in a Boat*

W. J. SLATER

IN the following article I wish to suggest that the behavior, language, and apparatus of the symposium gave rise to a metaphor of the symposium-ship which is related in some way to Dionysiac cult, and that this formalized metaphor persisted until Roman times. Since such a concept can be neither logically consistent in all its ramifications nor demonstrated as an orderly development, I have endeavored to sketch the possible outlines of a generic idea rather than to discuss in detail every point. I should hope that the thesis provides an explanation of certain ancient phenomena for which interpretation has hitherto been lacking or deficient.

First, the idea that the symposium was viewed as a ship at sea should cause no surprise, since the symposium was often viewed as a microcosm of life, especially as a haven from the storms of care that raged outside.<sup>1</sup> The ship of state and the ship of love are not more common than the ship of life as commonplaces of ancient metaphor.<sup>2</sup> But, besides this general consideration, there are four places and probably more that prove the existence of this image applied to the symposium in Pindar, Dionysius Chalcus, Choerilus, and the famous story of Timaeus.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nisbet-Hubbard, *Commentary Horace Odes* 1 (Oxford 1970), index s.v. "symposium." The world as a table — originally an Anaximenean concept — seems to have become symbolic (W. Deonna and M. Reynard, *Superstitions et croyances de table dans la Rome antique*, Coll. lat. 46 [Brussels 1961] 47). Note the play with the metaphor at Eur. *Her. Fur.* 698.

<sup>2</sup> The massive literature on nautical metaphors may be viewed in V. Pöschl's *Bibliographie zur antiken Bildersprache* (Heidelberg 1964) s.v. "Schiff." Of these I have found most useful the short but pithy dissertation of J. Kahlmeyer, *Seesturm und Schiffbruch als Bild im antiken Schrifttum* (Greifswald 1934). Lesky in *Thalatta* (Vienna 1947) 208 adds nothing to Kahlmeyer.

<sup>3</sup> The Timaeus story is an aitiology, which may or may not be true. In Aelius Aristides' panegyric of Cyzicus I, 390D, quoted by Torr, *Ancient Ships* (reprint Chicago, 1964) 55 n. 126, a temple is compared to a trireme with three decks, and it is quite possible that the appearance of the house alone could have caused it to be named trireme. But the people of Acragas had a reputation for luxury dinners and buildings, according to the gossip of Aelian. *VH* 12.30.

Pindar fr. 124a Snell:

ἐν ξυνῶ κεν εἴη

συνπότησιν τε γλυκερὸν καὶ Διωνύσοιο καρπῶ  
καὶ κυλίκεσσιν Ἀθαναίαισι κέντρον·  
ἀνὶκ' ἀνθρώπων καματώδεις οἷχονται μέριμναι  
στηθέων ἔξω· πελάγει δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοιο πλούτου  
πάντες ἴσα νέομεν ψευδῇ πρὸς ἄκτάν·  
ὃς μὲν ἀχρήμων, ἀφνεὸς τότε, τοὶ δ' αὖ πλουτέοντες.

Dionysius Chalcus fr. 5D West:

καὶ τινες οἶνον ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρεσίᾳ Διονύσου  
συμποσίῳ ναῦται καὶ κυλίκων ἐρέται  
〈μάρνανται〉 περὶ τοῦδε.

Choerilus Samius fr. 9 Kinkel:

†χερσιν

ὄλβον ἔχω κύλικος τρύφος ἀμφὶς ἐαγός†  
ἀνδρῶν δαιτυμόνων ναυάγιον, οἷά τε πολλά  
πνεῦμα Διωνύσοιο πρὸς ὕβριος ἔκβαλεν ἄκτάς.

Timaeus 566F 149 in Athen. 37b-d (trans. Gulick, Loeb):

Timaeus of Tauromenium says that in Agrigentum there is a house which is called the "trireme" from the following circumstance. A party of young fellows were drinking in it, and became so wild when overheated by the liquor that they imagined they were sailing in a trireme, and that they were in a bad storm on the ocean. Finally, they completely lost their senses and tossed all the furniture and bedding out of the house as though upon the waters, convinced that the pilot directed them to lighten the ship because of the raging storm. Well, a great crowd gathered and began to carry off the jetsam, but even then the youngsters did not cease from their mad actions. The next day the military authorities appeared at the house and made complaint against the young men when they were still half-seas over (ἔτι ναυτιῶντες). To the question of the magistrates they answered that they had been much put to it by a storm and had been compelled to throw into the sea the superfluous cargo. When the authorities expressed surprise at their insanity, one of the younger men, though he appeared to be the eldest of the company, said to them, "Ye Tritons, I was so frightened that I threw myself into the lowest possible place in the hold and lay there." The magistrates, therefore, pardoned their delirium, but sentenced them never to drink too much, and let them go. They gratefully promised . . . "If," said he, "we ever make port after this awful tempest, we shall rear altars in our country to you, as Saviours in visible presence, side by side with the sea gods, because you appeared to us so opportunely." This is why the house was called the "trireme."

The common factor in these passages is that the symposiasts are depicted as, or believe themselves to be, sailors in situations ranging from calm (Pindar) to noisy shipwreck (Timaeus, Choerilus), which Cicero calls the *tempestas comissationis*, by a much weaker use of the metaphor.<sup>4</sup>

It seems to be more than just a coincidence that two of the four examples are located in Acragas,<sup>5</sup> but I have not been able to discover a link between them. I would, however, suggest that the whole symposium metaphor could be connected with the supposed Sicilian invention of the kottabos,<sup>6</sup> and specifically with the form of it known as ἐν λεκάνῃ, which consisted of sinking little boats or ὀξύβαφα by throwing wine lees at them. In the view of what I have to say later, it may be of significance that somehow the word κοτταβίζω<sup>7</sup> came to mean to be sick. Athenaeus 668d tells us that the Sicilians went to the extent of designing rooms to play the game in, quoting from Dicaearchus (fr. 94 Wehrli), but these seem to have been round (fr. 97 Wehrli).

Two passages in Clement's *Paedagogus* (2.2.22.3-4, 28.1-3) show that the metaphor was also developed in the *peri methēs* literature,<sup>8</sup> since the passage Eratosthenes fr. 36 (Powell) recurs in Stobaeus and Athenaeus. Out of the first passage in Clement, Kock created *adespoton* (CAF 1227 [3.611]):

<sup>4</sup> *Cic. De Or.* 1.164. The best descriptions known to me of ancient drunkenness are Lycon fr. 26 Wehrli<sup>2</sup> and Libanius *Progymn.* 12.6, both rhetorical exercises in characterization. Libanius, like Theognis 506, notes that for the victim of wine the surroundings will not stand still.

<sup>5</sup> Kahlmeyer (above, n. 2) 22 noted the coincidence. As far as I know no one has brought the four passages I have discussed together, though Meineke (below, n. 29) and Kahlmeyer seem to have found two or three examples each, following Naeke, *Choerili Samii Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1817) 163ff.

<sup>6</sup> M. Vickers, "A Kottabos Cup in Oxford," *AJA* 78 (1974) 158. Add E. K. Borthwick, *JHS* 84 (1964) 47ff, "The Gymnasium of Bromios," who demonstrates not only that the kottabos imagery of Dion. Chal. fr. 3 is athletic, but that such imagery is to be found in other ancient authors. I owe this reference to the kindness of Francis Cairns. W. Deonna, *Un divertissement de table: à cloche-pied*, Coll. Lat. 40, [Brussels 1959] 18ff discusses kottabos and other "exercices de équilibre, qui agrémentent le symposium" (pp. 18ff).

<sup>7</sup> Noted with an attempt at explanation by K. Schneider *RE* II (1922) s.v. "Kottabos." S. Miller, *AJA* 76 (1972) 202, suggests the identification of kottabos-rooms.

<sup>8</sup> Most of our knowledge of this strong Peripatetic tradition comes from Athenaeus; see Wehrli, *Schule des Aristoteles*<sup>2</sup> 9 (Basel 1969) 73. To it belong also Plutarch's *Quaestiones conviviales* and Stobaeus' chapter *περί ἀκρασίας*. W. J. Schmidt's dissertation *περί μέθης* (Leiden 1947) is useful but very deficient, and does not touch our theme.

καὶ τὴν καταιγίζουσιν ἐκ μέθης ζάλην  
ῥᾶον φέρουσιν

and Stählin followed Blass in believing that some poem lay behind the passage which in Clement follows after the quotation of Eratosthenes. In fact the whole passage before and after is shot through with nautical metaphor, beginning with a quotation of Proverbs 23.33 f. on the effects of looking on wine:

τὸ στόμα σου τότε λαλήσει σκολιά, κατακείσῃ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν καρδίᾳ  
θαλάσσης καὶ ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης ἐν πολλῷ κλύδωνι.

A further important passage comes from the sympotic speech of Heracles in Euripides *Alcestis* 789f<sup>9</sup>:

μεθορμιεῖ σε πίτυλος ἐμπεσῶν σκύφου

where *πίτυλος* is a rowing metaphor applied to raising and lowering one's cup in drinking, in the "rowing of Dionysus." Borthwick has shown how the extensive metaphor of the "gymnasium of Bromius" has reflections in Euripides.<sup>10</sup> It would appear that the "ship of Dionysus" is also a metaphor known to his audience.

The connection with the next point is provided by a fragment of Hermippos, which attributes the arrival of the *agatha* to the coming of Dionysus himself from over the sea in his black ship; the words are reminiscent of a skolion of Bacchylides.

Bacchylides fr. 20B Snell:

καὶ συμποσ[ίαι]σιν ἄγαλμ' [ἐν] εἰκάδεσ[σιν],	5
εὖτε νέων ἀ[παλόν] γλυκεῖ' ἀνάγκα	
σενομενᾶν κλυλίκων θάληπῃσι θυμλόν,	
Κύπριδος τ' ἐλπὶς <δι>αιθύσσει φρένας,	8
ἄμμειγνυμένα Διονυσίοισι δάροις·	
ἀνδράσι δ' ὑψοτάτω πέμπει μερίμνας·	10
αὐτίκ' αἰ μέν πολίων κράδεμνα λύει,	
πᾶσι δ' ἀνθρώποις μοναρχήσκειν δοκεῖ·	
<—>	
χρυσῶν δ' ἐλέφαντί τε μαρμαίρουσιν οἶκοι,	
πυροφύροι δὲ κατ' αἰγλάεντα πόλιν	
νάες ἄγορυσιν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου μέγιστον	15
πλοῦτον ὥς λίνοντος ὀρμαίνει κέαρ.	

<sup>9</sup> Adduced by Van Nes, *Die maritime Bildersprache des Aischylos* (Groningen 1963) 20, who compares Dion.Chalc. fr 5. *πιτυλεύει* is "to take violent exercise" and there seems no need to make it mean "rowing" at Ar. *Vesp.* 678 (cf. Barrett on Eur. *Hipp.* 1464); rather I suspect a pun on "heaving away" both in exercise and in drinking.

<sup>10</sup> Borthwick (above, n. 6).



Hermippus fr. 63 Kock (CAF 1,243):

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,  
 ἐξ οὗ ναυκληρεῖ Διόνυσος ἐπ' οἶνοπα πόντον,  
 ὅσσοι ἀγάθ' ἀνθρώποις δεῦρ' ἤγαγε νηὶ μελαίνῃ.

Though we are here dealing with two different situations, the important point is that in both places wealth brought in ships is the result of Dionysus. In another list of the results of drunkenness, in Aristophanes *Knights* 92ff, the first delusion is again wealth as in Pindar (fr. 124a, quoted above).<sup>11</sup> The growth of the metaphor seems to be: (1) delusions of wealth in drunkenness, (2) delusions of wealth imported by sea, (3) wealth actually imported by Dionysus. The illusions that come with wine are imported luxuries that come over the sea in the ship of Dionysus. The fragment of Hermippus testifies to a connection of some sort between Dionysus as god of drunkenness, the bringer of illusion, and Dionysus the importer of good things, and so leads us to that obscure area of the *katagogia* of Dionysus at Athens, with which Nilsson connected the lyric fragment<sup>12</sup>

ἀναβάσσον αὐτῶ· / Διόνυσον ἀ[εῖ]σομεν / ἱεραῖς ἐν ἀμέρα[ι]ς / δώδεκα  
 μῆνας ἀπόντα. / πάρα δῶρα, πάντα δ' ἄνθη.

I intend to avoid the controversy whether he landed during the Anthesteria, since the evidence is not conclusive. But I would point to the three vases, the best-known being the Exekias vase, which show a sympotic Dionysus on board a real ship, either celebrating a komos or reclining

<sup>11</sup> The Pindar passage and the Aristophanes list are quoted by Brandt on Ovid *Ars Am.* 1.239. Cf. Hor. *Od.* 3.21.18 and *Ep.* 1.5.18.

<sup>12</sup> The text is quoted from a treatise on early dithyrambic poets, Pack<sup>2</sup> 1948 = PMG 929 (b). Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (Munich 1967) 583 n. 5 and *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*<sup>2</sup> (reprint New York 1971) 567 n. 18, connects the song as I would wish to do with the spring return of Dionysus. The absence of Dionysus for twelve months would imply that he only stayed for the length of the festival, or, if a connection with our theme could be established, that he came to unload his δῶρα before departing once more. πάρα is a technical term in epiphanies as noted by Pfister, *RE* suppl. 4 col. 311 s.v. "Epiphanie." The combination of imperative with short vowel subjunctive can be paralleled from Pindar *Ol.* 1.5-7: σκόπει . . . αὐδάσομεν. I read δῶρα with Nilsson and Oellacher, the editor princeps (*Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der Nationalbibliothek in Wien* n.s. 1 no. 22 [Vienna 1932] 138), against Page, Körte, and J. U. Powell (see Page, *Select Papyri* 3 no. 87 [Loeb 1950] 390). Nilsson and Powell (*CR* 46 [1932] 263 and *New Chapters in Greek Literature*, 3d ser. [Oxford 1933] 210) both read πάρα δ' ἄνθη in the last line, for which I have been able to find no justification.

in sympotic fashion.<sup>13</sup> In Philostratus *Imag.* 1.19 the boat is a *ναὺς θεωρίας* belonging to Dionysus, not a pirate ship that he has taken over. It is what has been called his *Wunderschiff*;<sup>14</sup> it symbolizes the effects or hallucinations induced by wine. When his ship comes in, then all good things come to pass. In Philostratus, Dionysus is in his festive ship, so filled to the gunwales with gold — the first illusion being wealth — and other desirable goods that it resembles a pyramid, when the pirates attack and are turned to dolphins. The Homeric hymn looks like an application of the Arion motif to a Dionysiac adventure; there are other similarities between Dionysus and Arion, the bringer of the dithyramb. At any rate, Athenians saw Dionysus arrive once a year and he arrived in his own boat, just as he did in several of the cities of Ionia.

If we turn to the actual conduct of the symposium, as we see from the story of Timaeus, the revelers could be half-seas over, or as Choerilus Samius puts it, shipwrecked among the fragments of their cups. I should mention here that they could be shipwrecked on the seas of love as well, either by the pirate ships of Aphrodite who, the epigrams tell us,<sup>15</sup> plundered poor sailing men, or by the doubtless slower tramp steamers, the *holkades*, who ply the seas of love.<sup>16</sup> Surely there were

<sup>13</sup> Literature on Dionysiac ships with or without wheels in W. Burkert, *Homo Necans* (Berlin 1972) 223. H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie*<sup>2</sup> (Munich 1962) 535 n. 2, has already brought together several of these passages and the Exekias cup, whose closest parallel is CV Tarquinia 1, pl. 5.3. In March 1975 a neck amphora was put up for auction at Basle, and Mark Davies was kind enough to draw my attention to the catalogue note, which I paraphrase for the benefit of those who are unlikely to trace it. The note comments on the two scenes, one of a vintage with reclining symposiastic sileni, the other of a merchant ship under sail with helmsman. The note draws attention to the Tarquinia vase and to friezes of ships, and continues: "Der Schiffstypus folgt der Tradition des Exekias auf der bekannten Münchener Schale mit Dionysos im Segelschiff, das in vielen Einzelheiten mit unserer Amphora übereinstimmt." There was a play called *Dionysus nauagos* (Pollux 10.33).

<sup>14</sup> So, e.g. Nilsson *ARW* 11 (1908) 400 = *Opusc. Sel.* 1.22 and Lesky, *Gnomon* 26 (1954) 211. Compare the song cited above. On Arion as Dionysiac symbol see Burkert (above, n. 13) 221–2. Alan Griffiths suggests to me that the pyramid effect may be related to ancient cult and compares the Egyptian boat depicted by Boardman, *JHS* 78 (1958) 2, and the Minoan sealstone shown by Sourvinou-Inwood, *Kadmos* 12 (1973) 149f. Certainly the *stylis* that was important in the Anthesteria looks suspiciously like the banners that had symbolic significance for Minoan seamen, as the latest frescoes from Thera demonstrate.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. *AP* 5.161 τὰ ληστρικὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης are, amusingly, also ὀλκάδες; cf. *Κύπριδος εἰρεσίην*, Meleager 60 Gow-Page = *AP* 5.204.

<sup>16</sup> E.g. *AP* 9.415–416. In 5.204 a yacht becomes with age a cargoship. Other ship varieties in *AP* 5.44.

many times when both Venus and Bacchus laid claim to what Meleager<sup>17</sup> calls the *κώμων χειμέριον πέλαγος*. Seneca says *comissatio altius mersit*,<sup>18</sup> echoing the comic poet Xenarchus,<sup>19</sup> who describes the process of capsizing and submersion in alcohol in greater detail. Not only do authors as far apart as Clement, Plautus and Petronius testify to the notion of "going under" in alcohol,<sup>20</sup> but the Greek words like *σαλεύω* are applicable to both sea and drunkenness.<sup>21</sup> The drinker is a sailor who, as Petronius says, *inundatur vino*. One therefore did not have to be a lover to go sailing at the symposium; one could be storm-tossed or drift quietly away just by drinking. One could, of course, get seasick like the young people in Akragas, but there are other reasons why we should feel that the equation *triclinium* = ship of Dionysus might provide a source of amusement. Several varieties of cups (as well as *hetairai*) had the names of ships, like our "schooner."<sup>22</sup> That the cups chased each other round the room is a notion common to Alcaeus and Bacchylides,<sup>23</sup> and in the epigram *AP* 5.261 they act as ferryboats carrying kisses around, while the sober Plutarch thinks of the whole company as being on a sort of ferryboat, what we should call mixed company.<sup>24</sup> Plutarch suggests other applications. If the boat got into difficulties, it was probably because the person steering the drink was incompetent,<sup>25</sup> so that the symposiarch was felt to be a steersman. A last example: Hesychius (κ 2163) has a gloss:<sup>26</sup> *κελεύματα· παιδιᾶς*

<sup>17</sup> *AP* 5.190 = Meleager 64 Gow-Page.

<sup>18</sup> *QN* 4B.13.6; cf. *De Tranq.* 17.8.

<sup>19</sup> *Fr.* 2 (*CAF* 2.468). See below regarding the text.

<sup>20</sup> Clement *Paed.* 2.2.26.3: *βεβυθισμένον τὸ σῶμα ὥσπερ ναῦς δέδυκεν ἐς βυθὸν ἀκοσμίας ταῖς τοῦ οἴνου τρικυμίας ἐπικεχωσμένον* (cf. Philo *De Plant.* 144); Plaut. *Rudens* 361; Petron. 21.6.

<sup>21</sup> E.g. at Plut. *QC* 614d; *λῆγος* and *θάλαμος* are both nautical terms.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. *akatos*, Epicrates *fr.* 10 K; *kantiharos*, Schol. *Ar. Pax* 143 = Menan. *fr.* 286 K-T; more in Antiphanes *fr.* 224 K, Epinicus *fr.* 2 K, and cf. Agathias *AP* 11.64: *οἶά τε λέμβοι / κισσύβια*. There was of course a cup called trireme. In *AJA* 76 (1972) 217 Mrs. I. Raubitschek is reported to have maintained that the eyes on eye-cups are ships' eyes. The paper has not yet been published. K. Schauenburg, *Studien zur gr. Vasenmalerei*, *Antike Kunst*, Beiheft 7 (Bern 1970) 33-45, gives a useful list of cups with inner friezes of ships, but I have not located any more relevant studies. Van Nes (above n. 9) points out that in *Epigr.* *fr.* 10 and Xenarchus *fr.* 10 the metaphors are broadened "zu einem ausführlichen Schiffsbild."

<sup>23</sup> Bacch. 20B.7 and Alcaeus *fr.* 346.6 LP; cf. Antiphanes *fr.* 237.3 (*CAF* 2.115).

<sup>24</sup> *QC* 679c, 707c.

<sup>25</sup> *διακυβερνήσαι τὸν πότον*, *QC* 712b.

<sup>26</sup> Latte in his note refers to Kretschmer, *Gr. Vaseninschr.* p. 231.67, but there is no necessary connection. There a pair playing piggyback is addressed by a man with the word *κέλευε*.



εἶδος. I would suggest that there is a possible connection with a game described by Galen, Lucian, and Plutarch in which someone was elected to give to the company eccentric orders to be performed under pain of forfeit.<sup>27</sup> So Phryne in Galen gets all the women to wash their faces, with the result that she is shown to be the only one that needs no makeup. Was the elected person a *κελευστής*? Whether chanteys were sung like the skolon in Page's papyrus selection<sup>28</sup> is impossible to verify. But I should mention that the so-called ship of state passages in early Greek lyric need to be reread in a new light.<sup>29</sup> Those poems of Archilochus apparently written at sea are no more likely to have been written at sea than paraclausithyra on doorsteps, but they would make sense if one spliced the mainbrace in one's own triclinium, while claiming the sea as dramatic background.

Two passages call for attention. The first is Xenarchus fr. 2 K, where the last two lines describing the submersion of the drinker read in Athenaeus:

ἡ τοῦ δὲ Σωτήρος Διὸς (sc. φιάλη) τάχιστα γε  
ἀπώλεσεν αὐτὴν καὶ κατεπόντωσέν μ', ὄρᾳς.

Meineke reads Canter's correction ἀπώλεσε ναύτην and notes "si recte emendatum est, de quo vix dubites, ambigere licet utrum ναύτην proprio an metaphorico sensu de potatore accipi debeat. Vide Naekium ad Choir. p. 165."<sup>30</sup> Here Kock and Edmonds have corrupted the text. The second passage that may find its explanation in the metaphor we have investigated is Horace *Epode* 9.35:

vel quod fluentem nauseam coerceat  
metire nobis Caecubum.

In spite of the large amount of commentary that this passage has attracted, especially by Williams and Fraenkel,<sup>31</sup> I have found no justifi-

<sup>27</sup> Galen *Protrept.* 1.26 K; Plut. *QC* 621e; Lucian *Saturn.* 4. Cf. Panyassis fr. 12.3 K from the tradition *Περὶ μέθης*.

<sup>28</sup> *Gk. Lit. Pap.* p. 390 = *PMG* 917.

<sup>29</sup> As Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1966) 70f, seems to suggest.

<sup>30</sup> *FCG* 3.616.

<sup>31</sup> Fraenkel (above, n. 29) 74 summarizes earlier attempts while stopping short of the point I am making. I cannot feel that I understand clearly what G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality* (Oxford 1968) 218, is trying to say on the issue. It seems to me that there is a further point that editors are missing. We have no evidence that Caecuban was used to cure possible hangovers, though it is probably better than any other first-rate wine in preventing them (Plin. *NH* 14.8.59). What is, however, quite remarkable is that the comic poet Philyllius fr. 24 (*CAF* 1.787) testifies that both Chian and Lesbian prevented hangovers. Chian wine was



cation for the strange, and it must be admitted slightly repellent, phrase, *fluentem nauseam*. The sympotic epode celebrating at length the victorious sea battle is clearly not held at sea, and the symposiasts are not literally liable to seasickness. However, if a nautical metaphor is being applied to the symposium, the phrase is in order. The advantages of thinking that it is are three. First, it excuses an otherwise unnecessarily vulgar allusion, for not only is *nausea* a prosaic word but the addition of *fluentem* makes it even more graphic, when, for example, the word *fastidium* could have expressed the thought more delicately. Second, the uniqueness of the metaphor can be explained by the model of Archilochus and possibly Alcaeus, or at least the Greek tradition behind the *Epodes*; here Fraenkel was very close to what I am suggesting. Third, we have a tone of light irony and humor introduced, insofar as Horace suggests at the last moment that the symposiasts too have been at sea as they followed the description of the pursuit of Caesar's enemies over the Mediterranean. In fact, it is possible to see in the extraordinary phrase the neat point of the whole poem; it would be typical of Horace's sense of humor. We must not forget that it was ἐν ναυτιῶντες that the symposiasts in Akragas confronted the magistrates, and, if Horace's ode was recited at a suitable symposium,<sup>32</sup> the point would be, as often, much more clear to his contemporaries than to us. A parallel is the so-called ship-of-state allegory in *Odes* 1.14, where, in fact, nothing forces us to accept this as the correct reading of the allegory. It has been suggested,<sup>33</sup> not without reason, that the ship of love or another ship was meant. If it were the symposiastic ship, that too would be possible, for without the key to the allegory given by the circumstances we are helpless.

The same, of course, is true of several ancient sympotic poems. What songs did the symposiasts in Acragas sing as they threw their furniture out the window? If they had the sense of humor we expect of them, possibly Alcaeus' ἀσυννέτημι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσις<sup>34</sup> or perhaps even

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prescribed against heartburn in the time of Varro (Plin. *NH* 14, 17, 96). It seems that all Horace's wines are first-rate and all inhibit nausea.

<sup>32</sup> The only real fragment of Maecenas' *Symposium* we possess deals with the effects of wine, fr. 3 André: "ministrat faciles oculos, pulchriora reddit omnia." This topos is as old as Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 410, and speculation as to Maecenas's source seems pointless.

<sup>33</sup> See Nisbet-Hubbard on *Odes* 1.14. O. Seel, "Zur Ode 1.14 des Horaz: Zweifel an einer communis opinio"; *Festsch. Vretska* (Heidelberg 1970) 244f speaks of an *Existenzsymbol*. See lastly E. Schäfer in *Toposforschung* ed. Jehn (Frankfurt 1972) 280 n. 68.

<sup>34</sup> Now properly explained by R. Kassel, *RhM* 116 (1973) 102ff.

an anacreontic like the one uttered by Cyclops in Euripides (*Cycl.* 503ff):<sup>35</sup> σκάφος ὀλκὰς ὥς γεμισθείς ("we are loaded to the gunwales with our joyful cargo"). Did they not suffer the hallucination of *monarchia*, as Bacchylides 20B.12 tells us? If so, the reference to *monarchia* in the Alcaeus fragment A6.27 may be a hallucination and not a political reference, just as one of Alcaeus' earlier ships of state is revealed by a papyrus commentary to be possibly an old prostitute.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> E. E. Pot, *De maritieme beeldspraak bij Euripides* (diss. Utrecht 1943) 30.

<sup>36</sup> Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 195.

## ENNIUS' USAGE OF *IS EA ID*

JON D. MIKALSON

THE creation of a poetic diction forms an important element in the development of a *Dichtersprache*. Poetic diction includes not only the selection or creation of certain poetic words but also the avoidance of certain words because of their essentially prosaic nature. B. Axelson has documented in *Unpoetische Wörter* the avoidance of certain words in Latin poetry for this very reason.<sup>1</sup> Lucretius is the earliest Latin poet of the thirteen poets represented in his study. Axelson's reason for excluding Ennius, though not stated, is obvious and justified: there are not a sufficient number of lines of Ennius extant to provide conclusive evidence for the study which he has undertaken. It is not impossible, however, to apply to Ennius the results and methods of Axelson's study, but in the case of Ennius it must be remembered that conclusive evidence for a large number of words cannot be presented as can be done with Ovid, Vergil, and the other poets whom Axelson studies. The fact that *item* occurs not once in the more than 500 lines and partial lines of the *Annales* may be attributed to chance. But the fact that this word occurs only twice in Vergil and only once in Ovid indicates a definite avoidance of the word.

We have for Ennius, however, a partial counterbalance to the lack of thousands of lines for statistical analysis: i.e. the prose fragments of the *Euhemerus*.<sup>2</sup> In these prose fragments it is possible to determine with what words Ennius expressed himself outside of the poetic medium. By examining the diction of the prose, and by taking note of certain words which occur frequently in the prose but not in the poetry, we may be able to isolate a word or words which Ennius may have considered prosaic. It would then be possible to determine whether Ennius' use of this word is in accord with the results of Axelson's study of the usage of later Latin poets. In this way we may find some indication that Ennius

<sup>1</sup> B. Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der lateinischen Dichtersprache*, Skrifter Utgivna av Vetenskaps-Societeten i Lund, 29 (1945).

<sup>2</sup> E. Laughton, *Eranos* 44 (1951) 35-49, and H. Krug, *Forschungen und Fortschritte* 24 (1948) 57-59, have independently proved conclusively that frs. I, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and XI (numbered according to Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae*<sup>2</sup>) of the *Euhemerus* are essentially Ennian prose. For fr. V, which Lactantius has cast into *oratio obliqua*, see E. Fraenkel, *Eranos* 44 (1951) 50-56.

was aware of the prosaic character of certain words and that he carefully avoided them in his poetry.

The pronoun *is ea id* presents itself as the most promising subject for this inquiry. First, all the grammatical forms of this word can be accommodated into the poetic meters, and thus it is never to be excluded from poetry on this basis.<sup>3</sup> Second, the pronoun occurs very frequently in the genuinely Ennian fragments of the *Euhemerus*. In fact, it occurs so frequently that it has been designated as one of the distinctive features of the narrative style of early Latin prose.<sup>4</sup>

In the seven fragments of the *Euhemerus* which preserve the prose of Ennius (I, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XI), twenty-seven occurrences of some form of *is* are attested,<sup>5</sup> a ratio of approximately 1:13 to all the words in these fragments. The distribution of the forms is as follows:

is	2	ea	0	id	1
eius	3	eius	1	eius	0
ei	2	ei	0	ei	0
eum	7	eam	1	id	4
eo	2	ea	2	eo	0
ei	0	eae	0	ea	0
eorum	1	earum	0	eorum	0
eis	0	eis	0	eis	0
eos	1	eas	0	ea	0
eis	0	eis	0	eis	0

On the basis of this extensive use of the pronoun *is* in the *Euhemerus*, one would expect to find numerous occurrences of it in the *Annales*. But quite the opposite is found. Otto Skutsch has recently published observations on the use of *is ea id* in the poetry of Ennius.<sup>6</sup> Skutsch notes that Ennius used the nominative forms of *is* in the *Annales* but avoided the oblique forms and replaced them with the highly archaic forms *sum*, *sam*, *sos*, and *sas*. He also notes that the oblique forms of *is* occur in the plays of Ennius. Skutsch's observations on this usage coincide with my own findings, which are presented below.

<sup>3</sup> All forms certainly *can* be accommodated, as is proved by their attestation in poetry. Some scholars have felt that uncertainty as to the proper metrical structure of forms such as *iis* and *ei* may have led to their exclusion (Axelson [above, n. 1] 71). On the contrary, however, a form with metrical flexibility would have been convenient for early Latin poets.

<sup>4</sup> Laughton (above, n. 2) 38.

<sup>5</sup> In fragment IV manuscript R<sup>1</sup> has *iis* for the *his* reported in all other manuscripts. This *iis* has not been included in the above tabulation.

<sup>6</sup> O. Skutsch et al. in *Ennius*, Entretiens Fond. Hardt 17 (Geneva 1972; hereafter referred to as Skutsch, *Ennius*) 24.



In the *Annales* only six instances of *is* are attested, five in the masculine nominative singular (lines 30, 141, 286, 306, and 378),<sup>7</sup> and one in the feminine nominative singular (line 107). When Ennius wished to employ an oblique case of the pronoun, he turned to the pronominal stem \**so*, \**sa*, which was already at this time archaic.<sup>8</sup> In each instance Ennius replaced *eum* with *sum* (lines 98, 131, 471), *eam* with *sam* (219), *eos* with *sos* (22, 151, 256, 356), and *eas* with *sas* (101).<sup>9</sup>

One fragment stands as an apparent exception to Ennius' otherwise consistent pattern of usage of the pronoun: *Annales* 619, *spoliantur eos et corpora nuda relinquunt*. It was, in fact, this fragment which motivated Skutsch's discussion of *is* in Ennius. Two problematical features of this line may now be regarded as solved; first, the line is in all probability correctly assigned to Ennius' *Annales*,<sup>10</sup> and, second, the lost first syllable must be restored as *de-*, to give *despoliantur* or (see below) *despoliant*.<sup>11</sup> Skutsch recognizes that *eos* in this line contradicts Ennius' practice in the usage of this pronoun and that it should be rejected. With the aid of an elegant conjecture Skutsch then proposes that the line should read as follows: *despoliant umeros et corpora nuda relinquunt*.<sup>12</sup> His assumption, which he himself terms "bold," is that an original *spoliantumeros* had been corrupted to *spoliantureos* before the line was excerpted by a grammarian who misinterpreted the corruption as an example of the solecism *spoliantur*. Skutsch's conclusions concerning *eos* are correct, but I would propose a much simpler and perhaps more tenable restoration of the line: *despoliantur sos et corpora nuda relinquunt*. It is quite conceivable that a grammarian or scribe whose attention was centered on the solecism *spoliantur* may have introduced for *sqs* a *lectio faciliior*. The line as I have restored it does not have the strong Homeric echo we should like,<sup>13</sup> but it does stand much closer to the text that has been transmitted to us.

<sup>7</sup> The lines are numbered throughout according to Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>8</sup> T. Bergk, *Kleine philologische Schriften* (1884) I 302; A. Meillet and A. Ernout, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue Latine* (1932) 906-907.

<sup>9</sup> Ennius did not extend the practice of avoiding the oblique forms to the compound *idem eadem idem*. Besides the masculine nominative singular *idem* (lines 120, 124, 144, and 477), there are attested in the *Annales* the oblique forms *eorundem* (200), *isdem* (193), *eosdem* (598), and the neuter accusative plural *eadem* (452).

<sup>10</sup> Skutsch, *Ennius* (above, n. 6) 23-24.

<sup>11</sup> H. Cancik, *RhM* 112 (1969) 94-95; Skutsch, *Ennius* (above, n. 6) 24.

<sup>12</sup> Skutsch, *Ennius* (above, n. 6) 23-25.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* 25. Professor Skutsch, who has kindly read this paper and has offered valuable suggestions and criticisms, suggests three objections to the emendation

From Ennius' usage of *is* in the *Annales* two conclusions may be drawn. First, Ennius very infrequently (six times in over 500 lines) employed the word. Second, he allowed only the nominative forms of the pronoun, and found a substitute to replace all the oblique cases. This pattern of usage is in distinct contrast with his use of the pronoun in prose, where he used the word very frequently (one of every thirteen words) and where he regularly employed the oblique cases. We have thus isolated a word which Ennius treated very differently in prose and in poetry.

Ennius not only distinguished between prose and poetry in his use of *is*, but also distinguished between the two poetic genres in which he composed. As Skutsch observed, Ennius' use of *is* in the tragic fragments differs significantly from his usage in the *Annales*. The following list summarizes this usage.

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*despoliantur sos* which I have proposed. First, he notes that *spoliantur* would be the only example in Ennius for a deponent verb where classical authors use the active only (Skutsch, *Ennius* 24). Second, he points out that there is no indisputable example of *sos* lengthening a preceding fall which before an oblique case of *is* would have remained short. Third, he observes that there is no close parallel for the metrical pattern created by *sos* (i.e. monosyllable before a solitary penthemimeres). Cases of preposition + monosyllabic oblique case, such as *Annales* 74 and 271, must be discounted. Skutsch regards *Annales* 565 (*cum . . . induperator*), a holodactylic verse with solitary penthemimeres, as an exceptional device picturing speed.

In response to these objections I might note first that although there is no example in Ennius of a deponent for the classical active, some weight should be given to the possible occurrence of *despoliatur* or *despolatur* in Afranius *Crimen* 42. The text of Afranius, cited by Nonius (480.9) under the heading *spolor pro spolio* (or *spolior*), is, however, very uncertain and allows no positive conclusions (Cancik [above, n. 11] 94 n. 6). Second, as Skutsch himself recognizes, the second objection is valid only if one accepts the emendation of *Annales* 98 proposed by Vahlen in his first edition but suppressed in the second edition. Vahlen's original emendation was accepted by Baehrens, L. Mueller, and Valmaggia and has recently been defended strongly by Skutsch himself (*Studia Enniana* 46-51). *Annales* 98 in its transmitted form would be an instance in which the \**so* pronoun may be replaced by the corresponding form of *is*. Finally, the metrical form of *despoliantur sos* is unparalleled and is unusual. Concerning this objection and the two other objections as well, two points should be made: first, the amount of evidence for this period of Latin is slight and very fragmentary, and therefore parallels cannot always be expected. Second, unusual metrical and morphological usages should not be rejected *a priori* from an author whose surviving works exhibit such a willingness for metrical and morphological experimentation.

is	52	ea	302	id	224
eius		eius		eius	
ei		ei	312	ei	
eum	46, 168, 425	eam	130	id	148, 237 (twice), 419
eo		ea	250	eo	12
ei		eae		ea	
eorum		earum		eorum	
eis		eis		eis	
eos	317, 390	eas		ea	
iis	322	eis		eis	

There are seventeen occurrences of *is* in the tragic fragments, of which fourteen are in the oblique cases. This is in clear contrast to the six uses of *is* in the *Annales*, no one of which is in an oblique case. Ennius has distinguished between epic diction and tragic diction, just as he distinguished between epic diction and prose diction. His distinction between the epic and tragic genres is in accord with the identical practice of Livius Andronicus. E. Fraenkel<sup>14</sup> has shown that Livius through the use of archaisms (such as the genitive singular in *-ai*) attempted to elevate the style of his epic not only above the language of common speech but also above the less solemn tragic language. Ennius endeavored for the same effect by the substitution of the archaic \**so* pronoun for the oblique cases of the pronoun *is* in the *Annales*.

The question must now be posed whether Ennius' usage of this pronoun is consistent with the usage of later Latin epic poets. E. Wölfflin and C. Meader have collected and analyzed the uses of the pronoun *is* in Latin literature,<sup>15</sup> and from their study Axelson has drawn his conclusions as to the prosaic character of the word. Both studies (Wölfflin and Meader 371-372 and Axelson 70-71) note the general avoidance of the pronoun *is* *ea* *id* in Latin epic poetry. Vergil used the pronominal and adjectival forms of this word only eighty-two times in the whole of the *Aeneid*, Ovid only ninety-four times in the *Metamorphoses*, and Lucan only six times in the *Bellum Civile*. As Wölfflin and Meader note (371), the process of limitation culminates with Claudian, who has only two uses of *is* in nearly 10,000 lines. The reason for the exclusion of this weak and colorless pronoun is obvious, and Bentley (note to Horace *Od.* 3.11.18) has stated it exquisitely: *poetae epici, magno sane cum iudicio, vocabulum hoc perpetuo mulctarunt exilio, ne heroici*

<sup>14</sup> *RE* suppl. 5 (1931) coll. 603-607.

<sup>15</sup> *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik* XI (1900) 369-381.

*carminis maiestatem humi serpere cogeret*. And thus it is established that Ennius' general avoidance of *is* is consistent with the usage of later Latin epic poets.

The second element in Ennius' usage of *is*, i.e. the use of these forms in the nominative but the exclusion of them in the oblique cases, is particularly interesting. What led Ennius to exclude only the oblique cases of *is* is a matter of conjecture. Wöfflin and Meader (372), though not discussing Ennius, note that the nominative forms of *is* are relatively infrequent in prose and thus may not have been felt to be strongly prosaic. This is clearly true in the *Euhemerus*, where only three of the twenty-seven attested forms are nominative, and this factor may have influenced Ennius' judgment as to which forms were worthy of epic diction. But Ennius, whatever the reason, was innovating when he excluded the oblique cases, because both Livius in the *Odusia* (Morel, line 21) and Naevius in the *Bellum Poenicum* (Morel, lines 5, 20, 22, 40) employed the oblique cases. That later Latin poets followed Ennius' pattern of the use of the nominative case and the avoidance of the oblique cases is indicated by Axelson's conclusion (70-71) that the forms which the Latin poets used most frequently are the nominative singular *is ea id*. This is the case, but it must be noted also that later Latin epic poets did not exclude the oblique cases as systematically as Ennius had done. Vergil preferred the nominative forms (forty-two of the eighty-two uses in the *Aeneid* are nominative), but he also allowed an occasional accusative or ablative. Vergil used in particular the neuter accusative plural *ea* (eighteen times). It is noteworthy that ten of Vergil's eleven pronominal uses of *ea* occur in some variation of the formula *ea fatus*. The formulaic character of this expression lends a certain nobility to the otherwise rather prosaic word. Ovid also preferred the nominative forms of the pronoun (forty-eight of the ninety-four uses in the *Metamorphoses*), but allowed, in addition to one genitive singular, also accusative and ablative forms. As has been demonstrated, the Latin epic poets in general made limited use of *is*, but had what Skutsch (*Ennius* 25) terms a "peculiar poetic prejudice against the oblique forms." This is precisely the pattern of usage which Ennius developed in contrast to his contemporaries. The conclusion must be, as Skutsch suggests, that the later Latin poets were strongly influenced by the pattern set by Ennius.

Other factors, of course, also influenced the later development of the usage of *is*. Such a colorless pronoun naturally would be avoided by all poets of the high style. In addition, the forms *eorum* and *earum* were cumbersome, cacophonous, and easily inferred by the reader from the



context. These factors can explain the general avoidance of *is* in poetry, but they do not explain the "peculiar poetic prejudice against the oblique forms." This prejudice was, I believe, Ennius' creation. His use of the nominative forms ennobled them sufficiently to be included in epic diction, whereas his innovative exclusion of the oblique forms condemned them. The later Latin poets did not choose to eliminate the oblique cases of *is* as completely as Ennius had done, in part perhaps because they rejected the \**so* pronoun which Ennius had introduced.

In one instance later Latin epic poets not only followed this general pattern of Ennius' usage of *is* but imitated very closely his specific treatment of this pronoun. Three of the five attested Ennian uses of *is* itself appear as *isque*. Eight of Vergil's thirteen pronominal uses of *is* in the *Aeneid* appear as *isque*, and, excluding 8.654, six of Ovid's twenty uses in the *Metamorphoses*. These later poets were clearly imitating Ennius' formulaic and metrically convenient use of this pronominal form.

In conclusion, one may state that Ennius was sensitive to a difference between prose and epic diction in his own writings. He differentiated not only between prose and poetry but also between the poetic genres in which he composed. He thus stands in the tradition of the Latin poets studied by Axelson. It was Ennius in the *Annales*, not Cicero in the *Aratea* (Wölfflin and Meader 369-370), who reformed the use of this pronoun in the Latin epic tradition, and, though the later epic poets were not as strict as he, his influence was felt throughout the history of Latin epic poetry.

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## VIRGIL AND PARTHENIUS

WENDELL CLAUSEN

*Aeneid* IV. 645-651:

interiora domus inrumpit limina et altos  
conscendit furibunda rogos ensemque recludit  
Dardanium, non hos quaesitum munus in usus.  
hic, postquam Iliacas uestis notumque cubile  
conspexit, paulum lacrimis et mente morata  
incubuitque toro dixitque nouissima uerba:  
"dulces exuviae . . ."

Περὶ ἐρωτικῶν παθημάτων II:

τὰ περὶ Τροίας ἄλωσιν καὶ ὃν τρόπον αὐτοῖς ἐσκεδάσθησαν  
αἱ νῆες κομιζομένοις ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰλίου διεπνυθάνετο, ξενίζων  
τε αὐτὸν πολὺν χρόνον διῆγεν. 2. τῷ δὲ ἄρα καὶ αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ μονὴ  
ἡδομένη· Πολυμήλη γὰρ τῶν Αἰολιδῶν τις ἐρασθεῖσα αὐτοῦ  
κρύφα συνῆν. ὥς δὲ τοὺς ἀνέμους ἐγκεκλεισμένους παραλαβὼν  
ἀπέπλευσεν, ἡ κόρη φωρᾶταί τινα τῶν Τρωϊκῶν λαφύρων  
ἔχουσα καὶ τούτοις μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων ἀλινδουμένη. 3.  
ἔνθα ὁ Αἴολος τὸν μὲν Ὀδυσσεά καίπερ οὐ παρόντα  
ἐκάκισεν . . .

Parthenius, who compiled his exquisite handbook of erotic tales for the use of Cornelius Gallus,<sup>1</sup> was Virgil's tutor in Greek; and Virgil apparently imitated one of his verses, *Georg.* I.437: *Glauco et Panopeae et Inoo Melicertae*: see Macrobius, *Sat.* V.17.18, and Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XIII.27. The indication of Parthenius' source here — *ἱστορεῖ Φιλίτας Ἑρμῇ* — may well be right, but it was not given by Parthenius.<sup>2</sup> In any case, Virgil would hardly look round for Philitas with Parthenius at hand.

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<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* I (1924) 230 n. 2, conjectures that Propertius also had help of this kind.

<sup>2</sup> See Rohde, *Der griechische Roman* (3rd ed., 1914) 121ff.





## JUVENAL AND VIRGIL

WENDELL CLAUSEN

Juvenal I.155-157:<sup>1</sup>

“pone Tigillinum, taeda lucebis in illa  
qua stantes ardent qui fixo gutture fumant,  
et latum media sulcum deducit harena.”

155 lucebis *RVALOUΞ*: lucebit *PGHKTZ*

156 gutture *VΦΞ*: pectore *PRAO*

157 deducit *PRVΦ*: deducis *LO*

Satirizing the great and bad is dangerous business: breathe a word against Tigillinus and you will find yourself in the amphitheater — a blazing torch. This passage, as the manuscript variants indicate, has been long and widely misunderstood; and is still misunderstood. Friedlaender (1895), like most editors, reads *deducis* — an obvious and feeble conjecture, probably of late antiquity — and assumes “enallage temporum,” present tense for future. Of such interpretations, or rather evasions of interpretation, Bentley demanded at Horace, *Carm.* I.37.24: “aut ubi natae sunt nisi in cerebellis Magistrorum: qui, si Hypallagen, Hyperbaton, Synchysin nominaverint, egregie loca quaeque contaminatissima se putant expedire?” Housman (1905, 1931), citing Seneca, *De ira* III.3.6: *circumdati defossis corporibus ignes et cadauera quoque trahens uncus*, supposed that a verse had fallen out after 156, a verse something like this: *quorum informe unco trahitur post fata cadauer* — a drastic expedient, accepted by Knoche (1950). But would the charred remnants of a body, or even of several bodies, make a broad furrow when dragged over the hard-packed sand? Struve (in Friedlaender) deleted 157 — an equally drastic expedient, accepted by Vianello (1935). Duff (1898, 1932) rightly remarks: “None of the many emendations<sup>2</sup> of this passage has any probability.”

“Locus hic subobscurus visus est interpretibus . . . qui fit, ut Pithoeus dixerit nullum in his Satyris locum esse, quem ex Grammaticorum glossis minus grammaticè intelligeret.” So Henninius (1685). The

<sup>1</sup> Text and apparatus criticus from my *OCT* edition (1959, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> Collected by Ruperti, I (1819) 309.

grammar of this passage was explained by the youthful Madvig (1837): "relativum semel positum ad alterum orationis membrum alio casu auditur,"<sup>3</sup> that is, *et* <*quae*> is understood from *qua* as *et* <*quod*> from *quo* in — one of Madvig's examples — Cicero, *Verr.* IV.9: *mancipium putarunt, quo et omnes utimur et non praebetur a populo*. The intervening relative clause *qui . . . fumant* poses no obstacle, for *qua* and *et*, standing each at the beginning of its verse, receive a slight emphasis which defines the structure. Madvig's interpretation is perfect and enjoys overwhelming manuscript support; but it has been rejected by editors of Juvenal, Mayor (1872, 1886) and Weidner (1889) excepted. Why? "Some editors accept *deducit* . . . and supply *quae* out of *qua*, as nom. to the verb: in this case it is not the body of a single victim, dragged through the arena, that forms the *sulcus*, but, a number of men being burnt in one long row, their flaming bodies are said to mark out a furrow, or series of depressions, in the sand. But *sulcus* surely means a depression of the soil, first the mark of a ploughshare, and then a ditch or trench; whereas, at such a scene as Juv. has in mind, the row of victims would surely strike the eye as something raised above the soil, not sunk beneath it." So Duff. Duff did not recognize, nor have other editors, that this passage is an imitation or reminiscence of a famous passage in the *Aeneid*, II.697–698:<sup>4</sup> the description of the portentous star that flashes across the night sky and lodges in Ida's woods, leaving a long furrow of light. Set together the two passages will make all clear:

tum longo limite *sulcus*  
dat *lucem et late loca sulphure fumant.*

"taeda *lucebis* in illa  
qua stantes ardent qui fixo gutture *fumant*,  
*et latum media sulcum deducit harena.*"

<sup>3</sup> "De locis aliquot Iuvenalis explicandis disputatio altera" = *Opusc. acad.* (1887) 541. See also Dissen (1832) at Tib. I.8.32; Housman at Manil. I.136, IV.184.

<sup>4</sup> Suggested by T. Maguire in a modest note, *Hermathena* IV (1881–83) 422–423, so modest that it has been ignored. Here it is entire: "I offer as a possibility: *sulcum deducis* = *deducis sulcum luminis*: Juvenal perhaps compressed into *sulcum deducis* Vergil's *Stella facem ducens . . . / . . . sulcus / Dat lucem . . .*, *Aen.* ii.694–698." Maguire notices that Virgil was imitated by Lucan V.561–562, X.500–502, Valerius Flaccus I.558, and Silius Italicus I.354–357, XV.11. (Virgil got the idea for his splendid metaphor from Apollonius of Rhodes, *Arg.* IV.296–297.) I. A. Campbell, *CR* 50 (1936) 122, detects an imitation or reminiscence of *Aen.* VII.457: *fumantes fixit sub pectore taedas* and concludes that Juvenal wrote *pectore*; on which see Housman, *Journ. Phil.* 34 (1918) 45–46 = *Classical Papers* III (1972) 967–968.

Ranged in a long row and half buried in the sand, the blazing victims would seem, from high in the amphitheater, to make a broad furrow of light in the darkness: compare the description of the funeral cortège of Pallas, *Aen.* XI.143-144:

lucet uia longo  
ordine flammaram et late discriminat agros.

Juvenal had in mind the nocturnal cruelties which Nero inflicted on the Christians: Tacitus, *Ann.* XV.44.4: *et pereuntibus addita ludibria, ut . . . crucibus adfixi atque flammati, ubi defecisset dies, in usum nocturni luminis urerentur.*

Juvenal's adaptation of Virgil's is curious, but no more curious than — to give but one example — Virgil's adaptation, *Aen.* IV.460:

inuitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi

of Catullus 67.39:

inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi.<sup>5</sup>

" . . . an expression, a phrase, a thought, which in its original place is natural, clear and well motivated, usually becomes somewhat peculiar, or a trifle hazy or less suitable in the context, when borrowed or imitated by another author . . . " <sup>6</sup> This is true of Juvenal, though not of Virgil, the greater poet.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. my remarks in *HSCP* 74 (1968) 90-91.

<sup>6</sup> E. Löfstedt, "Reminiscences and Imitations," *Eranos* 47 (1949) 48. Similarly A. G. Lee in a terse and elegant paper on "Tibullus" III.19 (IV.13), *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* n.s. 9 (1963) 6: "If we find anything awkward or inorganic, then the probability is that the passage containing it is the imitation. This probability becomes a virtual certainty if we can show that the thought expressed by one poet is not fully intelligible, or explicable, without bringing in the thought expressed by the other . . . Thus . . . a love-rosary of leaves is an awkwardness. It is unlikely that Hood would have thought of the idea unless Keats had previously imagined a rosary of yew-berries." There is "an awkwardness" of this kind in *Juv.* II.81:

uuaque conspecta liuorem ducit ab uua.

Why should one cluster of grapes turn color at the sight of another? The scholiast's explanation — *hoc ex prouerbio sumitur: uua uuam uidendo uaria fit* — is no explanation at all; merely a paraphrase of the verse. "Hoc ego de liuescentibus sub vindemiam acinis uvarum accipio, ex populi opinione [?] dictum, censentis ubi liuere et nigrescere coeperat unus uvae acinus, protinus, propinquum eo conspecto velut inuidia quadam [!] similem colorem ducere solitum esse." So Turnebus, *Advers. libri XXX* (1604) 283, whose fanciful interpretation was copied by Ruperti, II (1820). Friedlaender accepts the

There was another passage in the *Aeneid* present and related in Juvenal's mind to II.697-698 as he was writing the first satire, and with a result "somewhat peculiar." Juvenal 1.99-109, a turbulent scene at a great man's door as the dole is distributed:

iubet a praecone uocari	
ipsos Troiugenas, nam uexant limen et ipsi	100
nobiscum. "da praetori, da deinde tribuno."	
sed libertinus prior est. "prior" inquit "ego adsum.	
cur timeam dubitemue locum defendere, quamuis	
natus ad Euphraten, molles quod in aure fenestrae	
arguerint, licet ipse negem? sed quinque tabernae	105
quadringenta parant. quid confert purpura maior	
optandum, si Laurenti custodit in agro	
conductas Coruinus ouis, ego possideo plus	
Pallante et Licinis?"	

The allusion in line 108 is to Valerius Messala Corvinus, consul with Nero in 58; Nero gave him a yearly pension so that he might sustain a "harmless poverty" (Tacitus, *Ann.* XIII.34). With a typical exaggeration Juvenal imagines him, or some noble like him, reduced to keeping hired sheep: *conductas Coruinus ouis*. Weidner and Duff have nothing on the phrase; Friedlaender and Knoche (his translation, 1951) apparently understand it; Mayor certainly understands it, for he cites *Dig.* XIX. 2.9.4-5; Ramsay (Loeb, 1918, 1940) misunderstands it: "a Corvinus herds sheep for daily wage." That this misunderstanding must be very old is indicated by the scholiast's note: *quid praestat nobilitas, si mercenarius alienus est et pauper?* Corvinus is not imagined as a day laborer, a hired hand,<sup>7</sup> but as a sort of tenant farmer — a condition carefully defined

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scholiast's "proverb" and cites the Greek proverb: *βότρυς πρὸς βότρυν πεπαινεται*, which hardly elucidates *conspicua*. "*ab uua conspicua*, sonderbar, vom blossen Anblick einer schon gefärbten Traube! Ein Scholium ad h. l. bestätigt diese Lesart nur scheinbar: es ist corrupt, und hat einen anderen Sinn." So Heinrich (1839), who cites Ioh. Sarisb. *Policr.* V.10: *qui tangit picem, inquinabitur ab ea, uuaque contacta liuorem ducit ab uua* — which is what Juvenal ought to have written; but lingering in his memory for some reason (its rhetorical neatness?) was Ov. *Met.* II.494:

ursaque conspectos in montibus horruit ursos.

Ovid's verse is beautifully apt: Callisto, forgetting that she has herself become a bear, shudders at the sight of bears. Ovidian "echoes" are frequent in Juvenal, see E. Thomas, *Ovidiana* (1958) 505-525; this one has not been noticed.

<sup>7</sup> J. J. Hartmann, *Mnem.* n.s. 21 (1893) 330: "Sed quis umquam audivit aliquem agro gregibusque venundatis oves conducere quas pascat?" Hartmann



in Roman private law: a lessor (*locator*) furnishes material or property, a lessee (*conductor*) engages his work or craft, and shares in the profits; he is responsible for want of effort or skill, or loss through fraud or negligence.<sup>8</sup> *Laurenti . . . in agro*: but why there? Pliny *Ep.* II.17.3, in describing his Laurentine villa, mentions the many herds of sheep in the fields thereabouts. But Juvenal was thinking also of the fields where Aeneas and fierce Turnus had joined in battle long ago: *Aen.* XI.431: *Laurentibus agris*; XII.542: *Laurentes . . . campi*. A safe subject for poets, he dryly observes, unlike satire, 158–163:

qui dedit ergo tribus patruis aconita, uehatur  
pensilibus plumis atque illinc despiciat nos?  
“cum ueniet contra, digito compesce labellum:  
accusator erit qui uerbum dixerit ‘hic est.’  
securus licet Aenean Rutulumque ferocem  
committas . . . ”

The passage Juvenal had somehow in mind as he wrote *si Laurenti custodit in agro / conductas Coruinus ouis* was *Aen.* XII.516–520:

hic fratres Lycia missos et Apollinis agris  
et iuuenum exosum nequiquam bella Menoeten,  
Arcada, piscosae cui circum flumina Lerna  
ars fuerat pauperque domus nec nota potentum  
limina, conductaque pater tellure serebat.

520 limina *M*: munera *PR*

Menoetes — a young Arcadian who hated war and died in the fields of Laurentum, in happier times a fisherman; his house had been poor, and the doors of the great unknown; and his father a farmer, planting hired land: *conductaque pater tellure*.<sup>9</sup> His had been a peaceful rural existence; hence the pathos, noticed by Kroll: “ein hellenistisches Idyll, zu dem *exosum bella* passt, gemeint wohl im Sinne von Tibulls erster Elegie.”<sup>10</sup> Juvenal was no stranger to the pastoral mode — the contrast, oftener

wished to read *conductus*, which has since been found in two MSS — U and Vat. Urb. 342 (Knoche); it is probably accidental in each.

<sup>8</sup> *Dig.* XVII.2.52.3 (Juventius Celsus, a contemporary of Juvenal): *ideoque si pecus aestimatum datum sit et id latrocinio aut incendio perierit, commune damnum est, si nihil dolo aut culpa acciderit eius, qui aestimatum pecus acceperit: quod si a furibus subreptum sit, proprium eius detrimentum est, quia custodiam praestare debuit, qui aestimatum accepit.*

<sup>9</sup> *conductas Coruinus ouis*: such reminiscence is to be distinguished from obvious quotation for literary effect, as in II.100 *Actoris Aurunci spoliū* (= *Aen.* XII.94).

<sup>10</sup> *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (1924) 183.

implied than expressed, between the burdens of city life with its perils and the simple pleasures of the country: it pervades the third satire. Umbricius' (or Juvenal's) harrowing account of life in Rome ends quietly, as day declines, 315-322:

his alias poteram et pluris subnectere causas,  
sed iumenta uocant et sol inclinat. eundum est;  
nam mihi commota iamdudum mulio uirga  
adnuit. ergo uale nostri memor, et quotiens te  
Roma tuo refici properantem reddet Aquino,  
me quoque ad Heluinam Cererem uestramque Dianam  
conuerte a Cumis.

These lines are reminiscent of the close of Virgil's first eclogue: their conversation over, Tityrus offers homely comfort to a troubled Meliboeus, as the landscape darkens, 79-83:

hic tamen hanc mecum poteras requiescere noctem  
fronde super uiridi: sunt nobis mitia poma,  
castaneae molles et pressi copia lactis,  
et iam summa procul uillarum culmina fumant  
maioresque cadunt altis de montibus umbrae.

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## EMENDATIONS OF PSEUDO-QUINTILIAN'S LONGER DECLAMATIONS

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THE standard text of these grotesque but by no means uninteresting productions, by G. Lehnert (Teubner 1905), is an Augean stable;<sup>1</sup> R. Reitzenstein described it as "weder urkundlich noch verständlich." Readings, punctuation, and paragraph arrangement alike intimate that this editor had neither the capacity nor the desire to make sense of his author(s). A new edition has now been undertaken by L. Håkanson, who has prepared its way by publishing a collection of emendations and other textual comments as volume 70 in the Lund Royal Society series (*Textkritische Studien zu den grösseren pseudoquintilianischen Deklamationen* [1974]) — much the most valuable contribution to its subject in modern times. Unaware of these developments I had been assembling some ideas, not without some thought of myself preparing an edition; but that labor I am now happy to leave to Håkanson's exceptionally efficient hands. Meanwhile, although I have, not to my surprise, found myself forestalled by him at some points and bettered at others, I hope that what remains may seem worth independent publication.

The citations at the head of these notes reproduce Lehnert's text (reference by page and line), but in quotations within the notes his punctuation has sometimes tacitly been changed.

### I. PARIES PALMATUS

- 4.6      nec quod sceleratissima feminarum calamitatem nostram cruentato pariete imitata est, expavescimus. *quae* diligentia sollicitior fuit, ne prehenderetur: hoc magis indicavit sibi oculos non defuisse.

Instead of deleting *magis* (Obrecht) read *quo* for *quae* and replace colon with comma.

<sup>1</sup> Whereas the Shorter Declamations were very competently edited for the same series by C. Ritter (1884).

- 6.21 iungunt his multo incredibilia, ut occiderit patrem, pepercerit novercae, parricidium autem uno ictu explicuerit, quod fere vix etiam his contingere solet qui oculos manu sequuntur. nulla ergo luminum virtus, *sed* homo ferrum missurus in casum, satis felix, si percussisset quamcumque corporis partem, in ipsam protinus animam incidit et, an morti satisfecisset, intellexit.

The easy change of *sed* (*s*;) to *si* would, I suggest, be an improvement, though not absolutely required.

- 7.8 stupeo, si qua est fides, omnia *privignum* illa nocte fecisse. dicitur ad votum novercae gladium in vulnere reliquisse quem suum negare non posset. deinde per totum parietem quid aliud inscripsisse, quam se parricidam? . . . gratulor tibi, adulescens, si non potuisti parricidium illud admittere, nisi ut relinqueres argumentum caecitatis, habuisti innocentiae necessitatem.

Read *stupeo, si qua est fides. omnia privignus illa nocte fecisse dicitur ad votum novercae: gladium . . . posset; deinde . . . parricidam?* A colon should follow *adulescens*.

- 9.24 age, limen inveniam, cardinem sine strepitu movebo, dormientis cubiculum intrabo, . . . securus egrediar? sciente nullo revertar? vota sunt ista, sed oculorum. caecus desperaret, etiamsi tam multa *nox* polliceretur.

*egrediar* should be followed by a comma; the series of questions ends with *revertar*. The unintelligible *nox* is a reflection of *nox quando sit* . . . *nocte solus egrediar* . . . *nox ante deficiet* shortly preceding, and should be replaced with *non*. A blind man could have had no hope of escaping detection, even if the number of favorable chances needed for that purpose had been less than in fact it was.

- 11.25 tu si facere parricidium posses, ideo patrem tantum occidisses, ut tibi et novercam liceret occidere? *non* video *cui* videri velint relictam mulierem ideo tantum, ut videretur illud nefas illa fecisse. callide satis, sed hoc alio protinus argumento *subverteretur*. non est eiusdem consilii novercae parcere, ut substituat ream, et gladium relinquere quo ipse deprehendatur.

As in earlier texts, *occidere* should be followed by a full stop, not a question-mark. In the following sentence *videre* in BV does not help. *cur* for *cui* (M corr., S) appears in the old reading *non video cur, nisi velint* (better <*nisi*> *videri velint*), which makes sense; but the absence of an expressed subject for *velint* does not commend it. I prefer *nam*



*video qui videri velint*: 'For I see there are those who would like to make out that the woman was spared simply so that she might appear to have done the murder: a cunning enough argument, but...' *nam* is "occupatory." *subvertetur* should be read from Parisinus 1618 (cf. Håkanson, p. 20: "ein falsches -er- taucht in der Tradition mehrmals auf," with examples).

16.12 tu praeparare corpus illuc ad ictus potes, dum videris amplecti. tu blanda manu praetemptare pectus, ubi adsiduo visceris pulsu non quiescat anima, ubi statim mors sit. ubi *de spiritu* sanguinis locum explorare ante et cognoscere licet, potest et uno ictu mulier occidere.

As Håkanson has seen, *hoccum* (*hoc cum*) of BV should be kept against *locum* of Parisinus 1618. He reforms as follows: first, a comma after *amplecti*. Then *tu... anima, ubi statim mors sit, ubi* <se>des spiritu<s>, *sanguinis*. *hoc cum explorare ante* sqq. My only doubt is about *sedes*, for which Håkanson compares Manil. IV.929 *animi sedes tenui sub corde locata*. I had previously conjectured *ubi di<spertitio> spiritus, sanguinis*, comparing Cic. Nat. D. II.138, *eoque modo ex is partibus et sanguis per venas in omne corpus diffunditur et spiritus per arterias*.

18.13 transit ad aliud genus defensionis: sibi causam caedis non fuisse, cum hic heres inventus sit omnium bonorum. quis enim alius esse *debeat*, ut huic properandum fuerit ad hereditatem?

Read *debe<b>at*.

19.20 "nunc," inquit, "huc reddite illud, innocens, donec habuit meas manus tantum. si mori necesse est, illi potissimum incumbam." hoc illa iam olim gravis et infelix anima *querebatur*.

*illud*, *illi*, and *hoc* refer to the sword (*ferrum*). I see no sense in *querebatur*. Read *quaerebatur*. The sword (*hoc* is abl.) had long been seeking its owner's blood.

## II. CAECUS IN LIMINE

26.14 quanto alios praestat adfectus diligere vitae lucis auctorem? ... non inuenio, iudices, quemadmodum possit esse *contra* liberos salva reverentia. non est difficile, ut maritum uxor occidat, si non est difficilius, ut filius patrem.

"The commoner blunder is the reverse, to mistake exclamations for questions" (Housman, *Classical Papers* III, 1211). In this text this blunder runs riot. I notice it only here and at 51.15.

Rejecting Schulting's <non> *salva reverentia*, Håkanson fails to justify the text, though his remark, "Lehnert hat diese Stelle offenbar missverstanden, da er nach *reverentia* einen neuen Abschnitt beginnt," is well founded. The declaimer's point is that affection (respect) can only be relied upon as from child to parent, not short of that (as from wife to husband). Let *citra* (better palaeographically than *extra* or *ultra*) replace *contra*. For *salva reverentia* cf. 94.31, *parentibus . . . quibus apud liberos salva est mutua caritate reverentia*; 215.22, *solus hic exitus est a quo non est nec cadaveribus salva reverentia*.

- 28.1      nefas est, iudices, hunc iuvenem *reliquarum* debilitatum ratione defendi. quam incredibile est, ut occiderit patrem qui pati non potuit, ut perderet?

Any other young man might use his blindness and other physical handicaps as a defense against the charge of parricide, but *this* young man, who had saved his father's life, ought not to be so defended. *reliquarum* must be understood 'his other physical handicaps, apart from blindness'; see preceding paragraph. But the blindness would be part of such a defense, indeed the most important part. Something may have dropped out, e.g. <vel caecitatis> *vel reliquarum*, unless *reliquarum* be a misguided *marginale* which has invaded the text.

- 29.19      quid dicitis, iudices? nullumne tota domo, quod corrumpere, aliud parricida pectus invenit? difficilius hoc credas novercae, si te a nullo alio putes impetraturum. non ergo iuvenis credit *hoc omnes* loqui cum patre? omnium blanditiarum primum esse sermonem? novercam timeas *negantem*.

Stepmother's story, that Stepson asked her to administer poison to Father, is absurd; he would not take as his accomplice the one person most likely to betray him. Håkanson's proposal <nec> *negantem* is excellent and necessary. But I am not content with his comment "ob der Satz *non ergo* — *patre* wirklich richtig ist, wage ich nicht zu entscheiden." The sentence makes no sense in the context. For *hoc omnes* read *hanc in somniis*.

- 34.11      quanto ex hoc plus accipiat necesse est illa nocturni silentii quies quod ambulantis caeci nec manus cessant praemittuntur explorant

et adesse se nuntiant? *illa, per quae complexus veniunt*, <nescit cum> non sint in potestate caeci, *qua* toto se fateatur strepitu. quicquid occurrit, nequaquam potest evitare caecitas, nisi offensa.

There should be an exclamation-mark at *cessant* and a full stop after *nuntiant*. In the next sentence instead of Dessauer's supplement read *illa per quae complexus veniunt* <vestigia> *non sint in potestate caeci*, qui (*quia* Englund) . . . *strepitu*. Son could not tread softly in approaching his victim, as Stepmother could.

37.23 ut sciatis, iudices, neminem fuisse in domo quem non fragor ille confuderit, caecus quoque inventus in limine est, sicut solet ultro citroque commeari. iuvenis, si inter suum patrisque cubiculum facile discurrit, quid adhuc in limine facit? evasit, effugit, gladium iam reposuit. et quanto facilius est caeco simulare somnos, vultum quietis imitari?

Read *inventus in limine est*. <an>, *sicut solet ultro citroque commeari, iuvenis si . . . discurrit, quid . . . facit?* 'Or if (as you make out), being in the habit of passing to and fro, the young man is hurrying without difficulty between his own room and his father's, what is he doing hanging about on the threshold (instead of going back to bed and pretending to be asleep)?'

39.5 caeco vero facile est, etiam vigilanti subripere gladium. [quemadmodum paratur argumentum?] quaedam facere non potest negligentia, et facilius est, ut caecitatem imitentur oculi [gladium cruentatum reponendi]. *has* tantum causas habet qui occidit alieno.

I pass over the superfluous commas. The defense argues that the blind man's sword was stolen from his room and then put back blood-stained to incriminate him. He would not have been so careless as to put it back himself (for *neglegentia* cf. 22.3, *quicquid non potest esse neglegentiae*). Dessauer's two excisions are a mistake. Read *oculi. gladium cruentatum reponendi hic tantum causas habet qui occidit alieno*. Only someone other than the owner of the sword could have reason to replace it.

### III. MILES MARIANUS

48.24 inicitur manus, et ab adsignata statione miles abducitur, ut stuprum patiatur. vos interrogo, accusatores, quid faciet? feret libidinosas manus vulnera sua tractantes? deponet arma, *an*

*reponet?* *vir est enim, auctorem habet, hoc primi ordines iubent. aequum est tribuno militem parere, in diem sperare etiam processus potest, pro hoc merito accipiet fortasse vitem, ordines ducet, et sub illo alii militabunt.*

For *an reponet* (vv. ll. *aure ponet, reponet*) Håkanson conjectures *an opponet*, an improvement on Reitzenstein's *an <non> deponet*; but neither squares with the ensuing series of reasons, sarcastically offered of course, why Soldier should *not* resist. Perhaps *an reponet* was nothing more than a marginal query as to the reading. *vir est*, as Reitzenstein saw, is at odds with what follows; but his *iubetur* (sc. *a tribuno*) is awkward before *hoc primi ordines iubent*. Now *vir est* (*uirē*) is all but the same thing palaeographically as *iure* (sc. *faciet*). In laying aside his arms Soldier would be acting in accordance with *ius castrorum*; cf. 54.8, *ita, opinor, contra iura castrorum fecerat miles, etiam si tantum negasset*.

49.21 tu cogita quid te sensisse homines sciant. hoc exemplum in neutram partem potest taceri. *cogitare* certum est id quemque, cum iudicat, probare *quid* in re simili ipse fecisset.

Marius is adjured to think of the conclusions which will be drawn from his verdict. Read *cogita: certum est* sqq. For *quid* read *quod* (V).

51.15 en quem tribunum faceres, cum praetextati militabant?

This is not a question.

54.1 quis te, imperator, maioribus curis districto delicta militum coërcebit? *tribuni corpus* et peccata corriget? ad quem confugiam? cui querar?

All would be well without the meaningless *tribuni corpus*. Was this once a marginal note *tribunus cor.* (i.e. *corriget*)?

#### IV. MATHEMATICUS

68.11 non habeo infelix in cogitationibus, unde non timeam, et facinus quod sibi pro me pietas patris, quod *singulorum* innocentia rogat, sentio, patior, agnosco.

Astrologer had predicted at Son's birth that he would murder Father.

I am not sure that Håkanson's *singularis* is necessary. *singulorum* seems to refer to other people acquainted with the situation, who, innocent themselves, cannot believe that the prediction will come true. But he is certainly right in objecting to *rogat* ("wie kann der Sohn behaupten,



dass sein Vater um das Verbrechen *bittet?*"). Accordingly, he accepts Schulting's *negat*. I preferred *abrogat* (cf. Sen. *Herc. Oet.* 899, *nemo nocens sibi ipse poenas abrogat*).

71.19 vacua circa me tela ceciderunt.

Cited here *παρέργως* in support of my defense of Coripp. *Ioh.* V.13, *congressus vacuis ductor fortissimus armis*, in *Gnom.* 43 (1971) 519.

72.20 satis sit hactenus viri fortis nomen agnoscere, hucusque auctoritatem sacrae legis attingere, ut illam in advocationem *sacrae* mortis adducam.

Son is entitled to ask a reward for bravery in battle. He asks only permission to kill himself. What readers are expected to make of *sacrae mortis* I cannot imagine. *sacrae* should be expelled as a flagrant dittography.

73.12 fidem quin immo vestram, si qua adhuc lex est quae adiuvare possit mori volentem, commodate, conferte. *est utriusque iuris et auctoritas, est quod in mea morte* tribuatis. praestate causis ut moriar, praemio ut sepeliar.

The paradosis appears to be *est quod* (or *est quod in*) *utriusque iuris et auctoritas, est quod*. Håkanson writes [*est quod in*] *utriusque iuris auctoritati est, quod in mea morte tribuatis*. My own conjecture was to the same effect: *est quod utriusque iuris auctoritati* [*est quod*] *in mea morte tribuatis*. This order seems to me preferable, and the second *est quod* is more likely to be a dittography than the first. On the other hand, the fact that some manuscripts have *in* before *utriusque* is in favor of Håkanson's.

76.14 humiles prorsus abiectaeque mentes quas non implent haec eadem semperque redeuntia: *ut* qui honestis operatus artibus sciat quis finis bonorum, quae vera felicitas, nunquam sibi videbitur praematura morte periturus *sqq.*

For *ut* read *at*.

84.20 falleris, si adversus praedictas necessitates sufficere credis quod ego bonus filius sum, quod tu optimus pater. tu non mereris *scire, credo, ego utique nolle me scire*. quid est ergo fatum, nisi quod fit et non habet causas?

Somewhat drastic treatment seems required: *tu non mereris occidi, credo; ego utique nolle me sci<o occide>re*; cf. 85.27, *mathematicus hoc non futurum dixit ut vellem, sed ut occiderem*.

- 85.29 tu quoque, pater, quanto graviore passurus es ex ipsa dissimulatione cruciatus? *felicius illud* prorsus est, palam occidissem quem timeas. cum bene in osculis meis amplexibusque requiescas, subeat necesse est tacitas cogitationes praedicti periculi metus, *sqq.*

*felicius illud* is Lehnert's conjecture ('dubitanter'; *felicius s*), yielding by itself no sense. The manuscripts have *felicior ille*.

Father knows that Son, according to Astrologer, is fated to kill him. He will suffer agonies pretending that this knowledge is not always in his mind. Since he needs must fear Son, it would be better if he openly hated him. Read *felicius illud* (or *felicior* <*timor*> *ille*) *prorsus est, palam* odisse quem timeas. *occidissem* was prompted by *occiderem* just before.

- 86.15 quid tu me lacertorum viriumque beneficio stravissem nuper hostes putas?

Punctuate *quid?* . . . *tu putas?*

#### V. AEGER REDEMPTUS

- 90.2 ex quo se nobis tanto virium labore restituit, poterat eius quoque admirationem mereri *qui* pretio paulo ante cessisset. dii immortales, quam laudem, quem gloriae favorem impleverat, si pasceret *patrem, redemerat fratrem!*

Håkanson prefers to punctuate (after Reitzenstein and Wiles) with a colon after *impleverat*. But Virtuous Son did not ransom his brother; Father did that. Read *si pasceret patrem* <*qui*> *redemerat fratrem*; cf. 110.7, *pasce nunc quod te redimere volui, pasce quod fratrem tuum redemi*, and Gronovius' punctuation, *si pasceret patrem. redemerat fratrem*. In the previous sentence Håkanson takes *eius . . . qui . . . cessisset* as Virtuous Son himself ("hätte er auch die Bewunderung dessen erwerben können, der zuvor freiwillig auf den Loskauf verzichtet hätte"). I do not think this possible. Perhaps *qui* should be *cui*: Virtuous Son's brother would have been proud of him had he lived.

- 99.22 interim multa possunt afferre casus: sperare licet, repeteris; sperare, pater, fortassis evadat.

Virtuous Son may hope that Father will come back to ransom him; whereas Father may hope that Son will escape (as he did). Read *sperare, <fili>, licet: repeteris. sperare, pater: fortassis evadat*.

100.8 quid? quod inquit: "etiam luxuriosum praetulisti?"

Preferably: "*quid quod*" inquit etiam "*luxuriosum praetulisti?*" Cf. 98.9, "*fratrem*" inquit "*mihi praetulisti.*"

106.8 ego *serius*, gravis hinc, si videtur, incipiam: luxuriose, meruisti.

Read *severus*.

108.12 nuntio enim *et audiente et* tota civitate teste proclamo: tibi gratias agebat ille, dum moreretur.

*et audiente* <te> *et*, Reitzenstein; *et audiente* [et], Håkanson. Better, *te audiente et*.

108.25 non quidem quiddam velim, iuvenis, de virtutum tuarum admiratione detractum; audias tamen necesse est in hac *pietate* verum.

Not *pietate* but *impietate*. *impietas* is Father's word for Son's refusal to maintain him; cf. 124.1, *erit solutus omni auxiliandi necessitate, quando vestra interpretatione absentia impietatis occasio est*.

109.4 intelligit, iudices, et ipse iuvenis, non esse se calamitatum nostrarum iustitiae parem, *et* sic agit, tamquam alere non debeat. itaque transfert in hoc defensionem, ut posse se neget.

Non sequitur. *si* fell out before *sic* and *et* was added as a makeshift.

110.9 non ego lassitudinem tuam posco, *nunquam* otium meum, nec ut ipse securus quietusque transigam diem, *sqq.*

Obrecht's *tamquam* is hardly an improvement. Read *non, inquam, otium meum*.

## VI. CORPORIS PROIECTI

112.20 huius, iudices, poenae ab ipsa morte *repetite* crimen. ego sum, ego et *alligavi* filium meum et infamavi et, ne non accedat gravissimi doloris comes paenitentia, in illum mortiferum carcerem mersi.

Håkanson rightly commends Plasberg's rearrangement: *huius, iudices, poenae ab ipsa morte repetitae crimen ego sum: ego sqq.* But all is not yet well. *alligavi* ineptly anticipates in . . . *carcerem mersi*. The first of the

three self-accusations should be first in time. Read *ablegavi*: Father blames himself because Son left home to rescue him from the pirates at his summons (from the Argument: *qui habebat uxorem et filium, captus a piratis scripsit domum de redemptione*); cf. 124.15, *necesse habuit parere. non deseruit, sed abductus est*. The corruption recurs at 293.16.

116.20 *curva litora et immensum sideribus fretum et turritos urbium scopulos retro lego.*

*emensum* (Schulting) should be in the text. As he pointed out, *turritos scopulos* comes from Virg. *Aen.* III.535, *gemino demittunt brachia muro / turriti scopuli. urbium* may be an explanatory gloss, for the phrase *urbium scopulos* is not easy to swallow.

123.10 *non dubito fore dubium, quin ius in hac lege fuerit et mihi.*

On the contrary, *non puto* (or *non id puto*) *fore dubium*. The cause of the corruption is obvious.

123.23 *accedit illud vel gravius quod, cum rerum necessitas cotidie nos dividat, si quaedam fortuna parentes nos deprehenderit, quamvis exiguo divisus spatio, inpune opem non feret, non succurret, ut hac saltem se calumnia defendat non reliquisse <se>: "non abscessi neque pede, quod aiunt, uno a parente discessi."*

*reliquisse se* Lehnert, *reliquisset* B, *reliqui sed* V, *reliqui* cett. *accessi*, BV.

Father protests against a literal interpretation of the phrase *in calamitate deserere*, limiting it to physical withdrawal.

Håkanson's solution is mainly acceptable: *ut hac saltem se calumnia defendat*: "*non reliqui, sed non accessi, neque pede . . . discessi*." But *si* might be better than *sed*. 'If I did not go to him, that does not mean that I abandoned him.'

124.13 *tribunos deducimus, candidatos ferimus.*

I.e., 'we fathers take drastic measures against our sons, even if they are in positions which make them inviolable to everybody else.' I do not know what *deducimus* ('escort'?) can be supposed to mean. The right word is *ducimus*, 'lead off to punishment (prison or execution),' 'arrest.'

125.6 *si quisquam figuratione quadam in hac malorum condicione iudicem ponat, fortuna quaeso absit cuius tanta calamitas fuit.*



Read *si* <se> *quisquam*. The sense is: 'If anyone set himself up as our judge, I hope he will be fair and not let himself be swayed by what is the effect of luck' (i.e. Mother's blindness).

128.11 *adice* <eo> *quod tibi non necessaria filii praesentia fuit. adsidere enim, cibos ministrare, manum porrigere quilibet poterat. mentior, nisi factum est, me ab illis captum tam dura condicione venalem, quod utique in confessione est, nemo alius redemisset quam filius meus.*

*eo*, the reading of BV, should not be bracketed. The punctuation has to be reformed: . . . *quilibet poterat; mentior nisi factum est. me ab illis* sqq. Mother had not needed Son as Father had needed him. The facts prove his words; she had been cared for in her blindness, though Son was elsewhere.

131.23 *quomodo te vincula composuerant, iacuisti. matrem, patrem, propinquos tantum cogitasti. numquid indulgeo mihi, quod te puto expirasse in carcere meo?*

The question is unnecessary and ridiculous. Since Son had taken Father's place in prison, he would naturally have died there (cf. 112.23, *in illum mortiferum carcerem mersi*; 115.24, *cum pater filiusque de vinculis contenderent, et sibi quisque carcerem vindicaret*), but where would be the comfort for Father in that? *carcere* has replaced a different noun, *nomine*, if my guess is not out: 'breathed his last upon my name' = 'died uttering my name.'

## VII. TORMENTA PAUPERIS

134.16 *quid faciam, si temeritates quoque nostras conscientia reorum non potest pati? intellexi miseratione factum, qui ut torquerer exegeram, ex quo me dives non putat aliud in quaestione dicturum. neque ego, iudices, quemquam vestrum dubitare crediderim, ex qua conscientia, qua trepidatione descendat, ut quis torqueri nolit inimicum.*

"Wie man so etwas ohne Korruptelzeichen edieren kann, ist mir unmöglich zu verstehen." So Håkanson, who reads *intellexi miseratione* <non> *factum*, quia *ut torquerer exegeram*, sed quod *me dives*, sqq. This involves a good deal of rewriting, and the aptness of *quia* . . . *exegeram* is not apparent to me. But, as usual, he has seen the drift. Poor man had demanded to give evidence under torture; Rich Man objected

pretending pity but in reality because he deduced from the very fact of Poor Man's demand that he would have the fortitude to stick to his story. The answer at which I had arrived is rather less expensive: read *miseratione*<m> fictam. *ex quo* = 'from which fact.'

- 137.2 iniuriarum, caedis agere permisit [sc. lex], sed non cogit invitos. adeo *paene* levius est ultionem perire quam potestatem.

*paene* is pointless. I rather think that it comes from *poenam*, a gloss on *ultionem* (Schulting conjectured *poenas levius et ultionem*). The meaning is that it is a lesser evil that the vengeance of the law should not be exacted than that the right of the injured party to prosecute or not as he chose should be infringed. Or perhaps *ultionem* is the intruder.

- 139.1 ego nescio, an mihi possit in quaestione sufficere, quod vidi, et quod inimicus me contendit ideo velle *torqueri*. tormenta postulo. en ad quod confugiat homo qui se sciat posse mentiri.

Poor Man doubts whether even the consciousness of truth (*quod vidi* = 'the fact that I saw what I saw') will see him through the torture; certainly he could not stick to a lie under it. The passage can be rationalized thus: *quod vidi. et quod inimicus me contendit ideo velle torqueri* <quia me sciam posse mentiri>, tormenta postulo. en . . . mentiri! et quod = 'and as to the fact that.'

- 139.16 exigam quaestionem, an recusem, quid interest? tormentorum <vi> brevi futurus similis homini qui fateatur invitus.

*vi* is an old addition; but the manuscripts are sound, only the punctuation is false. It should run: *exigam quaestionem an recusem quid interest tormentorum, brevi futurus . . . invitus?* The Thesaurus has a number of examples of *gen. rerum* with *interesse*, such as Quint. Inst. VII.2.20, *nihil interest actionum utrum simul de utroque pronuntietur an sententia de uno feratur*.

- 139.24 quotiens tortori est rixa cum membris, cum cruciatus agnoscit adsiduis suppliciis durata patientia. et homo cui omnino est nova res dolor, corpus applicui quod scissa lacerataque veste primum ferre non potest pudorem, quod nescit ad flagellorum vices membra componere nec ullo verbera frangit occurso.

*cui omnino* (Dessauer) for *homini non* is an excellent conjecture. *applicui* (Schulting) for *appliciti* or *applicitum* only makes matters worse. I suggest: at *homo cui omnino est nova res dolor*, corporis [so M] appliciti

[quod] *scissa lacerataque veste primum ferre non potest pudorem*. <quid> *quod nescit . . . occursu*? In the previous sentence *cruciatu*s is acc. plur.

141.19 quis enim credibilior in caede pauperis quam dives inimicus? aut de quo facilius constare posset scelere quod non habet <testem>, nisi de sola ultione? non invenit multa verba, vidisse.

*testem* is Dessauer's supplement. Perhaps the words should run: *aut de quo facilius constare posset scelere? quod non habet* <orationem> *nisi de sola ultione*. In the words of M's margin: *vidisse ibi est nominativus casus*.

142.26 dicturum nunc putatis magis interesse securitatis, ut quis facinus sibi tantummodo credat, et id tutius esse inimico *patre* quam conscio. plus est quod adfirmo. filium in conspectu patris occidere sic operae pretium est, si illud ipse facias.

The first sentence should be a question (as should 154.5, *dicturum me putas*), like 327.8, *dicturum me putas* "non credet"? *patre* is nonsense, the argument suggested being that Rich Man had thought it safer to kill Poor Man's Son without an accomplice. If anybody else had to see the murder, better that it be his enemy (Poor Man). Read *praesente* (or *teste*).

143.25 quid ait dives? *orbitatem* meam in tale genus usumque convertet, si paterni doloris auctoritas facinus <tibi> inpingit alienum?

*tibi* is Dessauer's useless supplement (according to Lehnert, at least; but why not *sibi*?). The supplement required is *non* before *orbitatem*; or else read *non vertet* for *convertet*. If the bereaved father (i.e. Poor Man, the speaker) has foisted upon Rich Man a crime he did not commit, will the latter not take advantage of the situation to gain the satisfaction of having his enemy tortured?

144.23 filium meum . . . occidit mea nimia libertas. ita ego te non eculeo efferam, non super ardentis *exuam* flammam? nunc me vindicas, nunc tueris. modo, modo coram me filium meum *dives* occidit fiducia tui.

The passage has been much discussed. *libertas*, as R. Helm saw, is Poor Man's "Freimut," which had annoyed Rich Man and so led to the murder of Poor Man's Son. Poor Man proceeds to apostrophize his *libertas*. At two places, neither hitherto suspected, the text must be changed. *exuam* should be *exeram*. It surprises me that this did not

strike Håkanson, who quotes 169.18, *paupertatis est proprium... exerere libertatem*, and 252.6, *audete nunc lacessere divitem quibus vitae causa superest: exerite libertatem. efferam* and *exeram* amount to the same thing. Secondly *dives* is nonsense. Rich Man did not kill Poor Man's son in reliance on Poor Man's *libertas*; but Poor Man's confidence in it, his sense, that is, that as a free man he did not have to truckle to anybody, was, as he now says in a paroxysm of self-reproach, the real murderer. *dives* seems to be the addition of a reader who did not understand that *tui* = *libertatis* and that *fiducia* is nominative.

- 145.20 si totus undique dolor pariter admotus occiderit, ego tamen vidi. alioquin, nisi hoc animo meo, nisi licuerit oculis, morerer hoc dolore quo puto me posse torqueri.

Poor Man will stick to his story (*ego tamen vidi*) if the torture kills him. Otherwise, if his mind and eyes are not to be free so to testify (i.e. if his demand to be tortured is rejected), he would die (lit. 'be dying,' as though the situation had already arisen) of — what? The text is easy to translate, but the translation makes no sense. For *quo* read *qui*: 'I would die of *this* pain (the loss of my son unavenged), I, who think I can stand the torture.'

## VII. GEMINI LANGUENTES

- 150.14 perdiderunt legis huius auctoritatem quae ad *illas* uxorias querelas matrimoniorum solent deferre delicias. ego illam datam miseris tantum matribus puto potestatem. <potest> ab iniquo coniuge explicare divortium et contra maritales tuetur iniurias, ut nolis praestare patientiam. *illis* succurrit quas nefas est abire, discedere, quas in pessimi coniugii durum perpetuumque complexum communium pignorum nexus artavit, quae malos maritos pariter et patres nec relinquere nec ferre sufficiunt.

The action *malae tractationis* should be brought by a wife only when she has no other resource. Childless women have a different remedy — divorce. The law is for those who are tied to their wretched marriages by their children.

The first two sentences are discussed by Håkanson, who (with comma after *querelas*) would read Plasberg's *illam* for *illas* (presumably *illam ad* for *ad illas*; unnecessary anyway, I think) and, with Reitzenstein, *puto. potest autem* (right). The third awaits treatment. The subject of *succurrit* is not still *divortium* but *lex* (*malae tractationis*) and this must be expressed. Read *illis* <lex> or <illa> *illis*.



- 157.21 quando illos languor, quando suprema iunxerunt? et quandoque sit, necesse est <et> *alter* <extinguatur> ex geminis, quod pariter languerunt, non sic accidit quomodo fratribus, sed quomodo duobus.

"Ab aliis varie temptatus locus" (Lehnert). The supplements, due respectively to Dessauer and Lehnert, make nothing intelligible. Perhaps: *et quandoque sit, necesse est sit ex geminis? quod pariter* sqq. 'And whenever it should happen (that Twins fall sick or die at the same time), must it necessarily arise from their being twins?' The declaimer is out to show that Twins could have suffered from different complaints — they were ill, not as twins, but as individuals. *alter*, which I change to *sit*, is written *alt'* in V.

- 158.24 temptat pater, ut et huic rei credatis quod *desperaverint* omnes et quod speravit unus.

Read *desperaverunt* (V) and *et <illi> quod*.

- 162.1 adice, quod nec deprehendi *ex sanato* potest ullius causa languoris.

One twin has been vivisected for diagnostic purposes to save the life of the other. The declaimer proceeds to argue that no diagnosis is possible under such conditions — the physical signs would all be changed under vivisection. *ex sanato* stultifies the context, which requires *in exsecto*; for *deprehendere* thus see *Thes.* V(1).610.43. *i* having fallen out after *-di*, *exsecto* became *ex sanato*, harking back to 161.24, *ex homine sanato* (cf. also 161.4, *sanato*, where perhaps read <*ex*> *sanato*).

- 163.11 nunquam, iudices, res tam horribilis *inauditae* feritatis admissa est.

Read either the old conjecture *inauditae*<que> or <et> *inauditae* or <tam> *inauditae*.

- 166.10 convertitur hoc loco, iudices, mulier infelix et velut ad quandam praesentiam amissi iuvenis, "sive," inquit, "tandem securitate mortis explicitus in *aliquo* sedis aeternae pudore requiescis, sive exclusus ac vagus . . . per stupentes horrentesque manes umbra discurre, audi miserrimae matris *iniquissimam* conplorationem.

Burman's conjecture *paedore* deserves no more favor than it has received, but something must be done. Read *in <angulo> aliquo* or *in aliquo <angulo>*. *iniquissima conploratio* would normally be 'a most unfair complaint'; cf. Cic. *Fam.* III.7.2 *querelae iniquissimae*. Here it

must mean just the opposite, but I do not think *iniquissimam* can be ironical as Szantyr suggests (*Thes.* VII (1).1643.78; he compares 155.21, *iustas mehercules haberet mulier causas querelarum*, but *iustas* is not ironical either). It has to be understood as = *acerbissimam*; cf. *iniquo animo, inique ferre*.

## IX. GLADIATOR

168.24 ac si foret maius forte momentum, quis tamen parens tam durus est, ut propter aliquam inpensam carere filio velit? (*an velit*) quod ipse celatus sit, quod non suae misericordiae pauperem commiserim *sqq.*

*an velit* is Dessauer's. Better simply *an*.

179.13 decuerat quidem similtates quas maximi omnium *mortalium* esse voluere sapientes, in his desinere, in quibus nascerentur.

*esse noluere sapientis*, Reitzenstein. But "celeberrimum est dictum 'inimicitias debere esse mortales, amicitias aeternas'" (Dussault); *Thes.* VII(1).1621.72 cites Cic. *Rab. Post.* 32, Liv. XL.46.12; also, specially relevant here, Sen. *Contr.* V.2.2, *mortales esse inimicitiae debent*, and Quint. *Decl.* 257 (Ritter 51.6), *non oportet immortales esse inimicitias*. See also Bentley, *Diss. Phalaris*, VIII. *mortales* (s) is thus assured, but should follow *mortalium* (which is needed; cf. 183.29, *omnium mortalium inhumanissimum*), not replace it.

184.11 facilis, ut animadvertere vos spero, iudices, defensionis meae cursus est. antequam incipiam habere causam nimium bonam, hic iam conscientia trepidat oratio *sqq.*

The full stop should follow *bonam*, not *est*.

185.2 tamquam honestum defendam factum an tamquam necessarium? alterum absolvi facilius potest, alterum laudari rectissimum opinor, veritatis interest.

Read *alterum laudari*. <id> *rectissimum, opinor; veritatis interest. id = tamquam necessarium defendere*.

## X. SEPULCRUM INCANTATUM

190.5 non inani persuasione nec cogitationibus ficta lugentis umbra veniebat, nec agitabat incertos levis imago somnos, *ac* nec

confusi quidem tristi cinere vultus et *infernum* favilla caput *noctibus* suis obibat, sed filius erat, qualis aliquando, et iuvenis et pulcher habitu.

Dead Son appeared to Mother at night. *informe* (Gronovius) seems the best substitute for *infernum*, but *noctibus suis* lacks the point it assuredly once had. Read <nec similis> *noctibus suis*, 'dark as the nights on which he showed himself.' *ac* would be better away, or replaced by *at*.

190.13 nunc tenebras inanes et longas oculis flentibus noctes iuxta somnum mariti pervigil et *tantum* deserta metitur.

*tantum* <non> *deserta* Schulting. *tamquam*?

190.15 non desiderio *fictus* aut *fucatus* habitu nec, ut somniorum vanitate conspicitur, sed experta non totum mori hominem illud quod nec flammis uritur nec cineribus extinguitur nec urnis sepulcrisque satis premitur, expectat.

Read *fictum aut fucatum*, and cf. 193.10 *viridis et sane pulcher habitu*.

193.2 nihil de te, marite, nihil queror. satis magnas *dedisses* poenas, si totis noctibus mecum flere voluisses. vidisses utique . . . ipsum filium, qualis blandissimus erat, et, si dimittatur, *videbo*.

Nonsense. Read *satis magnas dedisti poenas. si totis noctibus mecum flere voluisses, vidisses* sqq. Husband had already paid dearly enough for his hardness of heart. Had he kept awake until morning with Mother, he would have seen Son. For *videbo* read *videbis* (Gronovius).

194.8 illum quem crudelibus flammis exussisti, ex quo cineres et ossa supersunt, iuvenem videbis et forte etiam die *speres*.

'*die speres* ist gewiss nicht richtig; möglicherweise hat 193.29 *nocte videbat, die sperabat* eingewirkt" (Håkanson). I fully agree, but would not substitute <au>*dies prendes*. Expel *speres* and the point glistens: 'You will see him, and perhaps even in the daytime.'

200.8 non ego fatigata planctibus sensi venisse noctem: videre filium pervigiles meruistis oculi, sed primum, *dum* metuo, umbra processit subito. dii boni, quod ego gaudium, quam vidi felicitatem!

<somnum> *dum metuo*, Reitzenstein. Read *meruistis oculi. sed primum, dum* <nondum> *metuo, umbra* sqq. The ghost's appearance was so sudden

that Mother had no time to feel afraid; she immediately knew her son and rejoiced. *primum* is explained by 1.26, *novissime non tamquam umbra veniebat sed adsidebat, sed amplexus dabat*.

203.8 *pessime* parentium qui liberos suos sepeliunt flere contenti, ut obiter ab rogo siccis oculis revertantur.

I would read *pessimi parentium* qui, <dum> (s) *liberos suos sepeliunt flere contenti*, [ut] *obiter* (= continuo) *ab rogo* sqq. After the loss of *dum*, *ut* was inserted to provide a construction for *revertantur*.

# XI. DIVES ACCUSATUS PRODITIONIS

210.15 quid? quod hoc solum est poenae genus, in quo non debeat nocens nisi de se queri, et tanto minus debeat esse miserabilis, in quanto *maior* est quod patitur invidia?

*erant enim leges ut . . . calumniator idem pateretur quod reus si convictus esset* (Argument). The penalty here demanded is the death of the false accuser's children. Read *maior<e> est*. The greater the *invidia* attaching to the penalty (*quod patitur*), i.e. the more atrocious it is, the less would the victim deserve pity. For he suffers the fate he brought upon the man he accused, so the worse that fate, the greater his crime. For the ablative see my note on Cic. *Att.* II.9.1, *non enim poterimus ulla esse invidia*.

213.7 nulli, cum coimus, sua cogitatio, sua mens, ulla ratio praesto est, nec habet ulla turba prudentiam singulorum sive quod *minus* publicos capimus affectus, sive neglegentior est qui se non putat solum debere rationem, et multi fiducia facimus omnium.

Two explanations of mob psychology are offered. The first, as the text stands, contradicts what is obviously intended. People in a crowd do not adopt the public emotions too little (*minus*), but too much (*nimis*). These two words of opposite meanings are easily and often confused by scribes.

213.19 non est, iudices, quod vos a gravitate iustitiae dolor ultionis abducatur; quod mortem suam inimicus offert. non petit illud, nisi quisquis ipse non debet occidi.

*ultionis* is the penalty demanded, the death of the children whose father has asked to die in their place. A different punctuation is required: *abducatur. quod mortem suam inimicus offert, non petit* sqq. *quod* = 'as to the fact that.'



## XII. CADAVERIBUS PASTI

- 218.23 iam enim vacat nobis lugere, iam cibos nostros efferimus, *viscera cremamus*; nam cetera nobiscum sepelientur.

The people are now able to bury whatever may remain of their fellow citizens whose bodies they ate during the famine. What would remain? Bones, obviously (cf. 229.25, *cum maxime inferimus in tumulos ossa insepulta*). Read *cremamus ossa*. The reverse order is metrically objectionable and *ossa* would drop out the more readily to leave a verb at the end of the sentence. *viscera* ('flesh') was then supplied from the previous sentence: *aestuant adhuc intra pectus sepulta ventribus nostris cognata viscera*.

- 219.4 et ego quidem me consumptis excuso qui mihi ipsi *irasci* non possum. at iste interim stat, ut videtis, longa via saginatus *sqq.*

*iste* is the envoy sent to buy corn, whose loitering caused the famine. Why should the orator (one of the cannibals) say that he cannot be angry with himself? Would it be true? And how would it be relevant? Anger is indeed appropriate against the envoy (cf. 227.8, *immanis belua est . . . qui quod comederit hominem non irascitur*; 228.2, *videte ut iure irascamur qui contra ius viximus*). Without *irasci* the point is excellent: 'Here I am, excusing myself to those whom I ate, when I can't (excuse myself) to myself.' Also the number of long syllables at the clausula is reduced from seven to five. A better clausula would be obtained by substituting *excusare*, which may be supposed to have fallen out. Either way *irasci* was added by a reader who felt the need for an infinitive with *possum*.

- 230.1 invenitur interim clusa domo conditus, si cuius mors famem evasit, quem rimantes non invenere *proximi qui inter suos ultimus decessit*.

Two ways are suggested by which a paterfamilias might have escaped being eaten. He might have died (of hunger) in a place where his surviving relatives could not find his body, *or* he might have been the last to die. *aut* (or *vel* or *sive*) has dropped out before *qui*.

- 232.14 puta me nihil in praesentia dicere nisi hoc unum: tardius quam potueras venisti. nondum tibi obicio duplicata tempora nec remensum totiens mare nec graves ancoras, nondum tantam moram quanta legationi satis *esset*.

The heroic clausula shows that something is amiss and the sense confirms it. The envoy had spent time selling corn in another community. He had taken as long as he would have needed to take if he had actually belonged to another community (which he would naturally visit first): cf. 235.3, *ita nos alienae civitatis legatum misimus. Read esset <alienae>.*

- 234.11 pendet interim fames, et illud quod iam diu cogitat, differt, ita tamen, ut subinde computet quot dies ad mortem supersint. *nam quid* profecit? meministis, cum contrarii venti flare coepissent, et in altum fluctus a terra volarent, quanta conploratio, quanti planctus fuerint: retinebitur, stabit, laborabit.

Not *nam quid* but *num quid*, an anxious question — ‘has he (the envoy) had any success?’ — by the hungry people (*fames*) struggling to put off the evil day when they will eat human flesh to save their lives. It should be in quotation marks, as should *retinebitur, stabit, laborabit* below.

- 237.18 ... confiteor, ne frumentum salva classe perderemus, non timuimus. non dico, ut maxima vis parata sit, ut more inmanis latrocinii turba raptorum litus premat: vel repugna vel fuge vel roga. incensurum naves depressurumque minitare potius quam totum frumentum utique populo pereat. partire vel gratis, dum nobis aliquid quo respiremus, adferas.

Envoy had made the excuse that he was afraid the other town would take the corn by force (*timui ne raperet*). His accuser should reply: ‘I won’t argue that you had no cause to fear. Even suppose you had been under actual attack, you had better courses open than the one you took.’ Håkanson recommends a colon after *dico*, a full stop after *minitare*, and a comma after *pereat*, to all of which I agree (except that I should prefer semicolons after *roga* and *minitare*). But something like *quod timeres non erat* has fallen out after *non dico*.

- 240.1 quo damno probas tempestatem? quid amisisti? frumentum certe totum venit in portum, nec laborasti. *tanquam* nimium onustas naves simulaveris, duplum adferre poterant.

Read <neque> *tanquam* ... *simulaveris: duplum adferre poterant* (cf. 183.10, *neque expectaveris*).

- 241.23 populatorem eversoremque civitatis nisi ad *supremum* damnabo, absolvatur. publicus reus redit.

Håkanson's proposal to add *supplicium* after *supremum* may well be right, but I think he may be mistaken in taking *redit* as present for future: "Wenn ich nicht diesen Verwüster unserer Stadt zur äussersten Strafe verurteilen (vom Ankläger, wie öfters) kann, mag er freigesprochen werden; er wird als *publicus reus* wiederkehren, als Angeklagter vor das Gericht des Volkes selbst geführt werden, d.h. man werde ihn lynchen!" Could not *redit* refer to Envoy's return from his mission? Though in form prosecuted by the speaker, he was really answering to the whole community from the day he landed, and would still have to answer if the present court did not condemn him to death. *populatorem* . . . *absolvatur* is a question, the fourth and last of a series.

244.12 deficit aliquis extremo iam spiritu pendens, tamen durat, quia prius moriturum alterum putat: invicem expectant, et, si spei figuracione tardius *cadet*, morsibus *pugnat*.

Read *cedet* (= *succedet*; cf. 84.16, in responso cui cuncta cesserunt, Suet. Nero 33.2, cum opinione tardius *cederet*) and *pugnant*.

244.27 quomodo me a scelere meo divellerem? in quas ultimas terras, quae inhospitalia maria conderem? *meum sine* conscientia urunt animum intus scelerum faces, et, quotiens facta reputavi, flagella mentis sonant.

Something is certainly is wrong, but what is right is hard to tell. Håkanson proposes *mea sine* <fine> *conscientia: urunt intus* sqq. I agree as to the punctuation, but think *meum* is more likely to represent *mecum*. This could stand with *sine* <fine>, but I should prefer something like *mecum simul conscientia* <iret>.

### XIII. APES PAUPERIS

251.4 hoc mihi damnum non brumae glacialis penetrabilis rigor, non suppressi longa siti flores induxerunt ieiunam miseris famem, non aviditas iniusta domini nihil mellis reservavit *sqq.*

A verb, *dedit* (cf. the Argument: *damni per iniuriam dati sit actio*), has dropped out somewhere in the first clause, perhaps between *mihi* and *damnum*.

253.8 negat esse damnum, quod animal liberum et volucre et vagum et extra imperia positum *perdiderit*.

*perdiderit* has to be taken as 'destroyed.' Better read *perdiderim*; cf. l.16, *quoniam quidem quaeritur an damnum sit perdere quod lucrum est habere*.

254.11 profecto quicquid iure possidetur, iniuria aufertur ut volucres mutae et aliae quae per rusticas villas quaeque ditibus cellis saginantur, in quibus tamen *domini ambigua* possessio est, et vaccae et armenta et omne pecudum genus.

I am not sure what should be done with *mutae*, but suggest that *non* should precede *ambigua*. *tamen* implies 'even though they are birds and most birds belong to nobody.'

257.7 nos ideo magistratus legesque a maioribus nostris accepimus, ne sui quisque doloris iudex sit, et adsiduae scelerum causae se *refellant*, si ultio crimen imitabitur.

How do the causes of crimes disprove themselves? The speaker is saying that private vengeance produces cause for another crime, which crime produces yet another, and so on. Read *reficiant*.

258.3 namque dum immaturos exterior alligat cortex, nondum dixeris florem . . . at cum se ruptis iam tunicis in patulum capita fuderunt et velut fissa in orbem, iamque *terrarum* videtur maturitas, et *ingenitus* occasus est et iam sine ventis quoque soluta natura labitur gratia, nec quicquam est flos nisi novus.

Rightly Håkanson: "Es ist bedenklich, mit Dessauer *terrarum* zu tilgen, unmöglich, es mit Lehnert zu halten." He proposes *iam quae* (so Dessauer) *tenera eorum videtur* ("kommt zutage") *maturitas*. I do not understand *iam quae* and would simply replace *terrarum* with *apertorum*. *ingenitus* (Dessauer, who also proposed *innatus*), for *ignotus* in the manuscripts, seem to me inferior in sense to Gronovius' *admotus*, though better palaeographically (*vicinus*, read as *iugnius*, is another possibility).

259.1 an non te *solus* vicinus colui? non frugum mearum primitias omni vere misi?

However large his estates, Rich Man must have had other neighbors. Poor Man had none. Read *solum*.

259.7 "admonui," inquit, "et, ut transferres, denuntiavi." idcirco contumacem merito punisti. non enim video quid aliud patrocínio tuo conferat haec denuntiatio: supervacua, si [non] licuit



tibi facere quod queror; iniusta, si <non> licuit. *ultio* aut sine ista aut ne cum ista quidem valeat.

*non* transp. Gronovius. *ultio* Lehnert: *iusta* codd.

Håkanson rightly demands a question mark after *punisti*. For the rest he recommends a punctuation of Schulting's, which I cannot interpret: *ultio* for *iusta* is, of course, unacceptable. Perhaps Wiles was right to delete the latter, taking *patrocinium* as the subject of *valeat*. As an alternative I suggest *causa*. *causa valet* is a standard expression, as in Cic. *Div. Caec.* 63, *semper haec causa plurimum valuit*.

259.25 *tantone* his in hac, ut putamus, aequissima libertate legibus vivimus, ut nobis habere medellam non liceat, vobis habere liceat venena?

"Burmman ist mit seinem *tam iniquis* auf den richtigen Gedanken gekommen, aber zu lesen ist, wie es scheint, gerade das Umgekehrte, *tam honestis*, ironisch gesagt" (Håkanson). Palaeographically this is a good answer, but I am not happy with it. I should prefer *tam novis*.

260.1 postremo quidem divitis patrocinio non putavi, iudices, respondendum, nisi rideri vestram maiestatem contumeliosa defensione non ferrem. "ultro enim," inquit "ad mortem venerunt apes tuae." ita plane. alioquin tu venenum floribus dederas. impudentiaene, iudices, eius adsignem, si hoc mihi apud vos *obtinuerit*, an stultitiae, si *speravit*?

Håkanson rightly objects to the dative *mihi* with *obtinuerit*, which verb besides makes no sense. He proposes *impudentiaene, iudices, eius adsignem, si hoc non nisi apud vos obtenderit, an stultitiae, si <sibi> persuaserit?* — "Soll ich dies seiner Unverschämtheit zuschreiben, wenn er dies euch gegenüber nur heuchelnd anführt, oder seiner Torheit wenn er wirklich daran selbst glaubt?" *obtenderit* ('put forward as a plea'; cf. 97.30, *famem obtendis*) is good, but the rest I find unacceptable. Read rather *impudentiaene . . . adsignem, si hoc mihi apud vos obtenderit, an stultitiae [si speravit]*? The bracketed words may have been the addition of somebody who, with *obtinuerit* (= *evicerit*), could make nothing of *stultitiae*, or else an explanatory gloss on *si . . . obtinuerit: si speravit* (sc. *hoc obtinere*).

#### XIV. ODII POTIO I.

272.6 brevis de concessis, *sed* statim satietati vicinus adfectus est.

*si statim*, Paris. 15103. Read *et statim* or simply *statim*. Love allowed by the conventions is short *and* at once close to satiety.

## XV. ODII POTIO II.

- 278.22 poposcit, exclusit. non defuerunt misero preces, adhibita sunt ex ipsa iuvenis condicione consilia. sed *ista* vincebat, et vires amoris impedimenta *perdebant*, donec intellegret, hominem qui explicari ratione non poterat, necessitate servandum.

Argument: *meretrix amatori suo pauperi dedit odii potionem. accusat illam pauper veneficii*. Harlot, says the defense here, had done her best to discourage Poor Man by other means.

First let me reform the punctuation: *poposcit, exclusit: non defuerunt misero preces. adhibita sunt ex ipsa iuvenis condicione consilia, sed ista vincebat* sqq. 'But he overcame all that (*ista*)' seems flat; one would have expected *sed amor ista vincebat*. Could we read *ipsa* (nom. sing.)? Harlot herself (i.e. her attractions) prevailed over her own efforts. *perdebant* cannot be understood as *irrita faciebant*: change to *prodebant*. The obstacles placed in the way of Poor Man's passion only revealed its strength.

- 282.9 "odium," inquit, "accepi." ecquid, iudices, satis me contra infamiam veneni vel solum medicamenti nomen absolveret? nec invenio, cur debeat idem videri quod *non potest* idem vocari.

The prosecution calls a hate-potion a poison; the defense would call it a healing drug. Which it is in any given case depends on the circumstances and the motive. Why then, since one thing can be called by two words of very different meaning, should not the distinction be admitted as real? To get this sense out of *cur . . . vocari* I think we have to read *potest non idem* instead of *non potest idem*. Such a potion *can* be called by either name.

- 283.4 quantum, dii deaeque, remedium condicione bibentis valuit? fecerat te *potius* ista felicem, si *divitem puella*.

Reitzenstein rewrote this passage, but to no purpose. Read *potio* (M) for *potius*. *quantum* may mean 'how much' or 'how little.' Here it means 'how little.' As a poor man, the lover gained more than a rich man would have gained by getting rid of a passion which he could not afford, but not very much more; for even a rich man would be happy in such a release. *si divitem puella* is nonsense; *puella* probably comes from *puellae* in the following line. Perhaps the original ran *fecerat te potio ista felicem si dives etiam fuisses* (cf. *Thes.* V (2).934.75).

- 283.12 hinc ergo iam meretricibus, quod illas etiam pauperes ament, quod facile contingant, quod laboribus exorentur adeuntium, <invidiam> facies, hic amator, ut divites ament, in crimen maximum captas transferre beneficium?

*invidiam* add. Dessauer. Perhaps: *hinc ergo . . . adeuntium* <facis invidiam>? *facies* hinc, *amator, ut divites ament*. 'You will make them love (only) the rich.' *in crimen* starts a new sentence.

- 284.23 cuius census ex manibus, ex laboribus substantia, quem <cibus> cotidie poscit ultra rationem in dies *demensus*, amentiam pateris *sqq.*

"*cibus* wurde von Burmann nach *poscit* ergänzt; warum Lehnert es vor *cotidie* setzt, ist schwer zu verstehen."

So Håkanson, who proposes *quem cotidie pascit* <non> *ultra rationem in dies* <cibus> *dimensus*. *dimensus* is right, of course (*dimersus* BM), and he is right in objecting to a text which makes a poor man's daily rations demand him beyond reason; but the rest is makeshift. Read *quem cotidie poscit* *cibus operae rationem*. The rations (i.e. the person providing them) demand an account of the work the poor man does to earn them.

- 285.6 odio sanandus est quem non explicat quod pauper adamavit. non tamen intellegere possumus te non solam <sanaturam> fuisse paupertatem.

Not *sanaturam fuisse* (Dessauer), but *sanavisse*. That poverty might eventually have cured Poor Man of his love is irrelevant here. What matters is the possibility that it was poverty, and not the potion, which actually did cure him.

- 285.18 incideras quidem in puellam minime superbam minimeque difficilem. *quasdam tamen non possumus circumire* meretrices. quam multa pro illis exigit *sexus, aetas poscit!*

Burman's *quaedam . . . circumcidere* makes excellent sense, except for *possumus*, which in view of the following *illis* has to be *possunt*.

- 286.18 referam nunc fabulosas inmodici furoris prodigiosasque novitates, conceptum nescientibus oculis ignoti hominis *aspectum*, formam suis in se luminibus ardentem, virgines patrum senectute flagrant *sqq.*

Narcissus and Myrrha are easily recognized, but who was the girl

who fell in love with a man she had never seen?<sup>2</sup> At all events it is obvious that *aspectum* should be *affectum* (= *amorem*).

## XVI. AMICI VADES

292.12 et si quis omnia vera ratione respiciat quicquid *liberos*, fratres, propinquos invicem tenet, amicitia est.

*parentes* seems to have fallen out before *liberos*.

292.23 sic effectum est ut nos statim fama committeret et tali certamine coimus, ut, si quid accidisset uni, deberet *alteri* exemplum. inde est, quod *et* pariter reverti *contendimus*, et quasi facilius esset in ter<ra> fides, placuit sub incerta pelagi cohaerere.

If one friend got into trouble the other must show himself the model of a friend in need; read *alter*. In the next sentence Burman's *contendimus* for the paradosis *contempsimus* falls very flat. Perhaps *nisi* (*n*<sup>1</sup>) was misread as the sign for *et*.

<sup>2</sup> I am indebted to Albert Henrichs for the following highly plausible suggestion: "The love story to which the phrase *conceptum nescientibus oculis ignoti hominis affectum* alludes seems to be that of Acontius and Cydippe, not as told by Callimachus (*Aet.* frs. 67ff Pf.; cf. Aristaen. *Ep.* 1.10), in whose version the girl does not harbor any tender feelings for the lover she does not know, but as romanticized in Ovid *Her.* XX and XXI. In Cydippe's letter to Acontius, her affection is clearly divided between her actual fiancé on the one hand and her clandestine lover on the other (XXI 195ff). Ovid's Cydippe was seen by Acontius on Delos but is not conscious that she saw him: XXI 105, *forsitan haec spectans a te spectabar Aconti*; cf. XX 207f. (In Aristaenetos, even Cydippe's handmaid fails to recognize the thrower of the apple and thinks that it rolled down from the lap of another girl.) In fact Acontius is so *ignotus* to Cydippe that he himself eventually decides to write her everything she should know about him (XX 221ff). On Delos, Cydippe's eyes were made the *unwilling* instrument of Acontius' passion as she enunciated the oath to Artemis written on the apple, thus pledging her love to a stranger. (I take *nescientibus oculis* to echo XXI 2, *inscia lingua*, and XXI 115ff, *luminaque in gremio veluti defixa tenebam, lumina propositi facta ministra tui*; it invites comparison with Ovid *Tr.* III 5.49f, *inscia quod crimen viderunt lumina, plector, peccatumque oculos est habuisse meum*.) For pseudo-Quintilian and his readers, the moral offense of this story presumably lay in the fact that a young girl exchanged secret letters with a lover who was a stranger to her, and that she did so knowing that she was betrothed to another man. Whether or not the suggested identification is correct, one oddity remains: by its very nature, pseudo-Quintilian's first exemplum lacks the odium of perverted love which attaches to all the other liaisons in his catalogue."



- 293.13 hinc illud evenit quod sumus pariter alligati. sic magis adversus solutum carcer inventus est. pudet, iudices, fateri; iam in hoc victus, iam inferior recessi. ex duobus magis amatur quem tyrannus paratus est *alligare*.

The situation is that of Damon and Phintias. For *alligare* read *ablegare* (see above, 112.20). Sense can now be made out of the previous sentence. The speaker is the one whom Tyrant has let go, which indicates that he loves his friend less than his friend loves him. For Tyrant does not want him to return as pledged; cf. 1.25, *praestitit rem quam videbatur ideo tyrannus indulsisse ne fieret*, and 297.13, *credidit mihi homo cui res favorabilis contingit si decipitur, qui sibi excogitasse contra omnes amicos videtur ut illi imponeremus*.

- 293.17 quantum tibi, amice, debeo? non potuit nos dividere nisi mater. *tibi* primum caecitas nuntiata est, tuus hic adfectus fuit quod hoc credidit tyrannus.

Why should Mother's blindness have been reported to her son's friend first, and why say so? *tibi* (*t*<sup>1</sup>), perhaps from the previous line, seems to have usurped the place of *cum* (*c̄*).

- 294.5 miserere, mater, si quis est magnorum meritorum pudor, querere *hoc* unum de caecitate: impatientius *ex* nobis amari semper absentem.

*hoc* was Burman's conjecture for *quod*. Håkanson rightly finds what follows unintelligible, but his reconstruction is equally so to me: *querere quod unum decet, a te impatientius ex nobis* (sc. *amico meo et me*) *amari semper absentem*. How should Mother love her son's friend more than her son, absent or not? I suggest: *querere unum, quod de caecitate* <didicisti>, *impatientius [ex] nobis amari semper absentem*. Mother complains that her son is deserting her to rejoin his friend; all she has to complain of is the fact of human experience which she has herself learned from her blindness (caused by weeping for her absent son), that absence makes the heart grow fonder.

## XVII. VENENUM EFFUSUM

- 302.2 quidquid citra suprema, citra exitum est, contumaciam vocat, *quantum* absolutionem aspicit, *vitam*.

Father has disowned Son three times, but the courts upheld the latter. Now Son has refused to drink poison when Father ordered him.

There have been several attempts to emend the meaningless *quantum*

... *vitam*. Håkanson's is much the best: *tamquam absolutionem aspicit vitam* ("er sieht mein Leben [die Tatsache, dass ich das Gift nicht zu mir nahm] wie eine Freisprechung an"). My solution was essentially similar: quo vultu *absolutionem* (sc. *aspexit*), *aspicit et vitam* (et *vitam* is in V). *quouoltu*, reduced to *quoltu*, would readily become *quantū*.

302.12 suae quod crudelitatis est, *vel* ab invidia se criminibus meis defendit, excusat, et ne vocem illam tamquam peractum facinus oderitis, substituit pro malo patre miserum.

*qui* for *vel* makes sense.

303.7 hic est ille quem desinere iam iusseratis, qui semper ad vos recurrit et vincitur. fallitur, quisquis *illam* de moribus senis lassitudinem vel patientiam sperat. patri qui abdicare non potuit, minus *est* filius nocens quam absolutus.

I suppose *illam* can be understood as 'that characteristic,' but I wonder whether *iam* should not replace it. Håkanson defends the last sentence: "*nocens* bedeutet nicht 'schädlich,' wie Helm annimmt, sondern 'verbrecherisch,' and der Sinn ist: 'Für einen Vater, der seinen Sohn nicht hat verstossen können, ist dieser weniger verbrecherisch als freigesprochen,' d.h. die Ursache des Hasses (und dann auch der neuen Anklage) sind nicht etwaige Verbrechen des Sohnes, sondern nur die verdriessliche Tatsache, dass er vom früheren Gericht freigesprochen worden ist." Ingenious, but unacceptable. For one thing, the statement is a general one; but all acquitted sons are not criminals or even (like this particular one) accused of a crime. Nor is it made clear why Father must not be expected to give up. For *est* read <ob>*est* or <odio> *est*.

305.12 sed ego sine cunctatione, sine tarditate, respondi, *et* me mori velle, eadem veritate et confessus sum, venenum esse quod terebatur.

Nobody else wanted to die. Read *respondi* [et] *me mori velle; eadem* sqq.

308.25 parricidam non facit severitas vestra, non saevitia, non terror: ad tam grande facinus non ira opus est sed moribus, non dolore, sed mente. omnes iniuriae levius exasperant, levius *oderunt* <innocentes>: innocentis fili ultio est mori.

*offendunt* (Schulting) can replace the senseless *oderunt*. But it is as monstrous as irrelevant to say that all injuries exasperate those who do

not deserve them less than those who do. The contrary is more plausible; cf. Apul. *Apol.* 3 (Helm, p. 4, ll. 11 ff). Instead of *innocentes* (Schulting) add *nocentes*. But it must be admitted that the passage would run much better without the words *omnes . . . oderunt*.

- 312.4 quaecunque nexus accepere naturae, et quae sanguine visceribusque constricta sunt, non laxantur diducta, sed pereunt, et quae de primo tenore nascendi vix in contrarium victa deflectunt *diiue* pravitatis suae rigore durata mox in pristinum cursum remissa non redeunt, sed quo totum pondus omnesque vires inclinata traxerunt, vigore quo sibi permissa crevissent, in ipsius vitii robur adollescunt.

For *diiue* read *dii*.

- 313.19 nesciunt prorsus abdicationibus mederi qui non statim cedunt, qui conscientiae suae rigore nituntur. non vincitur pater, non sum absolutus; cum domum veni, nemo me diligit, nemo reveretur.

I am tempted to read *cum vincitur*, but the text can stand, repunctuated. *nituntur*; *non vincitur pater. non sum absolutus*; *cum* sqq. *non vincitur pater* is a general statement, like *nesciunt . . . nituntur*.

- 314.6 "sed ut credamus," inquit, "voluisse te mori, cur potissimum veneno?" possis quidem, pater, hanc de omni supremorum genere litem facere morientibus . . . sic super strictum nudatumque mucronem proclamares: cur non veneno? *sed nihil* est delicatius exitu quem non supplicia, non metus, sed collecta de calamitatibus commendat infirmitas.

This is incomplete. Before *nihil . . . infirmitas* we need words to the effect that poison is a gentle, easy way to die. Only then does it become relevant to say that people who are not driven to suicide by fear of punishment, but choose it because they are weakened by adversity, are particularly fastidious about the means. A lacuna should be marked after *sed*.

- 315.26 quid si interveniat aliquis qui gaudeat, qui vindicari se putet, si testes adhibeat oculos quibus invidendum sit? statim mehercules adrogans vita *stimulabitur*, statim contumax dolor cum deprehensa morte dissentiet.

There is no pretense in the matter. Read *stimulabitur*.

## XVIII. INFAMIS IN MATREM I

- 322.8 coniungat, quantum volet, nocentissimus senex cum rumore

populi silentium suum et *relatura* ordinem tristissimae sortis conlata malignitate cludat ora, *compescat aditus*.

*relaturae* is the better attested reading and defended by Håkanson: "mag er versuchen (zur Schande) der Mutter seinen Mund zu schliessen." But *relatura* is obviously right: 'The lips which (otherwise) would tell the whole sad story.' "Im Folgenden ist *aditus* (*adiectus*, *abiectus*) gewiss mit *s* in *auditus* zu ändern." Father was not refusing to listen, he was refusing to talk. Read *compescat* <*vocis*> *aditus*.

323.9 suum rigorem, suum tantum secutus est animum. filium si *non ames*, videatur tibi mater adamasse?

Reitzenstein saw what is wrong, but his *quidni* before *videatur* is not likely to be the answer (we should need *qui non ames* or *si non amas*). Håkanson thinks that the question has only to be made a statement: "Wer selbst seinen Sohn nicht liebt, versteht nicht die Liebe einer Mutter, sondern meint, dass sie verliebt sei." But *filium si non ames* does not mean "wer selbst seinen Sohn nicht liebt." We should need *filium qui non ames*, *videtur* . . . *adamasse*. The simplest solution is to delete *non*.

328.7 quae tamdiu amavit, quando incipiat *amare desinere*?

Read *quae tam diu amavit, quando incipiat* <*ad*>*amare* [*desinere*]? Mother had loved her son all his life; when would she start to fall in love with him (i.e. was it believable that she would start)? For this contrast cf. 329.6, *omnes matres liberos suos, tamquam adamaverint, amant*. There was no question of Mother ceasing to love. *desinere* will have been added in an unsuccessful effort to make some sense out of *amare*.

330.26 prius est, ut repudietur uxor, ut divortio *fiat* in domo grande secretum.

Read <*pate*>*fiat*.

331.1 unicum pater ignibus verberibusque interrogas; rogo, quid facturus, si pernegaverit? videlicet, ut laudes, deinde dimittas, *ut amplectaris perusta vitalia et laceri pectoris vulnera pietati rursus admoveas*.

Make *unicum* . . . *interrogas* a question and read *aut* or <*aut*> *ut* before *amplectaris*.

332.23 quid spiritum dolore praecipitas? quid miserae intervalla patientiae pertinaci crudelitate continuas, *si frustra tibi sufficere credis quod audieris, nuntiare, proferre?* incestum ut credatur, ipse debet audiri.



Mother is supposed to be appealing to Father to go more gently with his torture of Son. In his own interests he should not kill the young man, because if he does the story of incest will not be believed. Read *quid . . . continuas?* [si] *frustra tibi sufficere credis quod audieris, nuntiare, proferre. incestum* sqq. Note the superfluous *proferre*. Such asyndetic doublets are a characteristic feature in these works.

333.<sup>1</sup> mirabar et ego, iudices, si tam nefanda quaestio alium exitum potuisset habere quam mortem. hic est parricidii pudor, sic desinunt *quae* incipere non debent. facinus quaestionis, operis scelere maiore exire tibi videris per orbitatem.

For *quae* read *qui*. There should be no comma after *quaestionis* (Lehnert and his predecessors seem to have taken *operis* for a noun), but a semicolon after *maiore* ('you are covering up the wicked act of torture by a greater crime; you think you can get clear by being a bereaved parent'); cf. Cato, *Orat. fr.* 59 (Malcovati), *tuum nefarium facinus peiore facinore operire postulas*.

#### XIX. INFAMIS IN MATREM II

343.<sup>12</sup> quis enim in hac civitate non novit taciturnitatis meae rigorem? quis ignorat qua cuncta soleam ferre patientia? ne occisurus quidem suspiria gemitusque praemisi. nihil feci unde erupturum quandoque per orbitatem patris animum aut tu praescio timore sentires, aut ipse periturus. hanc nunc me iactare *conscientiam* putas quod nihil in publico, nihil in ullo mihi permisi proclamare conventu? ego vero non sum questus de iuvene nec tibi.

For the irrelevant *conscientiam* (*conscientia* occurs in l.3) substitute *constantiam*.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Mr. Håkanson, who kindly read this paper at a late stage, informs me that the following conjectures have been anticipated: 4.7 *quo* (Wiles); 39.9, *hic* (Englund); 193.3, *dedisti* (Reitzenstein); 234.13, *num quid* (Schulting and Reitzenstein); also that *angulo* (166.12) was suggested to him some years ago by Professor Bertil Axelsson, though not hitherto published. At 19.23 he proposes *hoc* (acc., sc. *gladio incumbere*) . . . *quaerebat*, which I prefer to my own suggestion. In a review (*AJPh.*) which may appear before this paper but was written subsequently I have put forward a number of further conjectures inspired by Håkanson's notes.

On 71.19 add: "cf. Paul. Nol. *Carm.* XXVI. 191, *mox miser armis / milite deleto vacuis fugit agmine raro*."



## LIMES ARABICUS

G. W. BOWERSOCK

THE Roman system of frontier defenses in the region of Roman Arabia above <sup>c</sup>Aqaba (now Jordan and southeastern Syria) has long been regarded as a continuation of the frontier *limes* of the Euphrates and Khabūr.<sup>1</sup> The word *limes* is currently attached to these various frontier defenses, although obviously a desert frontier poses substantially different problems from one which follows the course of a river or (as sometimes in Europe) runs across mountain tops. Above all, the designation *limes* normally implies a line of defense, such as is easily marked out along rivers and mountains.<sup>2</sup> It is because of this legitimate and well attested sense of *limes* that the system in Roman Arabia has been described as a double *limes*, consisting of inner and outer *limites* running from north to south. This description is due to those pioneers in the exploration of the surface remains, Brünnow and Domaszewski, whose terminology and interpretation have been generally accepted.<sup>3</sup> Yet the more one studies the Roman organization of the eastern frontier in the southern sector the more disturbing it becomes to think of an Arabian *limes* in two parallel lines, inner and outer. A review of the evidence, both archaeological and literary, suggests that Roman policy and terminology for this part of the eastern frontier has been misunderstood. The present paper is an attempt to clarify the matter with particular reference to the evidence of the late Roman and early Byzantine periods.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, most recently, E. W. Gray, *Proc. Afr. Class. Assoc.* 12 (1973) 27-28.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. Piganiol, "La notion de *limes*," *V Cong. Int. Limit. Rom. Studios.*, Acta et Diss. Arch. III (1963) 119-122. Observe in the first paragraph of that article, "ligne continue, plus ou moins fortifiée," and in the last, "ligne frontière."

<sup>3</sup> R. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Die Provincia Arabia* (1904-1909); cf. R. Brünnow, "Die Kastella des arabischen Limes," *Florilegium de Vogüé* (1909) 65-77. The interpretations given by these scholars were accepted by the present writer in "A Report on Arabia Provincia," *JRS* 61 (1971) 236ff.

<sup>4</sup> The substance of this paper was presented in a lecture before the American Association of Ancient Historians in Columbus, Ohio, on 3 May 1975, and in a lecture before the Seminar for Arabian Studies in London, England, on 7 July 1975. For helpful comment I am grateful to Professors I. Ševčenko, I. Shahīd, and J. J. Wilkes.




FIGURE I



To begin with, the two north-south *limites* postulated for Arabia appear as a series of towers and forts along two north-south roads: one the old King's Highway which became the *via nova Traiana*, and the other a road supposed to have run to the east of Trajan's road.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the word *limes* is being made to describe guard posts on roads rather than frontier defenses; and in that sense it could be used to describe any number of protected roads well inside the frontiers of the Roman Empire. It might seem reasonable to call the easternmost road with its fortifications a *limes* but hardly the *via Traiana* sheltered in the interior. Something has gone wrong with the terminology. No ancient source ever refers to the *via Traiana* as a *limes*, let alone an inner one. Worse still, the continuous road postulated for the outer one is simply not there, so that it comes as no surprise to discover that neither that road nor an outer *limes* of Arabia is ever mentioned at all. A similar difficulty exists in recent work on the so-called *limes* in Palestine, which appears as another fortified route well inside a Roman province (across the northern Negev)<sup>6</sup> — a route never designated a *limes* in any ancient source. At the end of this paper it will be profitable to return to the Palestine *limes* in the light of the conclusions on Arabia.

The frontier of Arabia must be considered with equal attention to the sites and to the literary evidence. First, the surviving towers, forts, and camps, and their disposition: When all the observable remains are plotted on a map, there is manifestly a chronological confusion not unlike that inherent in Père Poidebard's aerial photography. Towers, forts, camps, and roads of all periods show up all together. It is for this reason that the carefully described itineraries of scholarly travelers are usually much more valuable. Sometimes, of course, important outlines can be discerned in composite maps or aerial photographs, especially where there were roads. Such is the case with the Strata Diocletiana. It is therefore worth noting that for Roman Arabia no continuous road along the edge of the desert is visible either on a composite map of sites or on the ground itself. The large-scale maps in volumes I and II of

<sup>5</sup> For *der äussere Limes* see volume II of Brünnow-Domaszewski (n. 3 above). Cf. also Bowersock (n. 3 above). Note M. Avi-Yonah, *RE* suppl. 13 (1973) s.v. *Palaestina*, col. 443, "Eine Parallellinie verlief weiter östlich, dem limes Arabicus entlang."

<sup>6</sup> M. Gichon, *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms*, *Bonner Jahrb. Beiheft* 19 (1967) 175ff; *IEJ* 17 (1967) 27ff; *Provincialia: Festschr. Laur-Belart* (1968) 317ff; and the same author's Hebrew dissertation (Jerusalem), *The Limes in the Negev from its Foundation to Diocletianic Times* (1967). Omitted in Avi-Yonah, "Palaestina" (above n. 5).

Brünnnow and Domaszewski's *Die Provincia Arabia* already showed this clearly.

The territory adjacent to the Wādī Ḥeṣā can serve as an illustration of the foregoing point. On the map (figure 2) from Brünnnow and Domaszewski, all visible remains are marked. (The routes without milestones [MS] or traces of Roman road [RS] indicate *only* the itineraries of those scholars.) Two roads come up from the south, with watchtowers and milestones. The *via Traiana* lies still further to the west, and thus there is evidence for at least three fortified north-south roads below the Wādī Ḥeṣā. Above the Wādī neither of the two ancient roads on the map can be traced very far. Nevertheless a complex network of watchtowers situated on strategic elevations provided protection of the area. Along the northern edge of the Wādī lies an east-west series of watchtowers, and above that there are clusters which overlook settlements like Mḥayy, El Māḥrī, Dhāt rās, or Ghadīr es-Sulṭān. What were probably tracks linking many of these places derived some protection from occasional guard points placed wherever there was a convenient elevation. It is abundantly clear that there was nothing like a fortified frontier line or even two such lines. The pattern presented by the Ḥeṣā remains is repeated both to the north and south. The only through road in the whole area is the *via Traiana*; fortifications and guard posts follow roads or wādīs, exploit elevations, cluster round settlements, and protect unpaved tracks linking various sites.

If one disentangles the web of surface evidence so as to ascertain what was there at any given time, the pattern is essentially the same, although inevitably more detailed where there has been excavation or systematic exploration. A survey of dated sites by chronological layers not only confirms the absence of a fortified line but also contributes to the military history of several crucial periods for the province. Naturally the main urban centers all had detachments of soldiers: these were Bostra, Gerasa, Philadelphia, Petra, and Aila.<sup>7</sup> Ammianus mentions explicitly the walls of the first three of these.<sup>8</sup> But it is the fortifications elsewhere which are revealing, for in the same passage Ammianus says of Arabia, *castrisque oppleta validis et castellis*. No word of a frontier line. Before Diocletian the following sites were definitely fortified, as in-

<sup>7</sup> Cf. A. Kammerer, *Pétra et la Nabatène* (1929) I.300ff. Brünnnow and Domaszewski (above, n. 3) treat the first four of these cities. For Gerasa, see especially C. H. Kraeling, *Gerasa: City of the Decapolis* (1938), for which C. B. Welles presented the inscriptions.

<sup>8</sup> Amm. Marc. 14.8.13.

scriptions have shown: Azraq, Ḥallābāt, Bshīr, Umm ej-jemāl, Qal'at ez-zerqā.<sup>9</sup> It could scarcely be clearer that a special effort was made to protect the whole region at the head of the Wādī Sirḥān and below Bostra. Furthermore, since Umm er-reṣās, Mḥayy, and Dhāt rās were Nabataean sites<sup>10</sup> which seem not to have been abandoned, it may be conjectured that some of the fortifications in and about those places are also pre-Diocletianic. From the earliest times of the province, therefore, there was no fortified frontier line.

During the reorganization of Diocletian and Constantine it is evident that particular attention was given to refortifying that crucial area at the head of the Wādī Sirḥān. From dated inscriptions we know of building at this time in Azraq, Bshīr, and Deir el Kahf, as well as road work in the area of Umm el Quṭṭein.<sup>11</sup> An unpublished inscription from Jawf at the southern end of the Wādī Sirḥān shows a legionary detachment there also at this time.<sup>12</sup> The next datable fortifications are the castella at Umm ej-jemāl and Deir el Kahf, where work was being carried out about 371.<sup>13</sup> The Deir el Kahf inscription can be dated 367–375; the one at Umm ej-jemāl belongs to 371 precisely. The cause of this flurry of activity is almost certainly to be found in the revolt of Mavia, queen of the Saracens, who — like Zenobia a century before — broke her allegiance to Rome after her husband's death and wrought havoc as far as Egypt. Her eventual conversion to Arianism through the piety of a holy hermit called Moses is a familiar story to church

<sup>9</sup> Azraq: *JRS* 61 (1971) 241 (Latin inscription recording repair of the castellum between 326 and 333, [*inc*]ur*ia vetustate* [*parietu*]m *ruina conlapsam*); Ḥallābāt: *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III. A.2, no. 17, p. 21 (inscription of 213); Bshīr: Brünnow-Domaszewski (above, no. 3) II.58 (tetrarchic inscription presupposing an earlier structure); Umm ej-jemāl: *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.3, no. 232, p. 131 (inscription of 177–180 on gate of Commodus); Qal'at ez-zerqā (just north of el Ḥadīd): *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.1, no. 10, p. 16. The unexcavated legionary camp at Lejjūn cannot be assigned a date in this chronological grouping.

<sup>10</sup> See Brünnow-Domaszewski (above, n. 3) II.63–72 (Umm er-reṣās), I.70–75 (Mḥayy), I.61–68 (Dhāt rās). On the staircase tower as a feature of Nabataean architecture at Mḥayy and Dhāt rās, see A. Negev, *Rev. Bibl.* 80 (1973) 378–379.

<sup>11</sup> For Azraq and Bshīr, see references in note 9. Deir el Kahf: *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, no. 228, pp. 126–127 (inscription dated to 306); Umm el Quṭṭein: *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, nos. 205, 206, p. 116 (milestones of 305–306); cf. nos. 207 and 208, pp. 116–117, less precisely dated.

<sup>12</sup> Inscription mentioned by G. W. Bowersock, *JRS* 63 (1973) 139 n. 57, and by M. Speidel, *Latomus* 33 (1974) 935 n. 7.

<sup>13</sup> *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, no. 229, pp. 127–128 (Deir el Kahf); A.3, no. 233, pp. 132–134 (Umm ej-jemāl).









historians.<sup>14</sup> Since the conversion came in about 373,<sup>15</sup> her revolt coincides perfectly with evidence for the castella at Umm ej-jemāl and Deir el Kahf.

Again in the territory above the Wādī Sirḥān there was renewed activity about 411 — at Umm ej-jemāl and Bāʿiq, presumably in response to an Arab invasion which Jerome indicates occurred at this time.<sup>16</sup> The last precisely datable fortification in Roman Arabia is at Ḥallābāt in 529,<sup>17</sup> and this is easily explained in terms of the emergencies which followed the death of Ḥārith the Kindite in 528 at the hands of Mundhir the Lakhmid.<sup>18</sup> The crisis of this time was the making of Ḥārith the Ghassānid. Although no epigraphical evidence can be invoked, the form of construction of a number of forts to the south strongly suggests that they are late, as Brünnow and Domaszewski observed. In particular, Jurf-ed-darāwīsh and Daʿjāniya fall into this category and imply that the easternmost road rising north to the Wādī Ḥeṣā (the road on which they are located) was, with its watchtowers, late.<sup>19</sup>

Ḥamza al Iṣfahānī, in an important passage of his *History*, attributes the building of Adhruḥ, where there are remains of a legionary camp, and Qaṣṭal (named for its *castellum*) to Jabala ibn Ḥārith, who appears from the new document on the Najrān martyrs to have been still alive in the 520s.<sup>20</sup> Though often rejected, a sixth-century date may well be correct, since Adhruḥ forms the southern terminus of the Jurf ed-darāwīsh road protected by apparently late forts; and the site itself, with its camp, is conspicuous by its absence from both the *Notitia Dignitatum*

<sup>14</sup> Rufinus, *HE* 2.6; Socrates, *HE* 4.36; Sozomen, *HE* 6.38; Theodoret, *HE* 4.23.1.

<sup>15</sup> The conversion seems to have occurred soon after Athanasius' death in May 373 since it is assigned to the beginning of Lucius' bishopric at Alexandria. Socrates (n. 14, above) provides a much later dating; and he was later followed in this by Theophanes (De Boor, pp. 64–65). But since Rufinus is clearly Socrates' source the earlier dating is generally accepted. Cf. R. Aigrain, *Dict. d'hist. et. de géog. ecclési.* s.v. Arabie, col. 1191.

<sup>16</sup> *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, no. 21, p. 42 (Bāʿiq; inscription dated to 411); III.A.3, no. 237, pp. 136–137 (Umm ej-jemāl; a castellum dated to 412/413). Cf. Jerome, *Epist.* 126 (*PL* 22.1086). An inscription on the south wall of the castellum at Zizā seems also to record building at about this time (ca. 410), but the dates by indiction and the era of Bostra are discrepant: Brünnow-Domaszewski II.94.

<sup>17</sup> *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, no. 18, pp. 22–23.

<sup>18</sup> Malalas (Bonn) 434–435. Cf. I. Shahid, *BZ* 53 (1960) 60.

<sup>19</sup> Brünnow-Domaszewski (n. 3), II.8ff (Daʿjāniya), 14ff (Jurf ed-darāwīsh).

<sup>20</sup> Ḥamza al Iṣfahānī, *Taʾriḫh* (Beirut ed. 1961) 100. On Jabala, see I. Shahid, *The Martyrs of Najrān*, *Subsidia Hagiog.* 49 (1971) 109, 273.

and the Peutinger Table. (This is not, of course, to deny the existence of a town there in earlier centuries.) If Ḥamza is right about Adhruh, there is no reason to challenge his testimony on Qaṣṭal. Furthermore, he goes on to state that Jabala's son Ḥārith, the patrician phylarch, was responsible for a building (*maṣnaʿa*) in the area of Daʿjāniya and Maʿān: this strikingly confirms the implications of the surface remains.<sup>21</sup> Daʿjāniya lies on the Jurf ed-darāwīsh road, and Maʿān lies just below its southern tip. Ḥārith evidently continued his father's fortification of this area, which (though strictly in Palestina Tertia) would have been naturally subject to the Ghassānid overlords. It should come as no surprise that Procopius, who clearly disapproved of Ḥārith, failed to mention the Ghassānid fortifications in his review of the buildings under Justinian.<sup>22</sup>

One fact emerges plainly from both the composite and the chronological survey of the Arabian fortification system. There was no *limes* in the sense accepted hitherto. The concept of the double *limes* cannot stand. Scholars after Brünnow and Domaszewski have shown discomfort in the face of the evidence. For example, Van Berchem, in discussing castella, uses the expression "*limes* proprement dit,"<sup>23</sup> which in the Arabian context means nothing. Similarly, Eric Gray, in his valuable survey of frontier problems, writes of "the *limes* proper" as opposed to the "inner zone" and "outer zone" of the *limes*.<sup>24</sup> If there was no such thing as a *limes* proper, the question arises as to what was meant by *limes* or Greek *λίμνον* with reference to fortified areas such as those under scrutiny.

The solution lies in the notion of inner *limes*, which — unlike many terms used by modern students of ancient history — occurs in ancient texts. On two occasions Malalas uses it (τὸ ἐνδότερον [or ἐσώτερον]

<sup>21</sup> Qaṣr Ubair is unknown. . . . مصنة بين دعبان وقصر أبير ومعان

مصنة (or مصنع) has often been translated "cistern": see Th. Nöldeke, *Die ghassanischen Fürsten aus dem Hause Gafna's* (1887) 51 n. 1; Brünnow-Domaszewski (n. 3) II.8; U. Monneret de Villard, *Introduzione allo studio dell' archeologia islamica* (1966) 41–42. But long ago Nöldeke had warned, "Beiläufig bemerkt, ist مصنة in diesen Angaben schwerlich immer mit Wetzstein als 'Cisterne' zu fassen." The rendering cannot possibly be correct in a register of buildings such as Ḥamza gives. مصنة (or مصنع) here is simply, as normally, a "construction" (fort, palace, etc.).

<sup>22</sup> On Procopius' prejudice, see I. Shahīd (Kawar), *BZ* 50 (1957) 376ff. On the omission of fortifications in Arabia, E. W. Gray (n. 1, above) 28.

<sup>23</sup> D. Van Berchem, *L'armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne* (1952) 4, 18.

<sup>24</sup> E. W. Gray (n. 1, above) 28.



λίμιτον), as can be confirmed from the nearly verbatim reproduction of his words in the *Chronographia* of Theophanes.<sup>25</sup> In both cases it is evident that he is referring to a whole region, since persons are said to travel through it. Elsewhere he uses the word λίμιτον manifestly to describe a territory within which people move or reside.<sup>26</sup> Likewise Justinian on the *limitanei* uses the phrase *in quibus locis vel limitibus*.<sup>27</sup> Perhaps the most significant text for understanding the notion of inner *limes* is Ammianus 23.5.1 on Diocletian and Cercusium: *muris turribusque circumdedit celsis, cum in ipsis barbarorum confiniis interiores limites ordinaret . . . ne vagarentur per Syriam Persae*. Obviously these inner *limites* extended to the actual frontier since they are *in ipsis barbarorum confiniis*.<sup>28</sup> The sense of "inner" is revealed to be simply "inside" the frontier. An "outer *limes*" would make no sense since that would be the territory of another nation, presumably hostile, on the other side of the frontier. And it happens to be the case that no writer of antiquity can be shown to refer to an outer *limes*.<sup>29</sup> What is more, in Greek Christian texts there appear references to the "inner desert" (ἐσωτέρα ἔρημος) but never to the "outer desert." The opposite of the inner desert is Περσική ἔρημος, "the Persian desert."<sup>30</sup>

Ammianus' use of the expression inner *limes* to mean the fortified territory up to where the barbarians lived matches Malalas' use. Both were easterners. Since the Roman concept of *limes* was certainly in origin that of a fortified line, it is legitimate to assume that this new sense of *limes* as a whole region originated in the east and precisely as a result of the special conditions of the frontier there. In a text of A.D. 409

<sup>25</sup> Malalas (Bonn) 434.21-22: ὁ δὲ Ἀρέτας φοβηθεὶς εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ ἐνδότερον λίμιτον ἐπὶ τὰ Ἰνδικά~ Theophanes (De Boor) 179.16-17: καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὁ φύλαρχος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ ἐσώτερον λίμιτον. The single manuscript of Malalas at 445.5-7 reads: καὶ γνόντες οἱ Σαρακηνοί, λαβόντες πᾶσαν τὴν πραῖδαν διὰ τοῦ ἐξωτέρου λιμίτου ἔφυγον, but Theophanes 178.14-15 has: καὶ γνόντες οἱ Σαρακηνοί σὺν τοῖς Πέρσαις λαβόντες τὴν πραῖδαν καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους διὰ τοῦ ἐσωτέρου λιμίτου ἔφυγον. The context of this latter passage is the flight of Mundhir from Antioch in 529, and it is evident that Theophanes has reproduced Malalas' authentic wording either exactly or (as with the first passage) in sense by writing ἐσωτέρου for an original ἐνδοτέρου.

<sup>26</sup> Malalas 426.1-2: καὶ ἀνανεῶσαι πόλιν τῆς Φοινίκης εἰς τὸ λίμιτον τὴν λεγομένην Παλμύραν. Cf. Malalas 302.22-303.1; 463.6-8.

<sup>27</sup> *Cod. Iust.* I.27.2.13.

<sup>28</sup> This point was well made by Fabricius in *RE* 13.1, col. 655, but it has not been widely appreciated. Dr. W. Liebeschuetz is reported to have given a brief communication on "inner *limes*" at the 1974 *limes* congress.

<sup>29</sup> As acutely noticed by E. Honigsmann, *Klio* 25 (1932) 137. For an inadmissible reading, "outer *limes*," in the text of Malalas 445, see note 25, above.

<sup>30</sup> *Patrol. orient.* 6 (1911) 682.14; 683.16.



in the Theodosian Code, *limes* is still used in its old sense of a frontier line (*munitio limitis atque fossati*);<sup>31</sup> but, as we have seen, in the sixth century Justinian used the word in the eastern sense, that of the Greek *λίμιτον*. This sense fits perfectly with the physical evidence of the sites themselves.

We may conclude the present investigation by returning to the Palestine *limes*. A number of late texts, Latin and Greek, refer to a *limes* of Palestine, a phrase which has been appropriated to describe the fortified road across the northern Negev (well inside the Roman empire).<sup>32</sup> With our new understanding of the eastern *limes* and with a moment's reflection on the names of provinces in the late period, it will be immediately obvious that the Palestine *limes* of the texts refers to the fortified part of Palestina Tertia (or Salutaris), which is in southern Trans-Jordan — what had originally been in the bottom half of the pre-Diocletianic province of Arabia.<sup>33</sup> When the church historian Rufinus refers to Mavia's invasion of *Palestini et Arabici limitis oppida atque urbes*,<sup>34</sup> he means the frontier territory from 'Aqaba into Syria.

One cannot be reminded often enough in the study of ancient history that words change their meaning, and that the stones on the ground sometimes guide us to a better understanding of the literary texts.

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<sup>31</sup> *Cod. Theod.* VII.15.1.

<sup>32</sup> E.g. *Rev. Bibl.* 27 (1920) 121: οὐδὲ λιπὼν λιμίτιοι Παλαιστ(ίνης) χθόνα διᾶν (Beersheba); *Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* III.A.2, no. 20, p. 33, frs. 15-19: ἐν μὲν τῷ Πα[λ]αιστίνης καὶ Εὐφρατῆ]σίας λιμίτῳ (Ḥallābāt); Rufinus, as quoted in the text with reference in note 34. For the "limes" of the northern Negev as postulated by Gichon, see the references in note 6 above.

<sup>33</sup> Bowersock (n. 3, above) 242; T. D. Barnes, *ZPE* 16 (1975) 277.

<sup>34</sup> Rufinus, *HE* 2.6. It should now be clear that Père Poidebard's *limes* of Chalcis is a misunderstanding of Malalas' phrase διὰ τοῦ λιμίτου Χαλκίδος at 296.5: A. Poidebard, *Le Limes de Chalkis* (1945).



## THE PLANCII OF PERGE AND DIANA PLANCIANA

C. P. JONES

### I

THE Plancii of Perge are among the more notable of those wealthy families regularly found in Greek cities of the Roman Empire. Probably stemming from Atina in Latium, they may have come to Perge as *negotiatores* under the republic.<sup>1</sup> They enter history with M. Plancius Varus, who as a praetorian senator in 69 brought about the destruction of a scion of the old nobility; his own career continued, however, under Vespasian.<sup>2</sup> Plancius was linked by some tie of kinship or marriage with another prominent Pergaeon, Cornutus Tertullus, the friend of Pliny and his colleague in the consulship of 100.<sup>3</sup> Plancius' daughter, Plancia Magna, was a great benefactress of the city under Hadrian;<sup>4</sup> her brother C. Plancius Varus, whom Cornutus Tertullus had perhaps adopted, may have been consul and legate of Cilicia under the same emperor;<sup>5</sup> in the next generation, the sophist Varus of Perge is clearly a member of the same family;<sup>6</sup> the last known member of it appears to be Celsus Plancianus, consul suffect with Avidius Cassius about 163.<sup>7</sup>

The inscriptions relative to this family have multiplied in the past decade. In 1965 S. Jameson discussed several new or partly known ones

I am grateful to Professor G. W. Bowersock for his help. I have used the following special abbreviations: *Bull.* = J. and L. Robert, "Bulletin épigraphique," appearing annually in *REG*; Jameson = S. Jameson, *JRS* 55 (1965) 54-58; Mitchell = S. Mitchell, *JRS* 64 (1974) 27-39; Panciera = S. Panciera, *RendPontAcc* 43 (1971) 109-134; Robert, *OMS* = L. Robert, *Opera minora selecta*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam 1969-1974). All dates are A.D. unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>1</sup> Jameson 55.

<sup>2</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 2.63; Jameson 56-58.

<sup>3</sup> Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958) 82-83; *Historia* 9 (1960) 363-364; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> I 273.

<sup>4</sup> A. Müfid Mansel, *AA* 71 (1956) 111, 117-20 (*AEpigr* 1958, 76-78); Jameson 55.

<sup>5</sup> Jameson 56; *PIR*<sup>2</sup> I 470; Syme, *Historia* 18 (1969) 365-366.

<sup>6</sup> Philostr. *VS* 2.6, p. 82 Kayser; thus Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1969) 22 n. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *CIL* 16.124; Syme, *Historia* 18 (1969) 366.

from Perge; the first is on the base of a statue of C. Plancius Varus, the second honors Plancia Magna.<sup>8</sup> Recently a Latin inscription from Colonia Germa in Galatia has revealed almost the entire career of M. Plancius Varus;<sup>9</sup> and this in turn allows an acephalous Greek inscription found in Attaleia to be referred to the same man.<sup>10</sup> Now S. Mitchell has made known texts from Tavium in eastern and Apollonia in southern Galatia which further document the widespread connections and possessions of the Plancii and Cornuti.<sup>11</sup> Other inscriptions await publication. M. Plancius Varus, who is already named in one from the eastern gate of Nicaea, now occurs also in a second, to be published by E. Bowie.<sup>12</sup> F. Zevi has announced, among other new fragments of the *Fasti Ostienses*, one that reveals the year 100 entire, and therefore will show the names of Cornutus Tertullus and Pliny.<sup>13</sup> And J. Inan has now published an almost complete statue of Plancia Magna found at Perge, and mentions new inscriptions there relating both to her and to hitherto unknown freedmen of the family.<sup>14</sup>

## II

Some observations may be made on texts recently published. The first one discussed by S. Jameson reads as follows: ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος | Γ. Ἰούλιον Πλάνκιον | Οὐᾶρον Κορνοῦτον | τὸν πάτρωνα καὶ εὐεργέτη(ν) || στεφανωθέντα πάντα | τὰ ἀθλήματα θέμιδος | Οὐαρείου ἐννεα[τη]ρίδος | τειμῆς χά[ρην]. Jameson does not comment on lines 5-7, despite their interest.<sup>15</sup> Plancius was both an athlete and a benefactor: athletes were usually drawn from the wealthy class, though it is striking if this man was also a Roman consul.<sup>16</sup> The reference to the

<sup>8</sup> Jameson 54-55 (*AEpigr* 1965, 208-209). A photograph of the second had already been published by Mansel, *AA* 71 (1956) 119 ill. 69, whence *AEpigr* 1958, 78.

<sup>9</sup> Mitchell 27-28, with earlier bibliography; add now C. P. Jones, *Gnomon* 45 (1973) 691; *AEpigr* 1971 (publ. 1974) 463; W. Eck, *RE* suppl. 14 (1974) 385 no. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *SEG* 6.650; see now Mitchell 28.

<sup>11</sup> Mitchell 34-38.

<sup>12</sup> Mitchell 28 n. 5.

<sup>13</sup> F. Zevi, *Listy filologické* 96 (1973) 128; *Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Epigraphik* (Munich 1973) 438.

<sup>14</sup> J. Inan, *Mélanges Mansel* (Ankara 1974) 648-649, A. Müfid Mansel, *AA* 90 (1975) 75.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Bull.* 1966, 457.

<sup>16</sup> For another athletic consul, cf. Valerius Asiaticus, cos. II A.D. 46 (*Tac. Ann.* 11.3.2, *ILS* 212.2.15); note also Rubellius Plautus (*Tac. Ann.* 14.59.2).



"nine-yearly Vareian games" (for that is the meaning of θέμις)<sup>17</sup> recalls another inscription of Perge mentioning an agonothete τῶν μεγάλων [Οὐα]ρείων πενταετηρ[ικῶν] ἀγώνων.<sup>18</sup> While the same Varus need not have founded both nine- and five-yearly Vareian games, that seems intrinsically likely: he is perhaps M. Plancius Varus, since the nine-yearly ones already existed in his son's day, and certainly not the sophist Varus, who lived in the mid-second century.<sup>19</sup>

Jameson's second inscription resembles two others in honor of Plancia Magna long since known<sup>20</sup> and presents no problems of interpretation. The text, however, can be improved. In lines 6–9 Jameson reads, without punctuation or comment, ἱέρειαν μητρὸς θεῶν διὰ βίου πρώτην καὶ μόν[ο]ν εὐσεβῆ καὶ φιλόπατριν. μόν[ο]ν, however, should clearly be μόνην;<sup>21</sup> πρώτην καὶ μόνην evidently qualifies the preceding ἱέρειαν . . . διὰ βίου.<sup>22</sup>

The inscription from Germa that gives the career of M. Plancius Varus adds *pro praetore* to his title of quaestor in Pontus and Bithynia (the corresponding part of the inscription from Attaleia is lost). Mitchell infers that Plancius had "acted in place of the proconsul or proconsul's legate."<sup>23</sup> In fact, provincial quaestors are not infrequently designated *pro praetore* in inscriptions of the early principate, apparently because they served after and not during the year of their magistracy.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> L. Robert, *RPhil* 3<sup>3</sup> (1929) 122 (*OMS* 2.1088); on the popularity of θέμιδες in Pamphylia, Robert, *REG* 49 (1936) 247 (*OMS* 1.683).

<sup>18</sup> K. Lanckoroński, *Städte Pamphyliens und Pisidiens* 1 (Vienna 1890) 167 no. 35 (*IGRR* 3.798).

<sup>19</sup> The sophist Varus was the founder supposed by Lanckoroński (above, n. 18) 165; reasonably enough, since he knew no other Varus of Perge. Jameson 54 n. 5 follows Lanckoroński, apparently not realizing that the inscription she is discussing disproves his view (or indeed that it mentions games at all). The editors of *AEpigr* 1965, 208 suppose that the honorand, C. Plancius Varus, was also the founder, but it seems implausible that a man should compete in games founded by himself.

<sup>20</sup> P. Le Bas and W. H. Waddington, *Inscriptions grecques et latines* (Paris 1870) 1371 (*IGRR* 3.794); H. A. Ormerod and E. S. G. Robinson, *BSA* 17 (1911) 246.

<sup>21</sup> Thus already *AEpigr* 1958, 78 (but μόν[ο]ν, 1965, 209); the lower right-hand serif is clear in Jameson's pl. 7. The final nu should not be dotted, since the traces are incompatible with any other letter.

<sup>22</sup> For πρώτη καὶ μόνη applied to a benefactress, Robert in J. des Gagniers et al., *Laodicée du Lycos: Le nymphée* (Québec and Paris 1969) 268; for the position of such epithets after the phrases they qualify, e.g. *IGRR* 4.860.7 (Robert 265).

<sup>23</sup> Mitchell 28.

<sup>24</sup> T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig 1887) 2.258–259, citing Dio Cass. 53.28.4, 57.16.1; cf. Dessau, *ILS* 3 p. 409.

The chronology of Plancius' career, despite much discussion, is still not satisfactorily settled.<sup>25</sup> The inscriptions from Germa and Attaleia give his posts up to his legateships of Achaea and Asia, held as a praetorian; there is no evidence of date beyond the fact that Achaea was free from Roman officials between 67 and (possibly) 70. Under Vespasian Plancius was proconsul of Bithynia; the old view that he was consul and proconsul of Asia under the same emperor is now exploded. The only other secure date in his career is provided by Tacitus, who describes him as *praetura functus* in 69.<sup>26</sup> Mitchell appears to take this to mean that by 69 Plancius had held only the praetorship and as yet no praetorian posts, since he dates all these to the reign of Vespasian. *Praetura functus*, however, is only Tacitus' variation on the more usual *praetorius*, and need not imply that Plancius had held only the praetorship and nothing further:<sup>27</sup> he could, therefore, have been legate in Achaea at least under Nero no less than under subsequent emperors. However, Mitchell is probably right to argue that his two legateships fell under Vespasian, and so that his proconsulate of Bithynia came later rather than earlier in the reign.

The acephalous inscription was found in the Byzantine wall of Attaleia.<sup>28</sup> While there is no strong reason to question that it comes from the city itself, a slight doubt may be admitted. This same wall is known to have been built partly with stones brought from other cities, especially Perge.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the *nomen* of the donor, Sempronius, is found at Attaleia,<sup>30</sup> and another inscription from there of which the origin is not suspect honors a prominent member of the Plancii.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>25</sup> For what follows see now Mitchell 28–29.

<sup>26</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 2.63.

<sup>27</sup> Thus G. W. Houston, *TAPA* 103 (1972) 171 n. 16; cf. F. R. D. Goodyear *The Annals of Tacitus* 1 (Cambridge 1972) 344. Note especially Q. Servaeus praetorian in 18 (Tac. *Ann.* 2.56.4), *praetura functus* in 32 (6.7.2).

<sup>28</sup> V. Viale, *ASAtene* 8–9 (1925–1926) 365.

<sup>29</sup> Robert, *RPhil* 3<sup>a</sup> (1929) 123, 131 (*OMS* 2.1089, 1097).

<sup>30</sup> Noted by *Bull.* 1948, 229 no. 33 (*SEG* 17.604).

<sup>31</sup> G. Radet and P. Paris, *BCH* 10 (1886) 156 no. 3 (*IGRR* 3.782); published as if new by M. H. Ballance, *BSR* 10<sup>2</sup> (1955) 111 (*Bull.* 1958, 495). This revised text is unknown to Mitchell 28 n. 2, as also to Jameson, *RE* suppl. 12 (1970) 117. Mitchell supposes that the honorand and the donor were freedmen of the Plancii; that is contradicted, for the honorand at least, by the description of him as *ἄνδρα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, γένους ἱερατικοῦ*.

## III

Evidence for the prominence and generosity of the Plancii may also be forthcoming from an unexpected quarter. S. Panciera has recently published three inscriptions, one of them discovered in 1780 and in standard collections, which refer to a temple of Diana Planciana at Rome.<sup>32</sup> From the place of discovery of the new inscriptions, where part of what appears to be a statue of Diana was also found, Panciera persuasively locates the temple on the Quirinal. Also noting that inscriptions attest a *statua Planci* on the *Vicus Longus*, which ran from the Quirinal to the Viminal, he argues that the honorand may have been a Plancius, not a Plancus as usually assumed, and that the statue may have stood near the temple of Diana Planciana.<sup>33</sup>

Panciera's identification of the founder, however, is less convincing. As he observes, the temple must have been of some importance to have its own *aeditui*; and since the two presently known were a Ti(berius) Claudius Aug(usti) lib(ertus) Heroicus and a C. Iulius Hymetus (*sic*), it must have been in existence under the early principate. Since no Plancus is known in this period who had connections with the cult of Diana, Panciera argues that the founder must be Cn. Plancius, the client of Cicero, curule aedile (probably) in 55 B.C.<sup>34</sup>

In this proposal Panciera leans heavily on the evidence of *denarii* of Cn. Plancius, which show a female head, a Cretan bow, and an ibex. It was apparently E. Babelon who first proposed that this head was that of "Diana Planciana."<sup>35</sup> Other numismatists, however, and also F. Münzer, have been more sceptical.<sup>36</sup> This head, with *causia*, earrings, and necklace, hardly suggests the virgin huntress; Babelon's own suggestion that it represents the province of Macedonia where Plancius had served as military tribune and quaestor seems much more plausible.<sup>37</sup>

The claims of Cn. Plancius are therefore not strong. Another Plancius, however, comes readily to mind. The temple of Diana Planciana, as has been seen, is first attested in the early principate; to be served by an

<sup>32</sup> Panciera 125-128 (*AEpigr* 1971, 31-32); *CIL* 6.2210 = *ILS* 4999.

<sup>33</sup> Panciera 128-130.

<sup>34</sup> Panciera 130-134. It is not clear why Panciera fails to consider the possibility of a Plancius, as well as a Plancus, in the early principate.

<sup>35</sup> E. Babelon, *Description historique et chronologique des monnaies de la république romaine* 2 (Paris 1886) 317-318; illustrated by Panciera 131.

<sup>36</sup> F. Münzer, *RE* 20 (1950) 2015; M. H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (Cambridge 1974) 455 no. 432, discounts any reference to Diana Planciana.

<sup>37</sup> Babelon (above, n. 35) 317; so now also Crawford (above, n. 36).

imperial freedman called Tiberius Claudius it should have been in existence at the latest by 100, and probably earlier.<sup>38</sup> Thus the earliest, indeed the only, references to the temple precisely fit the chronology of M. Plancius Varus; and there is also an evident connection between him and the cult of Diana. The Artemis of Perge was the chief divinity of the city, and in fact of Pamphylia generally.<sup>39</sup> She was naturally identified with Diana, and coins show the words DIANA PERG(ENSIS), or PERG(AEA), actually on the architrave of her temple.<sup>40</sup> That the Plancii were active in her service is both expected and attested. Plancia Magna, the daughter of M. Plancius Varus, was her priestess, and one of her dedications to "Diana Pergensis" survives.<sup>41</sup> The sophist Varus is said by Philostratus to have had statues in the goddess's temple.<sup>42</sup> It may therefore be thought almost a certainty that the Plancius who endowed the temple of Diana Planciana at Rome, and was honored with a statue nearby, was the famous M. Plancius Varus of Perge.<sup>43</sup>

So prominent was the cult of Pergaeian Artemis that it spread over Pamphylia into Pisidia and cities of the Aegean, and emigrant Pamphylians carried it as far as Egypt.<sup>44</sup> If Plancius Varus is rightly identified as the founder of the temple of Diana Planciana, then that is further evidence for its diffusion. It has been seen that the Plancii probably arrived in Perge as *negotiatores* under the republic; they flourished and intermarried, and in the second century produced Roman consuls and Greek sophists. Once back in Italy, however, they remained as faithful to the gods of their adoptive *patria* as any senator whose ancestors had never left Comum or Reate. Such devotion recalls those provincial

<sup>38</sup> For a freedman Tiberius Claudius still active in the early second century see W. Eck, *RE* suppl. 14 (1974) 100 no. 107b.

<sup>39</sup> Generally, see H. Oppermann, *RE* 19 (1937) 683-689; W. Ruge, *RE* 19 (1937) 699-700; for subsequent research, S. Onurkan, *IstMitt* 19/20 (1969-1970) 289-298. The site of the temple may now have been found: Onurkan 296-297, A. Müfid Mansel (above, n. 14) 96.

<sup>40</sup> Mionnet, *Description* suppl. 7 (Paris 1835) 45 nos. 82-83; F. Imhoof-Blumer, *Revue suisse de numismatique* 13 (1905) 163.

<sup>41</sup> Priestess: Ormerod and Robinson, *BSA* 17 (1911) 246, Jameson 55 (*AEpigr* 1965, 209). Diana Pergensis: *AEpigr* 1958, 76 = Jameson pl. 8.

<sup>42</sup> Philostr. *VS* 2.6, p. 82 Kayser.

<sup>43</sup> It may also be noted that the temple of Artemis in Perge received the coveted right of asylum at some time between 22 (Tac. *Ann.* 3.61-63) and the last years of Domitian (*SEG* 6.672). Though the ambassador who obtained this privilege was a certain Apollonius (*IGRR* 3.796, with Wilhelm's τῆ[ν ἀσυλίαν in line 7], Plancius might have exercised decisive influence at Rome.

<sup>44</sup> Oppermann (above, n. 39) 688-689; Ruge (above, n. 39) 700; Robert, *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie mineure gréco-romaine* (Paris 1963) 419.



emperors who promoted from the throne the cults of their native lands, as Trajan that of Hercules or Elagabalus that of the god of Emesa. As so often, the ways of monarchs are merely the ways of the upper class writ large.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



# SOSSIANUS HIEROCLES AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE "GREAT PERSECUTION"

T. D. BARNES

EUSEBIUS' tract, which is printed under the title "Against the Life of Apollonius of Tyana written by Philostratus, occasioned by the parallel drawn by Hierocles between him and Christ," tends to be edited as a pendant to Philostratus' work,<sup>1</sup> and it has been studied more for its comparison of Jesus and the pagan sage than for its relevance to the early fourth century.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, its few readers must find the writing dreary and pedestrian, and the bulk of the treatise consists of a somewhat wearisome examination and criticism of specific episodes or passages in the *Life of Apollonius*, book by book (chaps. 8-44 Kayser). But Eusebius provides historical and literary information which is often overlooked.<sup>3</sup> When combined with the evidence normally adduced, the *Contra Hieroclem* can be made to disclose additional facts about

I am grateful to Professors G. W. Bowersock and C. P. Jones for helping me to refine the arguments presented here. I am fully aware that many of them remain highly speculative.

<sup>1</sup> The most recent edition is that of C. L. Kayser, *Philostrati opera* 1 (Teubner 1870) 369-413, reprinted and translated into English by F. C. Conybeare, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 2 (Loeb Classical Library, 1912) 482-605. The title as given in the text is Conybeare's translation from Kayser. Photius, *Bibliotheca*, cod. 39, gives a different version, but neither is likely to be authentic, since the original title ought to have identified the person whom Eusebius addresses at the outset (p. 369.1: ὁ φιλότιτος; cf. p. 373.19: ἐταῖρε). Nor does Kayser's edition meet modern critical standards: he did not collate what appears to be the archetype of all the other manuscripts of the *Contra Hieroclem*, viz. Codex Parisinus Graecus 451, fols. 368-401. On this famous manuscript, written in A.D. 914, see esp. A. Harnack, *Texte und Untersuchungen* 1.1/2 (1882) 24ff; O. Staehlin, *GCS* 12 (1905) xviff; K. Mras, *GCS* 43.1 (1954) xiiiff; and on deficiencies in Kayser's treatment of manuscripts of Philostratus, M. Schanz, *Rh. Mus.*, n.s. 38 (1883) 305f.

<sup>2</sup> As by F. Faulhaber, *Die griechischen Apologeten der klassischen Väterzeit. I. Buch: Eusebius von Cäsarea* (Diss. Würzburg 1895) 108ff; H. Doergens, *Theologie und Glaube* 25 (1933) 292ff; G. Petzke, *Die Traditionen über Apollonius von Tyana und das Neue Testament* (1970) 6ff.

<sup>3</sup> I too have been guilty of this oversight and consequential errors (in: *JTS* n.s. 24 [1973] 437f, 440f).

Hierocles' career, about the publication of his polemic against the Christians, and about the antecedents of the "Great Persecution."

# I. THE DATE OF THE *CONTRA HIEROCLEM*

The date of the *Contra Hieroclem* was discussed early in this century by A. Harnack and E. Schwartz, with divergent results. The former saw in the *Contra Hieroclem* a youthful work which differed from Eusebius' later manner, and he argued that, since Eusebius virtually nowhere refers to the persecution of Christians, and never at all to Hierocles' own activities as a persecutor, he must have been writing before persecution began (early in 303).<sup>4</sup> The latter detected an allusion to the death of Galerius (April/May 311), and dated the work between that event and the death of Maximinus Daia (summer 313).<sup>5</sup> Although at least one other date has been proposed,<sup>6</sup> the majority of recent scholars who offer an opinion follow Schwartz and date the *Contra Hieroclem* to the years 311-313, albeit sometimes with hesitation.<sup>7</sup> The arguments advanced by Harnack are, I believe, cogent, and may therefore be restated and amplified.

The most general and powerful consideration is a subjective one. On the later chronology, the *Contra Hieroclem* was written very shortly before Eusebius began the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (in or shortly after 313).<sup>8</sup> Yet the tone of the two works is so different that it is hard to believe that the author wrote both at the same period of his life. Moreover, this general consideration is reinforced by something more objective. Eusebius states that the comparison of Jesus and Apollonius of Tyana was Hierocles' sole claim to originality: he "of all the writers,

<sup>4</sup> A. Harnack, *Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius* 2 (1904) 118; *Abh. Berlin*, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1916, Nr. 1, 29. Harnack also accepted the hypothesis that Hierocles wrote in Palmyra, following L. Duchesne, *De Macario Magne et scriptis eius* (1877) 11.

<sup>5</sup> E. Schwartz, *RE* 6 (1909) 1394 = *Griechische Geschichtsschreiber* (1959) 531.

<sup>6</sup> J. Stevenson, *Studies in Eusebius* (1929) 70ff, dated the work 306/307, on the grounds that Eusebius implies that he was writing when Hierocles was prefect of Egypt (pp. 373.10/11, 386.30/31).

<sup>7</sup> P. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne* (1934) 310; J. R. Laurin, *Orientations maitresses des apologistes chrétiens de 270 à 361* (1950) 130f; W. S. Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea* (1960) 18; J. Quasten, *Patrology* 3 (1960) 334 ("most probably between 311 and 313, or even earlier").

<sup>8</sup> K. Mras, *GCS* 43.1 (1954) lv, arguing from *PE* 4.2.10ff. The date cannot be long after 313, since Eusebius completed not only the *Praeparatio* (in fifteen books), but also its longer sequel, the *Demonstratio Evangelica* (in twenty), before 324.



who have ever attacked us, stands alone in selecting Apollonius, as he has recently done, for the purposes of comparison and contrast with our Saviour" (p. 370.9-12). The rest was plagiarized from others, especially Celsus, and hence had been refuted in advance by Origen (p. 369.7ff). But Porphyry's *Against the Christians* also drew a comparison between Jesus and Apollonius.<sup>9</sup> Apparently, therefore, when Eusebius wrote the *Contra Hieroclem*, he did not yet know of Porphyry's work.<sup>10</sup> Such ignorance is harder to explain on the later chronology, for the *Praeparatio Evangelica* is largely directed against Porphyry,<sup>11</sup> and a niche must be found for the composition of the lost *Contra Porphyrium*, in twenty-five books.<sup>12</sup> The argument for a date of 311-313 rests exclusively on a single passage, whose alleged allusion to Galerius is most uncertain:<sup>13</sup>

[Jesus] is the only example of a teacher who, after being treated as an enemy for so many years, by practically all men, subjects and rulers alike, has at last triumphed and shown himself far mightier, thanks to his divine and mysterious power, than the infidels who persecuted him bitterly, easily overcoming those who on occasion attacked his divine teaching,<sup>14</sup> and making the divine doctrine which he firmly laid down and handed on prevail for ages without end over the inhabited world (p. 372.15-23 Kayser: Conybeare's translation, slightly modified).

But those who "on occasion" or "from time to time" attacked Christianity may have been earlier emperors, principally Decius and Valerian, whose surrender to the Persian king (in 260) inaugurated four decades of peace for the Christians. The presumed allusion becomes less plausible when it is observed that Eusebius consistently fails to mention contemporary persecution or martyrdom in contexts where it would aid his argument. Thus, just before the passage quoted, there is mention of Jesus' original disciples and their readiness to die for his words, and to

<sup>9</sup> Jerome, *Tract. de Ps. lxxxi* 225ff (CCL 78.89) = frag. 4 Harnack.

<sup>10</sup> A. Harnack, *Abh. Berlin*, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1916, Nr. 1, 29. Against Harnack's hypothesis that Hierocles had used Porphyry, cf. *JTS* n.s. 24 (1973) 440.

<sup>11</sup> Note esp. *PE* 1.2.2ff, which is Eusebius' paraphrase of Porphyry's general thesis, rather than the quotation of a single passage, as argued by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Zeitschr. für neutest. Wiss.* 1 (1900) 101ff.

<sup>12</sup> For the evidence, A. Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur* 2 (1898) 564f.

<sup>13</sup> Harnack disallowed it (above, n. 10) 29.

<sup>14</sup> P. 372.19/20: τοὺς κατὰ καιρὸν ἐπανισταμένους . . . μετιών. Eusebius elsewhere uses the phrases κατὰ καιρὸν and κατὰ καιροῦς in identical senses, *Ecl. Proph.* 1.20 (PG 22.1081). For persecutions κατὰ καιρὸν/κατὰ καιροῦς, cf. *Ecl. Proph.* 1.8 (PG 22.1048), *HE* 1.1.2, *DE* 8.1.61, *In Is.* 49.26 (PG 24.440).

the conversion of countless throngs in Eusebius' own day (p. 372.8-10, 13ff), but no hint that Christians are still being or have recently been executed. Perhaps more significant, Eusebius not infrequently adverts to Hierocles' activity as a judge in court in order to ridicule his frivolity in believing improbable stories about Apollonius of Tyana or in too readily damning Christian beliefs (pp. 373.9ff, 382.24ff, 384.23ff, 386.29ff, 398.16f). If Eusebius knew that Hierocles had already condemned, tortured, and executed Christians, he would surely not have failed to allude to the fact. Such conduct manifestly belied Hierocles' pretense that he was an impartial "lover of truth."<sup>15</sup>

Taken by itself, therefore, it seems that the *Contra Hieroclem* should be dated before 303. A later date, however, appears to be entailed by the testimony of another writer, who is normally more accurate and reliable than Eusebius. Lactantius was in Bithynia when persecution began, and he describes how two pamphleteers in the imperial capital attacked the Christians (*Div. Inst.* 5.2.2ff). One cannot be identified,<sup>16</sup> but the other was clearly Sossianus Hierocles: "alius eandem materiam mordacius scripsit, qui erat tum e numero iudicum et qui auctor in primis faciendae persecutionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus etiam scriptis eos quos adflixerat insecutus est" (2.12). That corresponds closely to the description which Lactantius elsewhere attached to Hierocles' name: "qui auctor et consiliarius ad faciendam persecutionem fuit" (*Mort. Pers.* 16.4). But Lactantius implies that the publication of Hierocles' work was subsequent to the beginning of persecution.<sup>17</sup> Hence the deduction that he wrote the "Lover of Truth" in 303 precisely.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, if Eusebius wrote his *Contra Hieroclem* before 303, it would follow that Hierocles' work was already circulating in Syria and Palestine. How shall the contradiction be resolved? Unless the arguments advanced earlier contain some flaw, it will have to be supposed that Lactantius,

<sup>15</sup> Eusebius states the title of Hierocles' work as Φιλαλήθης (esp. p. 369.4: ἐν τῷ Φιλαλήθει) and consistently applies the epithet φιλαλήθης to the author, not to his work (pp. 371.30, 373.10, 382.26, 384.24, 389.7, 398.16, 406.26). Modern scholars sometimes report the title as Φιλαλήθης λόγος or Φιλαλήθεις λόγοι (e.g. respectively, Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch.d.gr.Litt.* 2<sup>6</sup> (1924) 776; T. D. Barnes, *JTS* n.s. 24 (1973) 438, adducing Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 5.3.22). But where Eusebius uses the words τὸν . . . Φιλαλήθη λόγον (p. 371.16/17), and τοῦ Φιλαλήθους τούτου λόγου (p. 370.5), he means "the book entitled 'Lover of Truth'" (Conybeare [above, n. 1] 487).

<sup>16</sup> *JTS* n.s. 24 (1973) 438f.

<sup>17</sup> Harnack tried to deny the implication: "Aus Lactant., i.e., folgt es nicht notwendig, dass Hierokles erst nach dem Ausbruch der Verfolgung geschrieben hat" (*Chronologie* 2 [1904] 118).

<sup>18</sup> Labriolle (above, n. 7) 307.

who heard Hierocles recite his work in Nicomedia (*Div. Inst.* 5.4.1), was unaware of an earlier publication in Syria — which Hierocles may have rewritten and expanded in the meanwhile.<sup>19</sup>

Since the chronological inference from Lactantius can thus be declined without impugning his general credibility, the consequences of an early date for the *Contra Hieroclem* deserve at least an exploration. The following pages seek to show that on this chronology Hierocles and the future emperor Constantine will probably have encountered each other on a highly significant occasion.

## II. THE CAREER OF HIEROCLES

Four official posts are attested for Sossianus Hierocles, none of which is entirely free from uncertainties of one sort or another. First, his name appears on two inscriptions from Palmyra, which both belong to the period of the Diocletianic tetrarchy (293–305). On one, Hierocles is described as “v. p. praes. provinciae” (*CIL* 3.133 = 6661), i.e. governor of the province in which Palmyra then lay.<sup>20</sup> The other inscription names two officials in connection with the building of baths: one may be a *vicarius Orientis*, the other is Hierocles, clearly acting in his capacity as governor (*AE* 1932.79 = *SEG* 7.152).<sup>21</sup>

Hierocles subsequently became *vicarius*, then governor of Bithynia (Lactantius, *Mort. Pers.* 16.4: “ex vicario praesidem”). He was in the latter post when, or at least soon after, the persecution of the Christians began in 303, and he had done much to bring it about: Lactantius characterizes him as “auctor in primis faciendae persecutionis” (*Div. Inst.* 5.2.12) and as “auctor et consiliarius ad faciendam persecutionem” (*Mort. Pers.* 16.4). Hierocles’ apparent demotion, from a vicariate to a post of lower rank and status, has been denied or explained away by a variety of devices.<sup>22</sup> A more plausible reason offers. Hierocles was transferred to Bithynia because of his known religious prejudices, in order to enforce anti-Christian policies in the imperial capital.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Observe that Lactantius speaks of a work in two books, *Div. Inst.* 5.2.13, 3.22.

<sup>20</sup> Which perhaps bore the name Augusta Libanensis; cf. A. Alt, *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 71 (1955) 173ff.

<sup>21</sup> From H. Seyrig, *Syria* 12 (1931) 321–323 no. 4.

<sup>22</sup> K. J. Neumann, *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche* 8 (1907) 39; E. Schwartz, *RE* 6 (1909) 1395; O. Seeck, *RE* 8 (1913) 1477; W. Seston, *Dioclétien et la tétrarchie* 1 (1946) 318; W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church* (1965) 485.

<sup>23</sup> J. Moreau, *Lactance: De la mort des persécuteurs*, Sources chrétiennes 39 (1954) 293.



Technically a demotion, the move brought (or kept) him close to the presence of the emperors and the real center of power.

A similar explanation can be given for the last post which is attested for Hierocles, the prefecture of Egypt. After describing the execution of Apphianus (2 April 306), Eusebius refers forward to the martyrdom of his brother Aedesius: "a little later" he assaulted the prefect Hierocles in Alexandria and was put to death (*Mart. Pal.* 5.3).<sup>24</sup> A papyrus from Karanis offers a precise date, with a consular year (*P. Cairo Isid.* 69 = *Sammelbuch* 9186). Unfortunately, the date is badly preserved and has been read both as January 307 and as January 310, though the weight of expert opinion inclines toward the later year.<sup>25</sup> The *fasti* of Egypt appear to allow either date: no prefect is unambiguously certified either between Clodius Culcianus on 29 May 306 (*POxy.* 1104) and Valerius Victorinus in 308 (*POxy.* 2674) or between Aelius Hyginus on 22 June 309 (*POxy.* 2667) and Aurelius Ammonius on 18 August 312 (*Chrestomathie* 2.64).<sup>26</sup> But an appointment in 309/310 would accord well with the known policy of Maximinus elsewhere: in 308 he dispatched a new governor to Palestine, who, on his arrival, alleged express imperial orders to treat Christians more harshly than before (*Eus. Mart. Pal.* 8.1).

So far the evidence from which recent scholarship has reconstructed Hierocles' career.<sup>27</sup> The *Contra Hieroclem* may now be adduced. Eusebius twice refers to Hierocles' official functions, in practically identical words:

τοῦ τε Φιλαλήθους τὰ ἀνωτάτω τε καὶ καθ' ὅλων δικαστήρια διειληφότος (4, p. 373.10/11 Kayser);

Ἱεροκλεῖ τὰ ἀνωτάτω καὶ καθόλου δικαστήρια πεπιστευμένῳ (20, p. 386.30/31).

<sup>24</sup> Epiphanius also refers to Hierocles' prefecture, *Pan.* 68.1.4f.

<sup>25</sup> In favor of 307, C. Préaux, *CE* 27 (1952) 247ff; C. Vandersleyen, *JJP* 13 (1961) 109ff; *Chronologie des préfets d'Égypte de 284 à 295*, Coll. Latomus 55 (1962) 80ff; for 310, H. C. Youtie, *CE* 28 (1953) 147ff; A. E. R. Boak and H. C. Youtie, *The Archive of Aurelius Isidorus* (1960) 274, 276; E. G. Turner, *CR* n.s. 15 (1965) 129.

The present article was written in autumn 1974: *POxy* 3120, published in 1975, now registers Hierocles unambiguously as prefect of Egypt in April 310.

<sup>26</sup> *PLRE* enters Titinnius Clodianus as prefect c. 310 (1.217, 1084). He is held to be a *praeses Thebaidos* by C. Vandersleyen, *Chronologie* (1962) 106.

<sup>27</sup> The *Contra Hieroclem* is nowhere cited in *PLRE* 1.432, Hierocles 4. Nor is the omission rectified in the *addenda et corrigenda* to that entry offered by J. R. Martindale, *Historia* 23 (1974) 248.



The words have been translated, respectively, "who has . . . taken possession of the supreme courts all over the province" and "who has been entrusted to administer the supreme courts of justice all over the province."<sup>28</sup> But this rendering hardly does full justice to the words "the highest and general courts"; since Eusebius elsewhere uses very different vocabulary to describe provincial governors, he probably does not here refer either to the governorship in Bithynia or to Hierocles' prefecture of Egypt.<sup>29</sup> If the *Contra Hieroclem* was written before 303, then the reference must be to Hierocles' vicariate. Eusebius surely has in mind the function of a *vicarius* in trying cases remitted to him by provincial governors.<sup>30</sup> Now, if this be so, Hierocles should be *vicarius* of the diocese in which Eusebius was writing, and his words may thus be taken to imply that Hierocles was *vicarius Orientis* shortly before 303.<sup>31</sup>

### III. PRELUDE TO PERSECUTION

Lactantius records an episode which shortly preceded the first imperial edict against the Christians (23 February 303). It occurred when Diocletian was "in partibus Orientis" (*Mort. Pers.* 10.1-5).

As the *haruspices* were sacrificing in the imperial presence, some Christian attendants made the sign of the cross and frustrated the attempt at divination. The cause being detected, Diocletian ordered everyone in the palace to sacrifice, and dispatched letters to provincial governors ordering that soldiers be forced to sacrifice or dismissed from the army. Since the next event to be recorded is the emperor's departure after an interval to spend the winter of 302/303 in Bithynia (10.6), the date must be 302 or not long before, while the place seems to be Antioch.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Conybeare (above, n. 1) 495, 533.

<sup>29</sup> Compare the descriptions of Urbanus, governor of Palestine: τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἡγούμενος (*Mart. Pal.* 3.1); τοῦ ἔθνους ἡγούμενος (4.11); ἡγεμῶν (4.8, 7.2 [short recension]); ἀρχων (7.1); δικαστῆς (4.11); τὴν Παλαιστινῶν διεῖπεν ἀρχὴν (7.2 [long recension], cf. 7.7). Duchesne (above, n. 4) 19 detected a reference to the Bithynian governorship, E. Schwartz, *RE* 6.1395, to Hierocles' prefecture of Egypt.

<sup>30</sup> Most clearly documented in the *Acta Marcelli* (ed. H. Delehay, *Anal. Boll.* 41 [1923] 260-267).

<sup>31</sup> For another possible holder of the post, cf. *POxy.* 1469 (*PLRE* 1.787).

<sup>32</sup> Note the reference to "universos qui erant in palatio" (*Mort. Pers.* 10.4). Moreau (above, n. 23) 266 argues for a date of 299/300, adducing *Eus. HE* 8.4.1, 8 app. 1. But the action which Eusebius places "long before" 303 appears to be a purge of Galerius' own entourage and army alone.

The latter part of Lactantius' account corresponds closely to something which Eusebius regarded as the beginning of persecution. The commander (ὁ στρατοπεδάρχης) gave the soldiers in the camps a simple choice, either to obey an order incompatible with Christian beliefs and keep their rank or to disobey the order and lose it: many Christians confessed Christ and forfeited their privileges, and a few were even executed (HE 8.4.3f). The commander's name was Veturius, and Jerome's version of the *Chronicle* describes him as "magister militiae" (227<sup>d</sup> Helm, cf. *Chronicle* p. 227 Karst). What was his precise and official title? Eusebius seems to regard him as the supreme commander of Roman forces in Syria and Palestine, but his precise post could conceivably be that of pretorian prefect.<sup>33</sup> For the date, 297 has recently been advocated.<sup>34</sup> But it is hard to avoid identifying Veturius' order to sacrifice with the order to sacrifice which Lactantius recounts.<sup>35</sup>

Date and place suggest that Sossianus Hierocles may have played some part in these transactions. If, as has been argued above, he was *vicarius Orientis* shortly before 303, then he may have been on hand when Diocletian was in Antioch. Now Lactantius professes to know that not all the emperor's advisers in Nicomedia in the winter of 302/303 were equally hostile to the Christians (*Mort. Pers.* 11.4ff), and he reports that Hierocles urged persecution in the imperial *consilium* (*Div. Inst.* 5.2.13; *Mort. Pers.* 16.4). A similar divergence of views may also have occurred when the ill-omened sacrifice was discussed "in partibus Orientis."

#### IV. DIOCLETIAN AND THE MANICHEES

The compilation known as the *Mosaicarum et Romanarum legum collatio* preserves a rescript concerning the Manichees (15.3), which reveals the assumptions underlying imperial religious policy in the period preceding the "Great Persecution". The rescript is quoted from the seventh book of the Codex Gregorianus, bore the names of Diocletian and Maximian, Constantius and Galerius, is addressed to one Julianus as proconsul of Africa, and was issued at Alexandria on 31 March of an unspecified year.<sup>36</sup> Its text reveals that Diocletian had

<sup>33</sup> Compare, however, HE 9.5.2, 6.1; *Mart. Pal.* 9.2, 13.2f, where στρατοπεδάρχης or a periphrasis is used of a much lower military commander (cf. PLRE 1.1017). Veturius, therefore, may be the *dux* commanding troops in the province of Palaestina.

<sup>34</sup> PLRE 1.955 (failing to distinguish carefully enough between Jerome's additions and the original text of Eusebius' *Chronicle* which he was translating).

<sup>35</sup> Moreau (above, n. 23) 266.

<sup>36</sup> FIRA<sup>2</sup> 2.580/581.

received a report from the proconsul, which catalogued the crimes of the Manichees (5) and presumably enquired whether and how they were to be punished: the reply orders that the ringleaders be burned with their scriptures and their followers either beheaded or sent to the mines of Phaeno or the quarries of Proconnesus (6/7). The preamble justifies such severity: innovation in religion always verges on the criminal (1/2), and the Manichees have come from a foreign power and are trying to corrupt the innocent Roman race by introducing wicked Persian ways (3/4).

The indirect relevance of this rescript (which many style an edict) to the Christians has long been recognized.<sup>37</sup> But the sharpness of such relevance depends in part on the date. Most recent writers assign the document to 31 March 297, when Rome and Persia were at war (4: "de Persica adversaria nobis gente").<sup>38</sup> The preamble, however, speaks of "otia maxima," which better suits a later date, while the heading and subscription indicate with something which approaches certainty that the correct date is 31 March 302.<sup>39</sup>

The rescript was issued on a 31 March between 293 and 305 to a proconsul of Africa whose name was Julianus.<sup>40</sup> It cannot, therefore, be assigned to any year when another man is known to be holding that office. Now it seems that the proconsulate of Africa was still an annual appointment (inscriptions record iterated tenures),<sup>41</sup> and by singular

<sup>37</sup> T. Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht* (1899) 576, 599.

<sup>38</sup> W. Seston, *Mélanges Ernout* (1940) 345ff; *Dioclétien* 1 (1946) 156; W. Ensslin, *RE* 7A (1948) 2442, 2481; J. Vogt, *Constantin der Grosse und sein Jahrhundert* (1949) 126; A. Chastagnol, *Les fastes de la préfecture de Rome au Bas-Empire* (1962) 37; Frend (above, n. 22) 488; P. Brown, *JRS* 59 (1969) 92 = *Religion and Society in the Age of St. Augustine* (1972) 95; H. Chadwick, *Oxford Classical Dictionary*<sup>2</sup> (1970) 643; J. Molthagen, *Der römische Staat und die Christen im zweiten und dritten Jahrhundert* (1970) 114.

<sup>39</sup> In favor of 302, see T. Mommsen, *Collectio librorum juris antejustiniani* 3 (1890) 188f; P. Jörs, *RE* 4 (1901) 162; L. Poinssot, *Mémoires de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France* 76 (1924) 292ff.

<sup>40</sup> The provenance of the law does not help, as Mommsen believed, *Abh. Berlin* 1860, 443f = *Ges. Schr.* 2 (1905) 288f (arguing in favor of 31 March 296). Recent students of Roman law seem agreed that the Codex Gregorianus was completed in 291 or 292; cf. J. Gaudemet, *La formation du droit séculier et du droit de l'église au IV<sup>e</sup> et V<sup>e</sup> siècles* (1957) 40ff; A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* 1 (1964) 474. If so, the rescript under discussion and *Mos. et Rom. leg. coll.* 6.4 (295) are subsequent additions, like the seven laws of 365 quoted elsewhere from the Codex Hermogenianus, which was probably completed in 295 (*Consultatio veteris cuiusdam iurisconsulti* 9.1-7).

<sup>41</sup> Even into the reign of Constantine: *ILAfr* 456, cf. B. Malcus, *Opuscula Atheniensia* 7 (1967) 101f.



good fortune the fasti of the province are complete, or almost complete, for these dozen years.<sup>42</sup>

T. Cl. Aurelius Aristobulus was proconsul from 290 to 294: he held the post for four years (*ILS* 5477), is attested as proconsul in 294 (*ILS* 637), and became *praefectus urbi* on 11 January 295.<sup>43</sup> The *Acta Maximiliani* certify Cassius Dio as proconsul in March 295; he therefore held office from summer 294 to summer 295, as Aristobulus' successor.<sup>44</sup> Dio was in turn succeeded by T. Flavius Postumius Titianus (*CIL* 8.26566 (295), cf. *ILAfr* 532).<sup>45</sup> The next precisely dated proconsulate is that of L. Aelius Helvius Dionysius, which also lasted for four years (*CIL* 8.12459); since Dionysius is attested in 297 or 298 (*ILAfr* 531) and 298 (*Frag. Vat.* 41 [March 298]), and was *praefectus urbi* in 301/302, the four years are either 296–300 or 297–301. However, although the day and month of its commencement have dropped out of the text of the Chronographer of 354, Dionysius' prefecture ended on 19 February 302, so that the later date for the proconsulate would limit his prefecture to a brief six or seven months. Accordingly, the earlier date is preferable, and Dionysius' proconsulate should run from 296 to 300.<sup>46</sup> After 300 no proconsul is precisely dated until C. Annius Anullinus, whom *acta martyrum* show enforcing imperial legislation against the Christians from July 303 to December 304.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, the *Acta Felicis* state that he was already proconsul in early June 303, which has been taken as proof that he entered office in July 302.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps so, but the *acta* could be mistaken on this detail (Anullinus did not actually try Felix until 28 June), and it is possible that his proconsulate began c. 1. June 303.<sup>49</sup> On present evidence, therefore, Anullinus should be regarded as adequately attested as proconsul only for the biennium 303–305. There remain three proconsuls who are not precisely dated:

<sup>42</sup> Poinssot (above, n. 39) 264ff. The list of proconsuls in *PLRE* 1.1073 fails to draw the permissible deductions from the fact of annual tenures.

<sup>43</sup> Chastagnol (above, n. 38) 21ff.

<sup>44</sup> On the *Acta Maximiliani*, see H. Delehay, *Les passions des martyrs et les genres littéraires*<sup>2</sup> (1966) 77ff. Dio succeeded Aristobulus as *praefectus urbi* on 18 February 296 (Chastagnol [above, n. 38] 25ff).

<sup>45</sup> Later consul in 301, *praefectus urbi* 305/306 (Chastagnol [above, n. 38] 41ff).

<sup>46</sup> Poinssot (above, n. 39) 313ff. Chastagnol (above, n. 38) 37 prefers 297–301 — in order to put Julianus in 296/297. It is argued below (from *P. Cairo Isid.* 1) that Diocletian was not in Alexandria on 31 March 297.

<sup>47</sup> Most reliably, the *Acta Felicis* (June/July 303) and *Acta Crispinae* (December 304); cf. Optatus 3.8 (*CSEL* 26.90). For other evidence, see *PLRE* 1.79.

<sup>48</sup> *Acta Felicis* 2.2/3 (5 June), cf. Poinssot (above, n. 39) 315.

<sup>49</sup> On the problem of the proconsular year, see recently *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (1971) 260f; G. W. Clarke, *Latomus* 31 (1972) 1053f.



Julianus, M. Tullius T[. . .]nus (*CIL* 8.1550 + 15552: between spring 293 and summer 305), and C. Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, whose proconsulate appears on an inscription which omits all the offices which he held under Maxentius (*ILS* 1217).<sup>50</sup>

Diocletian issued the rescript to Julianus from Alexandria: therefore it belongs to a 31 March when he was in the city. Two visits of Diocletian to Egypt are attested (in 298 and 302), and, if there was a third visit between 293 and 305, it occurred in a year when Julianus cannot have been proconsul of Africa. The preserved subscriptions to laws exclude a visit in 293 or 294.<sup>51</sup> In March 295 and 296 proconsuls other than Julianus are known to have been in office (Cassius Dio and Postumius Titianus). As for March 297, the edict of the prefect Aristius Optatus, promulgated in Alexandria on 16 March 297, renders the emperor's presence or imminent arrival highly improbable (*P. Cairo Isid.* 1 = *Sammelbuch* 7622).<sup>52</sup> In the following spring, Diocletian was certainly in Egypt, for preparations were being made for his journey up the Nile in September 298 (*P. Beatty Panopolis* 1.53ff), but Helvius Dionysius was proconsul of Africa (*Frag. Vat.* 41; *ILAfr* 531). The emperor then seems to have proceeded to Syria,<sup>53</sup> but he visited Alexandria again in 302, after which the detailed narrative of Lactantius enables his movements to be closely followed (*Mort. Pers.* 10.6ff). The second visit is attested in two sources, which both give the consular date, the so-called Barbarus Scaligeri and the Paschal Chronicle.<sup>54</sup> Their testimony deserves credence, for both derive from earlier Alexandrian chronicles and preserve valuable items of local tradition.<sup>55</sup> Since the

<sup>50</sup> On his career, *JRS* 65 (1975) 40ff.

<sup>51</sup> T. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.* 2 (1905) 273ff.

<sup>52</sup> The revolt of L. Domitius Domitianus, which Diocletian came to Egypt to suppress, began in the summer of 297 (not 296, as was formerly supposed) and ended in spring 298; cf. A. C. Johnson, *CP* 45 (1950) 15ff; T. C. Skeat, *Papyri from Panopolis* (1964) xff; *PLRE* 1.263; A. K. Bowman, *Akten des XIII. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses* (1973) 50f. To the evidence there discussed, add *Pan. Lat.* 8(5).5.2: "dent veniam trophaea Niliaca sub quibus Aethiops et Indus intremuit." Since this speech was delivered on 1 March 297, the revolt of Domitianus had not yet begun; the allusion is to the earlier troubles in which Busiris and Coptos were destroyed, and the context indicates that between 1 March 293 and 1 March 297 Egypt was visited either by Diocletian or by Galerius. I hope to discuss this earlier revolt more fully elsewhere.

<sup>53</sup> W. Ensslin, *RE* 7A, 2442ff.

<sup>54</sup> A. Schoene, *Eusebii chronicon libri duo* 1 (1875) 233 = *Chr. Min.* 1.290; *Chronicon Paschale* p. 514.16/17 Bonn.

<sup>55</sup> See, respectively, A. Bauer, *Texte und Untersuchungen* 29.1 (1905) 162ff; *GCS* 46 (1956) ixff; and E. Schwartz, *RE* 3 (1899) 2460ff. No reason, therefore, for concluding that "the evidence for a visit in 302 is unsound" (*PLRE* 1.474).

fasti of Africa permit Julianus to be lodged in 301/302, the rescript concerning the Manichees can accordingly be dated 31 March 302.<sup>56</sup>

A list of proconsuls of Africa from 290 to 305 may now be given:

T. Cl. Aurelius Aristobulus	290-294
Cassius Dio	294/295
T. Fl. Postumius Titianus	295/296
L. Aelius Helvius Dionysius	296-300
	300/301
Julianus	301/302
	302/303
C. Annius Anullinus	303-305

One of the two vacant spaces must be occupied by M. Tullius T[... ]nus, while Anullinus' tenure might have included 302/303. C. Ceionius Rufus Volusianus, therefore, should provisionally be lodged in 305/306.<sup>57</sup>

#### V. CONSTANTINE IN ANTIOCH

Eusebius saw Constantine once before he became emperor. He was in the imperial entourage, traveling through Palestine with Diocletian, who gave him the place of honor at his right hand (*Vita Constantini* 1.19). The court was clearly either going to Egypt or coming from Egypt: hence the date cannot be 296 (as is often assumed)<sup>58</sup> but must be either c. 298 or 301/302. That it was the latter can be established with a high degree of probability. Early and precise evidence exists for Constantine's career.

Born not long after 270,<sup>59</sup> Constantine, like many another, was able to distinguish himself as an officer in the victorious campaigns which the Caesar Galerius waged at the very close of the fourth century. Three sets of facts disclose the details. First, he served "per maximos tribunatus" (*Pan. Lat.* 7[6].5.3, cf. 6[7].3.3) to become, before 305, a "tribunus ordinis primi" (*Lactant. Mort. Pers.* 18.10). Second, he fought with

<sup>56</sup> Julianus is normally identified with Amnius Anicius Julianus, *praefectus urbi* from 326 to 329 (*PLRE* 1.473f). The abnormally long interval renders the identification less than certain; cf. Chastagnol (above, n. 38) 79.

<sup>57</sup> Poinssot (above, n. 39) 333ff; Chastagnol (above, n. 38) 54 also allows 306/307 as a possibility.

<sup>58</sup> Note, however, F. Millar, *JRS* 60 (1970) 216: "probably in 298."

<sup>59</sup> For the ancient evidence, see D. J. A. Westerhuis, *Origo Constantini imperatoris sive anonymi Valesiani pars prior* (Diss. Groningen 1906) 8. No source makes Constantine less than sixty-two or more than sixty-six at the time of his death (22 May 337).

bravery under Diocletian and Galerius "in Asia" and also under Galerius alone against the Sarmatians (*Exc. Vales.* 1.2/3). Third, according to his own statement, he saw the ruins of Memphis and Babylon in person and with his own eyes (*Oratio ad coetum sanctorum* 16, p. 177.1-4 Heikel).<sup>60</sup> The latter pair of items can be combined without difficulty. Constantine served under Diocletian and Galerius at the time of the Persian War, and he accompanied the Caesar when he invaded Mesopotamia in 298, captured the harem and treasury of the Persian king, and advanced to Ctesiphon.<sup>61</sup> Subsequently he served under Galerius on the Danube; success again attended the Caesar, so that by 301 the emperors could proclaim that the world lay in the lap of deep peace (*Edictum de pretiis*, praef. 5).<sup>62</sup>

In 298, therefore, Constantine was on campaign in Mesopotamia and cannot have traveled with Diocletian to Egypt. The occasion on which he traversed Palestine and on which he saw the ruins of Memphis must be Diocletian's later visit, in the winter of 301/302. Furthermore, since Constantine was with the imperial court at Nicomedia in February 303 (*Oratio ad coetum sanctorum* 25, p. 190.24ff Heikel), he presumably remained with Diocletian throughout the intervening period, and retained his place of honor at Diocletian's right hand both in Egypt and later in Syria. It follows that Constantine participated in the deliberations of the imperial *consilium* when it discussed the Manichees in March 302 and that he may have been present at the fateful sacrifice which led to persecution in the army.

## VI. THE ORACLE AT DAPHNE

If Constantine was in Antioch in 302, that has some relevance to the authenticity of the *Oratio ad coetum sanctorum*, which Eusebius appended to his life of Constantine (cf. *Vita Constantini* 4.32). The speech refers in passing to stories about the origin of the oracle at Daphne (18, p. 179.13/14 Heikel: κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἱστορουμένοις περὶ τῆς Δάφνης). This passage has recently been adduced as proof, not only that Constantine cannot have composed the speech, but also that it must have been written after Julian consulted the oracle (in 362).<sup>63</sup> But Constantine

<sup>60</sup> The authenticity of the speech has often been denied, most recently by R. P. C. Hanson, *JTS* n.s. 24 (1973) 505ff. He affirms that "it is highly improbable that Constantine could in fact have visited either of these ruins" (506).

<sup>61</sup> For the date, *Pan. Lat.* 9(4).21; *Joshua the Stylite*, trans. W. Wright (1882) p. 6.

<sup>62</sup> On these Danubian operations, cf. W. Ensslin, *RE* 14 (1930) 2523. Their existence is denied by Seston (above, n. 22) 134.

<sup>63</sup> Hanson (above, n. 60) 507ff.

had visited Antioch. Why then should he not be capable of remembering and referring to stories which he had heard in the city? Moreover, the oracle of Daphne may have been employed in 302 by the advocates of persecution. Theotecnus, the *curator* of Antioch, was assiduous in persecution and propaganda some years later: besides executing Christians, he erected a statue of Zeus Philios and instituted a cult with mysteries and oracles (Eus. *HE* 9.2.2ff; 11.5f; *PE* 4.2.10f). Now Gelasius of Caesarea alleged that Theotecnus also made play with oracles before the persecution began: he went into a cave, where Galerius used to sacrifice, and emerged with an oracle ordaining that the Christians be persecuted, which Galerius used to persuade his imperial colleagues to attack Christianity.<sup>64</sup> As it stands, the story must be false, at least in part, and Gelasius seems to have had other misconceptions about the early fourth century.<sup>65</sup> But it might have a basis in fact. If it were functioning in 302, the oracle at Daphne ought not to have kept silence.<sup>66</sup> During the following winter, the oracle of Apollo at Didyma was consulted, and the god replied "ut divinae religionis inimicus."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> G. C. Hansen, *Theodoros Anagnostes, Kirchengeschichte* (GCS, 1971) 158.9-14, cf. Theophanes p. 9.30-33 De Boor. This evidence is not noted in *PLRE* 1.908, Theotecnus 2.

<sup>65</sup> *JRS* 63 (1973) 34.

<sup>66</sup> The oracle was in operation fifty years later: Julian *Misopogon* 346b; Gregory of Nazianzus *Orat.* 5.22 (*PG* 35.704f); John Chrysostom *Liber in s. Babylam* 18f (*PG* 50.561ff); Sozomenus *HE* 5.19.12ff.

<sup>67</sup> Lactant. *Mort. Pers.* 11.7.



# DESPOINA KYBELE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR RELIGIÖSEN NAMENKUNDE

ALBERT HENRICHs

## I. DICHTERSPRACHE UND KULTSPRACHE

DIE bekannte Gebetstravestie in den *Vögeln* des Aristophanes beginnt stilgerecht mit einer Anrufung der zuständigen Götter.<sup>1</sup> Der amtierende Vogelpriester ist in seiner Litanei gerade bei den ausländischen Göttern angelangt und intoniert mit prosaischem Ernst *καὶ φρυγίῳ Σαβαζίῳ καὶ στρούθῳ μεγάλῃ μητρὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων*, als ihn Peisetairos mit folgendem Einwurf unterbricht (Vers 877):

*δέσποινα Κυβέλη, στροῦθε, μήτηρ Κλεοκρίτου.*

Sieht man von den beiden komischen Zusätzen ab, so entspricht diese hymnische Anrufung in der dreifachen Häufung der sakralen Namen Wort für Wort einem Pindarfragment in Philodems *De Pietate*:<sup>2</sup>

*[δέσπ]οιν[αν] Κυβέ[λαν] ματ[έρα].*

In beiden Apostrophen erweitern die Epiklesen *δέσποινα* und *μήτηρ* den eigentlichen Götternamen. Die Macht der Göttermutter schlägt sich nieder in der rhythmischen Fülle ihrer Titel. *Μήτηρ* und *μεγάλη*, einzeln oder miteinander verbunden, sind als Kulttitel Kybeles oft bezeugt und allgemein anerkannt;<sup>3</sup> es lässt sich zeigen, dass ihnen *δέσποινα*

<sup>1</sup> *Av.* 865ff. H. Kleinknecht, *Die Gebetsparodie in der Antike* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 28 [1937]) 27–33 erläutert alle in *Av.* 865ff. parodierten Entlehnungen aus der Sakralsprache mit Ausnahme von *δέσποινα Κυβέλη*. W. Horn, *Gebet und Gebetsparodie in den Komödien des Aristophanes* (Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft 38 [1970]) behandelt *Av.* 865ff. mehrfach, ohne jedoch ins sprachliche Detail zu gehen.

<sup>2</sup> *De Piet.* p. 19 Gomperz = Pindar fr. 80 Snell (revidierter Text nach *GRBS* 13 [1972] 84f); die Herstellung der Akkusative empfiehlt sich aus Platzgründen. Die dorische Form *Κυβάλα* ist inschriftlich bezeugt für Lokroi Epizephyrioi (7./6. Jh. v. Chr.; ediert von M. Guarducci, *Klio* 52 [1970] 133ff).

<sup>3</sup> Es lässt sich nicht immer sicher entscheiden, ob hinter einzelnen Epitheta Kybele selbst oder eine verwandte Berg- bzw. Göttermutter steht, zumal die literarischen Zeugnisse seit Pindar und Euripides durchweg synkretistisch sind. Ein extremer Fall ist E. *Cretae* fr. 472 N.<sup>2</sup> = fr. 79 Austin (bes. 13ff *Μητρί τ'*

gleichwertig zur Seite tritt. Anrufungen, die sich aus einer Serie von Kultnamen zusammensetzen, stehen in archaischer und klassischer Dichtung meist am Hymnen- oder Gebetsanfang. Deshalb ist das Pindarzitat aus stilistischen Gründen dem Exordium eines Kybelehymnus zuzuweisen.<sup>4</sup> Vergleichbare Epiklesenhäufungen finden sich jedoch vereinzelt auch im Gebetsformular am Hymnenende, so etwa am Schluss des epidaurischen Meterhymnus, der manche jüngere

*ορείαι δαΐδας ἀνασχών*, usw.); hier hat die durch den Stoff gegebene geographische Fixierung auf Kreta Euripides nicht daran gehindert, ein aus verschiedenen Kulturen zusammengesetztes Idealbild religiöser Weihe zu entwerfen. Zuweisung derartiger Kulttitel an Kybele ist nur dann erlaubt, wenn geographische oder rituelle Indizien hinzutreten; wirklich sicher ist die Identifizierung mit Kybele oft nur dann, wenn das Theonym ausdrücklich genannt wird (was naturgemäss nur selten der Fall ist). Im folgenden beschränke ich mich auf die frühesten Zeugnisse, die ich nach den Kriterien der Zuweisung anordne; dabei stehen die ganz sicheren Fälle am Anfang und die ganz zweifelhaften am Ende der Aufstellung.

Theonym: Ar. *Av.* 876 *μεγάλῃ Μητρὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων*, gefolgt von *Κυβέλλῃ* (vgl. S. Ph. 391; *Hom. Hymn.* 14.1; *Julian Or.* 5.179d); E. *Bacch.* 78f *Ματρὸς μεγάλας ὄργια Κυβέλλας*; PSI (sine num.) ed. V. Bartoletti, *Dai papiri della Società Italiana* (Florenz 1965) Nr. 1 (1. Jh. v. Chr.; abgedruckt als fr. dubium der *Theoph.* in der Menanderausgabe von Sandbach), wo in einer lyrischen Litanei *Μήτηρ ὀρ[εία]* und *Μήτηρ θεῶν* neben *Φρυγία βασιλεία*, *Ἀγγιδιστι* und *Κυρία* (unten Anm. 50) stehen.

Kulttopographie: S. Ph. 391ff (Paktolos) *ὀρεστέρα... Γᾶ* neben *Μήτηρ πότνια*; Tim. PMG 791.124 (Sardis; vgl. unten unter III 1) *Ματρὸς οὐρείας*; Weihinschriften aus Ephesos (4./3. Jh. v. Chr.) bei J. Keil, *Österr. Jahreshfte* 23 (1926) 258f *Μητρὶ ὀρείῃ*(ι) (wo die Ikonographie der zugehörigen Reliefs und der Titel *Φρυγίη* zeigen, dass Kybele gemeint ist); *IErythrai* 201a50 (3. Jh. v. Chr.) *Μητρὸς μεγάλης* und 207.98 (2. Jh. v. Chr.) *Μητρὶ μεγάλῃ*; *OGIS* 54c.3f (Pessinunt; 1. Jh. n. Chr.) *Μητρὸς θεῶν μεγάλης*.

Kultpraxis: Pindar fr. 70b9 *Ματέρι παρ μεγάλοι* (Tympana, Krotala, Fackeln), vgl. P. 3.78f (*Ματρί, Πανί*, Nachtfeiern) und fr. 95–96 (Pan assoziiert mit *Μάτηρ* *μεγάλα* bzw. *μεγάλα θεός*; ähnlich Ar. *Av.* 746 *Μητρὶ ὀρείαι* neben Pan); E. *Hipp.* 144 *Ματρὸς ὀρείας*, *Hipp. Morb. Sacr.* 4.22 Jones *Μητέρα θεῶν* und Men. *Theoph.* 27 Sandb. *Μητρὸς θεῶν* (die Göttin als Quelle des Enthusiasmus; vgl. TrGF 45 [Diogenes] F 1, wo Kybele als *ἱατρός* bezeichnet wird, und E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* 96 Anm. 90); PMG 1030.1 = Kallim. (?) fr. 761.1 *Μητρὸς ὀρείης* (neben *Γᾶλαι* und Krotala).

Angleichungen (*συνοικειώσεις*): E. *Hel.* 1301ff *ὀρεία... Μάτηρ θεῶν* und PMG 935.4ff (vgl. Anm. 5) *Ματέρα τῶν θεῶν* (Kybele [Krotala, Tympana, Löwengespann] geglichen mit Demeter [Kore-Mythos]); S. fr. 268 N.<sup>2</sup> (*Γῆ = Μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν*; vgl. S. Ph. 391ff), Kleidemos *FGrHist* 323 F 25 (*[Ῥέα] = Μήτηρ θεῶν*) und Melanipides PMG 764 (*Δημήτηρ = Μήτηρ θεῶν*) in einem Zitatennest bei Philodem *De Piet.* p. 23 Gomperz, der seinerseits von Apollodors *Περὶ θεῶν* abhängt (*CronErc* 5 [1975] 18ff).

<sup>4</sup> So W. J. Slater, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 151 und L. Lehnus, *ZPE* 10 (1973) 275ff; vgl. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*<sup>2</sup> (1923) 145ff.

Stileigentümlichkeiten aufweist und aus hellenistischer Zeit stammt: *χαῖρ' ὦ μεγάλη ἄνασσα Μᾶτερ Ὀλύμπου*.<sup>5</sup>

Wie ist diese enge Übereinstimmung von Pindar und Aristophanes zu erklären? Aristophanes zitiert gelegentlich Pindarstellen oder spielt darauf an;<sup>6</sup> aber bewusste Anspielung und damit direkte Abhängigkeit des Komödiendichters vom Lyriker ist für *Av.* 877 auszuschliessen, wo weder das Metrum lyrisch noch der Kontext dithyrambisch ist. Zufälliges Zusammentreffen in der poetischen Diktion ist ebenso unwahrscheinlich. Die alterwürdigen Ehrentitel der Götter wie *πότνια*, *ἄναξ* (*ἄνα*) und *ἄνασσα*, *δεσπότης* und *δέσποινα*<sup>7</sup> finden sich zwar im Hymnenstil Pindars ebenso häufig wie in den Gebetsparodien bei Aristophanes, aber beide Dichter variieren diese Titel so sehr, dass wörtliche Wiederholungen derselben Epiklesenkombination wegen ihrer Seltenheit eine Erklärung verlangen. Von den unbegrenzten Variationsmöglichkeiten geben folgende Beispiele einen Eindruck:<sup>8</sup>

Pindar fr. 37 *πότνια Θεσμοφόρε*

fr. 122.18 *ὦ Κύπρου δέσποινα*

fr. 36 *Ἀμμων Ὀλύμπου δέσποτα*

fr. 95 *ὦ Πᾶν Ἀρκαδίας μεδέων*

Ar. *Lys.* 833 *ὦ πότνια Κύπρου καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ Πάφου μεδέουσα*

*Nub.* 264ff. *ὦ δέσποτ' ἄναξ, ἀμέτρητ' Ἄηρ . . . σεμναί τε θεαὶ*

*Νεφέλαι βροντησικέραυνοι, ἄρθητε, φάνητ' ὦ δέσποινα*<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *IG IV 1<sup>2</sup> 131.26 = PMG 935.26*; zur Datierung zuletzt M. L. West, *CQ* 20 (1970) 214f (3. Jh. v. Chr.). Epiklesenhäufung am Hymnenschluss ist eine seltene Erscheinung (*Hom. Hymn. Dem.* 490ff; Kallim. *H.* 1.91f); wo sie vorkommt, ist sie stets Teil des *χαῖρε*-Formulars.

<sup>6</sup> Der Bettelpoet *Av.* 926 und 941ff (Pindar fr. 105) sagt ausdrücklich, dass er Pindar zitiert (*Av.* 939); *Nub.* 597 (Pindar fr. 325) sowie *Eq.* 1264ff (Pindar fr. 89a) und 1329 (Pindar fr. 76) singt der Chor.

<sup>7</sup> Zu den mykenischen Titeln *Potnia* und *Anassa* vgl. M. Ventrìs und J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*<sup>2</sup> (1973) 410f, 480; E. Vermeule, *Götterkult* (*Archaeologia Homerica* III 5 [1974]) 78–80; B. C. Dietrich, *The Origins of Greek Religion* (1974) 180ff. Während *πότνια* und *ἄνασσα* seit dem frühen Epos fester Bestandteil der Dichtersprache waren, wurden die Wortpaare *δεσπότης/δέσποινα* und *κύριος/κυρία* in der Literatur, im Kult und in der gesprochenen Sprache immer nebeneinander gebraucht. Von dialektischen Besonderheiten abgesehen (Hesych. δ 707), gehörte *δεσπ.* der gehobeneren Sprache an, während *κυρ.* von der Koine bevorzugt wurde.

<sup>8</sup> Dabei ist zu beachten, dass Pindars hymnische und dithyrambische Dichtung nur in wenigen Fragmenten erhalten ist.

<sup>9</sup> *ὦ δέσποινα* auch *Nub.* 429. Vgl. A. Dieterich, *RhMus* 48 (1893) 282f = *Kleine Schriften* (1911) 123f; Kleinknecht (Anm. 1) 21ff.

*Pax* 974ff. ὦ σεμνοτάτῃ βασιλείᾳ θεά, πότνι' Εἰρήνῃ, δέσποινα  
χορῶν, δέσποινα γάμων.

Über die Wechselwirkung von Dichter- und Kultsprache in vorhellenistischer Zeit lassen sich bestenfalls Vermutungen anstellen. Das gilt besonders für die feierliche Anrede eines Gottes im Gebet. Hier ist im Einzelfall eine strenge Unterscheidung zwischen poetischer Konvention und offizieller Kultsprache nicht durchführbar, weil einerseits Dichter wie Pindar Paiane, Hymnen und Dithyramben für lokale Kultfeiern schrieben und andererseits die Inschriften, wo vorhanden, nur über begrenzte technische Bereiche der Sakralsprache Auskunft geben, zu denen die Kultdichtung nicht gehört. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass wir über die speziellen Anlässe kultischer Dichtung und über die persönliche Religionsausübung der Dichter wenig oder gar nichts wissen; denn die biographischen Angaben antiker Scholiasten sind durchweg aus wirklichen oder vermeintlichen Selbstaussagen der Dichter herausgesponnen und damit unzuverlässig oder wertlos. So sind auch Pindars Äusserungen über die Grosse Mutter kein einheitliches persönliches Glaubensbekenntnis, sondern eine unzusammenhängende Reihe von Einzelaussagen: Pindar kennt einen Meterkult in Theben mit Nachtfeiern und Kastagnettenmusik; die Göttin heisst *Μάττηρ* und *σεμνὰ θεός* (*P.* 3.77ff; *I.* 7.3ff); die *χαλκόκροτος Δαμάττηρ* in *I.* 7.3 lässt sich kaum von der *σεμνὰ Μάττηρ μεγάληα* trennen, die bei einem Götterfest im Olymp vom Lärm der Tympana und Krotala und von Fackellicht umgeben ist (fr. 70b8ff); fr. 95 und 96 wird Pan, der "Herr Arkadiens", als *Ματρός μεγάλας ὀπαδέ* und als *μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα* apostrophiert. Tamburin und Krotala sind typische Instrumente orgiastischer Kulte, vor allem dem der Kybele; deshalb ist mit Überlagerung eines thebanischen Meter- bzw. Demeterkultes durch den kleinasiatischen Kybelekult zu rechnen. Ein derartiger Synkretismus passt gut zu dem von den Kabiren und Dionysos bestimmten Kultgefüge Thebens im 5. Jh. Neuerdings hat W. J. Slater jeden Zusammenhang zwischen den einzelnen göttlichen Materes in Pindars Gedichten ebenso bezweifelt wie die Existenz eines Kybelekultes im Vorhof von Pindars Haus in Theben.<sup>10</sup> Die Zweifel sind, soweit sie die Pindarbiographie betreffen,

<sup>10</sup> W. J. Slater, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 142–152. Slaters Argumentationsweise wird vermutlich eine neue *communis opinio* und damit einen übertriebenen Skeptizismus inaugrieren. Deshalb seien einige kritische Bemerkungen gestattet: (1) Slater (144f) verlegt *P.* 3.77ff nach Sizilien und postuliert einen Demeter-Pan-Kult in Syrakus. Diese m. E. gewalttame Interpretation, die dem antibiographischen Trend der gegenwärtigen Pindarforschung verpflichtet ist, würde, falls annehmbar, lediglich *eine* thebanische Meter eliminieren. (2) Slater 146:



berechtigt: Erst die antike Biographie hat Pindar zu dem Missionar des Kybelekultes gemacht, für den man ihn seitdem gehalten hat. Zwei Tatsachen sind jedoch unumstößlich: Pindar hat einen Kybelehymnus komponiert (fr. 80), in dem er Kybele als *Μάτρηρ* (der Götter?) titulierte; er kannte eine "erzrasselnde Demeter" in Theben, deren Paredros (im Kult?) Dionysos war (*I.* 7.3ff). Pindar wird den Kybelehymnus für einen kultischen Anlass geschrieben haben; nur die Meterkulte von Theben und Athen kommen als mögliche Auftraggeber ernsthaft in Frage. Wir wissen jedoch nicht, in welchem Verhältnis Demeter / Ge-Meter, Rhea, Kybele und etwaige lokale Meteres in diesen beiden Kulturen zueinander standen. Dagegen ist die staatliche Sanktionierung und die theologische Fundierung des Kultes der Grossen Mutter im Athen des 5. und frühen 4. Jhs. glaubhaft bezeugt.<sup>11</sup> Damit stellt sich die Frage, ob Pindar und Aristophanes die Epiklese *δέσποινα Κυβέλη μῆτερ* dem Gebetsformular des Kybelekultes entlehnt haben, dessen Kultsprache immer das Griechische war.<sup>12</sup>

Kulttitel wie Despotēs, Despoina, Kyrios und Kyria, ob wie gewöhnlich als Attribute zum eigentlichen Götternamen oder, seltener, als eigenständige Kultnamen gebraucht, sind seit H. Useners *Götternamen*

"By the time of Euripides, conflation of the Eleusinian and Asiatic mother was complete." 146 Anm. 21: "Perhaps the conflation is already present at Pind. *Isth.* 7.3." Damit lässt Slater den Kybelekult für Theben durch die Hintertür doch wieder herein, m. E. ganz zu recht. Ein Zusammenhang von *I.* 7.3 und fr. 80 ist also durchaus erwägenswert. Vgl. L. Lehnus, *SCO* 22 (1973) 8: "Gli inni di Pindaro . . . rinviano a quanto pare sempre a santuari e divinità beotico-tebane o naturalizzate tali." E. Will (unten Anm. 38) 99 vermutet, dass Pindar den Kybelekult in Syrakus kennengelernt habe, wo er archäologisch für die "klassische Zeit" bezeugt ist ("Mais où le poète avait-il rencontré la Phrygienne? Dans un de ses voyages certainement." Wirklich? Will lässt *I.* 7.3 unberücksichtigt.); damit würde aber ein synkretistischer Meter-Kybele-Kult im Theben Pindars keineswegs ausgeschlossen. (3) Slater 143: "Meter is never used of Kybele before Euripides." Pindar fr. 80 ist mindestens zehn Jahre älter als *Hipp.* 144 (oben Anm. 3). (4) Slater 142 und 151 hält es für möglich, dass sich fr. 95 (und fr. 96) aus dem Hymnus auf Pan *nicht* auf einen thebanisch-beötischen Kult bezieht. Aber wo sonst konnte Pindar einem Pan-Meter-Kult begegnet sein? Der Demeter-Pan-Kult in Syrakus (s. oben unter 1), falls es ihn wirklich gab und Pindar ihn kannte (woran ich nicht glaube), dürfte kaum so hoffähig gewesen sein, dass Hieron dafür bei Pindar einen Hymnus bestellt hätte; Pans Stammland Arkadien, wo der Kult der Megalai Theai alt und verbreitet war (unten Anm. 24), lag ausserhalb von Pindars Interessenkreis.

<sup>11</sup> L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (1932) 222; R. Kannicht, *Euripides, Helena* II (1969) 328–332; F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit* (RGVV 33 [1974]) 155 Anm. 24.

<sup>12</sup> Serv. zu Verg. *Georg.* 2.394 hymni vero matris deum ubique propriam, id est Graecam, linguam requirunt.

wiederholt behandelt worden.<sup>13</sup> Aber eine verlässliche Bestandsaufnahme, die alle Epochen der griechischen Religionsgeschichte und alle so titulierten Gottheiten einschliesslich der epichorischen Lokalgötter Anatoliens ebenso zu berücksichtigen hätte wie Wandlungen im religiösen Verständnis derselben Epiklese, fehlt noch immer trotz mancher guten Ansätze. Deshalb findet man in den einschlägigen Arbeiten keine befriedigenden Anhaltspunkte zur Beantwortung der obigen Frage. Von O. Kern stammt folgende Behauptung, die zwar in ähnlicher Form oft wiederholt aber anscheinend nie angefochten wurde, obgleich sie in mehrfacher Hinsicht irreführend ist: "In der Dichtersprache werden demnach die verschiedensten Göttinnen Despoina genannt, z. B. Artemis, Athena, Hekate, Kybele. Im Cultus ist der Name Despoina aber auf die unterirdischen Gottheiten beschränkt."<sup>14</sup> Dagegen lassen sich mehrere Einwände machen. (1) Das Verhältnis von Dichtersprache und Kultsprache lässt sich auch für den Titel Despoina keinesfalls auf die von Kern vorgeschlagene einfache Formel bringen. Was für Despoina Athena zutreffen mag, gilt nicht eo ipso auch für Kybele als Despoina. Für Athena lässt sich der Titel Despoina tatsächlich ausserhalb des attischen Dramas nur ausnahmsweise nachweisen, und schon gar nicht auf Inschriften; trotzdem ist gerade dieser Titel Athenas weder eine Schöpfung der Dichtersprache noch kann er auf sie beschränkt gewesen sein. Für Kybele als Despoina beweist ein weit gestreutes Vergleichsmaterial, dass hier die Dichtersprache, an der Spitze Pindar und Aristophanes, dem Sprachgebrauch des Kultes gefolgt ist. (2) Kybele und Artemis, denen sich Hekate unschwer beordnen lässt, repräsentieren zu sehr einen verwandten Götterttypus, als dass man sie mit Kern neben Athena als drei völlig verschiedene Trägerinnen des Titels Despoina ansehen dürfte. (3) Die Despoinai Arkadiens, die mit Kerns "unterirdischen Gottheiten" gemeint sind, zeichneten sich keineswegs dadurch aus, dass nur sie allein diesen Titel führten, sondern dadurch, dass in ihrem Fall die Epiklese *δέσποινα*(ι) als Eigenname fungierte.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> H. Usener, *Götternamen* (1896) 222–226, dagegen L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults* (1921) 85; C. Picard, *Éphèse et Claros* (1922) 359f; A. D. Nock, *Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background* (1928, repr. 1963) 32f = *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (1972) I 75f; B. Hemberg, *ΑΝΑΞ, ΑΝΑΞΑ und ΑΝΑΚΕΕ als Götternamen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der attischen Kulte* (Acta Univ. Upps. 1955:10); L. Robert, *RevPhil* 33 (1959) 222 und *CRAI* 1968 (1969) 583 Anm. 5 (zu *δεσπότης* / *δέσποτα*); Z. Stewart, "The God Nocturnus in Plautus' *Amphitruo*," *JRS* 50 (1960) 37–43 bes. 39ff (grundsätzliche Bemerkungen zur Methodik derartiger Untersuchungen); W. Fauth, *Der Kleine Pauly* III (1969) 413–417 s.v. Kyrios.

<sup>14</sup> *RE* 5.1 (1903) 252 s.v. Despoina.

<sup>15</sup> Paus. 8.37.9 (Lykosura) *ταύτην μάλιστα θεῶν σέβουσιν οἱ Ἀρκάδες τὴν*

Der grösseren Klarheit wegen werde ich im folgenden zur Bezeichnung der verschiedenen Typen von Götternamen und Göttertiteln eine einheitliche Terminologie benutzen, die ich mir für diesen Zweck erst schaffen musste, da geeignete Vorbilder fehlen. Ich unterscheide zwischen *Theonym* für den gebräuchlichen Eigennamen einer Gottheit (z. B. Ἀθηνᾶ); (*Kult*)*titel* für die Verbindung von δέσποινα (oder μήτηρ, etc.) mit einem Theonym (z. B. δέσποινα Ἀθηνᾶ); *Ortstitel* für die Verbindung eines geographischen Kulttitels mit einem Theonym (z. B. Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ Ἀθηναίων μεδέουσα); und schliesslich *Kultname* für den Gebrauch des blossen Kulttitels in der *dritten* Person statt des Theonyms (z. B. χαίρετω δὲ δέσποινα).

Die wenigen mir bekannten Behandlungen von Despoina als Kulttitel sind summarisch und meist auf das eleusinische Götterpaar Demeter und Persephone beschränkt.<sup>16</sup> Es ist nicht genügend beachtet worden, dass dieser Titel vorzüglich einer religionsgeschichtlich fest umrissenen Gruppe von naturverbundenen Göttinnen zukam: Kybele, Aphrodite,<sup>17</sup>

Δέσποιναν, θυγατέρα δὲ αὐτὴν Ποσειδῶνός φασιν εἶναι καὶ Δῆμητρος. ἐπὶ κλησὶς ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐστὶν αὐτῇ "Δέσποινα" (καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ἐκ Διὸς "Κόρην" ἐπονομάζουσιν, ἰδίαι δὲ ἐστὶν ὄνομα Περσεφόνη, καθὰ Ὅμηρος καὶ ἔτι πρότερον Πάμφως ἐποίησαν). τῆς <δὲ> Δεσποίνης τὸ ὄνομα ἔδεια ἐς τοὺς ἀτελέστους γράφειν (vgl. 8.25.4). Inschriftlich bezeugt (Lykosura, 3. Jh. v. Chr.) in IG V 2.514 = SIG<sup>3</sup> 939 = Ziehen, LGS 63 = Sokolowski, LSCG 68. Pausanias unterscheidet zwischen (Kult)titel (ἐπὶ κλησὶς) und Eigenname bzw. Theonym (ὄνομα), obwohl im Falle der Despoina von Lykosura beides zusammenfiel; denn die Existenz eines geheimen Eigennamens der arkadischen Despoina ist selbst für das 2. Jh. n. Chr. mehr als zweifelhaft. Z. Stewart (Anm. 13) 40 spricht bei *absolut* gebrauchten Kulttiteln (d. h. bei Kultnamen) treffend von "unattached epithets", schliesst aber die Despoina von Lykosura zu Unrecht von dieser Kategorie aus (vgl. unten S. 265f). Die mir bekannten Beispiele für den *Kultnamen* δέσποινα sind Kallim. fr. 194.105 μὰ (τὴν) δέσποιναν (unten unter III 2); [Lukian] *Asin.* 39.1 λαβὼν τὴν δέσποιναν (unten S. 280f); und die μεγάλη Σύρων ἀγνὴ δέσποινα einer Inschrift aus Thasos (unten S. 282). Die Δέσποινα Arkadiens und speziell die Δέσποινα von Lykosura unterscheiden sich prinzipiell nicht von den drei genannten Fällen; die moderne Grossschreibung, die sich mangels eines eigenen Theonyms für diese Despoinei eingebürgert hat, ist religionsgeschichtlich irreführend.

<sup>16</sup> L. Preller, *Demeter und Persephone. Ein Cyclus mythologischer Untersuchungen* (1837) 171 u. 384f; O. Kern (Anm. 14) 252ff; H. Graillot, *Le culte de Cybèle* (1912) 195 Anm. 7; F. Schwenn, *RE* 11.2 (1922) 2295 s.v. Kybele; Nock, *Essays* (Anm. 13) 75 Anm. 97 (Despoina als "title of the queen of the underworld"); L. Robert, *CRAI* 1968 (1969) 584 Anm. ("Hécate est invoquée comme δέσποινα dans les papyrus magiques"; vgl. unten Anm. 20).

<sup>17</sup> Pindar fr. 122.18 ὦ Κύπρου δέσποινα; E. *Hipp.* 415 (= 522, vgl. 117) = Xenarchus fr. 4 (II 468) K. ὦ δέσποινα ποντία Κύπρι; Theocr. 15.100 δέσποινα ἃ Γολγῶς τε καὶ Ἰθάλιον ἐφίλησας; AP 6.18.4 (Anm. 58); PGM IV 3219f τὴν



Artemis,<sup>18</sup> Demeter und Persephone,<sup>19</sup> Hekate,<sup>20</sup> gewisse Nymphen<sup>21</sup> und schliesslich Isis<sup>22</sup> wurden so angeredet.<sup>23</sup> Die ältesten dieser Göttinnen repräsentieren mit Ausnahme der erst später hellenisierten Isis die personifizierten Mächte der beseelten Natur, so wie sie in Wald

μητέρα καὶ δέσποιν[α] νυμφῶν. Aphrodite ἄνασσα: *Hom. Hymn.* 4.92 (χαῖρε ᾗ.); als Kultname auf kyprischen Inschriften (5. und 4. Jh. v. Chr.): E. Schwyzer, *Dialectorum graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora* (1923) 681.2.4 = O. Masson, *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques* (1961) Nr. 16.2 und 90.2 (vgl. 4.1, 6.1, 7.4, 17.4 und 91.2–3, immer in der Wendung ὁ ἱερεὺς τῆς Φανάσσης). *Venus domina*: *Prop.* 3.3.31; *Ov. AA* 1.148.

<sup>18</sup> Anakreon *PMG* 348.2f (unten S. 263); Bakch. 11.117 δέσποινα λαῶν; *Soph. El.* 626 ἀλλ' οὐ μὰ τὴν δέσποιναν Ἀρτεμιν ("cognomen Dianae est" F. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s.v. δέσποινα); *E. Hipp.* 74 u. 82 (unten unter II); *Philemon* fr. 4, 67 (II 468, 495) K.; *Orph. Hymn.* 35.6 θεὰ δέσποινα. *Dominam* . . . *Phoeben*: *Manil.* 2.913. *Montium domina*: *Cat.* 34.9, vgl. δέσποινα τῶν ὀρέων in einem Zauberrezept der Codd. Bonon. Univ. 3632 und Vindob. phil. gr. 108 (A. Delatte, *Anecd. Athen.* I 600). Artemis ἄνασσα: z. B. *Ar. Thesm.* 971; *E. IT* 1230, *IA* 1482 u. 1522f. *ῥανάσσης Πρεΐας* (d. h. ἀνάσσης Περγαίας) seit dem 2. Jh. v. Chr. auf Münzlegenden von Perge: z. B. Schwyzer (*Anm.* 17) 686a6, vgl. die Inschrift 686.29 (zur pamphyliischen Form des Ortsnamens s. G. Neumann, *Untersuchungen zum Weiterleben hethitischen und luwischen Sprachgutes in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit* [1961] 43); B. Pace, "Diana Pergaea," *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir W. M. Ramsay* (1923) 297–314 bes. 304. Vgl. *Anm.* 58.

<sup>19</sup> *Ar. Thesm.* 286f; *Plato Leg.* 796B ἡ δ' αὖ που παρ' ἡμῖν Κόρη καὶ Δέσποινα (vgl. *Anm.* 15); Fluchtafeln von Knidos (2. Jh. v. Chr.; gefunden im Temenos der Demeter, Kore, des Hades und der Chthonioi) bei A. Audollent, *Defix. Tab.* 2 B 5–6 = *SIG<sup>3</sup>* 1179 (δέσποινα Δάμ.), 4 B 9 und 8.16.19 (Δέσποινα); Goldplättchen *IG XIV* 641.1.10ff (Thurii, 4. Jh. v. Chr.; G. Zuntz, *Persephone* [1971] 301 u. 319) δεσποίνης δ' ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας. Vgl. *LSJ Suppl.* s.v.; N. J. Richardson zu *Hom. Hymn. Dem.* 365 δεσπόσσεις. *Domina* = Proserpina: *Verg. Aen.* 6.397.

<sup>20</sup> Aisch. fr. 388 N.<sup>2</sup> (742a Mette) δέσποινα Ἑκάτη; *E. Med.* 395ff; Charikleides fr. 1 (III 394) K. [aus einem Kultlied?] δέσποινα Ἑκάτη τριοδίτι, τρίμορφε τριπρόσωπε, τρίγλαις κηλευμένα. Hekate-Selene: *PGM IV* 2786 (vgl. Theocr. 2.162), VII 788 u. 880.

<sup>21</sup> Aisch. fr. 342 N.<sup>2</sup> (689a Mette) δέσποινα νύμφη; Kallim. fr. 602.1 δέσποινα Λιβύης ἡρωΐδες (vgl. unten *Anm.* 58). *Dominam Naida*: *Mart.* 7.15.2.

<sup>22</sup> Isishyrannus von Andros (1. Jh. v. Chr.; ed. W. Peek, *Der Isishymnus von Andros und verwandte Texte* [1930]), Zeile 6 σάμα τεᾶς, δέσποινα, μοναρχείας. Isis ἄνασσα: G. Ronchi, *Lexicon theonymon rerumque sacrarum et divinarum ad Aegyptum pertinentium quae in papyris ostracis titulis graecis latinisque in Aegypto repertis laudantur* (Testi e documenti per lo studio dell'antichità 45 [1974]) I 123f. Isis κυρία: Ronchi, *Lexicon* III 601ff, L. Vidman, *SIRIS* 332 u. 334; Κυρία (als Kultname) = Isis: Vidman, *SIRIS* 491 (Pompei) [nachzutragen bei Nock, *Essays* 75 *Anm.* 100]. *Domina Isis*: Vidman, *SIRIS* p. 344 s.v. I. domina; *Iuv.* 6.530. Vgl. *Anrn.* 58.

<sup>23</sup> Für die Christen war Maria ἡ δέσποινα ἡμῶν: *PGM* 5b40; 12.1; 20.39; vgl. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* 338.



und Feld auf den mediterranen Menschen des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. einwirkten.<sup>24</sup> Damit ist ein wichtiges Indiz dafür gewonnen, dass diese Anrede primär in der religiösen Erfahrung einer vorliterarischen Religionsstufe wurzelt. Grundsätzlich kann die Dichtersprache die im Wort fixierte Erinnerung daran ebenso treu bewahrt haben wie die Kultsprache. Manchmal hatten die Dichter sogar ein besseres kollektives Gedächtnis als der Kult und hielten an antiquierten Worten der Kultsprache fest, die in der Kultpraxis ihrer Umwelt längst durch jüngere Wortbildungen verdrängt worden waren. Als Zeugen für das religiöse Ausdrucksvermögen der Griechen, ihre Sakralsprache also, stehen deshalb Dichtersprache und Kultsprache prinzipiell einträchtig nebeneinander, als Zwillinge und nicht als feindliche Brüder. Wer jedoch wissen will, ob eine bestimmte Gottheit von ihren Verehrern in einer zeitlich und geographisch festgelegten Kultsituation unter einem bestimmten Titel oder Kultnamen angerufen worden ist, wird sich nicht auf ein einzelnes Dichterwort verlassen; vielmehr wird man nur dann eine Epiklese wie Despoina für die aktive Kultsprache in Anspruch nehmen, wenn sie inschriftlich bezeugt oder zumindest von mehreren Autoren in verschiedenen Literaturgattungen überliefert ist.

## II. Δέσποινα Ἀθηνᾶ

Die Stellen, an denen Athena Despoina genannt wird, sind zur Hauptsache auf die Tragödie und Komödie des späten 5. Jhs.

<sup>24</sup> Diese Urverwandtschaft trat in vielfachen Brechungen später wieder in den synkretistischen Angleichungsversuchen zutage, die mit wachsendem Einstürmen nahöstlicher Gottheiten seit dem 5. Jh. v. Chr. in Theologie und Kult zunahmen: z. B. E. *Hel.* 1301ff (vgl. *Hipp.* 142ff); Strabon 10.3.13ff. In Hierapolis Kastabala (Kilikien), wo Kybele in achämenidischer Zeit zumindest von der aramäischen Bevölkerung verehrt wurde und später als fackeltragende und pinienliebende Göttin Perasia fortlebte, fand sich folgendes Epigramm aus der Zeit des Antoninus Pius (Zeilen 1–4; Text nach L. Robert in A. Dupont-Sommer und L. Robert, *La déesse de Hiéropolis Castabala* [1964] 51): [εἴτε Σ]εληναίην εἴτ' Ἀρτεμῖν, εἴτε σ]έ, δαῖμον, / πυρφόρον [ἐν τ]ριόδοις ἦν σεβόμεσθ' Ἐκάτην, / εἴτε Κύριον Θήβης λα[ός] θυέεσσι γεραίρει, / ἢ Διῶ, Κούρης μητέρα Φερσεφόνης . . . Paus. 8.37.1ff bespricht die Sehenswürdigkeiten von Lykosura (oben Anm. 15): Altäre der Demeter Despoina und Megale Meter (Anm. 3); vor dem Tempel der monolithische Thron des Damophon (2. Jh. v. Chr. ?) mit Despoina und Demeter, daneben Artemis mit Hirschfell, Köcher und Fackel (vgl. Nilsson, *GGR* I 480 u. 497; R. Stiglit, *Die grossen Göttinnen Arkadiens* [1967] 32). Hesych. κ 4372 Κυβήβη· ἡ μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν (Anm. 3). καὶ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη <ὑπὸ Λυδῶν> ἢ καὶ Φρυγῶν. παρ' ὃ καὶ Ἰππῶναξ (fr. 127 West; vgl. fr. 156) φησί· "καὶ Διὸς κούρη Κυβήβη καὶ Θρεϊκίη Βενδῖς." ἄλλοι δὲ Ἀρτεμιν. Zu Isis-Kybele vgl. A. D. Nock, *AJP* 63 (1942) 221f = *Essays* (Anm. 13) II 555f; Vidman, *SIRIS* p. 67 CE 50a und p. 346 s.v. Mater deum magna; Ronchi, *Lexicon* (Anm. 22) III 669f.

beschränkt;<sup>25</sup> sie sind zahlenmässig leicht überschaubar und in ihren etwaigen Beziehungen zur Kultsprache vieldeutig. Das macht sie als Modellfall besonders instruktiv; denn die faktischen Grenzen unseres Wissens lassen sich an diesem konkreten Beispiel ebenso deutlich demonstrieren wie die grundsätzlichen methodischen Schwierigkeiten, die sich ergeben, wenn immer ein bestimmter Kultittel aus der Dichtersprache eruiert werden soll, ohne dass Prosaautoren oder Inschriften bestätigend hinzutreten.

Es empfiehlt sich, die einschlägigen Stellen nach ihrem Kontext in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. Zur ersten Gruppe rechne ich die Fälle, in denen Athena als Dialogpartner auf der Bühne anwesend ist und *δέσποινα* als *Anrede* der Göttin entsprechend aus der Dialogtechnik verstanden werden kann (S. *Aj.* 38, 105; E. *Supp.* 1227; *Rh.* 608). Daneben stehen als zweite Gruppe solche Passagen, in denen *δέσποινα* als *Anruf* der abwesenden Göttin in Gebetsformularen vorkommt (E. *Cyc.* 350; Ar. *Eq.* 763, *Pax* 271).

Die *Anredeformulare* (*ᾧ*) *δέσποινα* (bzw. *ἄνασσα*) einerseits und *δέσποινα* (bzw. *ἄνασσα*) + Eigenname andererseits werden im Dialog der Tragödie häufig von Untergebenen bzw. Sklaven gegenüber ihrer Herrin, von Menschen gegenüber Göttinnen und vereinzelt sogar von Göttern untereinander gebraucht. Sie erscheinen meist in formelhaften Wendungen und deshalb in derselben metrischen Position, wie die folgenden Beispiele zeigen:

S. *Aj.* 105 (Aias zu Athena) *ἡδιστος, ᾧ δέσποινα, δεσμώτης ἔσω*

S. *Tr.* 481 (Lichas zu Deianeira) *ἀλλ' αὐτός, ᾧ δέσποινα, δειμαίνων τὸ σόν* (vgl. 434)

S. *Aj.* 38 (Odysseus zu Athena) *ἦ καί, φίλη δέσποινα, πρὸς καιρὸν πονῶ*

S. *Tr.* 472 (Lichas zu Deianeira) *ἀλλ', ᾧ φίλη δέσποινα, ἐπεὶ σε μανθάνω*

Vgl. E. *Hipp.* 82 (Hippolytos zu Artemis *im Gebet*) *ἀλλ', ᾧ φίλη δέσποινα, χρυσέας κόμης*

<sup>25</sup> Dem Sprachgebrauch der Tragödie verpflichtet ist eine attische Weihinschrift in jambischen Trimetern von der Akropolis aus dem 2. Jh. n. Chr., deren Anfangsworte *δέσποινα Παλλάς* lauten (Kaibel, *Epigr. Gr.* 796 = *IG* II/III<sup>2</sup> 4347; vgl. W. Peek, *ZPE* 15 [1974] 225f). Für die Frauen von Kos (?) hiess Athena einfach *Δέσποινα*, ganz so wie im Athen der Komödie (unten Anm. 31): Herondas 4.57f (Kokkale spricht) *καινήν ταῦτ' ἔρεῖς Ἀθηναίην / γλύψαι τὰ καλὰ — χαίρετω δὲ δέσποινα* (dazu V. Schmidt, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Herondas* [1968] 114ff).

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| E. <i>Supp.</i> 1227 (Theseus) δέσποινα Ἀθάνᾱ   | } Versanfänge |
| [E.] <i>Rh.</i> 608 (Odysseus) δέσποινα Ἀθάνᾱ   |               |
| S. <i>Tr.</i> 49 = 180 (Untergebene) δέσποινα Δηϊάνειρα                               |               |
|   |               |
| A. <i>Eu.</i> 443 (Orestes) = 892 (Erinyen) = 235<br>(Gebet des Orestes) ἄνασσ' Ἀθάνᾱ | } Versanfänge |
| E. <i>IT</i> 1475 (Thoas) ἄνασσ' Ἀθάνᾱ  |               |
| E. <i>Tr.</i> 52 (Poseidon) ἄνασσ' Ἀθάνᾱ  |               |
| S. <i>El.</i> 666 (Untergebener zu Klytaimnestra) ὦ χαῖρ',<br>ἄνασσα                  |               |
| S. <i>Aj.</i> 774 (Aias zu Athena) ἄνασσα   |               |

Diese Ehrentitel stammen nicht aus der attischen Kultsprache; sie gehören vielmehr zum epischen Sprachgut der Tragödie. Bereits im frühen Epos bezeichneten die mykenischen Kulttitel Wanassa und Potnia ausser Göttinnen auch angesehene Frauen. Die *Ilias* gebraucht πότνια Ἥρη neben πότνια μήτηρ (bzw. μήτερ) sowohl in der Erzählung als auch vokativisch in der Anrede; daneben sind ἄνασσα als Titel Demeters (*E* 326) und πότνι' Ἀθηναίη (s. u.) im Anruf bemerkenswerte Einzelfälle. In der *Odyssee* finden sich überdies die Anrufe πότνα θεά und, ausser an Sterbliche auch einmal (*γ* 380) an Athena gerichtet, ἄνασσα. Die homerischen Hymnen und die lyrische Dichtung übertrugen diese beiden Titel auch auf andere Göttinnen, darunter Aphrodite.<sup>26</sup> Bereits die *Odyssee* kennt δέσποινα als Benennung für die Hausherrin; bei Anakreon findet sich dieser Titel erstmals für eine Göttin: sein ἄγρίων δέσποινα "Ἀρτεμι θηρῶν (*PMG* 348.2f) variiert das homerische πότνια θηρῶν "Ἀρτεμις ἄγροτέρη (*Φ* 470f). In der Tragödie impliziert δέσποινα immer eine grössere Distanz im sozialen Status als ἄνασσα;<sup>27</sup> deshalb wird Athena von Poseidon ἄνασσα genannt (und nennt ihn ihrerseits ἄναξ) und nicht δέσποινα (oben *E. Tr.* 52).

Im Gebet vergegenwärtigte sich der Grieche die Gottheit; die Götter, so glaubte er, sind ganz Ohr (ἐπήκοοι) und damit nahe.<sup>28</sup> So

<sup>26</sup> Aphrodite (vgl. Anm. 17, 58): ἄνασσα *Hom. Hymn. Ven.* 92; Alkman 1.18 Page. πότνια Sappho 1.4 LP. πότνι' ὠράνω (Gedichtanfang) Sappho oder Alkaios in *PMich* inv. 3498 II 6 (R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 12 [1973] 86 = Page, *Suppl. Lyr. Gr.* S 286). Eos: πότνια *Hom. Hymn. Ven.* 223 u. 230; Sappho 157 LP. Leto: πότνια Theognis 5 West. Athena: ἄνασσ' Ἀθανάα (Strophenanfang) Alkaios 325.1 LP. Vgl. πότνι' ἈθENAία und πότνι' Ἀθάνᾱ in metrischen Weihepigrammen des 6./5. Jhs. v. Chr. aus Athen (A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis* [1949] Nr. 24.1, 53.1, 181.1; vgl. blosses πότνι(α) in Nr. 218.1).

<sup>27</sup> W. S. Barrett zu *Hipp.* 88–89.

<sup>28</sup> O. Weinreich, *AM* 37 (1912) 19ff = *Ausgew. Schriften* I (1969) 131ff; vgl. Aesch. *Eum.* 297, *E. Bacch.* 392ff.

gesehen nähert sich der *Gebetsanruf* (ὦ) δέσποινα in der Tragödie in seiner dramatischen Funktion und szenischen Wirkung sehr der identischen dialogischen Anrede. Das ist dann besonders evident, wenn eine Kultstatue die physische Präsenz der Gottheit suggeriert, wie zu Beginn des *Hippolytos*; dort redet Hippolytos seine Herrin ebenso mit (ὦ) δέσποινα an (*Hipp.* 74, 82) wie am Schluss in der Sterbeszene (1395), während der Artemis als Dialogpartner auf der Bühne ist. Aus solchen Stellen kann man keine glaubhaften Rückschlüsse auf die Kultsprache und die ihr eigenen solennen Kulttitel ziehen, höchstens auf die private Gebetspraxis. Dieselbe Einschränkung gilt gegenüber einer Stelle wie *E. Cyc.* 350f. ὦ Παλλάς, ὦ δέσποινα Διογενὲς θεά, νῦν νῦν ἄρῃξον. Παλλάς und Διογενὲς θεά (vgl. *S. Aj.* 91) sind poetische Titel. Dagegen geben drei Anrufungen der Athena bei Aristophanes wichtigen Aufschluss über die Kultsprache und ihr Verhältnis zur Dichtersprache:

*Eq.* 763f. τῇ μὲν δεσποίνῃ Ἀθηναίῃ τῇ τῆς πόλεως μεδεούσῃ  
εὐχομαι

*Eq.* 581f., 585 ὦ πολιοῦχε Παλλάς, ὦ τῆς ἱερωτάτης . . . μεδέουσα  
χώρας

*Pax* 271 εἶ γ', ὦ πότνια δέσποινα Ἀθηναία, ποιῶν

R. A. Neil kommentierte zu *Eq.* 763: "Ἀθηναίη is unknown to ordinary Attic; it no doubt marks an old ritual formula, like μεδέουσα." Aber die jonische Vokalisation des Götternamens, falls echt, lässt sich leichter als epische Reminiszenz denn als Relikt der Kultsprache verstehen, wie ein Vergleich mit dem Gebetsanfang πότνι' Ἀθηναίη, ἐρυσίπτολι, δῖα θεάων (*Z* 305) zeigt. Potnia und Wanassa waren vermutlich noch im 8. Jh. wirkliche Kulttitel Athenas.<sup>29</sup> In der Dichtersprache und wohl auch in Kulthymnen, die sich vorwiegend der epischen Kunstsprache bedienten, lebten sie selbst danach noch jahrhundertlang weiter. In der offiziellen Kulttitulatur traten jedoch jüngere Synonyme an ihre Stelle, die teils poetisch waren wie μεδέουσα und teils mehr prosaisch wie δέσποινα. Für das 5./4. Jh. bezeugen mehrere Inschriften aus Athen, Samos und Kos den Kulttitel Ἀθηνᾶ (ἡ) Ἀθηνῶν μεδέουσα.<sup>30</sup> Sie bestätigen, dass Athenas Titel in *Eq.* 763 zum teil der Kultsprache entlehnt sind. Aber die Zeitgenossen des Aristophanes haben zu ihrer Stadtgöttin nicht als πότνια oder μεδέουσα gebetet; diese Worte gehörten

<sup>29</sup> E. Vermeule (Anm. 7) 79 zu *Z* 305.

<sup>30</sup> J. P. Barron, *JHS* 84 (1964) 34ff. Die epische Namensform Ἀθηναίη (s. oben zu *Eq.* 763) findet sich auf zwei Weihinschriften in attischer *Prosa* (Raubitschek [Anm. 26] Nr. 29 u. 119), offenbar in Anlehnung an hexametrische Weihungen.



nicht zu ihrem gewohnten Vokabular. Der im Alltagsleben und vermutlich auch im Kult gebräuchlichste Anruf Athenas war *δέσποινα* Ἀθηνᾶ, wie nach Aristophanes vor allem der Sprachgebrauch der Neuen Komödie lehrt.<sup>31</sup> In Athenas Titel bei Aristophanes überlagern sich also Kultsprache (*μεδέουσα*), Dichtersprache (*πότνια*) und Umgangsprache (*δέσποινα*); aber die Grenzen sind fließend: *μεδέουσα* stammt letztlich aus der epischen Dichtersprache; bereits Anakreon, Pindar und die Tragiker gebrauchen *δέσποινα* als Götterepiklese.

Theano in der Ilias und der "Paphlagonier" Kreon in den *Rittern* rufen Ἀθηναίη als Polias an, d.h. in ihrer alten Funktion als Stadtherrin, die mykenische Wurzeln hat.<sup>32</sup> Mit dem Herrschaftsbereich der jeweiligen Göttin wechselte auch der Geltungsanspruch des Titels "Herrin"; Wesensmerkmale und geographische Verbreitung einer Göttin setzten ihm meist natürliche Grenzen. Zur Verdeutlichung wurde häufig in der Dichtung und nur ausnahmsweise im Kult der Herrschaftstitel um nominale Zusätze erweitert, aus denen die Zuständigkeit der Gottheit erhellte; *πότνια θηρῶν*, *δέσποινα θηρῶν*, *Κύπρου δέσποινα* (Pindar fr. 122.18) und *Ἀθηνῶν μεδέουσα* sind frühe und typische Beispiele. Aber gewöhnlich genügte der bloße Titel Despoina, der zum Kultnamen verabsolutiert wurde und für die betreffenden Verehrer aus dem Wesen *ihrer* "Herrin" heraus festen und unverwechselbaren Inhalt gewann.<sup>33</sup> Im Falle der arkadischen Despoinai ersetzte

<sup>31</sup> Men. Kol. 23 *δέσποινα* Ἀθηνᾶ, *σῶιζέ με* (dazu Gomme-Sandbach treffend: "This would seem to be a citizen's appeal."); Sik. 144 (Anfang eines Stossgebets) *ὦ δέσποινα* Ἀθηνᾶ (R. Kassel verglich bereits Ar. Eq. 763 und Aisch. Eu. 487):

<sup>32</sup> M. P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion*<sup>2</sup> (1968) 485ff.

<sup>33</sup> Vgl. E. Vermeule, *Greece in the Bronze Age* (1964) 295 zu den Potniai der pylischen Tafeln: "The nature of Potnia . . . is left general. Everyone must have understood who they were." Z. Stewart (Anm. 13) 40 zu inschriftlich bezeugten Kultnamen wie *Σωτήρ* für Asklepios und *Frugifer* für den afrikanischen Saturnus: "Here the examples of unattached epithets and of similar lack of precision seem to imply so sure a feeling of familiarity that no mistake could be made." W. Baudissin, *Kyrios als Gottesname im Judentum und seine Stelle in der Religionsgeschichte* III (1929) 15: "Wenn wir uns demnach denken dürfen, dass in ursemitischen Zeiten die Numina der verschiedenen Kultusorte alle mit *ēl* bezeichnet werden konnten und voneinander durch Epitheta unterschieden wurden, so wird man damals allerdings in den einzelnen Kultbezirken wahrscheinlich von dem Hauptgott des Bezirks einfach mit *ēl* ohne weiteren Zusatz geredet haben." H. Donner und W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*<sup>2</sup> II (1968) 16 zu Nr. 11 (phöniz. Inschrift aus Byblos, ca. 350 v. Chr.) כהן בעלה ("Priester der Herrin"): "Wahrscheinlich die bekannte בעלה גבול (wie griech. *Bēlthīs* bei Hesych; *βαάλτις* in *FGrHist* 790 F 2 p. 812.12), deren Gestalt

oder verdrängte dieser zum Kultnamen gewordene Titel sogar die Individualnamen.<sup>34</sup> Unter den übrigen Trägerinnen des Titels Despoina lässt sich nur Kybele, die mit der hethitischen Mauerkrone dargestellt wurde und als Kubaba bereits im 14. Jh. "Herrin von Karkemisch" hiess, mit der Stadtherrin Athena typmässig vergleichen; in ihrer späteren und dominanten Funktion als "Bergmutter" stand Kybele jedoch nicht Athena sondern Artemis am nächsten. Artemis als "Göttin des Draussen" (Wilamowitz) und "Herrin der Tiere" sowie Demeter als Hüterin des Erntesegens sind aber von Haus aus Despoiṇai ganz anderer Art als Athena. Wie fügt sich die Herrin Kybele in dieses reich differenzierte Bild von synonymen Kulttiteln und wechselnden göttlichen Machtbereichen?

### III. Δέσποινα Κυβέλη

Immer wieder sieht man Ar. Av. 877 als klassischen — und leider oft auch als einzigen — Beleg dafür angeführt, dass Δέσποινα Titel der Kybele war. Dieser Ehrenplatz ist jedoch nicht länger gerechtfertigt. Denn durch die neue Herstellung des Pindarfragments wissen wir jetzt, dass dieselbe Epiklese bereits geraume Zeit vor 414 v. Chr. gebraucht worden ist. Da Pindar ein differenzierteres Verhältnis zum Kult der Grossen Mutter hatte als Aristophanes und wohl entsprechend besser über die Kultpraxis informiert war, wiegt sein Zeugnis schwerer als das des Komikers; andererseits konnte Aristophanes für seine Gebetsparodie mit um so grösserer Publikumswirkung rechnen, je wortgetreuer er die Kultsprache nachahmte. Aber Pindar und Aristophanes sind nicht die einzigen Zeugen dafür, dass Kybele den Titel Despoina trug. Die übrigen Zeugnisse verteilen sich über nahezu acht Jahrhunderte;<sup>35</sup> ihnen ist jedoch gemeinsam, dass sie alle aus Zusammenhängen stammen, in denen Götter und Kulte Kleinasien entweder

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den Bybliern so wohlvertraut war, dass die Nennung des ganzen Namens unnötig war." Vertreter verschiedenster Disziplinen sind sich demnach darin einig, dass von den jeweiligen Verehrern einer bestimmten Lokalgöttheit deren Kulttitel leicht und oft zu Kultnamen verabsolutiert wurden. Diese Entwicklung zeigt sich besonders deutlich in den semitischen Sprachen, in denen den Kultnamen häufig Personalsuffixe beigefügt wurden, um so das persönliche Abhängigkeitsverhältnis des Gläubigen von seiner Gottheit auch im Kultnamen zum Ausdruck zu bringen (vgl. Baudissin, *Kyrios* III 555ff; unten unter V).

<sup>34</sup> Oben Anm. 15.

<sup>35</sup> Vgl. R. Pfeiffer zu Kallim. fr. 194.105 (Ar. Av. 877; Tim. Pers. 125; Cat. 63); O. Weinreich, "Catulls Attisgedicht," *Mélanges F. Cumont* (1936) 490f = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II (1973) 515f (AP 6.51).

als Lokalkolorit oder um ihrer selbst willen eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Den betreffenden Autoren wird es also um eine möglichst authentische Wiedergabe religiöser Traditionen zu tun gewesen sein. Die mir bekannten Stellen sind:

1. Tim. Pers. (PMG 791) 123ff

πρὸς μελαμ-  
πεταλοχίτωνα *Ματρὸς οὐρείας*  
δεσπόσυνα γόνατα πεσεῖν<sup>36</sup>

2. Kallim. fr. 194.105f

οὐ μὰ Φοῖβον, οὐ μὰ δέσποιναν  
[τῇ κ]ύμβαλοι ψοθεῦσιν, οὐ μὰ *Πακτ[ωλόν]*

3. Anonymes hellenistisches Weihepigramm AP 6.51 (Anon. XLII Gow-Page) 1-2 und 9-10

*Μῆτερ ἐμὴ Πείη Φρυγίων θρέπτειρα λεόντων,*  
*Δίνδυμον ἧς μύσταις οὐκ ἀπάτητον ὄρος*

Ἰλαος, ᾧ δέσποινα, τὸν ἐν νεότητι μανέντα  
γηραλέον προτέρης παῦσον ἀγρειοσύνης.

4. Julian Or. 5.160d δέσποινα *Μῆτερ*, εἴπερ εἰμὶ σώφρων, ἔπου μοι.

1. Timotheos lässt nach der persischen Niederlage bei Salamis die kleinasiatischen Vasallen des Grosskönigs in einen bewegten Threnos ausbrechen (105ff Page), der mit der Apostrophe der Landschaft Mysien beginnt und von der Hoffnung auf Rückkehr in die Heimat — Tmolos und Sardis werden genannt — getragen ist. Die erhoffte Rettung kann nur von der "Bergmutter" kommen. Die Kleinasiaten in der Fremde vergegenwärtigen sich also das heimatliche Kultbild, in dem die Göttin präsent ist. In Gedanken werfen sich die Geschlagenen ihr, der "Herrin", zu Füßen, die ein "Chiton aus schwarzen Blättern" umhüllt, und umschlingen sie mit ihren Armen. Der aus Milet gebürtige Timotheos scheint in dieser lebendig empfundenen Szene den griechischen Bittgestus mit der orientalischen Proskynese verbunden zu haben. Die konventionelle Diktion entspricht zwar griechischem Usus und Empfinden, aber das untypische *δεσπόσυνα* suggeriert orientalische Unterwürfigkeit. Jedenfalls stellt sich Timotheos die Göttin mit menschlichem Körper vor. Deshalb kann er nicht gut an die eigentliche

<sup>36</sup> Wilamowitz, *Timotheos* (Berlin 1903) z. St. paraphrasierte: πρὸς τὰ γόνατα τῆς δεσποίνης πεσεῖν.

Bergmutter von Pessinunt, die phrygische Kybele, gedacht haben; denn ihr lokales Kultbild war damals noch das bekannte anikonische Idol in Gestalt eines vom Himmel gefallenen Meteoriten.<sup>37</sup> Aber der Stein von Pessinunt ist ein religionsgeschichtlicher Sonderfall. Denn die als *Kubaba* (altanatolisch), *Kuvava* (lydisch), *Κυβήβη* (Hipponax fr. 127 West; Charon von Lampsakos *FGrHist* 262 F 5; Herodot 5.102.1) und *Kubile* (phrygisch; vgl. Hipponax fr. 156 West) bekannte Göttin wurde seit dem 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr. in Nordsyrien und danach vor allem im östlichen Kleinasien, in Phrygien und in Lydien in menschlicher Gestalt verehrt; als anthropomorphe "Mutter Kybele" hat sie durch Vermittlung der Jonier Kleinasiens seit dem 6. Jh. v. Chr. auch auf dem griechischen Festland Einzug gehalten.<sup>38</sup> In Kleinasien dagegen hatte die anatolische "Grosse Mutter" als Lokalgöttin von Ort zu Ort unterschiedliche Züge und Kulttitel angenommen; diese reiche Vielfalt ihrer lokalen Erscheinungsformen überdauerte die Jahrhunderte bis in die Münzprägungen und Inschriften der römischen Kaiserzeit. Der Jonier Timotheos muss ebenfalls eine bestimmte örtliche "Bergmutter" vor Augen gehabt haben, wie das ungewöhnliche Epitheton *μελαμπεταλοχίτων* zeigt, welches in konkreter Anschaulichkeit die eigentümliche Körpergewandung ihres lokalen Kultbildes beschreibt. Ohne diese Bergmutter näher zu bestimmen, bezog Wilamowitz den Ausdruck auf ein Stoffgewand mit Rankenornamenten in Form von schwarzen Blättern, "wie sie auf den Prachtgewändern der Vasen oft genug erscheinen."<sup>39</sup> Da Timotheos für die Grosse Artemis von Ephesos

<sup>37</sup> A. B. Cook, *Zeus* III 1 (1940) 393ff. Vermutlich ist der Fetisch schon lange vor der Übertragung nach Rom (205/4 v. Chr.) durch anthropomorphe Kultbilder ersetzt bzw. ergänzt worden; wir wissen aber nicht wann. Die belgischen Ausgrabungen in Pessinunt haben bisher nichts für die frühe Geschichte des Heiligtums ergeben; vgl. zuletzt P. Lambrechts, *Türk Arkeoloji Dergisi* 20 (1973) 107-115, 21 (1974) 79-84.

<sup>38</sup> Ikonographie der Kubaba/Kybele: G. M. A. Hanfmann und J. C. Waldbaum, "Kybebe and Artemis. Two Anatolian Goddesses at Sardis," *Archaeology* 22 (1969) 264-269. Namensformen: R. Gusmani, "Der lydische Name der Kybele," *Kadmos* 8 (1969) 158-161. Herkunft und geographische Verbreitung: E. Laroche, "Koubaba, déesse anatolienne, et le problème des origines de Cybèle," in *Éléments orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne* (1960) 113-128; E. Will, "Aspects du culte et de la légende de la Grande Mère dans le monde grec," in *Éléments orientaux* 95-111.

<sup>39</sup> *Timotheos* (Anm. 36) 46 Anm. 1. Dazu bemerkt G. M. A. Hanfmann (brieflich): "There are two possibilities: the one envisaged by Wilamowitz — namely a real dress presented to the goddess, or its imitation in sculpture (painted), for which one should indeed study the archaic and classical textiles; or, an image of the goddess with inlays, such as the black obsidian used by Phidias on the base of the Zeus image in Olympia."



einen Hymnus komponiert hat (PMG 778) und deshalb deren Kult vermutlich aus eigener Anschauung kannte, könnte man versucht sein, eine Identifizierung der "Bergmutter" mit der ephesischen Artemis zu erwägen. Zahlreiche Reproduktionen des Kultbildes der Artemis von Ephesos in der Plastik und auf spätrepublikanischen sowie kaiserzeitlichen Münzen Kleinasiens zeigen nämlich, dass die Kultstatue einen schachbrettartig aufgeteilten Schurz trug, der auf der Vorderseite des Chitons auflag und Unterkörper samt Beinen der Göttin bedeckte; dieser abnehmbare Schmuck der Statue war aus Metall gefertigt, wahrscheinlich aus Goldblech (πέταλα χρυσᾶ).<sup>40</sup> Aber abgesehen davon, dass Gold selbst in angelaufenem Zustand nicht wirklich schwarz ist, schliesst die Kulttopographie von Ephesos eine solche Identifizierung aus: Noch in frühhellenistischer Zeit wurde die phrygische *Μήτηρ ὀρείη* (d. h. Kybele) in einem eigenen Metroon am Bergabhang oberhalb des Artemistempels gesondert verehrt (oben Anm. 3). In Sardis wurden noch im 5./4. Jh. v. Chr. die Artemis Ephesia (*artimus ibsimsis*)<sup>41</sup> und

<sup>40</sup> Der Vergleich von μελαμπεταλοχίτων mit der Bekleidung des Kultbildes der ephesischen Artemis hat sich als unhaltbar erwiesen. Trotzdem fasse ich hier die ikonographischen Daten zusammen, um anderen denselben Irrweg zu ersparen, vor dem mich das fachmännische Urteil von G. M. A. Hanfmann bewahrt hat.

R. Fleischer, *Artemis von Ephesos und verwandte Kultstatuen aus Anatolien und Syrien* (EPRO 35 [Leiden 1973]) 1–137 (mit älterer Lit.) und Tafeln 1–57a; C. Seltman, "The Wardrobe of Artemis," *Numism. Chron.* 12 (1952) 33–51, bes. 36: "From waist to feet it is enclosed in an *ependytes*, i.e. a metallic sheath divided into regular, rectangular compartments" (von Seltman 42 fälschlich als Palmrinde gedeutet; dagegen Fleischer 88–98 u. 123ff). Keine der bildlichen Darstellungen des "Ependytes" der Artemis Ephesia ist älter als das 2. Jh. v. Chr.; das Aussehen des ephesischen Kultbildes zur Zeit des Timotheos muss also aus der Typologie der viel jüngeren Repliken erschlossen werden. Fleischer 123 vermutet, dass der Ependytes zwar "ursprünglich ein mit Platten aus Goldblech verziertes Prunkgewand nach Art der mesopotamischen Götterkleider" war, aber bereits um 400 v. Chr. (Xen. *An.* 5.3.12) und "nach Analogie der Goldbleche aus Delphi" (Fleischer 94 u. Tafel 59) vielleicht sogar schon "um die Mitte des 6. Jhs." ganz aus Goldblech getrieben war (vgl. Fleischer 96, 98, 183). Πέταλα χρυσᾶ: M. Fränkel zu *IPergam.* 336.5f = Vidman, *SIRIS* 313, und die weiteren inschriftlichen Belege bei LSJ s.v. πέταλον II. *Lyd. Mag.* 2.4 übersetzt *bracteolatus* mit χρυσοπέταλος (vom Goldbesatz am Gewandsaum des Kaisermantels). Das ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος στεφάνου πέταλον χρυσοῦν ἐκπεσόν bei Ael. *Var. Hist.* 5.16 bezieht sich auf den aus einem goldenen Blütenkranz bestehenden *Halsschmuck* des Kultbildes (vgl. Fleischer 65).

<sup>41</sup> R. Gusmani, *Lydisches Wörterbuch mit grammatischer Skizze und Inschriftensammlung* (Heidelberg 1964) Wörterbuch s.vv. (pp. 63f, 130f). Dass zweimal in lydischen Inschriften (wohl des 4. Jhs. v. Chr.) aus Sardis unmittelbar nach der *artimus ibsimsis* die *artimus kulumsis* (*Ἀρτεμὶς Κολουσῆ*) erwähnt wird (pp. 156f),

die anatolische Kybele (*kufava* bzw. *kuvava*)<sup>42</sup> auf lydischen Inschriften unterschieden. In den zwei Göttinnen einer in Sardis gefundenen Stele, von denen die eine ein Reh und die andere einen Löwen trägt, hat man Artemis und Kybele erkannt; beide besaßen getrennte Kultbezirke.<sup>43</sup> Zu Lebzeiten des Timotheos hat man demnach sowohl in Ephesos als auch in Sardis die ephesische Artemis und die "Bergmutter" Kybele im Kult unterschieden. Diese Unterscheidung war Timotheos sicher geläufig. Denn einige Dutzend Verse nach der Anrufung der "Bergmutter" läßt er einen gefangenen Phryger aus Kelainai in holprigem Griechisch ausrufen (160f): "Ἀρτεμις ἐμὸς μέγας θεὸς παρ' Ἐφεσον φυλάξει. Mit derselben Treue zum kultischen Detail, mit der Timo-

zeigt, wie differenziert der Kult der lokalen Muttergottheiten selbst innerhalb eines relativ begrenzten Gebiets war und wie sehr die Ortsansässigen auf den Unterscheidungen bestanden. Vgl. J. Keil, "Die Kulte Lydiens," *Anatolian Studies Ramsay* (Anm. 18) 239–266 bes. 252 u. 257f (Listen der in Lydien inschriftlich bezeugten lokalen Ἀρτέμιδες und Μητέρες), und C. J. Cadoux, *Ancient Smyrna* (1938) 25–27 u. 215ff. Vgl. Anm. 117.

<sup>42</sup> Kubaba ist bisher in zwei lydischen Inschriften erwähnt: (1) auf einem Stein aus der Nekropole von Sardis, der zwei Inschriften trägt, steht *kufav(a)* (zur Neulesung vgl. Gusmani [oben Anm. 38] 160) neben dem altanatolischen Gott Santas, während in der Begleitinschrift Artemis neben dem anatolischen Mondgott (?) Qldāns genannt ist (Gusmani, *Lyd. Wörterbuch* [Anm. 41] 252 Nr. 4); (2) eine beim Löwenaltar der Kybele in Sardis (vgl. Anm. 43) gefundene Scherbe trägt die Aufschrift *kuvav* (R. Gusmani, *Neue epichorische Schriftzeugnisse aus Sardis (1958–1971)* [Cambridge, Mass. 1975] 28–30 Nr. A II 5). Nach Mitteilung von G. M. A. Hanfmann ist eine lydische Grabstele aus Sardis (nicht aus Manisa, wie früher angenommen), auf der die ephesische Artemis namentlich genannt ist (Gusmani, *Lyd. Wörterbuch* 268 Nr. 54), in die archaische Zeit zu datieren; daraus folgt, dass Artemis und Kybele schon im 6. Jh. v. Chr. in Sardis als getrennte Göttinnen nachweisbar sind. Zur Unterscheidung von Kybele und Artemis in Sardis vgl. auch G. M. A. Hanfmann und J. C. Waldbaum, *A Survey of Sardis and the Major Monuments Outside the City Walls*, *Archaeological Exploration of Sardis Report 1* (Cambridge, Mass. 1975) 179 Anm. 16, 180 Anm. 44.

<sup>43</sup> Publikation der Stele: G. M. A. Hanfmann und J. C. Waldbaum (Anm. 38) 265 mit Abb.; vgl. Hanfmann, *Letters from Sardis* (1972) Abb. 181. Im Artemisbezirk von Sardis fanden sich bisher keine Inschriften für Kybele oder Meter. Die Lage des zweifach bezeugten Metroons von Sardis ist noch nicht ermittelt (unpublizierte Inschrift IN 63.121 [Brief der Laodike, Gemahlin Antiochus' III.] aus der Synagoge von Sardis aus dem Jahre 213 v. Chr., vgl. D. G. Mitten, *BASOR* 174 [1964] 34; Plut. *Them.* 31.1). Aber Kybeles archaischer (etwa 570–550 v. Chr. [Professor Hanfmann]), mit Löwen geschmückter Altar wurde in neuen Ausgrabungen am Ostufer des Paktolos inmitten von Goldbearbeitungswerkstätten gefunden: A. Ramage, *BASOR* 191 (1968) 11f Abb. 9–11, 199 (1970) 22; Hanfmann, *Letters from Sardis* 221f, 230–235 (mit Abb.), und *From Croesus to Constantine* (1975) 14 Abb. 31–32 (Altarrekonstruktion).

theos vorher das Gewand der "Bergmutter" beschrieben hat, gibt er jetzt den Titel der ephesischen Artemis wieder. Denn noch ein halbes Jahrtausend später rief man in Ephesos: *μεγάλη ἡ Ἀρτεμις Ἐφεσίων*.<sup>44</sup> Timotheos hat also seine kultischen Beiworte ganz bewusst gewählt. Dieselbe Prägnanz der Wortwahl, die *μελαμπεταλοχίτων* und *μεγάλη θεός* kennzeichnet, wird man auch für *δεσπόουνα* annehmen dürfen, das ja hier poetische Umschreibung von *τῆς δεσποίνης* ist: Timotheos kannte *Δέσποινα* als Kultnamen der "Bergmutter", hinter der sich am ehesten die Kybele von Sardis verbirgt, wie die namentliche Nennung der Stadt in Zeile 117 seiner Komposition vermuten lässt.<sup>45</sup> Das folgende Zeugnis des Kallimachos bestätigt diese Vermutung.

2. Im Mittelpunkt von Kallimachos' 4. Jambus stand der lydische Ainos mit dem Streitgespräch zwischen dem Lorbeer und dem Ölbaum vom Tmolos. Das Papyrusfragment bricht mit einer eidlichen Beteuerung des Lorbeers ab, in der drei göttliche Schwurzeugen angerufen werden: Apollon, der Paktolos und "die Herrin, der die Zimbeln tönen." Dazu bemerkt R. Pfeiffer: "arbor Lydia per Pactolum fl. iurat, ut alii per flumen patrium." Zum lydischen Fluss treten zwei kleinasiatische Gottheiten, der didymeische Apoll, dessen sich der Lorbeer kurz zuvor gerühmt hatte (fr. 194.28ff), und Kybele, die ja an den Ufern des Paktolos in Sardis verehrt wurde.<sup>46</sup> Die hieratische

<sup>44</sup> *Apostelgesch.* 19.28, 19.34, vgl. 19.27. Die literarischen (Xen. *Eph.* 1.11.5) und inschriftlichen Belege bei Bauer, Arndt, Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* p. 109 s.v. *Ἀρτεμις*; *Forschungen in Ephesos I* (1906) 278ff (Anhang: Inschriftliche Zeugnisse über das Artemision) Nr. 1 = Nr. 55 (*τῆς μεγάλης θεᾶς Ἀ.*) und Nr. 5, 29 u. 55 (*τῆς μεγίστης θεᾶς Ἀ.*); L. Robert, *RevPhil* 41 (1967) 75f. Im Falle der Artemis Ephesia wurde der Kulttitel (*μεγάλη θεὰ Ἀ.*) zur Akklamation (*μεγάλη ἡ Ἀ.*); umgekehrt setzt jedoch nicht jede *μέγας*-Akklamation einen entsprechenden Kulttitel voraus (vgl. Nock, *Essays* [Anm. 13] 36 mit Anm. 18).

<sup>45</sup> *Δέσποινα* als Titel der Artemis Ephesia ist nicht bezeugt. Die älteste Inschrift (Mitte des 6. Jhs. v. Chr.) aus dem Artemision D in Ephesos steht auf einem Silberplättchen "recording contributions of gold and silver" (L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* [1961] 344 Nr. 53). Auf Seite B Zeile 1 hat D. Hogarth eine zerstörte Buchstabenfolge zögernd zu [*Δεσ*] *πρωιη Εφ[εσῖα]* ergänzt (*The Archaic Artemisia*. British Museum Excavations at Ephesus [1908] 123 u. 138); diese Herstellung entbehrt jeder Grundlage und hat zu falschen Folgerungen verleitet (so bei Fleischer [Anm. 40] 131).

<sup>46</sup> Vgl. oben Anm. 42-43; R. J. Penella, *HSCP* 79 (1975) 310f. Der Kallimachosstelle selbst lässt sich nicht entnehmen, ob der Dichter speziell die sardische Kybele gemeint hat oder Kybele allgernein als eine für Lydien oder Anatolien überhaupt typische Göttin. Die Timotheosstelle (oben unter III 1) spricht jedoch dafür, dass die Despoina Kybele von Sardis bereits vor Kallimachos auch in der Literatur ein fester Begriff war.



Periphrase, die bei Kallimachos den Namen der Kybele vertritt und stilistisch E. Nordens "Relativstil der Prädikation" zuzuordnen ist,<sup>47</sup> kombiniert Kulttitel und Kultinstrument und hält damit zwei wichtige Elemente des Kybelekultes fest: die Allmacht der Göttermutter in den Augen ihrer Hierodulen und die entnervende Monotonie der lauten Kultmusik. Es versteht sich, dass der lydische Baum die einheimische Göttin unter ihrem authentischen Titel anruft. Entsprechend darf man aus dem mehrfachen Vorkommen von *domina* und *era* als Titel Kybeles bei Catull 63 schliessen, dass im Text von Catulls griechischer Vorlage *δέσποινα* stand.<sup>48</sup> Den lateinischen Äquivalenten könnte zwar ausser *δέσποινα* auch *κυρία* zugrundeliegen, wie W. Kroll vermutete;<sup>49</sup> aber es ist undenkbar, dass Kallimachos oder ein anderer stilbewusster Dichter ein derart unpoetisches Wort wie *κυρία* als Götterepiklese gebraucht hätte, mag es auch vereinzelt in der Komödie und häufig in kultischen Prosatexten in dieser Funktion vorgekommen sein.<sup>50</sup> Damit bestätigt Catull in direktem Rückgriff auf hellenistische griechische Vorbilder, dass Despoina neben Meter der wohl bekannteste Kultname Kybeles war. Römische Kultschriftsteller wie Varro haben eigens auf

<sup>47</sup> Norden, *Agnostos Theos*<sup>2</sup> 168ff. Vgl. dagegen die Nennung des Theonyms bei Kallim. fr. 193.35 *Κ[υβή]βητι τὴν κόμην ἀναρίπτειν*.

<sup>48</sup> *Era*: Cat. 63.18 u. 92. *Domina*: Cat. 35.14, 63.13 u. 91; Verg. *Aen.* 3.113 (nach Cat. 63.76); Ov. *Fasti* 4.342 u. 368; *CIL* X 6076 u. XIV 74. O. Weinreich, *Mél. F. Cumont* 489 = *Ausgew. Schr.* II (Anm. 35) 516 übersetzte Cat. 63.91 *dea magna* (oben Anm. 3), *dea Cybebe*, *dea domina Dindyme* treffend als *δέσποινα Δωδυμένη, μεγάλη θεὰ Κυβέλη*.

<sup>49</sup> Zu Cat. 63.18. Weinreich (Anm. 48): "Auch *κυρία* wäre möglich, das phrygischen Gottheiten gern gegeben wird" (vgl. Anm. 50). Ganz willkürlich dagegen K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (1960) 262 Anm. 1 zu *domina* als Kulttitel der Mater deum: "Es ist wohl Übersetzung von *πότνια θηρών*. Wenn es im Kult gebräuchlich war, was nicht sicher ist, musste es die Römer fremdartig berühren." Die einzigen griechischen Entsprechungen von *domina* als Titel der Kybele sind *δέσποινα* und, vereinzelt, *κυρία*; beide waren im Kult gebräuchlich. Vgl. Anm. 51.

<sup>50</sup> *Kyria* als Titel der Kybele: Kybelehymnus im PSI sine num. (oben Anm. 3) 25 δ[ε]υρο *Kyria* (unmittelbar voraus gehen Titel wie *Μήτηρ θεῶν* und [*Ἀγγδ*]ιστι *Φρυγία Κρησία*); Inschrift aus Ikonion/Pisid. im *JHS* 22 (1902) 341 (ohne Datierung) *Μελέαγρος Διομήδους ἀρχιερεὺς κατὰ κέλευσιν τῆς Κυρίας Μητρὶ Ζιζιμμηγῆι εὐχὴν* (wo die *Kyria* sicher mit der Meter Dindymene identisch ist; zur Dedikationsformel *κατὰ κέλευσιν*, die göttliche Weisung voraussetzt, vgl. Nock, *Essays* [Anm. 13] I 45-47); vgl. *IG* XII Suppl. 27 (Mytilene; ohne Datierung) 2-4 κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τῆς κυρίας Ἀρτέμιδος. In der Kaiserzeit war *κυρία* als Kulttitel und Kulname verbreitet, besonders für Isis (oben Anm. 22); in einer Weihung an Juno Dolichena aus Dura Europos (3. Jh. n. Chr.) heisst es (J. und L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1953, 206): (Name des Stifters) τὴν *Kyria*ν εὐξάμ(ενος) ἀνέθηκ(α).



diese Eigentümlichkeit der Kultsprache aufmerksam gemacht: *Dominam proprie Matrem Deum dici Varro et ceteri adfirmant*.<sup>51</sup>

3. In dem anonymen Epigramm AP 6.51 weiht der pensionierte Gallos Alexis sein Kultgerät und Haupthaar der phrygischen Göttin. Obwohl sich das Gedicht nicht sicher dem Meleager-Kranz zuweisen lässt, spricht die Nachahmung durch Philippos von Thessalonike für Entstehung in späthellenistischer Zeit.<sup>52</sup> Dagegen beweisen der stereotype Anlass der Weihung, die zahlreichen stilistischen Manierismen und die bewusste Häufung literarischer Topoi, dass wir kein echtes Weih-epigramm vor uns haben sondern ein literarisches Genrebild von allerdings überdurchschnittlicher Qualität.<sup>53</sup> Die eigentliche Weihung wird von den beiden oben zitierten Distichen umrahmt, in denen Kybele direkt angesprochen ist. Die kunstvolle triadische Epiklese<sup>54</sup> des einleitenden Distichons, in dem Namen, Machtsphäre und Aufenthaltsort der Kybele poetisch umschrieben werden,<sup>55</sup> wird im Bittgebet des Schlusssdistichons fortgesetzt; dort verbindet sich in typischem Gebetsstil der Vokativ des erneuten Anrufs (ὦ δέσποινα) mit dem Imperativ der eigentlichen Bitte.<sup>56</sup> Die zahlreichen kultischen Einzelheiten seiner Milieuschilderung dürfte der anonyme Verfasser eher der literarischen Tradition, wie sie noch bei Kallimachos und Catull greifbar ist, als eigener Anschauung entnommen haben.<sup>57</sup> Daran,

<sup>51</sup> Serv. auct. zu *Aen.* 3.113 = Varro *Antiqu. Rer. Div.* 16.17 Merkel (R. Merkel, *Fastorum libri sex* [1841] p. CCXXIII). Das häufige Vorkommen von *domina* als Kulttitel der Magna Mater auf italischen Inschriften beweist, dass sich Varros Bemerkung nicht ausschliesslich auf die Dichtersprache beziehen kann.

<sup>52</sup> AP 6.94 = Philippos XIV Gow-Page; vgl. A. S. F. Gow und D. L. Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams* (1965) II 581 zu Anon. XLII 8.

<sup>53</sup> Auffallend literarisch ist Vers 8 καὶ ξανθὰς τὰς πρὶν ἔσεισε κόμας (vgl. R. Pfeiffer zu Kallim. fr. 193.35 [Anm. 47] und W. Kroll zu Cat. 63.11). Ausscheiden aus dem aktiven Dienst einer Gottheit: AP 6.165, 172, 173, 210, 234. Haaropfer: AP 6.173, 6.217.10, 6.234.6, 6.237; H. Hepding, *Attis* (RGVV I [1903]) 162 Anm. 5; E. R. Dodds zu E. *Bacch.* 494.

<sup>54</sup> O. Weinreich vergleicht Cat. 63.91 (oben Anm. 48).

<sup>55</sup> Der Synkretismus Rhea/Kybele ist ausgesprochen literarisch; vgl. Dodds zu E. *Bacch.* 120–134 (*Πετή* in AP 6.51.1 G. Hermann statt des *Γαίης* der Hss.; vgl. AP 6.94.6 [s. Anm. 52] und AP 6.217–219). Dindymene: Kallim. *Ep.* 40.2. Löwen: Alkman *PMG* 56.5; Pindar fr. 70b19ff; Soph. *Ph.* 400f; W. Kroll zu Cat. 63.76; vgl. die thematisch einheitliche (Gallos verscheucht Löwen durch den Lärm des Tympanon) Serie von vier Epigrammen AP 6.217–220 (= Dioscorides XVI, "Simonides" II, Alcaeus XXI und Antipater LXIV Gow-Page).

<sup>56</sup> Vgl. Cat. 63.92 *procul a mea tuos sit furor omnis, era, domo*; das Stossgebet der Claudia bei Julian (dazu im Folgenden).

<sup>57</sup> Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* II 292f.

dass die Urfassung dieser literarischen Portraits des Kybelekultes jedoch auf Observation der tatsächlichen Kultpraxis beruhte, wird man nicht zweifeln. Entsprechend ist dann auch der Anruf ὦ δέσποινα im Bittgebet des Alexis zu beurteilen: für sich genommen wäre er bestenfalls ein dubioses Zeugnis für Despoina als Kulttitel der Kybele, selbst wenn man berücksichtigt, dass δέσποινα als Titel oder Anruf von Göttinnen in vergleichbaren Weihepigrammen äusserst selten vorkommt und auf verwandte Götterttypen wie Aphrodite und die Libyschen Nymphen beschränkt ist;<sup>58</sup> stellt man das Epigramm jedoch neben Kallimachos fr. 194.105 und Catull 63, so erweist sich selbst der unscheinbare Anruf ὦ δέσποινα als milieugerecht und ebenso wie Μῆτερ am Gedichtanfang als literarische Reminiszenz einer kultischen Epiklese.

4. Julian leitet seine theosophischen Reflektionen über die Göttermutter und den Attismythos mit einem historischen Abriss ein, in dem er die Kultlegenden über die Einführung der Kybele in Athen und

<sup>58</sup> Kybele: παμπότνια (Vokativ [V.]) AP 6.281.3 (3. Jh. v. Chr. [III<sup>a</sup>]). Kybele heisst in der AP sonst Μήτηρ, Μήτηρ θεῶν oder Μήτηρ οὐρεία (oben Anm. 3). Artemis (vgl. Anm. 18): πότνια (V.); vgl. R. Pfeiffer zu Kallim. fr. 786) AP 6.268.3 (III<sup>a</sup>), 6.271.4 (III<sup>a</sup>), 6.274.1 (IV<sup>a</sup>), 6.347.2 (III<sup>a</sup>); πότνα γυναικῶν AP 6.287.1 (II<sup>a</sup>); ἄνασσα 6.356.3 (hellenistisch). Lathria (vgl. GRBS 13 [1972] 75 Anm. 22): πότνια (V.) AP 6.300.6 (III<sup>a</sup>). Eileithyia: ἄνασσα (V.) AP 6.146.3 (III<sup>a</sup>). Ino (als Amme des Dionysos): Weihepigramm aus Melitaia/Thessalien bei J. Roux, *Euripide. Les Bacchantes* II (Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon 21 [1972]) 634, dessen Schlusdistichon lautet οὐνεκεν, ὦ δέσποινα, τεὰς ἀνὰ χεῖρας ὑπερβ[ε] / οἴκου καὶ κτεάνων Σώφρονος ἀν' ἔχο[ις]. Aphrodite (vgl. Anm. 17): ἀνθερο δεσποίνῃ AP 6.18.4 (VI<sup>p</sup>); δεσπότι AP 6.17.5 (II<sup>p</sup>); βασίλεια (V.) AP 6.19.2 (VI<sup>p</sup>); πότνια (V.) IG I Suppl. 422<sup>13,4</sup> = J. Geffcken *Griech. Epigramme* Nr. 60 (Athen, VI/V<sup>a</sup>) u. AP 6.19.4 (VI<sup>p</sup>); ὦ πότνια AP 6.340.5 (III<sup>a</sup>). Athena: ἀπειροτόκου δεσπότι παρθενίης AP 6.10.2 (II<sup>a</sup>), vgl. 6.160.8. Hera: πότνα (V.) AP 6.243.2 (späthellenistisch). Isis (vgl. Anm. 22): ἄνασσα (V.) AP 6.231.7 (I<sup>p</sup>). Libysche Nymphen (Pfeiffer zu Kallim. fr. 602.1 [oben Anm. 21]): ἡρώισσαι Λιβύων χάρεστε δεσπότιδες AP 6.225.6, vgl. Kallim. fr. 602.1 δέσποινα Λιβύης ἡρώιδες (ἡρώισσαι war ihr Kultname nach Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* II 173 u. *Gl. d. H.* II 9; dagegen Gow-Page *Hell. Epigr.* zu Nicaenetus 2689). In allen vorstehenden Fällen sind die Epitheta ohne den eigentlichen Götternamen verwandt, und zwar gewöhnlich als eingeschobener Anruf. Dagegen sind Verbindungen mit einem Theonym selten: z. B. πότνια Ὀρθεία in einem späthellenistischen Weihepigramm aus Messene (dazu zuletzt G. Daux, *ZPE* 12 [1973] 233) und πότνια Νίκα in AP 6.313.1 ("Bakchylides"). Eine einheitliche Gruppe ohne kultische Bedeutung bilden die hellenistischen Anrufungen der Nacht durch Verliebte (Wilamowitz, *Gl. d. H.* I 253): AP 5.165.1f (I<sup>a</sup>) παμμήτειρα θεῶν, λίτομαί σε, φίλη Νύξ... πότνια Νύξ (πότνια Νύξ: Gow zu Theocr. 18.27, der auf E. Or. 174 und *Fragm. Grenf.* [Pack<sup>2</sup> 1743] 11 verweist); *PAnt.* 15.4 ὦ δέσποινα Νύξ (auch bei C. Austin, *CGF* 240.4; *Menandri Rel. Sel.* ed. F. H. Sandbach p. 327).

Rom referiert (*Or.* 5. 159a–161b). Seine hochdramatische Wiedergabe der Wundererzählung von der Ankunft der Göttin in Rom im Jahre 205/4 v. Chr. berührt sich eng mit der Version Ovids (*Fasti* 4.249ff). Als das Festschiff, das den Fetisch der Grossen Mutter aus Pergamon nach Rom überführte, im Schlamm des Tiber steckenblieb und sich nicht wieder flottmachen liess, gab man der Vestalin Claudia Quinta die Schuld; denn sie stand im Verdacht (zu Unrecht, wie dann das Wunder bewies), das Keuschheitsgebot gebrochen zu haben. In ihrer Not forderte die Priesterin ein Ordal heraus, befestigte ihren Gewandgürtel am Bug des Schiffes und rief aus: *Δέσποινα Μήτηρ, εἴπερ εἰμι σώφρων, εἶπου μοι*. Dieses Stossgebet entspricht in seinem dreigliedrigen Aufbau von Anruf, Bedingung für Erhörung und Bitte dem ältesten griechischen Gebetstypus.<sup>59</sup> Das Gebet der Claudia Quinta war traditioneller Bestandteil der Kultlegende; zumindest die Vorbehaltsklausel und die Bitte finden sich in identischen Formulierungen bereits bei Ovid.<sup>60</sup> Der Anruf ist dagegen bei Ovid poetisch ausgeschmückt und fehlt in den vorjulianischen Prosaversionen ganz.<sup>61</sup> Im zweiteiligen Anruf *δέσποινα Μήτηρ* vertritt *Μήτηρ*, wie durchweg in *Or.* 5, das Theonym. Der Anklang an das älteste Anrufformular des Kybelekultes bei Pindar und Aristophanes ist deutlich: *δέσποινα Κυβέλη μήτηρ*.<sup>62</sup> Bei Julian liegt vermutlich eine Verkürzung dieses traditionellen Anrufs vor; denn in einem Stossgebet, das die Not eingibt, ist kein Platz für zeitraubende Reihungen von Titeln. Formal vergleichbar sind *θεὰ Μᾶτερ* bei Timotheos (*PMG* 791.128) und der in Stossgebeten der Komödie übliche

<sup>59</sup> C. Ausfeld, "De Graecorum precationibus quaestiones," *Jahrbücher für Philologie* Suppl. 28 (1903) 505–547 bes. 514ff.

<sup>60</sup> *Fasti* 4.319ff *supplicis, alma, tuae, genetrix fecunda deorum, / accipe sub certa condicione preces. / . . . / sed si crimen abest . . . / . . . castas casta sequere manus*. Suet. *Tib.* 2 (Claudia) *precata propalam, ut ita demum se sequeretur, si sibi pudicitia constaret*.

<sup>61</sup> Vgl. Anm. 60 und Hdn. 1.11.4f *προσευξαμένη, εἰ παρθένος εἶη καὶ ἀγνή, πεισθῆναι τὸ σκάφος. ῥαϊδίως δὲ τῆς ζώνης ἐξηρτημένη ἢ ναὺς ἠκολούθησεν*. Vermutlich haben die Schöpfer der Kultlegende oder spätere Interpreten Epitheta der Magna Mater ethisch umgedeutet. So sind *ἀγνή* (z. B. *Od.* 5.123; Aesch. *Ag.* 134) und *παρθένος* (E. *Hipp.* 1440, vgl. 66; Weihepigramm aus Messene oben Anm. 58) Epitheta der Artemis; die der Magna Mater nahestehende Dea Syria hiess auf Delos *Ἀγνή θεός* (Anm. 103) und in Phistyon und Beroia *Παρθένος* (Anm. 101). Der *ἀγνή θεός* entspricht die *ἀγνεία* ihrer jungfräulichen Verehrer (Hippolytos; Galloi); vgl. Nock, *Essays* (Anm. 13) I 7–15. Nachtrag: Vgl. *παρθένωι Ἀρτέμιδι* in einem Weihepigramm aus Paros des 6. Jhs. v. Chr. (*IG* XII 5 215 = G. Kaibel, *Epigr. Graeca* 750a). H. Herter, *Kleine Schriften* (1975) 122, 149ff; W. Burkert, *Homo Necans* (1972) 72f.

<sup>62</sup> Oben unter I.



Anruf δέσπων' Ἀθηνᾶ.<sup>63</sup> Δέσποινα Μητὲρ im Mund der Claudia Quinta ist mehr als blosser Höflichkeitsformel: es ist das letzte Echo eines jahrhundertealten Kulttitels der Kybele.<sup>64</sup>

Fassen wir zusammen! Im 5. Jh. v. Chr. (Aristophanes), in hellenistischer Zeit (anonymes Weihepigramm) und schliesslich im 4. Jh. n. Chr. (Julian) wurde Kybele im Gebet unter dem Titel δέσποινα angerufen, den sie mit zahlreichen anderen Göttinnen teilte. Dagegen gebrauchten Kallimachos und Catull die Titel δέσποινα, *era* und *domina* absolut und in der dritten Person statt des Theonyms Kybele: οὐ μὰ δέσποιναν (Kallim. fr. 194.105); "nam quo tempore legit incohatam / *Dindymi dominam*" (Cat. 35.13f) neben "est enim venuste / *Magna Caecilio incohata Mater*" (35.17f); "*Dindymenae dominae vaga pecora*" (63.13) und "hilarate *erae* citatis erroribus animum" (63.18). Die Verwendung des blossen Titels δέσποινα statt des Theonyms zur Bezeichnung einer Göttin in der dritten Person ist an sich der Dichtersprache fremd; dagegen ist sie in der Kultsprache verbreitet. erinnert sei an den Demeterkult und den Kult der arkadischen Despoinai (oben Anm. 15 und 19); hierhin gehört auch ἄνασσα als Kultname der Aphrodite und Artemis (oben Anm. 17 und 18). Der Vergleich mit der Kultsprache zeigt, dass die hellenistischen Dichter und höchstwahrscheinlich bereits Pindar (fr. 80) Despoina als *Kultnamen* Kybeles kannten. Inschriften, die diese Folgerung bestätigen würden, gibt es bisher meines Wissens nicht, zumindest nicht für Kybele selbst. Stellvertretend kommt uns jedoch die Dea Syria, seit hellenistischer Zeit Kybeles "Schwester" (so Apuleius), zu Hilfe; denn einer ihrer Kultnamen war δέσποινα.

#### IV. DER ESEL, DER DIE HERRIN TRÄGT

In der ersten Hälfte des 2. Jhs. n. Chr. schrieb ein unbekannter Verfasser den griechischen Eselsroman, der uns nur indirekt in der dem Lukian zugeschriebenen Epitome (*Asin.*) und in der lateinischen

<sup>63</sup> Oben Anm. 31. Vgl. Aesch. *Ch.* 18f ὦ Ζεῦ, δός με τείσασθαι μόνον πατρός (den gleichen Aufbau haben die beiden Stossgebete *Ch.* 489f); Ter. *Andr.* 473 Iuno Lucina, fer opem, serva me, obsecro; Ach. Tat. 8.13.4 (ebenfalls vor einem Ordal) ὦ δέσποτα Πάν, εὐγνωμονήσεαι καὶ μὴ παραβῆης τὸν νόμον τοῦ τόπου.

<sup>64</sup> Julian schrieb *Or.* 5 in einer Märznacht des Jahres 362 in Konstantinopel während des Frühlingsfestes der Magna Mater; sein Besuch in Pessinunt erfolgte rund drei Monate später (vgl. J. Bidez, *La vie de l'empereur Julien* [1930] 253ff u. 275).

Δέσποινα als blosser Ehrentitel einer Göttin ist für die spätere Kaiserzeit



Bearbeitung des Apuleius (*Metam.*) vorliegt.<sup>65</sup> Der Roman handelt davon, wie der in einen Esel verwandelte Lukios durch Verkauf und andere unglückliche Umstände immer neuen Herren in die Hände fällt. Nachdem Lukios etwa zwei Drittel seines Leidensweges zurückgelegt hat, wird er im makedonischen Beroia an Wanderpriester der Dea Syria verkauft, die ihn als Lasttier für eine besonders kostbare Last benutzen: Bei den Bettelzügen der Agyrten muss er τὴν θεὸν tragen, d. h. eine bekleidete Statue der Atargitis.<sup>66</sup>

Der Esel, der das Allerheiligste trägt, war wohl eine gewohnte Erscheinung in ländlichen Kulturen: ὄνος ἄγων μυστήρια.<sup>67</sup> Der Verfasser des Eselsromans parodiert jedoch nicht bloss ein Sprichwort sondern die Kultpraxis und Kultsprache der Bettelpriester im Dienst der Dea Syria. So wird das Tragen des Götterbildes durch den Esel zweimal mit dem Wort κομίζειν bezeichnet, das im Zusammenhang mit Kultübertragungen häufig von der Einbringung des neuen Kultbildes gebraucht wird.<sup>68</sup> Die Ankunft und Aufnahme der Agyrten in einem Dorf wird so geschildert (*Asin.* 41.1–3): ἐπειδὴ ἤδη ὄρθρος ἦν, ἀρόμενος τὴν θεὸν αὐθις ἀπήειν ἅμα τοῖς ἀγύρταις καὶ ἀφικόμεθα εἰς

bezeugt; vgl. *IG IX 2 1201.4ff* (Methone/Magnesia; ohne Datierung, aber kaum älter als das 3. Jh. n. Chr.), wo folgende Gottheiten als Beschützer eines Grabes aufgezählt werden: Βασιλέα θεὸν μέγιστον παντοκράτορα κτίστην ὄλων καὶ θεοὺς πάντας καὶ θεοὺς ἥρωας καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν δέσποιναν Βασιλίδα.

<sup>65</sup> H. v. Thiel, *Der Eselsroman, I. Untersuchungen. II. Synoptische Ausgabe* (Zetemata 54 I/II [1971–1972]). Im folgenden ist *Asin.* nach dieser Edition zitiert.

<sup>66</sup> *Asin.* 37.1 τὴν θεὸν ἐνσκευασάμενοι ἐμοὶ ἐπέθηκαν = *Metam.* 8.27.3 deamque serico contextam amiculo mihi gerendam imponunt. Die Kybelestatue des stadtrömischen Kultes war ebenfalls bekleidet, wie der Ritus der *lavatio* zeigt, der den in Griechenland vielerorts bezeugten Plynterien entspricht (vgl. L. Koenen, *ZPE* 4 [1969] 6–18).

<sup>67</sup> *Ar. Ra.* 159; Leutsch und Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* II, Index Prov. s.v. Die μυστήρια sind Kultgeräte (*ZPE* 4 [1969] 228 Anm. 19). Esel als Lasttier der Metragyrten: *Aes. Fab.* 173 und 193 (ὄνος βαστάζων ἄγαλμα) Hausrath.

<sup>68</sup> *Asin.* 37.5, 41.7. Einführung des Kybelekultes in Rom 205/4 v. Chr.: Hdn. 1.11.3 κομισθέν δὲ ἐπὶ νεὼς τὸ ἄγαλμα (vgl. *Lucr.* 2.608f quo nunc insigni per magnas praedita terras / horrifice fertur divinae matris imago). Übertragung des Sarapiskultes von Memphis nach Delos um 200 v. Chr.: *IG XI 4 1299.37* ἐκομίσαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς Μεμφίδος (sc. τὰ ἱερά); vgl. κομίζειν im Zusammenhang mit der Einführung des Sarapiskultes in Alexandria (*Plut. De soll. anim.* 36 [984 AB]; *De Is.* 28 [361 F]). Ankunft des Asklepios in Sikyon: *Paus.* 2.10.3 φασὶ δὲ σφισιν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου κομισθῆναι τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ ζεύγους ἡμιόνων. Übertragung des Demeterkultes von Knidos nach Syrakus: *Schol. Pind. P.* 2.27b Δεινομένους . . . τοῦ τὰ ἱερά ἐκ Τριοπίου τῆς Κύπρου (sic) εἰς Σικελίαν κομίσαντος (vgl. *Herod.* 7.153).

κώμην ἄλλην μεγάλην καὶ πολυάνθρωπον. ἐν ἧ καὶ καινότερόν τι ἑτερατεύσαντο, τὴν θεὸν μὴ μείναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου οἰκίαι, τῆς δὲ παρ' ἐκείνοις μάλιστα τιμωμένης ἐπιχωρίου δαίμονος τὸν ναὸν οἰκῆσαι. οἱ δὲ καὶ μάλα ἄσμενοι τὴν ξένην θεὸν ὑπεδέξαντο τῇ σφῶν αὐτῶν θεῷ συνοικίσαντες, ἡμῖν δὲ οἰκίαν ἀπέδειξαν ἀνθρώπων πενήτων. Der Eselsroman imitiert hier den Stil missionarischer Reiseberichte, wie wir ihn vor allem aus dem Neuen Testament, der Apostelgeschichte, der Apolloniosvita des Philostratos, den apokryphen Apostelakten und neuerdings dem Kölner Mani-Codex kennen.<sup>69</sup> Anspielungen auf die Kultsprache sind τὸν ναὸν οἰκῆσαι und τῇ θεῷ συνοικίσαντες, die den speziellen Gebrauch von οἶκος im Sinne von "Tempel" voraussetzen und σύνναος umschreiben.<sup>70</sup> Direkte Entlehnung aus dem Vokabular der Berichte über Kultübertragungen ist ὑποδέχεσθαι für das Gewähren von Gastrecht gegenüber einem neuen Gott.<sup>71</sup>

In unverkennbarer Parodie der Sakralsprache wird der Götterträger Lukios zweimal θεοφόρητος genannt.<sup>72</sup> Θεοφόρητος wird normalerweise im passivischen Sinn als Synonym zu θεοφορούμενος gebraucht und bedeutet "vom Gott getragen", d. h. besessen; beide Wörter bezeichnen häufig die religiöse Ekstase in orgiastischen Kulte wie dem der Grossen Mutter.<sup>73</sup> Der korrekte Ausdruck für das aktivische ὁ τὴν θεὸν φέρων ist

<sup>69</sup> Vgl. z. B. E. Norden (oben Anm. 4) 313ff; R. Söder, *Die apokryphen Apostelakten und die romanhafte Literatur der Antike* (1932) 21ff.

<sup>70</sup> O. Weinreich, *Sitzb. Heidelb. Akad., Phil.-hist. Kl.* 1919 (16) 7: "(Οἶκος ist) das passende Wort zur Bezeichnung eines Privatheiligtums." F. Sokolowski, *LSAM* zu Nr. 20.5 (init. Lit.). Vgl. *IG XII* 7 75 (Arkesines/Amorgos; ohne Datierung): [ἱε]ρὴ Μητρὸς ὁρέης (vgl. Anm. 3) ἡ οἰκίη. L. Robert, *Arch. Eph.* 1969, 7–14 ("salle de banquet" eines religiösen Vereins).

<sup>71</sup> Vgl. *Asin.* 39.2 καὶ τὴν θεὸν μάλα ἄσμενος τῇ οἰκίᾳ ὑπεδέξατο καὶ θυσίας αὐτῇ προσήγαγεν. Von Sophokles und Asklepios heisst es (*Et. Gen.* [Vat. gr. 1818 fol. 101<sup>rv</sup>; Laurent. S. Marci 304 fol. 76<sup>r</sup>]; *EM* 256.6ff): καὶ γὰρ ὑπεδέξατο τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οἰκίᾳ καὶ βωμὸν ἰδρύσατο. ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας οὖν ταύτης Δεξιῶν ἐκλήθη. Demetrios Poliorketes als σύνναος der Athena Parthenos 304/3 v. Chr. (Plut. *Dem.* 23.3): τὸν γὰρ ὀπισθόδομον τοῦ Παρθενῶνος ἀπέδειξεν αὐτῷ κατάλυσιν. κακεῖ δίαίταν εἶχε τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς λεγομένης ὑποδέχεσθαι καὶ ξενίζειν αὐτόν. Fest der Koragia in Mantinea 64/3 oder 62/1 v. Chr. (*IG V* 2 265.21f; vgl. M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der attischen* [1906, Nachdr. 1957] 361 Anm. 4): ὑπεδέξατο (sc. die Wohltäterin Nikippa) δὲ καὶ τὰν θεὸν εἰς τὰν ἰδίαν οἰκίαν. Ankunft der Demeter in Argos (Paus. 1.14.2): λέγεται οὖν ὡς Δήμητρα ἐς Ἄργον ἐλθοῦσαν Πελαγονὸς δέξατο οἴκῳ (vgl. E. Schmidt, *Kultübertragungen* [RGVV VIII 2, 1909] 105ff). Vgl. *Ev. Luc.* 10.38, 19.6. Übertragung des Sarapiskultes von Thessalonike nach Opus (*IG X* 2.1 255.17): ὑπεδέξατο τὸν Σάραπιν καὶ τὰν Εἰσω (vgl. F. Sokolowski, *GRBS* 15 [1974] 443f).

<sup>72</sup> *Asin.* 37.2, 38.7.

<sup>73</sup> Vgl. die Untersuchungen zum Entrückungsvokabular von F. Pfister: *RE Suppl.* VII (1950) 105f s.v. Daimonismos; *Würzburger Jahrbücher* [1948]

dagegen θεοφόρος, das als Kultterminus inschriftlich bezeugt ist.<sup>74</sup> Θεοφόρος im Sinne von "Götterträger" gehört zu einer umfangreichen Gruppe von Kulttermini auf -φόρος, die sich vor allem in der Kaiserzeit häufen und Träger von Kultgeräten bezeichnen: z. B. ἄρρη(το)-,<sup>75</sup> βωμο-,<sup>76</sup> γαλακτη-,<sup>77</sup> δειδρο-,<sup>78</sup> θυρσο-,<sup>79</sup> ἱερα-,<sup>80</sup> κιστα-,<sup>81</sup> κλειδο-,<sup>82</sup> λικνα-,<sup>83</sup> ναρθηκο-,<sup>84</sup> πυρ-,<sup>85</sup> σεβαστο-,<sup>86</sup> σημια-,<sup>87</sup> und φαλλοφόρος.<sup>88</sup> Der Esel Lukios fungierte also als kultischer βασταγεύς.<sup>89</sup> Der Verfasser des Eselsromans hat in seinem gewitzten Wortspiel Kultparodie und

406-408; *RAC* 4 (1959) 956f s.v. Ekstase. Θεοφόρητος war der Titel einer Komödie des Alexis (II 325 K.); in den dialogischen Fragmenten der Θεοφορουμένη Menanders (*PSI* 1280.27 = Pack<sup>2</sup> 1309; p. 145 in der Ausgabe von F. H. Sandbach) werden die Μητήρ θεῶν und die Κορύβαντες genannt. Photios 182.20 Porson und 183.1 (= Kratinos fr. 82 K.) gibt τὸν θεοφόρητον als Interpretament zu Κύβηβον.

<sup>74</sup> Dionysische Agrippinilla-Inschrift im Metropolitan Museum aus dem 2. Jh. n. Chr.: F. Cumont, *AJA* 27 (1933) 244 ("Le titre est nouveau"). Ein halbes Jahrhundert vorher kam jedoch auf Samos bei der ersten Freilegung der Wasserleitung des Eupalinos folgende Inschrift zutage: Διονυσόδωρος ὁ θεοφόρος Μητρί 'Επικρατείᾳ ἀφ' ὧν ἐργάζεται (Ed. pr.: Tageszeitung "Samos" im Juni 1882 = *Παρνασσός* 6 [1882] 519; Μητρί [d.h. eine lokale Meter] mit W. Drexler in Roscher, *Lex. d. Myth.* II 2 [1894-1897] 2898 nach *Jahresb.* 36 [1888] 17).

<sup>75</sup> W. Burkert, *Hermes* 94 (1966) 1ff.

<sup>76</sup> J. und L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1950, 134; 1958, 413.

<sup>77</sup> L. Robert, *Op. Min. Sel.* II (1969) 990, 999; Cumont (Anm. 74) 259; L. Robert, *RevPhil* 48 (1974) 202 Anm. 131, 204 Anm. 142.

<sup>78</sup> D. Ladage, *Städtische Priester- und Kultämter im lateinischen Westen des Imperium Romanum zur Kaiserzeit* (Diss. Köln 1971) 126-131.

<sup>79</sup> W. Quandt, *De Baccho ab Alexandri aetate in Asia Minore culto* (Diss. Hal. 21.2 [1913]) 264.

<sup>80</sup> *IG* X 2.1: 16.8, 58.4, 258; M. Fränkel zu *IPergam.* 336.1; P. Herrmann, *Denkschr. Österr. Akad.*, Phil.-hist. Kl. 80 (1962) 39 zu συνβολαφόρος; J. G. Griffiths zu *Plut. De Is.* 3 (352 B); L. Vidman, *SIRIS* Nr. 16 zu ἀγιαφόρος; L. Robert, *RevPhil* 48 (1974) 197 Anm. 99.

<sup>81</sup> Cumont (Anm. 74) 246.

<sup>82</sup> C. Picard (Anm. 13) 248f (242ff auch zu χρυσοφόρος und κοσμοφόρος).

<sup>83</sup> Cumont (Anm. 74) 250; *LSJ* Suppl. s.v.

<sup>84</sup> Quandt (Anm. 79) 264.

<sup>85</sup> K. Clinton, *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Trans. Am. Philos. Soc. 64.3 [1974]) 94f, 122f.

<sup>86</sup> L. Robert (Anm. 77) 832ff bes. 839; 1277f.

<sup>87</sup> *IBulg.* 1517; H. W. Pleket, *Talanta* 2 (1970) 67 Anm. 7.

<sup>88</sup> Cumont (Anm. 74) 252.

<sup>89</sup> J. und L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1966, 167 (danach T. Drew-Bear, *Glotta* 50 [1972] 189f). Zur Audienz vor Trajan fuhren laut Bericht der Acta Alexandrina (*POxy.* 1242) die jüdische und die griechisch-pagane Gesandtschaft der Alexandriner nach Rom ἑκαστοι βαστάζοντες τοὺς ἰδίους θεοὺς (17f; vgl. 51f ἡ τοῦ Σαράπιδος προτομή ἣν ἐβάσταζον οἱ πρέσβεις αἰφνίδιον ἰδρῶσεν).



Situationskomik geschickt verbunden.<sup>90</sup> Nachdem Lukios für seinen "Verrat der Mysterien"<sup>91</sup> mit der Knöchelpeitsche verprügelt worden ist, wird ihm befohlen, τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄφωνον εἶναι θεοφόρητον (*Asin.* 38.7). Der Befehl ist komisch-paradox: Wie kann man gottbegeistert, d. h. θεοφόρητος sein, ohne einen Ton von sich geben zu dürfen?<sup>92</sup> Lautes Schreien galt als Symptom religiöser Ekstase, vor allem in den Kulte der Kybele, Hekate und der Korybanten.<sup>93</sup> Als Packesel kann Lukios ebensowenig sein verräterisches Iah unterdrücken wie ein Gottbegeisterter seine Entzückungsrufe.

Der Eselsroman parodiert also in der Agyrtenepisode bewusst den zeitgenössischen Kult der Dea Syria und die Kultsprache. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist auch folgender Satz zu verstehen (*Asin.* 39.1): ἐντεῦθεν οὖν μετὰ τὰς μαστιγὰς λαβὼν τὴν δέσποιναν ἐβάδιζον καὶ πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἤδη καταλύομεν εἰς ἀγρὸν πλουτοῦντος ἀνθρώπου. Die Wendung

<sup>90</sup> Das Wortspiel θεοφόρητος / θεοφόρος dürfte dadurch erleichtert worden sein, dass einerseits θεοφόρος im esoterischen Sinn von "den Gott in sich tragend" der passivischen Bedeutung von θεοφόρητος sehr nahe kam und dass andererseits in der Koiné adjektivische Komposita des Typs δύσφορος und ἀνακόλουθος häufig neben den entsprechenden Verbaladjektiven δυσφόρητος und ἀνακολούθητος ohne Bedeutungsunterschied gebraucht wurden.

<sup>91</sup> *Asin.* 38.5 ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ ὠργίζοντο ἐμοὶ τῷ μηνύσαντι τὰ ἐκείνων μυστήρια. Hier ist die Arkandisziplin der kaiserzeitlichen Sekten und Mysterien parodiert, die ihre Adepten eidlich verpflichteten, τηρῆσαι τὰ μυστήρια (so z. B. Hipp. *Elench.* 5.27) bzw. negativ μῆτε ἑτέροις αὐτῶν τι μηνύσειν (*Jos. BJ* 2.8.7) oder ἑτέροις δὲ μηδὲν ἐξειπεῖν (*Hipp. Elench.* 9.18; vgl. M. Smith, *Hebrew Union College Annual* 29 [1958] 273–313 bes. 303); dazu A. Henrichs, *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos* (PTA 14 [1973]) 40ff. Lukios ist durch seinen "Verrat" an der Kybelereligion ein Abtrünniger geworden und wird zur Strafe gegeißelt; die Kinäden hätten ihn totgeschlagen, wenn ihn nicht der drohende Blick der Göttin gerettet hätte (*Asin.* 38.7). Eine vergleichbare religiöse Konfliktsituation wird im Kölner Mani-Codex berichtet (*CMC* 100; vgl. *HSCP* 77 [1973] 43): Mani hatte in der Täufersekte, in der er aufgewachsen war, ein Schisma herbeigeführt. Seine Gegner waren des Zornes voll (*CMC* 100.4f αὐτόθι πάντες ἐχαλέπηναν ὑπ' ὀργῆς. *CMC* 100.15f πικραίνόμενοι καὶ ὀργιζόμενοι); sie verprügelten Mani und hätten ihn umgebracht, wenn nicht Manis Vater Pattikios interzediert hätte.

<sup>92</sup> Das Oxymoron ist erkannt worden von P. Junghanns, *Die Erzähltechnik von Apuleius' Metamorphosen und ihrer Vorlage* (Philol. Suppl. 24.1 [1932]) 92; v. Thiel (Anm. 65) I 176.

<sup>93</sup> Strabo 10.3.7 (über ekstatische Kulte einschliesslich des der phrygischen Mutter) μετὰ θορύβου καὶ ψόφου καὶ κυμβάλων καὶ τυμπάνων καὶ ὄπλων, ἔτι δ' αὐλοῦ καὶ βοῆς. Eust. zu Dion. P. 809 p. 359.26 = Arrian, *Bith.* fr. 9 Roos (über die korybantischen Riten der Phryger) ὅταν δὲ κατασχῇ αὐτοὺς τὸ θεῖον, λαυνάμενοι καὶ μέγα βοῶντες καὶ ὀρχούμενοι προθεσπίζουσι τὰ μέλλοντα, θεοφορούμενοι καὶ μαινόμενοι. Vgl. Cat. 63.28; Ov. *Fasti* 4.186; Nonn. *D.* 30.56.



λαβὼν τὴν δέσποιναν erinnert in ihrer konkreten Kürze an ähnliche Formulierungen der Kultsprache: λαβόντες δὲ ἤγον τὸν ἱερὸν φόρτον;<sup>94</sup> ἀφίδρυμα τί τῶν ἱερῶν λαβοῦσα;<sup>95</sup> βασταζόντες τοὺς ἰδίους θεούς;<sup>96</sup> τὸν θεὸν ἔχων;<sup>97</sup> "Οσιριν κομίζων.<sup>98</sup> Die "Herrin" ist die Dea Syria, die im Eselsroman sonst immer ἡ θεὸς heisst, während δεσπότης und δέσποινα ausnahmslos die wechselnden Dienstherren des Lukios bezeichnen.<sup>99</sup> Aber der Esel Lukios ist rechtmässiges Eigentum der Agyrten und damit auch wie sie Leibeigener der Göttin selbst, deren "Sklave" er ist.<sup>100</sup> Die profane Bedeutung von δέσποινα als "Dienstherrin" fällt also hier mit dem Kultnamen Despoina zusammen. Der feine Witz konnte nur dann beim Lesepublikum ankommen, wenn es mit dem vorausgesetzten religiösen Sprachgebrauch vertraut war. Also war Despoina als Kulthname für die Dea Syria in hadrianischer Zeit zumindest im nördlichen Griechenland geläufig.<sup>101</sup> Dazu passt der inschriftliche Befund. Auf Thasos fand sich auf einem Architrav folgende Weihinschrift aus dem frühen 2. Jh. n. Chr.:<sup>102</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Julian Or. 5.159d (Einführung des Kybelekultes in Rom; s. oben unter III 4).

<sup>95</sup> Strabon 4.1.4 p. 179 (Übertragung des Kultes der Artemis Ephesia von Phokaia nach Massalia um 600 v. Chr.).

<sup>96</sup> Oben Anm. 89.

<sup>97</sup> IG XI 4 1299.4 (Übertragung des Sarapiskultes von Memphis nach Delos; vgl. Anm. 68).

<sup>98</sup> Dessau, ILS 4417 = IGR III 1105 = Vidman, SIRIS Nr. 359: sacerdos Osirim ferens. Προφή[της] "Οσειριν κ<ο>μ[ι]ζ<ω>ν (laut A. Ermans Abschrift hat der Stein ΚΩΜ[.]ΖΟ. Vidman stellt mit Dessau κωμ[ι]ζ<ω>[ν] her).

<sup>99</sup> Δεσπότης: Asin. 35.4, 35.5, 43.1, 45.2, 46.1, 49.3 (κάγῳ τὸν δεσπότην ἔφερον) u. ö.; δέσποινα: 8.1, 11.2, 12.1, 27.4 u. ö. Vereinzelt werden ἡ κεκτημένη (11.6, 27.2) und κύριος (35.3) gebraucht.

<sup>100</sup> Lukios wird als δοῦλος bezeichnet Asin. 36.2, 36.4 und 42.7. In der bekannten Inschrift eines syrischen Agyrten aus Kefr-Hauar wird Ἀταργάτη κυρία (vgl. Anm. 50) neben einem Λούκιος δοῦλος αὐτῆς genannt (BCH 21 [1897] 60; F. Cumont, *Die orientalischen Religionen im römischen Heidentum* [Nachdr. 1959] 255 Anm. 2 und 263 Anm. 56).

<sup>101</sup> Zu Zeit und Herkunft des Verfassers des Eselsromans vgl. v. Thiel (Anm. 65) I 36ff. Der Kult der Dea Syria war seit dem 3. Jh. v. Chr. in Makedonien und speziell in Beroia verbreitet (K. Orlandos, *Archaiol. Deltion* 2 [1916] 144–147, Nr. 2.4 und 3.7; A. D. Nock, *Conversion* [1933] 59; F. R. Walton, *RAC* 1 [1950] 856f s.v. Atargatis).

<sup>102</sup> E. Will, BCH 64–65 (1940–1941) 200–210; C. Dunant und J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos* II (1958) 182 u. 223 Nr. 374. Zu hellenistischen und kaiserzeitlichen Kybeledarstellungen auf Thasos vgl. F. Salviat, BCH 88 (1964) 239–251.

κυρίου Ἡρωνος δεσπότου ἱερόν  
μεγάλης Γαλλίας ἀθανάτης ἱερόν  
μεγάλης Σύρων ἀγνῆς δεσποίνης ἱερόν.

Im Gegensatz zu dem thrakischen Gott Heron und der hier erstmals bezeugten "Grossen Gallia" wird die Dea Syria lediglich bei ihren Kulttiteln und ihrem Kultnamen genannt; Σύρων δέσποινα ist ein zum Kultnamen gewordener Ortstitel und vertritt als Kultname, um die üblichen Kulttitel μεγάλη und ἀγνή erweitert, das fehlende Theonym Atargatis bzw. dessen gebräuchliche Umschreibungen, nämlich die Kultnamen Συρία θεός und Ἀγνή θεός.<sup>103</sup> Als nationaler Kultname entspricht Σύρων δέσποινα vergleichbaren Bildungen wie Συρίας θεός (POxy. 1380.106f),<sup>104</sup> Atargatis Syrorum (Tert. Ad. nat. 2.8), mater Syriae (CIL VI 30970) und θεὰ Συρία Ἱεροπολιτῶν (BCH 21 [1897] 60).

Kybele war "von Hause aus eine obermesopotamisch-nordsyrische Gottheit, die um die Mitte des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. in Kleinasien Fuss fasste."<sup>105</sup> Die damit gegebene Ursprungsverwandtschaft der "Herrinnen" Atargatis und Kybele zeigt sich in dem identischen Kultpersonal von Eunuchen und Agyrten und gelegentlich in direkter Kultgemeinschaft; so lässt noch Apuleius die Dea Syria in einem Dorftempel der Mater Deum Aufnahme finden.<sup>106</sup> Deshalb darf δέσποινα als Kultname der Dea Syria in hadrianischer Zeit, der durch die thasische Inschrift und durch Asin. 39.1 gesichert ist, als indirekte

<sup>103</sup> Ἀγνή θεός (θεά): IDélos 2224.11, 2225.4, 2267.3, 2284.1 u. ö.; ἀγνή Ἀφροδίτη: 2220.8, 2222.3, 2228.4, 2229.9 u. ö.; ἀγνή Ἀφροδίτη Συρία θεός: 2245.5f, 2252.7 u. ö. Die ältesten der genannten Inschriften stammen aus der 2. Hälfte des 2. Jhs. v. Chr. Vgl. P. Roussel, *Délos colonie Athénienne* (1916) 261 u. 269f; oben Anm. 61.

<sup>104</sup> Die Stelle lautet im Zusammenhang: (Isis heisst) ἐν Φοίνικι (oder Φοινίκη) Συρίας θεός. Die Herausgeber B. P. Grenfell und A. S. Hunt verbanden ἐν Φοίνικι Συρίας; dagegen Συρίας θεός richtig B. A. von Groningen, *De papyro Oxyrhynchita* 1380 (1921) 39 und G. Manteuffel, *De opusculis Graecis Aegypti e papyris, ostracis lapidibusque collectis* (Travaux de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, Classe I, No. 12 [1930]) 78, während U. Wilcken, "Zu den 'Syrischen Göttern'," *Festgabe für A. Deissmann* (1927) 3 Anm. 2 Συρία[s] θεός bevorzugte.

<sup>105</sup> Donner und Röllig (Anm. 33) II 334 nach E. Laroche (Anm. 38) 119; vgl. Hanfmann-Waldbaur (Anm. 38).

<sup>106</sup> *Metam.* 9.10.3 propter unicam caliculum, quem deum mater sorori suae deae Syriae hospitale munus obtulit, noxios religionis antistites ad discrimen vocari capit! Vgl. Graillot (Anm. 16) 190ff, 312ff; P. Lambrechts und P. Noyen, "Recherches sur le culte d'Atargatis dans le monde grec," *NouvClio* 6 (1954) 258-277 bes. 273; R. Turcan, *REA* 63 (1961) 52.

Stütze dafür gelten, dass auch für Kybele die Kontinuität ebendieses Kultnamens während der frühen Kaiserzeit gewahrt worden ist.

# V. KUBABA, "HERRIN VON KARKEMISCH"

Die für eine griechische Inschrift ungewöhnliche Häufung der göttlichen Namen und Titel auf dem thasischen Stein ist wohl letztlich auf den Einfluss syrophönizischer Kulttitel zurückzuführen. Im phönizischen Sprachbereich<sup>107</sup> könnte der Text der dritten Zeile dieser Inschrift in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit etwa folgendermassen gelautet haben: \*לרבנתן לעשתרת קדשת (\*"Unserer Herrin [eigtl.: unserer Grossen], der heiligen Astarte"), vielleicht gefolgt von einem zusätzlichen Titel wie בעלת + Ortsname ("Baalat ['Herrin'] von . . .") und schliesslich vom Namen des Weihenden.<sup>108</sup> Umgekehrt lässt sich die späthellenistische Weihung<sup>109</sup> לרבתי לאלם אדרת אס אלם עשתרת ולאולם ("Meiner Herrin [eigtl.: meiner Grossen], der mächtigen<sup>110</sup> Göttin Isis, der Göttin Astarte und den Göttern, die . . .") etwa so ins Griechische übersetzen: \*κυρία Ἰσιδι θεᾷ μεγίστη (καὶ) Ἀστάρτη Ἀφροδίτῃ καὶ τοῖς (ἄλλοις oder συννάοις?) θεοῖς . . . ; entsprechend lässt sich das Formular<sup>111</sup> הרבת בעלת גבל ("Die Herrin [eigtl.: die Grosse] die Baalat ['Herrin'] von Byblos") wiedergeben mit \*μεγάλη κυρία Ἀφροδίτῃ Βυβλία oder \*μεγάλη Βύβλου δέσποινα oder \*κυρία Ἀφροδίτῃ ἢ Βύβλου μεδέουσα.

<sup>107</sup> Vergleichbare Weihungen in aramäischer Sprache scheinen zu fehlen. Für unsere Zwecke wichtig ist jedoch *KAI* (Anm. 33) 240.2 זקיקא "die Reine" als Beiname einer Göttin (Donner-Röllig z. St. verweisen auf Ἀγνή θεός [oben Anm. 103] als Kultname der Atargatis). Kanaan. רבתן entspricht aram. מרתן (*KAI* 246.2; 247.1 u.ö.).

<sup>108</sup> Zum Typ vgl. *KAI* 17 (Tyros; 2. Jh. v. Chr.). רבת + Suffixpronomen als Titel der Astarte: *KAI* 14.15; 29.2; 33.3. קדשת als Kulttitel: *KAI* 162.3; vgl. Baudissin, *Kyrios* (Anm. 33) III 208f Anm. 1 ("aber doch macht die weite Verbreitung der Epitheta ἅγιος, sanctus für Gottheiten auf syrischem und karthagischem Boden es wahrscheinlich, dass darin die Wiedergabe einer bei den Aramäern und Phöniziern seit alten Zeiten gebrauchten Benennung vorliegt, und das könnte wohl nur ḫdš sein"); Cumont (Anm. 100) 266 Anm. 65 (mit Belegen).

<sup>109</sup> *KAI* 48.2 (Memphis; 2./1. Jh. v. Chr.).

<sup>110</sup> Zur Bedeutung des phön. Götterepithets *addir* vgl. Baudissin, *Kyrios* (Anm. 33) III 14, 86, 120; zu רבת / μεγίστη vgl. Baudissin III 71 mit Verweis auf *FGrHist* 790 (Philon von Byblos) F 2 p. 811.24 Ἀστάρτη δὲ ἡ μεγίστη.

<sup>111</sup> *KAI* 10.2, 10, 15 (Byblos, Stele des Jēhaumilk; 5./4. Jh. v. Chr.). רבת (bzw. רבתי "meine Herrin" in Zeilen 3, 3f, 7, 7f) ist Kulttitel und "Herrin von Byblos" Kulturname. Vgl. בעלת גבל gefolgt von אדרת ("seine Herrin") in zwei Weihungen von ca. 900 v. Chr.: *KAI* 6.2; 7.3f.

All das bleibt ein Spiel mit theoretischen Möglichkeiten, solange nicht bilingue Inschriften konkrete Beispiele liefern. In den erhaltenen griechisch-semitischen bzw. lateinisch-semitischen Bilinguen, die naturgemäß ein ungewöhnlich ausgeprägtes Sprachbewusstsein voraussetzen, werden jedoch soweit ich sehe wörtliche Übersetzungen von semitischen Göttertiteln vermieden;<sup>112</sup> dessen ungeachtet ist daran festzuhalten, dass in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit und in syrophönizischem Einflussbereich die griechischen Göttertitel *κυρία* und *δέσποινα* häufig Wiedergaben der entsprechenden kanaanäischen bzw. aramäischen Titel *רבת*, *בעלת*, *אדת* und *מרת* sind.<sup>113</sup> Ebenso wie im Griechischen konnten auch die semitischen Titel absolut als Kultnamen gebraucht werden: z. B. *KAI* 83 (punisch) *לרבת לאמא ולרבת לבעלת החדרת* (etwa \**τῇ κυρίαί Μητρὶ καὶ τῇ κυρίαί χθονίων βασιλείαι* [eigtl.: "... und der Herrin, der 'Herrin der Gruft'"]); *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique* I 7 (Karthago) *הכהנת רבתן* ("die Priesterin unserer Herrin" [d. h. der Tanit]) und *KAI* 11 (Byblos; um 350 v. Chr.) *כהן בעלת* ("Priester der Herrin" [d. h. der "Herrin von Byblos"; vgl. Anm. 33]); *KAI* 246.2 u. ö. (Hatra; 1./2. Jh. n. Chr.) *מרן ומרתן ובר מרין* ("Unserem Herrn, unserer Herrin und dem Sohn unserer Herren" [vermutlich die Trias Hadad, Atargatis und Simios]).

Das semitische Vergleichsmaterial fällt offensichtlich in zwei funktionsmässig verschiedene Kategorien: Neben Kultnamen von Lokalnumina des Typs *בעלת גבל* ("Herrin von Byblos") und *עשתרת ארך* ("Astarte vom Eryx")<sup>114</sup> stehen Kulttitel wie *רבת* und *אדת*. Entsprechende Kultnamen und Kulttitel lassen sich für die syrisch-kleinasiatische Kubaba-Kybele nachweisen. Die älteste erhaltene Titulatur in akkadischer Sprache aus dem 14./13. Jh. v. Chr. lautet "Herrin (*bēltu*) Kubaba, Herrin (*bēlet*) von Karkemisch."<sup>115</sup> Hier sind Kulttitel,

<sup>112</sup> Lukians *Ἀφροδίτη Βυβλία* (*Dea. Syr.* 6) entspricht dem phön. Baalat Gebal. Eine phönizisch-griechische Bilingue hellenistischer Zeit aus Malta (*KAI* 47) übersetzt *צר לאדנן למלקרת בעל צר* ("Unserem Herrn Melkart, Herrn von Tyros") mit *Ἡρακλεῖ ἀρχηγέτῃ*. In einer punisch-lateinischen Weihung aus Sardinien (*KAI* 172; *CIL* X 7513) an *להרבת לאלת* ("der Herrin, der Göttin") fehlen Titel und Name des göttlichen Empfängers in der lateinischen Fassung ganz. In der bekannten phönizisch-griechischen Bilingue aus Idalion/Zypern (*KAI* 39 und Masson, *ICS* [Anm. 17] 220; 389/8 v. Chr.) ist der Doppelname Rašaf-MKL fälschlich aber lautähnlich mit *τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Ἀμύκλῳ* wiedergegeben (vgl. W. Burkert, *Grazer Beiträge* 4 [1975] 67ff.).

<sup>113</sup> Dasselbe gilt natürlich auch für die maskulinen Entsprechungen. Vgl. Baudissin, *Kyrios* (Anm. 33) III 2c-44, 52-65, 88ff.

<sup>114</sup> *CIS* I 140.1.

<sup>115</sup> RS 17.146.50 in *Le Palais Royal d'Ugarit IV*: J. Nougayrol, *Textes accadiens des archives sud* (1956) 157.



Theonym und Ortstitel verbunden; letzterem entsprechen formal die jüngeren Titel "Kubaba von PWŠD/R",<sup>116</sup> μήτηρ Δινδυμήνη (z. B. Herod. 1.80) und *domina Dindyme* bzw. *Dindymi domina* (Cat. 63.91; 35.14).<sup>117</sup> Neben den Ortstiteln stehen allgemeinere Titel wie ματαρ Κυβιλε, <sup>118</sup> δέσποινα Κυβέλη μήτηρ (Pindar und Aristophanes) und schliesslich der absolute Kultname δέσποινα. Dasselbe Nebeneinander von Ortstiteln und Kultname lässt sich auch bei der verwandten nahöstlichen Aphrodite beobachten: Neben der עשתרת פף ("Aphrodite von Paphos")<sup>119</sup> und der θεὰ Κύπριοι ἐυκτιμένης μεδέουσα (Hom. Hymn. Ven. 292) steht die ἄνασσα der kyprischen Inschriften.<sup>120</sup> Die Erklärung für dieses Nebeneinander liegt auf der Hand. Sobald sich nämlich der Kult dieser vorderorientalischen Lokalgöttinnen von ihren Stammsitzen aus weiter verbreitete, wurde das lokale Epithet "Herrin," das den ortsansässigen Verehrern sowohl als Kulttitel wie auch als Kultname selbstverständlich war, durch den Zusatz des Kultsitzes für die Missionszwecke konkurrenzfähig gemacht. Man kann derartige religiöse Herkunftsbezeichnungen durchaus mit dem Warenzeichen "made in X" vergleichen. Daneben konnte dieselbe Gottheit natürlich jederzeit und überall durch den blossen Kultnamen vom Typ *b'lt* / δέσποινα bezeichnet werden.

Der Vergleich mit den semitischen und phrygischen Vorläufern hat gezeigt, dass μήτηρ, δέσποινα und "Herrin von X" als typische griechische Titel bzw. Namen Kybeles seit dem 6./5. Jh. v. Chr. mit dem Kult der Grossen Mutter aus Kleinasien eingeführt worden sind. Die Verbindung mit den nordsyrischen und phrygischen Stammsitzen der Kybele ist auch in hellenistischer Zeit nicht abgerissen. Deshalb ist zu vermuten, dass die griechischen Kulttitel der Grossen Mutter auch noch nach der Etablierung der Göttin im griechischen Sprachgebiet wiederholt von den vorderorientalischen Vorbildern beeinflusst worden

<sup>116</sup> A. Dupont-Sommer und L. Robert (Anm. 24) 7ff = KAI 278 (aramäische Inschrift aus Bahadrlı/Kilikien; 5./4. Jh. v. Chr.).

<sup>117</sup> Ortstitel waren in den epichorischen Kulturen Anatoliens von der Bronzezeit bis in die späte Kaiserzeit verbreitet; vgl. neuerdings die "Mutter dieses Bezirks, des (Bezirks) von Pantra" (*ēni qlahi ebiyehi pñtrēñni*) als lokaler Name der Leto im lykischen Teil der griechisch-lykisch-phönizischen Trilingue von Xanthos (E. Laroche, CRAI 1974, 117 und 121, dessen frühere Erklärung von *qla* als "enceinte, sanctuaire," in *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* 55 [1960] 183, damit bestätigt worden ist.). Vgl. Anm. 41.

<sup>118</sup> Altphyrgische Inschrift (7./6. Jh. v. Chr.): W. M. Ramsay, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* N.S. 15 (1883) 134 Nr. 11 = J. Friedrich, *Kleinasiatische Sprachdenkmäler* (Kleine Texte 163 [1932]) 126 Nr. 9.

<sup>119</sup> *Répertoire d'épigraphie sémitique* II 921.

<sup>120</sup> Oben Anm. 17.

sind. Hinter Kybeles Titeln "Mutter" und "Herrin", so einfach sie klingen und so leicht sich der Grieche des Festlands, an lokale Meteres und Despoinai gewöhnt, damit anfreunden konnte, verbirgt sich eine über Jahrhunderte aktivierte Kultursymbiose, die sich im Einzelfall oft der wissenschaftlichen Analyse entzieht.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Für nützliche Hinweise danke ich Frau Maureen F. Kaplan und Professor Jonas C. Greenfield. Besonderen Dank schulde ich meinen Kollegen G. M. A. Hanfmann und Zeph Stewart: Professor Hanfmann hat einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Abschnitt III 1 geleistet; Professor Stewart hat das ganze Manuskript mit Argusaugen und Sachverstand gelesen und verbessert.

## SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

SARA MACK AMIS — *Patterns of Time in Vergil*

THE introduction deals briefly with Vergil's use of the tropes called zeugma and hendiadys. Examination of a number of examples of each leads to the conclusion that they are in fact two aspects of the same tendency — to see connections where others would see none, to see multiplicity in unity and vice versa. The habit of mind that produces these tropes is at work in Vergil's manipulation of time.

Chapter 1, "Time and Timelessness in the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*," is a brief study of several passages in the two earlier works designed to introduce the more elaborate study of the *Aeneid* that follows. In the *Eclogues* section, ways are noted in which the timeless, leisured Arcadia of bucolic poetry comes in contact with the world of time and event represented by Rome. Rome offers a political scene, contemporary Augustan statesmen and poets, and various types of poetry at odds with the pastoral scene. After allowing an uneasy alliance between these two disparate worlds through nine *Eclogues*, Vergil explodes pastoral in the tenth by introducing into Arcadia the statesman Gallus — a Roman, a soldier, an elegist. The main emphasis in the *Georgics* section is on the shifts from the past to present to future — the way the "moment" of the narrative shifts, as in the conclusion to book II, for example, from present-day Italian farmers to the golden age of the legendary past. A single situation, the farmer's life, moves kaleidoscopically, presenting one aspect after the other, as it moves through time, and the farmer's life becomes the measure of the universe.

Chapter 2, "Time and History in the *Aeneid*" compares Vergil's treatment of past and future with that of Homer and Apollonius and concludes that the Greek poets have much less interest in what happens outside the present moment of the narrative than Vergil has. There are specifically Vergilian usages that are linked with the special time awareness that the poem conveys — succession of generations, genealogies, and backgrounds interconnecting the great expanses of time in

the poem; suggestive patterning of the cities Troy, Carthage, and Rome; symbolic connections between past and present or future, as in Aeneas' gift to Dido, or the names of the ship captains. The chapter concludes with some speculations on the effects of these usages on audiences in Vergil's time and ours.

Chapter 3, "Time and Tense in the *Aeneid*" examines the tense structure of the *Aeneid*. The narrative is found to consist of little scenes in which the main thrust is carried by the present tense, with approximately two-thirds of all indicative verbs in that tense. Transitional and subordinate material of various kinds is given in the three past tenses, chiefly the perfect. Statistics from Lucan and Ovid show that their practice is very different from Vergil's. The effect of Vergil's practice is to engage the reader in the action while allowing Aeneas' present to merge at times into the present of Augustan Rome.

Chapter 4, "Roman History in the Future Tense," deals with the crucial role of prophecy in the *Aeneid*, both the short-term predictions addressed to Aeneas, which allow us to compare a statement about the future with its present-time reality in the poem, and the long-range predictions that outline the possibilities for Augustan Rome. From studying the short-term predictions one finds that the present adequately represents the prophecy only when it is inauspicious, that what sounds good about the future remains in the future and is never quite realized in the present. A similarly pessimistic picture results from study of the three Roman "propaganda" prophecies when one takes into account the significance of the selection of heroes put before us and the events of Roman history as they are presented.

Chapter 5, "The Loss of the Future," deals with the last four books of the *Aeneid* and with the virtual disappearance of prophecy in them. There are only four predictions of any kind in these books, and only two of these are of any importance. Thus we are, for the most part, left to concentrate on the character of the narrative present, the war that seems to be an exemplum of the madness that marks all wars and thus gives a new perspective to the history of Rome, which has been presented as little but war. The narrative present is characterized by loss of control and direction, not only in Aeneas, but also in Jupiter, whose grand master plan disintegrates in the closing books of the poem, as is clear, for example, in the council of the gods and his intervention later in the same book.



JOHN BELTON — *Olympian 10, Olympian 13, Pythian 9, and the Occasional Nature of the Pindaric Epinician*

The Pindaric epinician is written to celebrate a victory in the great national games of ancient Greece won by an athlete competing at the Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, or Isthmian games. Commissioned by the victor or one of his relatives, Pindar builds his ode around a few specific facts — the victor's name, the location and nature of his victory, the name of his city, his family, and, if he is a youth, his trainer. If the victor has won before, the poet will list his earlier victories. Out of these facts, Pindar weaves a poem for the victor which preserves the details of his victory for all time, tying that victory, through the world of myth, to the legendary deeds of heroes and gods.

Each Pindaric ode is different. Just as its metrical system is unique, so is its content shaped specifically to suit the occasion. Though each ode shares certain traits with other epinicians, it is also entirely unlike all others. Though the conventions of the epinician genre appear limiting, the occasional nature of the odes results in great variety and freedom of expression, making it difficult — if not impossible — to generalize about the odes. It is within these differences that the spirit of the epinician lies.

My dissertation considers the way in which occasional material is incorporated into the epinician by analyzing three Pindaric odes, *Olympian 10*, *Olympian 13*, and *Pythian 9*. My intent is to show how the form and content of each is determined by the specific occasion for which it is written. Chapter 1 examines the occasion behind the composition of *Ol. 10*, giving special attention to the nature of the mutual indebtedness between the victor and the poet as it is reflected in the epinician contract. Chapter 2 considers the way in which specific elements of the *Program* in *Ol. 13*, particularly its mention of the victor's city and of earlier victories, are used by the poet to celebrate the victor, and examines the importance of the poet's role in placing the victor's achievements in a proper context in which they can be measured and evaluated. The analysis of *Pyth. 9* discusses the homecoming ceremony for which the epinician is commissioned. It treats the poet's view of this celebration as a reenactment, for the victor's community, of ceremonies held at the games, further amplifying the complexity of the relationship between the poet, the victor, and the victor's community. All the chapters concentrate on the importance of the occasion in determining the final form of the poem.

The epinician poet's dilemma is multifaceted. He writes for hire and has certain responsibilities to his patron, not the least of which is praising the victor. Yet, in order to maintain his own credibility and that of his poetry, he cannot exaggerate or overvalue. He must observe measure, for his praise only becomes meaningful if it is accurate and truthful — "truth" being, in part, that which stands the test of time. To this end, the poet shapes his praise, observing measure through his selection of gnomes and myths and through his structuring of this material.

Pindar's professionalism does not mean that his praises are mechanical or unfelt. Certain generic truths (such as "victory loves song," etc.) fill his work, but behind these gnomic utterances and epinician commonplaces lies an organizing intelligence committed not only contractually but spiritually and emotionally to his task. As Pindar tells us in *Ol.* 13.96–97, he is a *willing* servant both to his patrons and to the Muses. By serving one, he also serves the other. The relationship is thereby beneficial to both parties and is, in this way, made vital. The mutual indebtedness of poet and victor in *Ol.* 10 is more than a cliché. Pindar needs the victor to provide the subject matter for his song. This generic indebtedness is thus crucial to the poet's notion of the function of poetry.

In the same way, the poet is neither the impersonal bard of Bundy nor the personal apologist of Wilamowitz. His personal and professional identities are much the same thing. He works within the epinician genre in a highly personal way, blending the conventional voice of the herald with the more idiosyncratic voice of the poet. He makes each ode unique and original to reflect the uniqueness and originality of the victor. The youth of the victor in *Ol.* 10 necessitates a compulsory acknowledgment of his indebtedness to his trainer. A possible tardiness in the composition of the ode and the generic idea of the repayment of victory by song both contribute to this theme of indebtedness around which the ode is structured.

In *Ol.* 13, Xenophon's double victory and the numberless victories of his family require the poet to take special precautions in his celebration of them. Success and its continuation rest with the gods whose favor the poet courts, through prayer and invocation, in the ode. Xenophon's individual achievements, subordinated to those of his family and city, are woven into a larger fabric within which their full value can be acclaimed without provoking hubristic thoughts in Xenophon or incurring the gods' wrath for his success.

In *Pyth.* 9 Pindar designs his ode for the victor's homecoming — a

ritual which is echoed in the myths and serves as a reenactment for the distant community of Cyrene of the original victory procession for Telesicrates following his triumph at the Pythian games.

The poet's goal is to preserve the victor's deeds, to make him and them immortal. Immortality, for Pindar, is nothing more than continuing life in the memories of men. Just as Pindar's mythic references revive the exploits of distant heroes of the past, so his epinicians recreate the moment of the victor's triumph and the proclamation of it, making it vivid in the minds of the ode's audience. In this way, Pindar's occasional poetry insures the permanence of the momentary brilliance of men.

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PAMELA FRAZIER BENBOW — *Epinetra*

The epinetra catalogued and discussed in this paper represent the findings of a research for surviving examples of the rare ceramic shape. Most epinetra were thrown on the wheel; about one-third of the circumference was cut out along the length of the vase-like object; and the resulting roughly half-cylindrical shape, with one end closed, was the epinetron. The object was worn by seated women over the thigh and knee-cap as a kind of work surface upon which they refined spun thread prior to weaving.

Fine-ware epinetra in the black- and red-figure techniques are exclusively Attic, although some were exported, and date from the late sixth century B.C. to ca. 400 B.C. Most of the coarse-ware examples have come from the Athenian Agora and are largely of fifth century B.C. date. Outside Attica, only Rhodes, with a few unlikely but possible exceptions, imitated the shape; but Rhodian epinetra are far cruder than their Attic fine-ware counterparts.

The fine-ware epinetra are generally decorated on the closed end with a female head, probably that of a goddess; an incised scale pattern covers the top, and painted panels the sides of the objects. It is doubtful that fine-ware epinetra were actually used in wool working; they may have been elaborate imitations of the object of daily function. The fine-ware and Rhodian examples have been found in graves and in the sanctuaries of Athena, Artemis, and Demeter.

The heavy concentration of Attic epinetra in the first twenty years of the fifth century B.C., their strict adherence to a decorative canon, and their limitation to Attica as the place of manufacture all suggest that the

objects were conceived and produced for a specific purpose; and their *raison d'être* should be sought in the religious and social practices of Athens under the Cleisthenic democracy and in the decade that preceded the sack of Athens by the Persians.

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JOHN BUCKLER — *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.*

The efforts of Thebes from 371 B.C. to 362 B.C. to establish itself as the hegemon of Greece marks the last significant effort of any Greek power to seek such a position, and its failure to do so led to the exhaustion of the Greek states. Chapters one and two give the background of the Theban hegemony, beginning with a geographical description of Boiotia in order to indicate the extent and nature of the physical resources available to Thebes and to suggest how geography influenced Theban efforts to reunify Boiotia under a new Confederacy. The background events from the seizure of the Kadmeia in 382 B.C. to the battle of Leuktra are covered; and a new treatment of the battle, differing substantially from J. Wolters' in *Antike Schlachtfelder* IV.290ff, is offered.

Chapters three and four treat Epameinondas' first two invasions of the Peloponnesos and the creation of the Theban–Peloponnesian alliance. Epameinondas' establishment of an independent Messenia is treated as an aspect of his efforts not only to destroy the internal stability of Sparta but also to build a bloc of Peloponnesian states inimical to Sparta. His goal was to surround Sparta by establishing strong enemies on its borders, stretching from Messenia to Arkadia to Argos. His success in isolating Sparta led to a rapprochement between Sparta and Athens, but this alliance proved barren because of the divergent aims of the two powers and their inability to cooperate effectively against the Thebans. In his second invasion of the Peloponnesos, the aim of which was to reduce Sparta's remaining allies in the northern Peloponnesos, Epameinondas subdued all of Sparta's northern allies except Corinth and Phleious. After this campaign the Spartans abandoned all efforts to defend their Peloponnesian allies, and the Athenians confined themselves to defending Corinth. The reduction of Spartan power in these two invasions rendered Thebes' Peloponnesian allies more secure, but with that security arose an increasingly independent spirit, especially among the Arkadians. Consequently, the Arkadians began to question Theban leadership of the general alliance and



to take a stronger stand in Peloponnesian politics. The Thebans did nothing to check this willful tendency and, owing to internal dissension, virtually ignored the Peloponnesos until 366 B.C. Chapters three and four also trace the development of a growing opposition within Thebes to the policies of Epameinondas and Pelopidas and the rise of a party, led by Menekleidas, opposed to foreign ventures. The strength of Menekleidas' party is discernible in the trials of Epameinondas and Pelopidas after the first invasion of Lakonia and in the second trial of Epameinondas in 369 B.C. Because of Menekleidas' opposition, Epameinondas never enjoyed a free hand in the creation and execution of Theban foreign policy, which in turn prevented the development of a firm, consistent program with regard to both Sparta and the allies.

Chapters five and six deal with Theban intervention in Thessaly and Macedonia, Theban efforts to conclude a Common Peace, and Epameinondas' abortive naval policy. In 369 B.C. the tyrant Alexandros of Pherai appeared ready to bring all Thessaly under his sway. To meet this threat the Thebans entered into a pact with the Thessalian cities opposed to the tyrant and with King Alexandros of Macedonia, by which the Macedonian king agreed to intervene immediately in Thessaly and oppose the tyrant until the Thebans could relieve him. King Alexandros in return received the promise of Theban support against Ptolemaios Alorites, a pretender to the throne. From 369 to 364 B.C. Pelopidas attempted to defeat Alexandros decisively and to bring stability to Thessaly and Macedonia. Yet the northern theater of operations always took second place to the Peloponnesos. Not until Pelopidas' death at the battle of Kynoskephalai in 364 B.C. did the Thebans reduce Alexandros to the status of a subject-ally. In 367 B.C., as a result of the strain of operations in both the Peloponnesos and the north, the Thebans attempted to settle affairs in Greece by negotiating a Common Peace treaty. Pelopidas won the support of King Artaxerxes of Persia, and in 366 B.C. a peace conference convened at Thebes; however, the negotiations foundered on the Arkadian refusal to recognize Theban claims to hegemony. Upon the rejection of the Common Peace, which contained a clause demanding the disarmament of the Athenian fleet, the Thebans set out to accomplish by arms what they had failed to do by diplomacy. In 366 B.C. they began, at the instigation of Epameinondas, to build a fleet; it was ready for service in 364 B.C. Epameinondas used the fleet in an attempt to create a maritime alliance with Byzantion, Khios, and Rhodos; but these states were unwilling to rebel against Athens without substantial support, which

the Thebans could not provide. After Epameinondas' voyage of 364 B.C., which coincided with Alexandros' defeat in Thessaly, the Thebans retired from northern Greece and turned their attention to the Peloponnesos.

Chapters seven and eight are concerned with the deterioration of the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance and the ensuing chaos in the central Peloponnesos. In an effort to refurbish their position as leaders of the grand alliance, the Thebans in 366 B.C. sent Epameinondas on his third invasion of the Peloponnesos. Although he succeeded in bringing the Akhaian League into the general alliance, his policy in Akhaia was upset by the Arkadians and his opponents at home. This blow to Theban prestige was followed in 366 by another diplomatic setback, the Arkadian-Athenian alliance, which gave the Arkadians further freedom of action and increased protection against Theban interference in their affairs. Because of Theban inability to provide its allies with firm and consistent leadership, Thebes by 365 B.C. had lost control over its central Peloponnesian allies, and made no attempt to stop the war that broke out between Arkadia and Elis. By 362 B.C. this war had bankrupted the Arkadian League and put such a strain on the federal government that the League split into two hostile camps. The faction led by Mantinea and supported by Athens concluded an alliance with Sparta, while the remnant led by Tegea remained loyal to Thebes. The disruption of the Arkadian League threatened to destroy Epameinondas' ring around Lakonia and to liberate the Spartans from the isolation imposed upon them since 369 B.C. In response to this threat and in order to reestablish order in Arkadia, Epameinondas led his final invasion of the Peloponnesos in 362 B.C. At the battle of Mantinea he defeated the combined army of the Spartans, Athenians, and their allies, but was killed at the moment of victory. His death robbed the Thebans of their victory and ended their hopes of hegemony.

Following the narrative are four appendices, dealing with (A) the primary sources for the hegemony, (B) the constitution of the Boiotian Confederacy from ca. 378 to 338 B.C., (C) the chronology of the hegemony, and (D) Epameinondas' second trial. The thesis ends with notes, corrigenda, illustrations, and photographic plates.

KEVIN K. CARROLL — *The Parthenon Inscription*

It had been known that the east architrave of the Parthenon had once held a bronze-lettered inscription, but the text had never been deciphered. In 1895-1896, Eugene P. Andrews made squeezes of the cuttings which had been used to attach the bronze letters to the architrave and managed to decipher most of the text. Andrews never published the Greek text; *IG II<sup>2</sup> 3277* is from a copy of Andrews' text made by Cecil Smith. Recently, S. Dow has deciphered the remainder of the text. The inscription is Neronian and is firmly dated to A.D. 61-62.

The thesis begins with a review of previous work, especially that of Andrews and Dow. The thesis then explains how the inscription was deciphered and what can be known about the bronze letters; there is also a full discussion of the present state of the inscription.

The next part of the thesis presents a commentary on the text of the inscription. The date, the civic bodies of Athens mentioned, and the priestess of Athena are considered, as is Nero's nomenclature, which appears in an unusual form. I conclude that the format is honorific. There is also a discussion of the use of *Αὐτοκράτωρ* (*Imperator*) before the emperor's name when it was not being used in this manner in official usage. This too is honorific and does not have the significance which has sometimes been attributed to it.

The commentary ends with a discussion of the titles given to Tiberios Klaudios Novios in the text. While the office of Hoplite General is relatively well-known, the others, Epimeletes [of the City] and Nomothetes, are not. These two offices are discussed and all relevant inscriptions are cited. Not all inscriptions previously used in discussing these offices are accepted as valid evidence. In regard to the office of Epimeletes of the city, the evidence is not sufficient to allow a definite determination of the function of the office, although it can be said that the office probably involved some general supervision over monuments and dedications in Athens. Novios may well have been the first to hold the office. It is suggested that his lawmaking, indicated by the title Nomothetes, may have had some connection with the creation of the office of Epimeletes of the City. The only other known Nomothetes was concerned with the revision of the Athenian constitution during the reign of Hadrian. A recent attempt to redate a group of Athenian archons, which would move Pythodoros out of the Hadrianic period, is considered and rejected.

The concluding chapters of the thesis take up the questions of what type of inscription this is, and what was the occasion for it. The con-



clusion reached is that the inscription is a summary of an honorary inscription voted for Nero in connection with the Parthian Wars. It is placed on the Parthenon due to the connections of that building and the Akropolis with victories over eastern enemies. It was put up in bronze letters in imitation of a common practice on Roman triumphal arches.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in History 1975

DANIEL K. CLIFT — *A Prosopography to the Speeches of Cicero: Historical Figures before 80 B.C.*

The immense size and diversity of Cicero's writings have inevitably produced fragmentation and subdivision in the specialized studies which these works have inspired. During the current century the increased interest in prosopography and its use as an approach to the study of the Roman Republic have been concerned to a large degree with the information provided by Cicero; and yet, there still exists no complete prosopography to his works. Earlier attempts in this direction have not been successful, nor do they measure up to the demands or standards of contemporary scholarship.

The present study seeks to remedy this situation, within the limits of a dissertation, by offering a prosopography of the historical figures who appear in the extant speeches and who lived principally before Cicero's time. I have established the year 80 B.C. as the terminal date, for it marks not only the occasion of the *Pro Roscio Amerino*, Cicero's first major speech, but also the time of the full implementation of the Sullan constitution. There are, of course, various marginal cases which occupy both sides of this date, and only those whose *floruit* fall before 80 B.C. have been included. A major magistracy before 80 B.C. constitutes an appropriate basis for determining the *floruit* — as, for instance, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius cos. 80 (*RE* 98), and thus qualification for inclusion. In other less defined cases, however, inclusion or omission have remained at the author's discretion. The cutoff date here adopted also excludes the various individuals who are transformed from contemporary references to historical allusions in the course of Cicero's career — e.g. L. Sergius Catilina pr. 68 (*RE* 23).

After an introduction which offers a brief survey of the previous scholarship on this subject, there follows the prosopography of the 366 historical figures who appear in the speeches. The names have been arranged alphabetically according to the *nomen gentilicium*, and the order



of appearance within an individual *gens* is determined by its order of appearance in Pauly-Wissowa. Complete lists of magistracies are generally not given, but rather the principal ones and any others that are particularly applicable to Cicero. Complete references for each individual to the speeches and the fragments of speeches have been provided, and they have been divided according to references *nominatim* and anonymous or descriptive references. The orthography of the names has been noted together with any problems or peculiarities of nomenclature or textual corruption, and complete genealogical information and the analysis of the references in the speeches are provided for each individual. For the sake of clarity and reference, each person has been identified by the Pauly-Wissowa reference number, and the appropriate cross references are also provided for other standard reference works and specialized studies.

This dissertation has for the most part an historical orientation, and it combines three areas of research — Ciceronian *indices nominum*, various historical and prosopographical works on Roman Republican history, and to a lesser degree specialized studies of Cicero's theory and practice of both history and rhetoric. This study is principally designed as a reference work.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1975

#### FREDERICK T. GRIFFITHS — *Theocritus' Hymn to the Dioscuri*

If any idyll can claim to reflect broadly on Theocritus' role in Hellenistic literature, it must be his *Hymn to the Dioscuri*, which incorporates successively aspects of all of his standard forms (hymn, bucolic, mime, epic, encomium) and marks his closest approach to the styles and subjects of Callimachus and Apollonius Rhodius. But scholarly work on the poem in this century has not been able to get beyond the preliminary questions of whether this concatenation of sometimes incompatible episodes deserves to be considered a unified composition and whether Theocritus has written in imitation of Apollonius or vice versa. These two questions largely answer each other and reveal a coherent purpose to the composition: the poem as a whole responds to Apollonius by a systematic demonstration of how heroic poetry should and should not be written and how epic relates to the other favored genres of the period.

The severe disharmonies of style and characterization in the poem must be judged from Hellenistic standards of unity, which would

derive less from Aristotle than from the model of Hesiod (including the spurious catalogue poetry), whose dominant influence on the age may be argued to center less on brevity and didacticism than on the flexibility of a discontinuous and associative style accommodating a mixture of genres. By these standards, *Idyll* 22 is unique but not unusual, and closely parallels the antithetical structures of Theocritus' style elsewhere. The contradictions inherent in the Dioscuri's peculiar degeneration from astral saviors to human warriors actually reflect one of Theocritus' central concerns in myth, the ambiguously human and divine identity (Helen, Heracles, Ptolemy) and its literary implications for the use of secular or hymnic forms. And, while Castor's exploit does neatly reverse the style and character portrayal of the preceding Polydeuces episode, such contrasts characterize the relationship of digressions to framing narratives in the short epic from Callimachus to Virgil. The diptych of *Idyll* 22 may in fact be an influential model for the digressive style of the short epic.

The poem by itself gives every indication that all of its parts were composed to stand together: the prologue introduces both episodes, they systematically echo each other as well as the prologue, and the epilogue recapitulates the poem's range of styles and characterizations in a way that actually emphasizes the inconcinnities, thereby to acknowledge them as intentional. If Theocritus were stitching together originally independent adventures, he would not thus advertise their incompatibility. Nor can the Castor episode be dismissed as a perfunctory and clumsy attempt to supply a counterpart for the Polydeuces episode. For whereas Theocritus' primary source, Pindar's *Nemean* 10, offers a treatment of the myth eminently compatible with the rest of *Idyll* 22, all of Theocritus's innovations in the myth and the style work toward making Castor's combat a symmetrical reversal of what precedes. While he executed Polydeuces' adventure in an urbane and stylish modern style, here he produces the age's crudest pastiche of Homer. The very modern heroes of the Polydeuces episode — polite, playful, and aesthetically sensitive — become violent and unfeeling bandits in the second adventure in a way that directly undoes Pindar's amelioration of the myth. The contrasts between episodes are clearly deliberate and well-calculated to balance a polished and variegated treatment of heroic myth in the first episode with an ironical demonstration in the second of the kind of Homerizing that should be avoided. This interpretation can be confirmed by Theocritus' serious uses of Homer elsewhere (especially in *Idyll* 16), his ironic treatment of heroic myth in *Idylls* 13 and 24, and his comparable parodies of erotic poetry.

The recognition of the unifying critical intent of *Idyll* 22 resolves the long-disputed question of relative chronology between Theocritus and Apollonius. In the Polydeuces episode, as well as in its companion piece, *Idyll* 13, Theocritus has adapted Apollonian narratives into the distinctive style of the idylls. Then, in the Castor episode, to parallel the slaughter of the Bebryces in the *Argonautica* he shows by contrast the effect of Apollonian style on an otherwise successful narrative. All of *Idyll* 22 (including the opening storm scene) along with *Idyll* 13 imitates a strongly unified passage in the *Argonautica* (1.1153-2.177), and the direction of influence is indicated by the fact that tightly interconnected systems of imagery and characterization in Apollonius, organized around a central theme, show up randomly distributed and often with distinct irony over four episodes in two idylls with no common theme. This pattern is easily explained by Theocritus' critical intent, but it is incomparably more difficult to imagine how or why Apollonius would work diffuse, comic, and thematically diverse material from Theocritus into a symmetrical and highly systematic exposition of the nature of Heracleian heroism. In fact Theocritus cites his model openly enough by recurrent allusions to the opening of the *Argonautica*, by use of distinctively Apollonian diction, constructions, and poetic devices (unparalleled by elements of Theocritean style in Apollonius), and by retention of plot elements integral to the Apollonian narrative but with no real function in Theocritus' own adaptation. Perhaps most decisive is that Theocritus misleadingly foreshadows the endings of Apollonius' Hylas and Polydeuces narratives, but then unexpectedly alters the endings himself — a procedure that presupposes the audience's familiarity with the Apollonian versions. To reverse the order poses the question of how Apollonius could twice have transformed *suggestiones falsi* from the Theocritean narratives into the basis for intricate central transitions in his continuous narrative.

In light of this interpretation, the lacuna after line 270 and the attribution of the rest of the speech to Castor, as proposed by Wilamowitz, must be rejected as unsupported by manuscript evidence, inconsistent with what follows, and justifiable in any case only by the mistaken desire to rehabilitate the Dioscuri in this episode.

Beyond the questions of unity and chronology, *Idyll* 22's implications for the interpretation of Theocritus are quite extensive. While the poem does show considerable affinity with Callimachean poetics, attempts to draw Theocritus into any feud with Apollonius should be resisted. Theocritus may in fact be credited with an independent third position, which he defines by his distinctive uses of Hesiod and



the *Odyssey* and which in some ways approaches closer to Apollonius than to Callimachus.

Apart from the rejection of artless Homerizing, *Idyll 22* reveals the connections that Theocritus perceives between his own style and the great tradition of epic. He indicates the *Odyssey*, as well as Hesiod, as the source of bucolic poetry and manipulates the format of the *Homeric Hymns* as a means of reconciling epic narrative with the tone of satyr play and mime. Similarly, by basing a landscape description on the Homeric conventions of garden description and *ecphrasis* of art objects he defines the distinctiveness of his practice in the bucolic poems. He also demonstrates the flexibility of the Homeric model by returning to Apollonius' own Homeric sources for the Polydeuces narrative (Odysseus with the Cyclops, the boxing matches) to draw out of them a comic aspect consonant with the dominant tone of the idylls. Finally, he develops sport as a mode of competition mediating between the violent confrontation of epic and the herdsmen's contests in song. As a whole, then, *Idyll 22* gives Theocritus' most affirmative view of the possibilities of adapting heroic poetry to the idyll format following the model of discontinuous Hesiodic epic.

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DAVID FREDERICK GROSE — *The Administration of the City of Rome under the Republic*

This dissertation presents several topics related to the administration of the City of Rome during the Republic. Given the fact that the Republican constitution did not recognize the need for a separate urban government distinct from that of the city-state, emphasis has been placed upon those activities of the assemblies, senate, magistracies, and priesthoods which directly involved urban services and facilities.

Among these urban-related matters were the arrangements made within Rome to protect the city whenever it was threatened by attack, a situation which occurred on numerous occasions during the Republic. Specifically, the second chapter deals with the history and development of the city's fortifications, the decrees passed and internal measures taken to ready the population for an attack or siege, and the paramilitary organization adopted to man the defenses, an organization which at various times made use of the *seniores* of the *comitia centuriata* and of the urban proletariat, but not of the field army.



The third chapter describes the administration of urban public properties, sacred and secular, movables and real estate. Their nature, legal status, and historical development are briefly touched upon, and the administrative procedures established to acquire, sell, rent or concede, construct, repair, and maintain those properties are discussed. The fourth chapter is devoted to the same matters as they relate to Rome's public "utilities," here referring to the urban waterworks and aqueducts, the urban sewer and drainage systems, and the building and maintenance of public streets, squares, and rights-of-way. Bathing establishments, bridges, public latrines, cemeteries, dumps, traffic regulation, street lighting, and similar subjects are also included in this chapter.

The indirect and limited role of the state in policing Rome and its public monuments and the nature of a police jurisdiction in a self-help society are the topics of chapters five and six. Emphasis is placed on the evidence for urban crime and violence at Rome, the role of the senate and magistracies, especially the *triumviri capitales*, in respect to urban crime, and the importance of the praetorian *edicta* and *interdicta publica* as effective tools to protect the urban population's rights to use, enjoy, and even repair public amenities and properties. Another public service, that of fire protection, is also treated in these chapters. Contrary to the accounts of most modern commentators, the Republican government did take an active role in providing the city and its inhabitants with a measure of fire protection. The *vigiles* of Augustus reflected earlier practice and did not represent a radical innovation in the nature of urban governance at Rome.

Such social aids and services as the grain distributions (*frumentationes*) and the provision for a limited *cura annonae*, for market supervision, and for the erection of market buildings, market squares, docking and storage facilities, and shops, as well as the sponsorship of annual religious festivals (*feriae publicae*) and public games (*ludi*), constitute the seventh chapter, the last of those which set out the content of Rome's urban administration. In all instances the dissertation has stressed the administrative organization and procedures employed by the Romans to handle these urban services and facilities, as well as to describe the scope and historical development (where known) of the same.

The introductory chapter provides an account of the various topographical boundaries (*pomerium*, defensive wall, the first milestone, and so forth) which in law and practice delimited the administration of the city from its *territorium*. It also presents the literary and epigraphical evidence for the internal subdivisions of Rome (*pagi*, *montes*, *vici*,

*curiae, regiones, and partes*) and for their officers in order to assess their role in the administration of urban affairs, but concludes that none of them were employed as formal administrative districts in the sense of Augustus' *XIV Regiones*. The relationships among the magistracies and between the senate and the magistrates in regard to urban administration, the use of compulsory citizen labor, of state-paid employees, and of public slaves to handle urban tasks, the method of urban finance, the development of urban by-laws, and an assessment of the administration of Republican Rome are dealt with in the conclusion.

Three appendices complete the dissertation. The first describes the physical remains of the Republican colony of Cosa and its close architectural and administrative affinity to Republican Rome. The second is devoted to certain aspects of the topographical and demographical development of Rome in the course of the Republic, chiefly those concerning the limitations of our evidence and using the expansion of the water system as an example. The third is a brief note on the technical meanings of two phrases found in Livy and elsewhere — *terror nocturnus* and *conclamatum ad arma est* — with emphasis on their significance for the life of an ancient city.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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ROBERT ANDREW KASTER — *The Tradition of the Text of the Aeneid in the Ninth Century*

Unlike the works of any other classical Latin poet, the text of the *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid* of Vergil can be constituted entirely from the sources of late antiquity, and so stands independent of the medieval and renaissance manuscripts upon which the texts of other authors are founded. As a result of the wealth of ancient testimony available, the medieval manuscripts of Vergil — including those written during the rebirth of literacy in the ninth century — had been ignored or consulted only sporadically by modern editors before the investigations undertaken by R. A. B. Mynors (*P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, ed. R. A. B. Mynors [Oxford 1969]). Mynors's collation of thirteen Carolingian manuscripts demonstrated, in effect, the continuity of the tradition from antiquity to the early Middle Ages. Despite the fact that only two ninth-century manuscripts appear to be connected closely with an extant ancient source (*a* with the capital manuscript *R*, *γ* with *P*), the testimony of the Carolingian texts for the most part repeats that of the ancient: so, for example, only in five places did Mynors receive into his text of the

*Aeneid* a reading first attested by a ninth-century witness (*A.6.96 qua*, 9.514 *iuuet*, 10.428 *interimit*, 10.805 *arce*, 12.342 *eminus eminus*). Of these five, all but 9.514 *iuuet* had been read by previous editors.

If the ninth-century manuscripts bring little that is new to the text of Vergil, they might perform, nonetheless, a more general function. The early Carolingian manuscripts of other texts popular — and hence contaminated — in antiquity are preserved in such small numbers that they afford only glimpses of the critical period during which a given contaminated tradition was revived after two centuries of virtual dormancy. The manuscripts of Vergil, in their kind and number, present in the text of one author many of the aspects of ninth-century textual transmission found discretely in other traditions. The transmission of the *Aeneid* (to which the dissertation is limited) might serve, therefore, as a model of a contaminated tradition and so allow us to gain a knowledge of the method of the Carolingian age more comprehensive than can be obtained from the other contaminated texts which do not offer remains from this period as numerous or diverse in character.

The dissertation is a preliminary work, meant to provide a general description of the transmission of the text of the *Aeneid* as conveyed in eleven manuscripts of the ninth century. Ten of these books have been reported by Mynors (*b, r, d, f, h, t, a, e, u, v*): I have collated *b, r, d, f, v* myself, and draw upon the collation-books made available to me by Prof. Mynors for my knowledge of the primary and corrected texts of *h, t, a, e, u*. The readings of an eleventh manuscript, designated by the siglum *o* (Bruxellensis Bibl. Reg. 5325-5327), are reported for the first time.

After a description of the manuscripts, the dissertation is divided into two parts, followed by eight appendices (the appendices contain the collation relevant to the chapters in each of the two parts). The first part involves something of a winnowing process, an attempt to reduce the mass of variant readings to some coherent order according to the manuscripts in which they occur. Each of the chapters in the first part deals with a different aspect of the transmission. First, some seven hundred places are identified where the text, as transmitted in other (i.e. ancient) sources, is divided between two traditional variants, but where the ninth-century manuscripts are unanimous (or nearly so) in supporting one reading against the other. These places of unanimity are interpreted as being representative of the vulgar tradition which reached the Middle Ages from late antiquity. When the ninth-century manuscripts thus agree in a vulgar reading, they are correct twice as often as they are incorrect.



In addition, there are some five hundred places where the eleven Carolingian manuscripts divide according to consistent combinations. The combinations I have called "groups," although the term does not necessarily mean that the manuscripts are related (in the sense associated with the genetic model). Rather, the members of each group are associated primarily in the possession of texts of similar character. Group I consists of two manuscripts, *b* and *r*, which are not related formally but which individually offer excellent texts, so that they often possess rare, good readings in common and alone against the rest. Group II consists of five manuscripts, *d*, *f*, *h*, *o*, *t*, which give some evidence of sharing a common source (with the possible exception of *f*). If they are related, the relationship is not close; rather, each is derived from a contaminated source, so that in addition to the large number of errors which they share, errors either vulgar or peculiar to themselves as a group, each has a certain number of unusual and correct readings which distinguish it from the other members of the group. Group III consists of four manuscripts, *a*, *e*, *u*, *v*, which give clear and repeated evidence of being related formally: *e*, *u*, *v* probably derive their text from *a* as corrected, although none appears to be a direct copy; *a* before correction was an excellent witness (on the order of *b* and *r*) but was corrected against a source with a very inferior text. The manuscripts of this group very rarely have a correct reading not found among the other manuscripts, but share the largest number of errors.

There are also some one hundred seventy places discussed in part I which demonstrate most clearly the contamination in the tradition: in these places the distinctions among the groups are less well-defined, as the variant readings are distributed irregularly among the manuscripts.

In each of the above categories — in the places of consensus, in the peculiar readings shared by one group, and in the places of obvious and general contamination — the incorrect variant readings are only rarely *lectiones faciliores*. Most often the variant reading is a specious alternative which removes no apparent difficulty, but which may be shown to be inferior on philological grounds; second in frequency are the variant readings which offer an alternative where there are little or no grounds for rational decision. The principle of *lectio difficilior potior* is applicable very seldom.

Each of the eleven manuscripts was corrected at least once during the ninth century by a reader who compared his own text with that of another manuscript. Since the correctors were often quite thorough in their collation, and since no manuscript can be shown to have been



compared with another extant manuscript, the corrections provide us with the evidence of (at least) eleven other ninth-century witnesses and allow us to gauge the effect of contamination on the extant texts. The second part of the dissertation is a survey of the correction executed in the texts of the manuscripts. The survey is designed to suggest answers to two related groups of questions. The first group of questions concerns the character of the tradition as a whole: Was the vulgar tradition maintained as the text of the *Aeneid* was copied and corrected from one manuscript to another? Was the vulgar tradition extended, i.e. is the text found in the ninth-century manuscripts more homogeneous after correction than before? Did correction consistently produce a more readable text, through the exclusion of impossible errors and the inclusion of easier variant lections? The second group of questions concerns the traits of the correctors themselves: Are there any discernible trends in the kinds of readings preferred by the correctors? Are there any indications that the act of correction in the ninth century was also an act of criticism?

In answer to the first questions above, we find that the readings identified with the vulgar tradition were affected very little by correction: a reading, good or bad, which was found in all (or nearly all) of the ninth-century manuscripts tends thus to be represented after correction as well, while individual manuscripts which deviated from the consensus of the rest tended to lose the aberrant reading through correction. The common readings drive out the uncommon. This does not lead, however, to an appreciable extension of the vulgar text. For although the manuscripts of group I, *b* and *r*, lost through correction most of the distinctive readings which they shared, the manuscripts of groups II (*d*, *f*, *h*, *o*, *t*) and III (especially *e*, *u*, *v*) were not similarly affected. Manuscripts *b* and *r* were corrected against manuscripts which, unlike themselves, contained many more vulgar readings. In the case of *b*, the sources of correction appear to have been heterogeneous, readings characteristic of group II or group III having been entered with similar frequency; in the case of *r*, the manuscript(s) of comparison contained, in addition to many vulgar readings, a large number of readings especially characteristic of group III. The manuscripts of group II and group III, however, appear to have been corrected against sources with a text similar to their own: that is, a manuscript of group II (for example) lost very few of the distinctive incorrect readings it originally shared with the other members of the group and gained very few of the inferior variants peculiar to group III. The traditions of groups II and III appear to have been isolated each from the other.

Nor can correction be said to have led to the creation of a more readable text. There is no evidence at all that a reader, when faced with two plausible lections, adhered to a coherent standard of judgment, whether the two readings were stylistically or linguistically interchangeable, or whether one was an easier alternative to the other. Impossible readings were removed by correctors much more frequently than they were introduced; yet in each of the manuscripts there is found at least one instance (and in most manuscripts rather more than one) where a reading was entered which is so deficient in form, syntax, or sense that it is incapable of being construed. The evidence indicates throughout that the reader/correctors of the ninth century tended uncritically to record what they found in their manuscripts of comparison. The direction taken by the tradition was determined, therefore, less by the critical skills of the correctors than by the chance contact of two manuscripts in a contaminated tradition.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1975

WALTER NORMAN NICHIPOR — *The Text of Herodian's History*

The subject of this study is the manuscript tradition and text of Herodian's history. The first chapter consists of a brief survey and analysis of recent scholarship on the life of Herodian and the value of his work. In writing of the period from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the accession of Gordian III, he drew on what he had seen and heard during his own lifetime. He was also aided by his experience in governmental posts. His importance as a witness for the political views of his time and his skill in narrative and rhetoric command particular attention.

After a brief summary of previous work on the manuscripts, the second chapter gives a detailed description and history of the extant codices. There are no Greek witnesses for the class O other than those used by Mendelssohn and later editors: Monacensis Graecus 157, of the fourteenth century (A); Vindobonensis phil. Graecus 59, of the fifteenth century (B); and Marcianus Graecus 389, also of the fifteenth century (V).

For the class *i*, however, previous editors have utilized only a few of the extant sources: Gronovianus 88, of the eleventh century (*g*); Laurentianus 70.17, of the fifteenth century (*l*); and the Aldine *Editio princeps* of 1503. There are several others, most known to Mendelssohn but not studied by him. The oldest, Ambrosianus Graecus B119 sup. (*p*), dates from the eleventh century but contains only selected speeches.

Ambrosianus Graecus G69 sup. (*d*), Bruxellensis 11291-11293 (*b*), Laurentianus conv. supp. Graecus 164 (*c*), Laurentianus 57.45 (*f*), Laurentianus 70.21 (*m*), Marcianus Graecus 390 (*v*), and Marcianus Graecus App. XI.14 (*z*), all of the fifteenth century, and Sinaiticus Graecus 1725 (*s*), of the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, are complete. Another manuscript of the full text, Escorialensis R.III.16 (*e*), copied in the year 1540 from a printed text, is to be identified with the "*Codex Schotti*." Neapolitanus Graecus II C 32 (*n*), of the fifteenth century, contains a collection of short excerpts, as do three less important sixteenth-century codices. An extraordinary multitude of even later manuscripts, most dating from the eighteenth century, can be found in Greece and elsewhere. "Phantom" codices and indirect evidence make the problem of transmissions more complex.

The relationship of the manuscripts forms the subject of the third chapter. New collations of the first two books and of certain later passages in all the manuscripts form the basis of discussion. The witnesses for the class O are ABV. Their evidence can be supplemented by Bonfine's translation, unknown to Mendelssohn and later editors, which rests on a manuscript similar to but independent of A. For the class *i*, the most important witness is *g*. The short selections in *p* also seem to be of independent value. The remaining *i* manuscripts and the Aldine of 1503 all derive their text directly or indirectly from *g*. (Mendelssohn and his successors erred in supposing *l* and the Aldine to be independent of *g*.) The manuscripts *dfz* do present the original readings of the first leaf of *g*, which is now partially illegible. Politian's translation was based on several manuscripts of the class *i*, but apparently all of them were derived from *g*. The most important indirect evidence for the Greek text is found in the fragments of the *Excerpta Constantiniana*, which preserve parts of the narrative of Johannes Antiochenus; his source was a manuscript anterior to the common ancestor of all our extant codices. A stemma follows the chapter.

The final section consists of a text of book I with a critical apparatus and supplementary notes on the readings adopted. The title which appeared in the common ancestor of all our manuscripts was evidently *Ἡρωδιανοῦ τῆς μετὰ Μάρκον βασιλείας α'*. Certain orthographical variations, such as that between *εἰς* and *ἐς*, may well go back to the author himself. A new transposition seems in order at 1.6.9 'The name of Pompeianus at 1.8.4 is perhaps to be deleted as a gloss. At 1.8.7 the word *κοινοῦς* should probably be changed to *ἐκείνους*. The correct reading at 1.11.4 may be *τῆς θεοῦ ᾗ τῆς Εὐτίας*. At 1.13.3 the best solution seems to be transposing to obtain the reading *ὁ δῆμος <καὶ>*



πάν τὸ ἱππικὸν τάγμα ἐν ὄπλοις εἰσί. Solutions to other problems are often already at hand in the emendations recorded in previous editions or in hitherto neglected articles, such as the important one published by H. van Herwerden in *Mnemosyne* n.s. 12 (1884) 1-23. A select bibliography concludes the study.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1975

FRANK J. NISETICH — *The Poetry of Victory: A Study in the Occasional Nature of Pindar's Odes*

This dissertation is basically a genre study, differing from other studies of the epinician ode by its focus on the occasion for which each ode was composed. It begins with the manner in which certain facets of the occasion of victory inspired the production of metaphors, chiefly the metaphor which fuses the victor's crown with the poet's song. No one seems to have fully understood this metaphor, whose meaning, I believe only emerges when it is seen in its epinician context. Related to it is the metaphor by which the poet identifies himself with the herald at the games who proclaimed the victor as he advanced to receive his crown. Chapters one through three of the thesis attempt to explain these metaphors by tracing them to their origin in the occasion of victory.

The next two chapters take up another issue, the presence in Pindar's odes of what have been called the elements of hymnal style. Scholars have tended to view these elements in various ways, all of which, to my knowledge, are summarized and subjected to criticism in chapter four of the thesis. Basically, previous scholarly arguments touching on the use of the hymn in Pindar maintain that the hymn is either purely decorative or purely functional, that it either allows the poet to make an impressive sound or eases a transition for him. The argument in chapter four suggests that the hymn may have something to tell us about the occasion for which the ode was composed and about the nature of the ode itself. Chapter five then goes on to corroborate this, arguing that the poet resorts to hymnal language always at significant moments, when he is moving either from the victor's coronation at the games (a religious ceremony) to the myth, or conversely. The elements of hymnal style in other words derive from the religious character of the occasion. If there is anything unusual about that occasion, it will be reflected in the poet's use of hymnal language. The latter then is a sensitive medium, not a merely mechanical device.



The fundamental point of chapters four and five is that style, even hymnal style, mirrors reality. In the two final chapters the focus shifts from style to theory. Chapter six begins with a reminder that Pindar himself repeatedly calls his song a hymn. The demonstration that hymnal language is a sensitive medium responsive to certain real demands does not, of course, amount to a demonstration that the poem in which that language occurs is a hymn, but there are other indications that Pindar's label should be taken seriously. Over and over, for example, he calls upon a god or hero to favor the victor in the future, to give increase to his glory either by bestowing upon him other victories, or by blessing the song, the vehicle of his praise. This increase in the fortunes of the victor is the unvarying content of the poet's hymnal appeal. Chapters six and seven discuss a topic equally constant in Pindar, a notion of the poetic power itself — namely that the song *adds* something, gives added life and greater scope to the theme it celebrates.

The latter part of the dissertation deals essentially in matters of religion, poetic imagery, and rhetorical theory. The study of the rhetorical principle of *αὔξησις*, amplification, brings these concerns together. *Αὔξησις* as defined in the rhetoric of Aristotle, Longinus, and others is simply the process of making as much as possible of one's theme, whether one is a poet or an orator; it is particularly well-suited to the needs of the encomiast. Pindar of course never descends to a prose utterance, and there is no suggestion that he has any inkling of the future meaning of *αὔξησις* (if he knew the word at all) in rhetorical theory. He is however quite conscious of his obligation to bestow through poetry an increase on the victor's fortunes; it is clear that he did not find this obligation burdensome. His delight in imagery drawn from the world of natural growth is well-known. What is less familiar is that he tends to think of the special power of his own verse in similar terms: the power of poetry to give increase to its theme and the power operating in natural generation and growth tend to coalesce for him; they can be seen together in his use of imagery, particularly when he creates metaphors to describe the activity of his Muse.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1973

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM — *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*

I have prepared a new edition of the *De Motu*, with text, translation, commentary, and interpretive essays. In an introductory chapter, I discuss the arguments for and against acceptance of this treatise as an

authentic work of Aristotle. There are no sound arguments against authenticity; the treatise is likely to be one of Aristotle's latest works, and contains revisions of a number of earlier theories. Chapter 2 presents a brief history of the text transmission, with an extensive discussion of Michael of Ephesos' commentary and of William of Moerbeke's Latin translation (the latter forthcoming in *Traditio* 1976). The results of my work on the manuscripts, my critical apparatus, and discussions of textual problems are summarized in "The Text of Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*," in this issue. I present a translation of the treatise, and a line-by-line philological and philosophical commentary.

The five interpretive essays are intended to provide extensive discussion of the most interesting philosophical problems which the *De Motu* raises, with reference both to other Aristotelian treatments and to modern attempts to deal with similar problems. The first examines Aristotle's use of the teleological explanation, and his arguments for regarding this as the best sort of explanation for natural phenomena. These arguments are claimed to be both philosophically interesting (a comparison is drawn with some contemporary defenses of teleology, e.g. those of C. Taylor and J. Mackie) and crucial for an understanding of Aristotle's ethics and psychology. The second discusses Aristotle's methodology in scientific inquiry and argues that the *De Motu* represents a promising revision of an overly rigid picture of the sciences as separate deductive systems which have no contribution to make to each other. The third discusses Aristotle's account of soul and body in the *De Anima* and in the *De Motu*, asking how his views are to be related to modern discussions of physicalism and mind-body identity (e.g. by Smart, Nagel, and Taylor). I argue that the accounts in the two works are not incompatible, and try to show, in this connection, how we should understand the *De Motu*'s exposition of the activities of the *symphyton pneuma*. The fourth essay discusses various Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning and the practical syllogism, arguing that certain difficulties which arise in connection with the *EN* VII account of the syllogism are absent from the interesting exposition in the *De Motu*. The *De Motu*'s project of explaining the activities of all animals leads Aristotle to produce a different account, more consistent with the general outlines of his theory of deliberation. This account is illuminated by comparison with theories of explanation advanced by G. H. von Wright. The final essay analyzes Aristotle's use of *phantasia* in the explanations of action in the *De Anima* III.9-11 and in the *De Motu*, arguing that mental images are not central to his theory, as has often

been supposed. His interests are better understood with reference to Ryle, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Ishiguro than within the usual empiricist framework.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1975

JOHN TYLER RAMSEY — *Studies in Asconius*

These studies lay the foundation for a projected commentary on Asconius. At this time prolegomena have been completed and a commentary on selected passages relevant to the *Pro Cornelio*. The prolegomena contain a thorough examination of all the evidence pertinent to the date of composition, the life of Asconius, and his place of birth.

The sole surviving piece of internal evidence for the date of composition is to be found at p.27C.1-5 in the commentary on the *Pro Scauro*. On this occasion Asconius refers to the consulship of C. Caecina Largus with the emperor Claudius in A.D. 42 and states that Caecina is the present owner of the house on the Palatine that formerly belonged to Cicero's client. This passage raises a number of problems both textual and historical. The piece of property belonging to Caecina is also mentioned by Pliny the Elder (*HN* XVII.5), a fact which tends to confirm the emendation of the manuscripts to read Largus Caecina, but Asconius and Pliny disagree as to the previous owner of this house. Various proposals can be made for reconciling this discrepancy. The nomenclature of the emperor Claudius as reflected by this passage also raises some questions. The conclusion that this passage was written after the death of Claudius appears inevitable, since reference is made to the emperor without any of his official titles. Therefore it was written in the short interval between A.D. 54 and 57, the probable year of Caecina's death that can be surmised from the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*. The absence of the epithet "Divus" for Claudius is the sole obstacle in the way of this conclusion, and other evidence, both inscriptional and literary, can be used to show that the nomenclature of Claudius immediately after deification was far from firmly established.

The date furnished by the text is in agreement with most of the ancient testimonia. The notice for Asconius in Jerome's *Chronicle*, however, must be treated with caution. Under the year A.D. 76 Jerome writes: "Q. Asconius Pedianus scriptor historicus clarus habetur." Jerome's use of the words "clarus habetur" elsewhere (e.g. 159Hd) and similar expressions, such as "insignis/inlustris habetur," tend to exclude the assumption that this notice is an obituary or intended as a particular



landmark in Asconius' life. The dates of Asconius' birth and death can only be estimated from the statement in Jerome that Asconius died in his eighty-fifth year and the fact that Asconius' sons were not yet of senatorial age in the mid-50s (p. 43C.27-28). The reference in Quintilian (I.7.24) to Asconius in the past tense places his death prior to A.D. 93 at the latest, and he therefore lived most probably from about 1 B.C. to A.D. 84.

All of the personal details recounted by the ancient testimonia suit this chronology except the statement in Philargyrius that Asconius and Vergil were contemporaries. This piece of evidence must be discarded as an exaggerated or garbled account by a late authority. On the other hand, the special relationship that seems to have existed between Asconius and Livy is probably genuine and points to a common place of origin rather than personal contact. Asconius was hardly old enough to benefit from Livy's tuition, but he does refer to him as "Livius noster" (p.77C.4-5) and Quintilian cites Asconius as an authority on the orthography practiced by Livy. According to Quintilian, Asconius himself adopted the same idiosyncracies which he vouched for in Livy, and these peculiarities can be found on inscriptions from the region around Patavium. This same region, and notably Patavium, furnish the largest number of inscriptions on which the gens Asconia is attested. Further confirmation that Patavium was Asconius' place of birth is found in Silius Italicus (*Punica* XII.212ff). He specifically celebrates the exploits of a young Pedianus of Patavium, and this name inevitably reminds the reader of Asconius. In fact an inscription found at Aphrodisias indicates that the poet and the historian were perhaps somehow related (*CR* 49 [1935] 216-217). The cognomen Pedianus is extremely rare and appears to be distinctively associated with Asconius the historian. The termination suggests that it may have been derived from the maternal branch of Asconius' family, and therefore the reference to this name in the *Punica* merely signalizes a branch of the gens Asconia of which Q. Asconius Pedianus was the most distinguished representative.

The commentaries themselves were written by Asconius at a time when the speeches of Cicero were an important part of the school syllabus. His notes are mainly historical, and he was writing for an adolescent audience, as we can see from the dedication of his work to his sons. The need for a secondary work of this sort can be appreciated in view of the many provincials who were flocking to Rome and to the local grammarians to study rhetoric. Language presented no barrier to this new class of students, but republican history almost certainly did. Asconius provided the necessary companion work to the speeches, and



many of his notes are of a pedagogical nature aimed at drawing the reader's attention to features in the text itself and analyzing the art of Cicero's rhetoric. Asconius seems to have been the first in a long line of commentators on the speeches of Cicero, but he was not the inventor of a new literary genre. His works belong to a well-established literary tradition that goes back to the commentaries on prose authors produced at Alexandria. Our best representative of this class of Hellenistic scholarship is the surviving portions of Didymos' commentary on Demosthenes.

The passages commented on in the sample commentary were selected with a view to the events leading up to the trial of Cornelius, the date of the speech itself, and its length in the published version. Attention is particularly focused on those passages that concern the trial and conviction of C. Manilius. The fragments of the *Pro Cornelio* and Asconius' remarks make it clear that the recent conviction of Manilius affected the case against Cornelius, and Asconius is our best source for the circumstances surrounding the prosecution of Manilius. It can be shown that Cicero's speech *Pro Manilio* was most probably delivered in December 66 B.C. at the contio reported by Plutarch (*Cic.* 9.5) and Dio (36.44.2), and that Asconius wrote a separate commentary on this oration. The latter assumption best accounts for the fact that Asconius discussed Sulpicius' proposal "de libertinorum suffragiis" on two separate occasions. This proposal receives very little attention in the rest of our sources, but it is alluded to by Cicero in the *Pro Cornelio*, and probably found a place in the *Pro Manilio* where Cicero compared the acts of his client with those of Sulpicius, who also introduced legislation affecting freedmen and the command in the Mithridatic War. Furthermore, several new emendations to the text are proposed at p.60C.9ff. The restored text in this crucial passage that summarizes the trials of Manilius is used to demonstrate that Manilius was tried only once in 65 B.C. on the charge of having disrupted his former trial before Cicero's court. The charge against Manilius at his first trial, *repetundae*, is examined to reveal the strategy of the prosecution. Finally the three numerical references in Asconius to the manuscript of the *Pro Cornelio* are used to estimate the length of the published text of the speech, and this estimate is confirmed by the independent testimony of Nepos, a fragment from Cicero's *Hortensius*, and Pliny the Younger.





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